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What are the Least Developed Countries?
Fifty countries are currently designated by the United Nations as “least developed countries” (LDCs): Afghanistan, 
Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde (until December 2007), 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor–Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. The list of LDCs is reviewed every three years by the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in the light of recommendations by the Committee for Development 
Policy (CDP).
The following criteria were used by the CDP in the 2006 review of the list of LDCs:
(a) A “low-income” criterion, based on the gross national income (GNI) per capita (a 3-year average, 
2002–2004), with thresholds of $750 for cases of addition to the list, and $900 for cases of graduation from 
LDC status;
(b) A “human assets” criterion, involving a composite index (the Human Assets Index) based on indicators of 
(i) nutrition (percentage of the population undernourished); (ii) health (child mortality rate); (iii) school 
enrolment (gross secondary school enrolment rate); and (iv) literacy (adult literacy rate); and
(c) An “economic vulnerability” criterion, involving a composite index (the Economic Vulnerability Index) based 
on indicators of (i) natural shocks (index of instability of agricultural production; share of population displaced 
by natural disasters); (ii) trade shocks (index of instability of exports of goods and services); (iii) exposure to 
shocks (share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in GDP; merchandise export concentration index); (iv) 
economic smallness (population in logarithm); and (v) economic remoteness (index of remoteness).
For all three criteria, different thresholds are used for addition to, and graduation from, the list of LDCs. A country 
will qualify to be added to the list if it meets the three criteria and does not have a population greater than 75 
million. A country will normally qualify for graduation from LDC status if it has met graduation thresholds under at 
least two of the three criteria in at least two consecutive reviews of the list. However, if the GNI per capita of an 
LDC has risen to a level at least double the graduation threshold, this country will be deemed eligible for graduation 
regardless of its performance under the other two criteria. After a recommendation to graduate a country has been 
made by the CDP and endorsed by ECOSOC and the General Assembly, the graduating country will be granted 
a three-year grace period before actual graduation takes place. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 
59/209, this standard grace period is expected to enable the relevant country and its development partners to agree 
on a “smooth transition” strategy, so that the loss of LDC-specific concessions at the end of the grace period does 
not disturb the socioeconomic progress of the country.
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The least developed countries covered in this report consist of all the countries in that category in 2007. Cape Verde 
is therefore included even though it has now graduated (see box below). The 50 LDCs covered are subdivided, for the 
purpose of analysis, according to (a) geographical groups and (b) export specialization.
Geographical classification
African LDCs (and Haiti): Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, 
Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia (32).
Asian LDCs: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nepal, Yemen (8).
Island LDCs: Cape Verde, Comoros, Kiribati, Maldives, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu (10).
Some of the island LDCs are geographically in Africa or Asia, but they are grouped together with the Pacific islands due 
to their structural similarities. Similarly, Haiti and Madagascar are grouped together with African LDCs.
Classification according to export specialization
UNCTAD has classified the LDCs into six export specialization categories, namely, agriculture, fuels, manufacture, mining, 
mixed and services. They are classified in these categories according to which export category accounts for at least 45 
per cent of the total exports of merchandise goods and services (see table A). Mineral exports from Burundi and Mali do 
not quite meet the required thresholds but since they account for over 40 per cent of those countries’ total exports and 
play a major role in their economies, they are classified as mineral exporters.
The data used for this analysis are taken from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), 
the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2007. The classification involves some degree of arbitrariness: the LDCs have been 
classified using their average merchandise export and service data for the period 2003–2005, except for Sierra Leone, 
for which only the estimates for the period 2004–2005 were available.
The merchandise exports of individual LDCs have been divided, using SITC Rev. 3 codes, into: agriculture (sections 0, 1, 
2 and 4, excluding divisions 27 and 28), fuels (section 3), minerals (divisions 27, 28 and 68, and groups 667 and 971), 
manufactures (sections 5–8, excluding division 68 and group 667). With the exception of group 971 (non-monetary 
gold), SITC Rev. 3 section 9 (commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC) has been included only 
in the total export of goods and services. It follows that the export shares of table B do not necessarily add up to 100. 
Data for Afghanistan, Chad, Liberia, Somalia, Togo and Tuvalu have been estimated using mirror statistics. The unavailability 
of services data for Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia and Tuvalu limit the exercise to merchandise exports in these countries. 
Merchandise export data for Liberia and Togo exclude re-export of ships, boats and floating structures (SITC Rev. 3 group 
793).
Six LDCs have been classified as oil exporters, 11 as agricultural exporters, 10 as mineral exporters, 6 as manufactures 
exporters, 12 as services exporters, and 5 as mixed exporters (see table B). Madagascar, Senegal and Togo also export 
services, agricultural goods and manufactured goods. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic also exports manufactured 
and agricultural goods. Myanmar has become an exporter of fuels and agricultural goods.
The Least Developed Countries Report 2002 (p. 131) classified 21 LDCs as agricultural exporters on the basis of their export 
structure in the late 1990s. Of these, only 11 are still exporting mostly agricultural products. Two (Chad and Sudan) have 
become oil exporters, three (Burundi, Mali and Mauritania) have become mineral exporters, five have become service 
exporters (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, and the United Republic of Tanzania), one (Togo) is also 
exporting manufactures and services, and one (Bhutan) is re-classified as manufactures exporter.
Graduation of Cape Verde from the group of LDCs
Cape Verde graduated from the group of LDCs on 21 December 2007. In the 2006 review of the list of least developed 
countries, Cape Verde met, for the second time, two of the three indicators required for graduation: it had a GNI 
per capita in 2004 of $1,487 (with the graduation threshold set at $900) and a human assets indicator of 82.1 (with 
the graduation threshold set at more than 64). However, Cape Verde did not meet the third indicator: its economic 
vulnerability indicator stood at 57.9, with the graduation threshold set at less than 38. 
The analysis contained in this report covers Cape Verde as one of the least developed countries as the data in this 
report do not refer beyond the year 2006, when Cape Verde was still part of the group of LDCs.
xiiiOverviewCountry classification used in this Report
Table A. Classification of LDCs according to their export specialization, 2003–2005
Oil
exporters
Agricultural 
exporters
Mineral 
exporters
Manufactures
exporters
Services 
exporters
Mixed
exporters
Angola Afghanistan Burundi Bangladesh Cape Verde Lao People’s Dem. Republic
Chad Benin Central African Republic Bhutan Comoros Madagascar
Equatorial Guinea Burkina Faso Dem. Republic of the Congo Cambodia Djibouti Myanmar
Sudan Guinea Bissau Guinea Haiti Eritrea Senegal
Timor-Leste Kiribati Mali Lesotho Ethiopia Togo
Yemen Liberia Mauritania Nepal Gambia
Malawi Mozambique Maldives
Solomon Islands Niger Rwanda
Somalia Sierra Leone Samoa
Tuvalu Zambia Sao Tome and Principe
Uganda United Republic of Tanzania
Vanuatu
Source: UNCTAD secretariat estimates based on United Nations COMTRADE data; IMF, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position 
Statistics, online, December 2007; and UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2007.
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Table B. Shares in total merchandise goods and services exports for the LDCs, 
by country and main sectors, 2003–2005
(Per cent)
Country Export
specialization
Agriculture Minerals Fuels Manufactures Services
     Afghanistan A 65.0 7.5 10.1 17.4 ..
     Angola O 0.1 2.2 95.8 0.3 1.5
     Bangladesh MF 6.6 0.1 0.3 80.8 12.2
     Benin A 51.1 1.1 0.2 6.5 40.4
     Bhutan MF 12.6 15.8 0.5 47.6 21.6
     Burkina Faso A 74.4 0.8 1.2 8.3 13.9
     Burundi MN 37.8 41.8 0.1 2.4 17.9
     Cambodia MF 3.1 0.4 0.0 73.0 23.5
     Cape Verde S 1.9 0.0 5.0 7.1 86.0
     Central African Republic MN 30.2 58.0 0.2 1.5 8.3
     Chad O 6.9 0.0 86.3 2.5 4.2
     Comoros S 19.7 0.0 0.0 3.7 76.5
     Democratic Republic of the Congo MN 5.7 71.9 10.2 2.3 8.5
     Djibouti S 1.7 1.0 0.2 1.2 94.5
     Equatorial Guinea O 2.3 0.0 90.8 4.1 2.4
     Eritrea S 3.5 0.2 0.0 2.0 94.0
     Ethiopia S 36.2 2.8 0.0 2.6 57.5
     Gambia S 6.8 0.1 0.0 3.7 89.3
     Guinea MN 4.3 71.8 2.0 10.8 10.8
     Guinea-Bissau A 70.2 0.6 7.4 14.2 7.2
     Haiti MF 4.6 0.5 0.0 70.2 24.0
     Kiribati A 77.8 1.1 0.5 16.3 0.0
     Lao People's Democratic Republic MX: A, MF 29.6 5.9 3.6 32.4 27.4
     Lesotho MF 7.4 14.1 0.0 69.3 8.8
     Liberia A 76.2 9.3 6.1 8.3 ..
     Madagascar MX: A, MF, S 29.6 2.6 2.9 29.1 30.9
     Malawi A 78.3 0.3 0.1 13.2 8.1
     Maldives S 15.9 0.1 4.2 5.4 74.3
     Mali MN 32.2 42.7 0.4 5.2 19.1
     Mauritania MN 25.6 56.3 0.0 1.5 10.8
     Mozambique MN 15.6 48.5 11.3 5.6 17.2
     Myanmar MX: A, O 36.7 3.7 31.8 18.8 7.8
     Nepal MF 13.8 2.5 0.0 48.5 35.2
     Niger MN 24.1 44.7 1.2 7.1 22.2
     Rwanda S 28.4 11.7 1.7 4.4 53.0
     Samoa S 9.7 0.1 0.1 36.9 52.9
     Sao Tome and Principe S 20.8 0.0 0.0 1.1 78.1
     Senegal MX: A, MF, S 23.9 2.3 13.4 26.6 33.8
     Sierra Leone MN 6.5 52.8 0.4 8.2 31.3
     Solomon Islands A 70.0 0.3 0.0 1.4 27.6
     Somalia A 89.3 4.0 0.3 6.4 ..
     Sudan O 13.1 2.7 78.8 2.9 1.8
     Timor-Leste O 17.7 1.1 70.0 10.7 0.0
     Togo MX: A, MF, S 25.9 7.9 0.6 37.9 26.5
     Tuvalu MF 11.1 1.7 0.0 87.2 ..
     Uganda A 44.8 6.0 3.8 9.1 36.2
     United Republic of Tanzania S 24.5 26.4 0.1 3.5 45.5
     Vanuatu S 14.1 0.0 0.3 8.3 77.1
     Yemen O 4.5 0.5 84.9 2.8 7.3
     Zambia MN 17.8 51.9 1.1 16.0 13.3
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat estimates based on UN Comtrade; IMF, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics, online, 
December 2007; UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, 2007.
Note: A: agricultural exporter, MF: manufactures exporter, MN: mineral exporter, MX: mixed exporter, O: oil exporter, S: services exporter.
For the SITC codes, Rev. 3 used for the classification, see text.
  The country shares do not add up to 100 as SITC Rev. 3, section 9, except group 971 (non-monetary gold), has not been included.
  Data on services were not available for Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia and Tuvalu.
Overview
The strong growth performance of the least developed countries (LDCs) as a group has been one of the most 
encouraging features of the global economy in the current decade. Economic growth since 2000 has been higher than 
in the 1990s. In 2005 and 2006, there was further growth acceleration and the LDCs together achieved their strongest 
growth performance in 30 years. Their average growth rate in both these years exceeded the 7 per cent target set by 
the LDCs and their development partners as a key goal in the Brussels Programme of Action for the Least Developed 
Countries for the Decade 2001–2010, agreed at the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries 
in 2001. It is estimated that, in 2007, there was only a slight slowdown, to 6.7 per cent. 
Against this background, this Report considers three issues. Firstly, it assesses how sustainable economic growth is in 
the LDCs and examines how many LDCs are participating in the growth surge. Secondly, it considers the extent to which 
economic growth is leading to improvements in human well-being, and in particular to accelerated poverty reduction 
and improved progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. Thirdly, it assesses progress towards country-
owned development strategies in LDCs and the role of recipient-led aid management policies at the country level as 
a practical policy mechanism to strengthen country ownership. These are central aims of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, adopted in March 2005, whose implementation status will be assessed in Accra, Ghana, in September 
2008.
There are major downside risks to the sustainability of rapid growth. This reflects the fact that the type of growth 
which is occurring in most LDCs is strongly affected by trends in international markets and, in particular, commodity 
prices. On top of this, the LDCs depend heavily on external sources of finance, particularly official development 
assistance (ODA), rather than domestically-generated resources. The LDCs are growing rapidly, but without a positive 
process of diversification and structural change. As a result, they are very vulnerable to trade shocks due to the volatility 
of commodity prices, affecting both exports and imports. But the aid inflows which provide their major source of 
external finance are mainly directed towards improving social services and social infrastructure, including governance 
mechanisms, rather than increasing their productive capacities and promoting structural change and diversification. 
The expectation implicit in the prevailing development policy paradigm was that investment in productive sectors 
would be taken care of by the international private sector, through access to international capital markets or inflows of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). But this has proved to be an illusion in the former case, as LDCs remain almost entirely 
marginalized from this source of finance. As for FDI, inflows have concentrated on a few LDCs and have often been 
weakly linked with the rest of the economy. Workers’ remittances are growing and –– while playing a role in directly 
alleviating poverty for those who receive them –– their contribution to development by financing investment remains to 
be proven. They should not be seen as a substitute for long-term capital inflows, and deliberate policies are required to 
enhance their developmental impact. 
The relationship between economic growth and human well-being is a complex issue. Rapid economic growth 
in the LDCs has been associated with a slow rate of poverty reduction and human development, as gauged by their 
progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. In 2005, 36 per cent of the total population of the LDCs lived in 
extreme poverty –– that is to say on less than $1 a day –– and 76 per cent subsisted on less than $2 a day. Although the 
incidence of poverty (i.e. the share of the population living in poverty) is falling slowly, the number of people living on 
less than $1 a day or on less than $2 a day was larger in 2005 than in 2000. 
The LDCs as a group are off track to achieve the goal of reducing the incidence of poverty by half between 1990 
and 2015, and there is no evidence of a significant change in the trend since 2000, after the adoption of the Millennium 
Declaration and more socially-oriented policy reforms. For most human development indicators for which data are 
available for a wide sample of LDCs, less than half the countries are on track to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals, and for some indicators, only one third of the countries or even less are on track. The effects of soaring international 
food prices in 2007 and early 2008 are likely to be more severe in the LDCs than in other developing countries. Rising 
international prices are already being transmitted to national markets, and rising food prices will have negative effects 
on poverty trends in the LDCs, further slowing progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.
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The weak correlation between growth and improvements in human well-being arises because of the type of 
economic growth which is occurring. This can not generally be equated with an inclusive process of development. In 
most LDCs, the majority of the population is employed in agriculture, but agricultural labour productivity is very low 
and growing very slowly. As it is difficult to make a living in agriculture, more and more people are seeking work in other 
sectors of the economy. However, remunerative employment opportunities are not being generated quickly enough 
to meet this growing demand for non-agricultural work. With this accelerating process of “deagrarianization”, poverty 
in LDCs now has two faces. One face is low-productivity, small-scale agriculture; the other is low-productivity, urban, 
informal-sector activities in petty trade and services. 
As discussed in the last three Least Developed Countries Reports — on Knowledge, Technological Learning and 
Innovation for Development (2007), Developing Productive Capacities (2006) and Linking International Trade with Poverty 
Reduction (2004) — the trends which are occurring are related to policy choices, in particular the development model 
which has been pursued in most LDCs. This model has sought to deepen the integration of the LDCs into the world 
economy, increase the efficiency of resource allocation and free markets. Global integration is vital for development and 
poverty reduction in LDCs. However, without the development of productive capacities and associated employment, 
external integration does not lead to inclusive development. Export-led growth without associated expansion of sectors 
serving domestic markets often leads to an exclusive pattern of economic growth. The impact of the soaring international 
food prices illustrates the vulnerability of LDCs following the current approach, and underlines the need for a policy 
change towards more sustained and inclusive development. As UNCTAD said at the High-level Conference on World 
Food Security in June 2008 in Rome, the food crisis is a development crisis.
With the global economic outlook worsening, most LDCs will face major challenges in the period ahead. This will 
require renewed efforts by both the LDCs and their development partners to develop the productive base of LDCs 
and address their structural weaknesses. Otherwise, the marginalization of the LDCs in the global economy is likely to 
deepen. Most of them are highly vulnerable to rising oil and food prices. Their export performance depends heavily on 
volatile commodity prices or on low-skills manufactures in which global competition is intensifying. In addition, as the 
reaction to the recent food price increases shows, with the high levels of poverty in LDCs, external shocks can easily 
lead to social unrest and conflict. To build economic resilience, they need to improve agricultural productivity and 
diversify their economies to create non-agricultural employment opportunities. As argued in earlier Least Developed 
Countries Reports, this requires a new development model focused on building productive capacities and shifting from 
commodity-price-led growth to catch-up growth.
Achieving a more sustainable type of economic growth and better poverty reduction and social outcomes in LDCs 
requires effective national development strategies, effective development aid and development-friendly international 
regimes for trade, investment and technology. The fundamental priority for LDC Governments is to formulate and 
implement national development strategies that promote sustained development and poverty reduction. Their 
development partners need to: (a) scale up aid flows to meet their commitments; (b) align aid flows to the priorities 
expressed in LDCs’ national development strategies; and (c) deliver aid in ways which respect country leadership in 
the formulation and implementation of their national development strategies and help to strengthen their capacity to 
exercise such leadership. 
 Unfortunately, the Report finds that there are still major constraints on the ability of LDC Governments to exercise 
effective leadership in the design and implementation of their national development strategies and policies. This arises 
because of very high levels of dependence on donor finance, weak technical capacities, the continuing bark and bite of 
policy conditionality, the slow progress in aid alignment with country plans and budgets, and donor financing choices. 
Weak country ownership has negative consequences for governance. When politicians and policymakers feel 
inhibited from saying and doing certain things because of a sense of aid dependence, the political qualities of a free-
thinking society atrophy. The Report shows that weak country ownership is also having adverse consequences for 
development effectiveness. This is particularly due to: (a) the weak integration of the macroeconomic framework with 
sectoral and trade policies; (b) the downscaling of ambition in relation to increased aid inflows; and (c) the low financing 
of productive sector development. 
Increasing country ownership should be a major priority for both LDC Governments and their development partners 
in order to improve development effectiveness. This will involve action on a range of fronts, which include in particular 
further consideration of the issues of policy conditionality and aid predictability, and the building of local research and 
policy analysis capacity which can support the generation of policy alternatives and in particular home-grown solutions. 
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However, one of the principal recommendations of the Report is that a first step towards improving country ownership 
could be to adopt recipient-led aid management policies within LDCs. The Paris Declaration encourages countries to 
do this. Moreover, some LDCs are global pioneers in the introduction of country-level aid management policies. The 
report urges other LDCs to follow their lead. 
How sustainable is LDCs’ growth?
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE
The record rates of economic growth achieved by the LDCs as a group in 2005 and 2006 were underpinned by a 
record of level of exports –– which was particularly associated with high commodity prices for oil and minerals –– and 
record levels of capital inflows, particularly aid. 
The export performance of the LDCs as a group was particularly remarkable. In nominal terms, the value of 
merchandise exports from LDCs rose by some 80 per cent from 2004 to 2006, reaching $99 billion in 2006. This 
aggregate picture is being driven to a large degree by the enhanced export performance of oil-exporting LDCs (Angola, 
Chad, Equatorial Guinea, , Sudan, Timor-Leste and Yemen), as well as by mineral exporters (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique and Zambia). Seventy-six per cent of the total increase in LDCs’ 
merchandise exports from 2004 to 2006 can be attributed to these countries. The increase is largely explained by rising 
international commodity prices.
For the LDCs as a group, dependence on commodities has increased since 2000, along with the growth acceleration. 
Primary commodities increased from 59 per cent of total merchandise exports in 2000–2002 to 77 per cent in 
2005–2006. Within this overall pattern, however, there was considerable divergence between African, Asian and island 
LDCs. The Asian LDCs continued to diversify their economies away from commodities towards manufacturing, while 
African LDCs increased dependence on primary commodities. Island LDCs remained primarily dependent on service 
exports, which also exhibit high levels of volatility.
The widening regional divergence between African and Asian LDCs in terms of the form of their integration into the 
global economy is evident in their different export structures. In the period 2005–2006, over 92 per cent of all exports 
from African LDCs consisted of primary commodities, including fuels, while in Asian LDCs, this figure was less than half 
(44 per cent). This type of specialization rendered Asian LDCs much less vulnerable to external fluctuations. Some of 
them also achieved high rates of export growth based on manufactures. However, the share of medium- and high-tech 
manufactures exports originating from LDCs remained very small (8.4 per cent). The slowness of the process of export 
upgrading, even in Asian LDCs, remains an issue of concern.
The ability to compete in global markets and increase manufactures exports has helped Asian LDCs promote a 
limited degree of structural transformation in which manufacturing is increasing as a share of gross domestic product 
(GDP). However, for the LDCs as a group, the recent growth surge is not generally associated with a structural transition 
in which the share of manufacturing in total output is growing. In fact, compared to ten years ago, half of the LDCs have 
experienced deindustrialization as measured by a declining share of manufacturing in GDP.
Whilst exports have boomed in LDCs, imports have also surged. In 2006, 42 LDCs had trade deficits and, in 37 of 
them, this deficit was higher in 2006 than it was in 2003–2004. The merchandise trade deficit of oil-importing LDCs 
has increased from $25 billion in 2005 to $31 billion in 2006. By contrast, the merchandise trade surplus of the oil-
exporting LDCs rose from $11 billion in 2004 to $29 billion in 2006. Together, oil and food constituted 30 per cent of 
LDCs’ merchandise imports in 2006.
Most LDCs are highly dependent on food imports. In 2005–2006, the food import bill of the LDCs as a group 
reached $14.6 billion, which was equivalent to 4.4 per cent of their GDP. This is $6.1 billion higher than in 2000–2002, 
an increase equivalent to some 2 per cent of their GDP in 2005–2006. It is against this background that soaring food 
prices in 2007 and early 2008 are having such a negative impact on LDCs. 
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CONTINUING HIGH DEPENDENCE ON EXTERNAL FINANCE
Despite the record rates of economic growth, LDCs remain highly dependent on external finance. The level of 
domestic savings continues to be low in many LDCs, including good performers, which have achieved rapid economic 
growth. In 2006, only one third of the LDCs had gross domestic savings rates above 15 per cent of GDP. Fifteen LDCs 
had negative domestic savings rates, meaning that they were relying on foreign savings not only to finance domestic 
investment but also their domestic consumption.
ODA inflows are particularly important. In this regard, it is encouraging to note that net aid disbursements reached 
the record level of $28 billion in 2006. Sixteen LDCs also received significant debt relief in 2006, with $27 billion ODA 
principal being forgiven for 16 of them through the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. However, only eight Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee members (Luxembourg, 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium and United Kingdom) met the Brussels Programme of 
Action target of making net ODA disbursements equal to or higher than 0.15 per cent of their gross national income 
(GNI), whilst six of these countries (the above countries minus Belgium and the United Kingdom) met the higher target 
of 0.20 per cent of GNI.
Multilateral and bilateral aid commitments are increasingly concentrated on social infrastructure and services. ODA 
commitments to social infrastructure and services constituted 42 per cent of total ODA commitments to LDCs in 
2006, up from an average of 34 per cent during the period 2000–2004 and 31 per cent in the second half of the 
1990s. In 2006, the share of aid going to education, health, population programmes, water supply and sanitation, 
Government and civil society all were higher than during the period 2000–2004. This reflects the impact of the focus on 
the Millennium Development Goals as well as the concern to improve governance. In contrast, aid to build productive 
sectors and economic infrastructure has continued to receive less priority. The share of aid committed to economic 
infrastructure and production sectors (including multisector) constituted just 25 per cent of total ODA commitments to 
LDCs in 2006. This was similar to the level during the period 2000–2004. 
Despite all the rhetoric of a renewed interest in economic infrastructure, the share of aid committed to transport, 
storage and energy was less in 2006 than it was in 2000–2004, and the portion committed to agriculture (including 
forestry and fishing) and industry (including mining and construction) also declined over that period. The share of 
aid committed to economic infrastructure and production sectors was also much lower than in 1995–1999, when 
it had been 38 per cent. Aid commitments to improve economic infrastructure decreased from 18 per cent of total 
commitments to LDCs in 1995–1999 to 12 per cent in 2006. Commitments to transport and storage infrastructure 
decreased from 11 per cent of total commitments to LDCs in 1995–1999 to 6 per cent in 2006, and disbursements to 
energy-related sectors shrunk from 5 per cent to 2 per cent in 2006.
 These trends perhaps reflect the assumption that the international private sector can take over from official finance 
in these sectors. In practice, however, this assumption has proved flawed. LDCs remain marginalized from international 
capital markets. There has been a trend towards increased FDI inflows, which reached a level of $9 billion in 2006 after 
faltering in the previous years. Moreover, manufactures-exporting LDCs are now also attracting more FDI. Nevertheless, 
most FDI still remains concentrated on natural resource extraction, particularly of oil and minerals, and profit remittances 
on FDI are rising rapidly.
Migrant remittances reached the record level of $13 billion in 2006 and are particularly important for a few Asian 
countries. However, channelling these resources to finance long-term development rather than just short-term poverty 
alleviation remains a challenge to policymakers.
To sum up, the record rates of economic growth are welcome, but LDCs remain locked into a pattern of economic 
growth which makes them highly vulnerable to external shocks and in particular international commodity price volatility. 
Given the high levels of poverty, there is little surplus to deal with shocks, and domestic savings are very low. The 
development of productive capacities and diversification thus depends heavily on external finance. ODA is particularly 
important because LDCs have very limited access to international capital markets and FDI is mainly resource-seeking 
and focused on a few countries. However, ODA is mainly directed towards social sector development rather than 
building economic infrastructure and productive capacities. The allocation of ODA to health, education and other 
social purposes is of course important, and in itself makes a partial contribution to building productive capacities, but 
the key to strengthening the resilience of LDC economies is to build the capabilities of domestic producers and to 
diversify and strengthen linkages. 
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Trends in poverty and progress towards 
the Millennium Development Goals
Trends in terms of poverty reduction and progress towards the Millennium Development Goals have not been as 
apparently positive as the economic growth trends. Indeed, improvements in human well-being on these dimensions 
have been quite slow. 
TRENDS IN POVERTY
The incidence of extreme poverty (measured as the proportion of the people living on less than $1 a day) has 
decreased from a peak of 44 per cent in 1994 to 36 per cent in 2005. But the absolute number of extremely poor 
people continued to rise in the LDCs until 2003, when the upward trend leveled off. Poverty reduction has been much 
faster in Asian LDCs than in African LDCs, where the absolute number of extremely poor people continues to rise. In 
2005, we estimate that 277 million people lived on less than $1 a day in all LDCs, including 206 million in African 
LDCs, 71 million in Asian LDCs and 1 million in island LDCs. Classifying LDCs according to their export specialization, 
poverty incidence is highest in commodity exporters, i.e. those for which petroleum, mineral and agricultural products 
account for the majority of their exports. 
Although the incidence of extreme poverty is declining, the proportion of the population living on more than $1 a 
day but less than $2 a day has remained constant, at approximately 40 per cent of the population. The population living 
on less than $2 a day has been declining only very slowly. In 2005, 581 million people lived under these conditions in 
the LDCs. This corresponds to three quarters of the population, which shows that poverty continues to be pervasive in 
these countries. 
GROWTH AND POVERTY IN THE LDCS
The relationship between economic growth and human well-being is a controversial subject with many different 
viewpoints. This Report finds that the recent period of rapid economic growth in the LDCs has been associated with 
a slow rate of poverty reduction and progress towards the Millennium Development Goals because of the type of 
economic growth that is occurring and the development model in place in the LDCs. 
Since 2000, economic growth has accelerated sharply in the LDCs, but this has been accompanied by only a 
marginal increase in the pace of poverty reduction, contrary to expectations. Thus, the relationship between economic 
growth and poverty reduction has weakened in the LDCs since then. This is explained by five main reasons:
(a) Private consumption has been growing at a lower rate than total GDP. Private consumption provides the link 
between macroeconomic growth and well-being at the household level. Standards of living can only improve if 
private consumption is rising. Conventionally, private consumption growing by less than GDP frees more resources 
to finance investment and the provision of public services. However, in a context of widespread poverty, there 
may be a conflict between the objectives of domestic resource mobilization and poverty reduction, which can 
only be lessened through foreign savings;
(b) The population of the LDCs has been growing faster than in any other large groups of countries. Reducing 
poverty under these circumstances requires that the economy create productive jobs and livelihoods at a very fast 
pace in order to absorb the rapidly growing working-age population. Economic growth in most LDCs, however, 
has not led to a hefty expansion of employment, and the jobs that are being created are mostly low-productivity 
and low-paying jobs. This reduces their contribution to poverty reduction;
(c) Economic growth in LDCs has mostly been led by the expansion of exports. This type of growth dynamic is 
often concentrated within an externally oriented enclave, such as capital-intensive natural resource extraction sites 
or export-processing zones, with few linkages with the rest of the economy.  Such a pattern of growth generally 
benefits limited segments of the population (those somehow linked to export activities), while leaving the majority 
excluded. This is particularly the case for those earning their livelihoods from agriculture. They are almost 70 per 
cent of the population and their earnings depend on agricultural productivity. This has traditionally been low in 
most LDCs and — more worryingly — it has been growing only very slowly since the early 1990s. This situation 
tends to perpetuate pervasive poverty in the LDCs;
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(d) A more recent development has compounded the difficulties in combating poverty in these countries, namely 
deagrarianization. This refers to a process in which more and more people from rural areas seek work outside 
agriculture. It could be positive if people were pushed out of agriculture by rising productivity and pulled into 
other sectors by the new employment opportunities being created outside agriculture. There are signs of such a 
structural transformation in a few Asian LDCs, which have combined rising food productivity based on a “Green 
Revolution” with steady industrialization founded on expansion of manufacturing exports. However, for most 
LDCs, deagrarianization is a negative process in which people are pushed out because they cannot make a living 
in agriculture. Even worse, they cannot find remunerative work elsewhere. As a result, there are now two faces of 
poverty in LDCs: poverty associated with long-standing agricultural neglect; and urban poverty, most dramatically 
evident in growing numbers of unemployed youth; and
(e) Income inequality is hindering poverty reduction in many LDCs. Worsening income distribution —  i.e. increasing 
inequality — can slow the shrinking of poverty, even in countries experiencing strong economic growth. This has 
been the case in recent years in a majority of LDCs for which data are available.
PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
 Very low material living standards are associated with very low levels of well-being in terms of a broad range of 
social indicators. As with the analysis of poverty trends, lack of data availability seriously hampers analysis of progress 
towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals that deal with human development. However, for the 
few indicators for which it is possible to get information for a wide range of countries, a clear pattern is emerging. This 
pattern has four basic features:
(a) Some LDCs are making significant progress towards achieving some specific Millennium Development Goals, but 
there are very few LDCs that are making progress on a broad front encompassing more than three targets;
(b) More progress is being made on targets which depend primarily on the level of public service provision, and 
Governments and donors are committed to increasing public expenditure and implementing well-targeted 
programmes. In this regard, progress towards universal primary school enrolment shows what can be done in 
quantitative terms;
(c) There is a distinct hierarchy of achievement which reflects two factors: the priorities of Governments and donors 
who are funding the scale-up, and the magnitude and time-scale of investments required to meet the targets. The 
conjunction of these two factors largely explains why achievements in increasing primary education enrolment 
outstrip progress in improving access to water, which in turn outstrips achievements in improving sanitation; 
and
(d) Progress towards targets that depend more on household incomes rather than mainly on public service provision 
has been slowest. In this regard, progress has been slow in reducing the incidence of extreme poverty and hunger. 
It has also proved difficult to maintain progress in reducing child mortality, where trends reflect the effects of both 
private incomes and public services. 
The overall implication of these trends is that broad-based success in achieving progress towards the Millennium 
Development Goals is as yet elusive in the LDCs. It is likely to remain so unless the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals is placed in an economic development framework and efforts focus on generating productive jobs 
and livelihoods, rather than just increasing the provision of public services directly linked to the Millennium Development 
Goals. An outcome in which the education targets were achieved but school leavers were left without the employment 
opportunities to exercise their skills and meet the new expectations would be tragic and dangerous. 
The impact of the global food crisis on LDCs
Rapidly rising international food prices in 2007 and early 2008 will have negative effects on poverty trends in LDCs 
and slow progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The negative effects will arise for 
the following reasons:
(a) Rising food prices are restricting the ability of households to meet essential subsistence needs, given that their 
budget constraints were very tight even before the soaring prices; 
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(b) The large increases in food prices threaten economic growth through rising import bills in countries that already 
face rising trade and current account deficits;
(c) Rising food prices will have second-round effects on economic growth but farmers may not be able to adequately 
take advantage of rising prices because of their limited access to land, weak productive capabilities and a production 
and marketing cost squeeze associated with rising input and transport costs; and
(d) Dynamic growth forces can be stalled, given that these prices will compress profits in formal businesses — as 
subsistence wages adjust to higher food prices — and the available resources of the self-employed, whose 
accumulation activity, to the extent that it occurs, is directly related to their food consumption costs.
The overall effects are likely to be particularly severe in the LDCs, because most of them are net food importers 
and they already have large trade deficits. Levels of poverty and food insecurity in LDCs are already high, and many 
people spend as much as 50–80 per cent of their household income on food. Moreover, for 20 LDCs, the price 
rises will exacerbate already-existing food emergencies, which require external assistance, owing to such factors as 
natural disasters, concentrations of internally displaced persons and localized crop failures. Food price riots had already 
occurred in eight LDCs by June 2008.
THE NEED FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY
The trends in economic growth, poverty, human development and food security that are taking place in LDCs and 
that are analysed in the preceding section are related to policy choices and to the development model which has been 
pursued in most LDCs. The current pattern of economic growth is neither robust nor inclusive enough. A basic message 
of this Report, therefore, is that it is time for a paradigm shift in development policy. 
For some observers, the policy shift now required is a return to agricultural development. Indeed, as shown in The
Least Developed Countries Report 2007, there has been a serious neglect of agricultural research and development, 
which is so important for increasing agricultural production and improving the living standards of small-scale producers. 
However, whilst improving agricultural productivity is vital, it is also important to improve productive employment 
activities outside agriculture, particularly in view of the process of deagrarianization which is occurring. What is therefore 
required is not a shift in sectoral focus, but rather a deeper change in approach which puts production, productive 
capacities and productive employment opportunities at the heart of policies to promote development and poverty 
reduction.
The nature of this paradigm shift is discussed in some detail in The Least Developed Countries Report 2006, and its 
policy implications in relation to knowledge, technological learning and innovation are set out in The Least Developed 
Countries Report 2007. In brief, what we have been advocating has three elements:
?? ??????? ??????? ?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????? ??????? ????? ??????? ????????????????
international trade per se. International trade is essential for productive development and productive development 
is essential for international trade. But policy should start at the development end, rather than the trade end, of 
the relationship between trade and development;
?? ??????????????????????????????? ????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reduction. This does not mean that social sector spending and human development goals are unimportant. Improved 
health and education standards are essential in the LDCs. However, there is a need for a better balance between 
the roles of private incomes (based on employment) and public services (through which health and education are 
primarily provided) in poverty reduction; and
?? ?????? ??? ?? ????? ???? ?? ??????? ???????? ???????? ??????? ???????????? ??? ?????????? ???????????? ???? ?????????
poverty. The persistence of pervasive poverty and the food price bubble indicates massive market failure. Whilst 
Governments are not omnipotent, there is need for creative solutions based on public action which mobilizes key 
stakeholders, including in particular the private sector, to resolve development problems and create development 
opportunities.
Making such a change towards a more sustainable and inclusive development model depends on the decisions and 
political will of LDC Governments. However, they are also engaged in a development partnership for poverty reduction 
with donors. The terms of this development partnership affect both the nature of the current strategic approach and 
policies, and also the potential to change them. 
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Changes in the terms of development partnership
IMPORTANCE OF COUNTRY OWNERSHIP
Since 2000, development cooperation has been based on a partnership approach. The roots of the approach can 
be traced to the OECD report, Shaping the Twenty-first Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation (1996). 
That report not only argued that aid should be focused on achieving a limited set of international poverty reduction 
and human development targets (a list that later formed the basis for the Millennium Development Goals), but also 
stated that the key to making a difference in achieving those targets was the establishment of development partnerships 
between donor and recipient Governments. The basic principle, according to the OECD report, was that “locally-
owned country development strategies should emerge from an open and collaborative dialogue by local authorities 
with civil society and with external partners, about shared objectives and their respective contributions to the common 
enterprise. Each donor’s contributions should then operate within the framework of that locally-owned strategy in ways 
that respect and encourage strong local commitment, participation, capacity development and ownership”.
The idea of country ownership of national development strategies is at the heart of the partnership approach to 
development cooperation. Its importance was affirmed by the then President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, 
who made “ownership” one of the four key principles of the Comprehensive Development Framework, and in 1999 
said that: “Countries must be in the driver’s seat and set the course. They must determine the goals, and the phasing, the 
timing and sequencing of programs”. Country ownership is also one of the key operational elements in the preparation 
of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). It was also part of the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development 
agreed in 2002, which states that “effective partnerships among donors and recipients are based on the recognition 
of national leadership and ownership of development plans”. It was reaffirmed at the G8 summit at Gleneagles in 
2005, where, as well as bold commitments to cancel debt and scale up aid, it was agreed that: “It is up to developing 
countries themselves and their governments to take the lead on development. They need to decide, plan and sequence 
their economic policies to fit with their own development strategies, for which they should be accountable to all their 
people” (Gleneagles Communiqué, “Africa”, para. 31). Moreover, enhanced country ownership is one of the main 
components of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the implementation of which will be assessed in Accra, 
Ghana, in September 2008.
Within the LDCs, PRSPs are the main operational instrument of the partnership approach to development and 
the key locus where country ownership is being forged. This Report assesses progress towards country ownership in 
the formulation and implementation of recent PRSPs in LDCs using evidence from case studies to be found in the 
literature. It focuses in particular on progress towards the exercise of leadership in the design and implementation of 
their development strategies and in coordinating development actions. This is one of the key commitments of the Paris 
Declaration but it is not the aspect of ownership that is currently being monitored. 
Defined in these terms, the notion of country ownership is very difficult to monitor. However, the case studies enable 
the identification of some ways in which the nature of the aid relationship is working to strengthen or weaken country 
ownership. They also enable the identification of some of the adverse consequences of weak country ownership.
PROGRESS TOWARDS COUNTRY OWNERSHIP
The Report finds that in the context of the PRSP approach, significant steps have been taken to enhance country 
ownership. Donors and international financial institutions are making major efforts to stand back and give country 
authorities greater space for formulating and implementing their development strategies and policies. However, it also 
finds that various processes continue to weaken country ownership in LDCs and this is having adverse consequences for 
development effectiveness and aid effectiveness. These processes cannot be attributed to the practices of donors per se
or recipients per se, but rather depend on the nature of aid relationships. Ensuring that high levels of aid dependence 
do not result in donor domination is a complex challenge for both aid donors and aid recipients. 
The processes weakening country ownership come into play at the level of policy formulation or at the level of 
policy implementation. The latter may arise because donors deliver part of their aid in ways which are off-plan, off-
budget or simply unknown, or because, even when aid is integrated with government priorities, processes and systems, 
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the way in which PRSPs are implemented is strongly influenced by policy conditionality, monitoring benchmarks or 
donor financing choices. 
The Report shows that although progress is being made in the context of the drive to improve aid effectiveness, 
there is a continuing problem of poor alignment and harmonization of aid with Government plans, budgets and 
processes. Some LDCs are caught in what the OECD has called a “low ownership trap”, where there is low capacity 
in Government and donors fear aid will be mismanaged and so set up parallel systems, which in turn undermine 
government capacity. There are also continuing problems of predictability that disrupt planning and budgeting, and 
Governments have incomplete information on how much aid money is entering the country and what it is used for. 
These widely recognized problematic features of aid delivery continue to undermine ownership in LDCs. Progress in 
this regard will be a key consideration at the meeting to assess the status of implementation of the Paris Declaration in 
Accra, Ghana, in September 2008.
 The ability of countries to exercise effective leadership in the process of policy formulation is undermined by weak 
technical capacities. As a result, countries sometimes have to rely heavily on donor support in the design of national 
strategies. Freedom of action in policy design can also be constrained by the need to mobilize aid inflows and the 
sense, justifiable or not, that signs of lack of commitment to the types of policies that donors and international financial 
institutions believe are the best ones can work against aid mobilization. Second-generation PRSPs are now very broad 
documents that include an amalgam of elements, including: (a) a core policy agenda which is strongly owned by the 
national Government; (b) a policy agenda that is directly or indirectly negotiated with donors and around which there is 
broad consensus and agreement; and (c) a policy agenda that is more closely aligned with donor preferences and that 
enjoys very little or very narrow country ownership. There is thus an ownership frontier within the PRSPs. It is possible, 
therefore, for aid to be aligned and harmonized with the document but for this to be done in a way that is more focused 
on donor priorities within the national plan. 
A consequence of this is that the processes of policy implementation are now a very important mechanism through 
which country ownership can be strengthened or weakened. The Report shows that there have been major shifts in the 
practice of policy conditionality. There is an increasing tendency for policy conditionalities to be drawn from Government 
documents and there has also been a shift towards administrative benchmarks rather than legally binding conditionality. 
However, macroeconomic stabilization, privatization and liberalization are still important types of conditionality. Policy 
conditionality has not been conducive to policy pluralism. 
Given the broad policy agenda contained in PRSPs, donor financing choices are also an important determinant of 
how PRSPs work out in practice. This is the case even when donors give budget support, as this support usually involves 
performance assessment frameworks that are negotiated to set priorities. Donors are particularly oriented towards 
financing social sectors and social infrastructure. 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WEAKENING OF COUNTRY OWNERSHIP
The second-generation poverty reduction strategies in LDCs are quite different from the early PRSPs. They seek 
to place poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals within a broad economic 
development framework. In many LDCs these strategies have the potential to become effective development strategies. 
However, realizing this potential depends on meeting a broad range of development governance challenges, rather 
than merely focusing on poverty-oriented public expenditure and budgeting, which have been the key concerns in 
the first-generation poverty reduction strategies up to now. The weakening of country ownership is having adverse 
consequences for addressing these challenges and also development effectiveness. 
There are three major adverse outcomes that are related to weak country ownership. 
Firstly, the macroeconomic framework of poverty reduction strategies is weakly integrated with sectoral policies and 
trade policies. This lack of integration is problematic because the parameters of macroeconomic responses, such as the 
impact of public spending, depend on sector-level issues (costs and consequences). It also means that there has been 
a failure to properly integrate trade into poverty reduction strategies as the macroeconomic forecasts of exports and 
imports are divorced from the actual trade policies within the strategies.
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Secondly, there is a downscaling of ambition in relation to increased aid inflows. It is clear that most LDC Governments 
want increased aid inflows, but there is a fundamental mismatch between this desire and the way in which PRSPs are 
written. This arises because the macroeconomic framework is usually based on modest projections of future aid inflows. 
In fact, with these forecasts the PRSPs are downscaled to be realistic in terms of past aid inflows rather than upscaled 
to explore how increased aid inflows can be effectively used to promote economic growth, poverty reduction and the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. This results in minimalist poverty reduction strategies rather than 
poverty reduction strategies that explore the effects of the scaling-up of aid. 
Thirdly, there is a low level of financing of productive sectors. One of the hallmarks of the second-generation 
PRSPs is that they are no longer narrowly focused on increased social expenditure but also include the development of 
productive sectors. However, as noted above, there has been no change in the relative share of aid disbursements going 
to productive sectors over the last few years. This mismatch between the change in the policy content of PRSPs and 
the lack of change in the composition of aid is a primary indicator of weak country ownership in the implementation 
of poverty reduction strategies. The low financing of productive sector development means that although PRSPs aspire 
to place poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs within a broad economic development framework, in 
practice they do not succeed. Moreover, the combination of policy conditionality geared to stabilization, liberalization 
and privatization, with donor financing oriented towards social sectors, ends up giving a specific strategic thrust to 
PRSPs. The evidence discussed earlier in this overview shows that this development model is unlikely to result in either 
sustained or inclusive development. 
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Increasing country ownership should be a major priority for improving development effectiveness in LDCs. This 
involves action on a range of fronts. One of the principal recommendations of the Report is that a first step towards 
improving country ownership could be to adopt aid management policies within LDCs. The Paris Declaration encourages 
countries to do this. Moreover, some LDCs, such as Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of 
Tanzania, are pioneers in this innovative practice.
Initial experience indicates that country-level aid management policies can provide a powerful bottom–up approach 
to better aid management. The improvements observed include: better data on aid inflows; increased levels of trust; 
increasing assertiveness on the part of the Government in expressing its preferences; greater rationalization and 
harmonization of processes and procedures among donors; increased predictability of aid, with donors making multi-
year aid commitments; reduced transaction costs as donors support a joint assistance strategy; and increased mutual 
accountability, as performance indicators relate not only to government actions but also to donor actions in relation 
to aid disbursements. The introduction of jointly agreed monitoring indicators at the country level in relation to donor 
practices seems to be a particularly powerful way to reduce transaction costs and promote alignment and harmonization. 
However, it is important that country-level efforts to improve aid management do not crowd out thinking and action on 
the design of effective development strategies.
The purpose of a country-level aid management policy is to ensure that development assistance is of such a type, 
and is so deployed, as to maximize its contribution to the priorities set out in its development strategy. Together, a 
country-level aid management policy and country-owned development strategy can work as important instruments 
through which the terms of development partnership can be made more effective. The aid management policy can 
help to build trust and develop more balanced partnership, but in itself it will not be sufficient. 
In the end, enhanced country ownership will depend on systemic measures as well as country-level action. Given 
the new focus of the second-generation PRSPs, it is necessary to rebuild State capacities for promoting growth and 
development. Renewed attention needs to be given to the nature of policy conditionality and the problem of aid 
predictability and volatility. It is also necessary to assess whether there are systemic biases against using aid in a catalytic 
way to develop productive sectors. Action to build local policy analysis capacity in LDCs and to generate alternative 
perspectives, especially from developing countries and LDCs, in the production of knowledge about development will 
also be important. 
Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi
Secretary-General of UNCTAD
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1
How Sustainable is 
LDCs’ Growth?
A.  Introduction
In 2005 and 2006, the least developed countries (LDCs) as a group achieved 
their highest rates of gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 30 years. This 
chapter examines the factors behind this growth performance and assesses its 
sustainability. 
The chapter shows that the LDCs are highly integrated into the global economy 
through international flows of goods, services, capital and people (i.e. migrant 
workers and their remittances). Strong economic growth has been driven by record 
levels of exports, particularly associated with high commodity prices for minerals 
and oils, and record levels of capital inflows, especially aid. However, despite their 
high GDP growth, LDCs are still characterized by low levels of domestic resource 
mobilization and investment, very weak development of manufacturing industries, 
high levels of commodity dependence, weak export upgrading, worsening trade 
balances, and rising food and energy import bills. These conditions imply that 
LDCs are very vulnerable to growth slow-downs, or even growth collapses, arising 
from external sources. Despite their high level of integration, the LDCs remain 
marginalized in terms of their share of global output and global trade. 
The easing of the debt burden in a number of LDCs through the Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2006 opened a window of opportunity for 16 LDCs 
that were eligible. However, aid disbursements are still below donor commitments. 
Moreover, aid is focused on social sectors and social infrastructure, notably 
education, health and good governance, rather than on increasing investment in 
economic infrastructure and the development of productive sectors. Increased 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are now associated with rapidly increasing 
profit remittances. With the global economy slowing and the downside risks of the 
global outlook worsening, LDCs will face major challenges in the period ahead. 
This will require renewed efforts by both the LDCs and their development partners 
to develop their productive base and address structural weaknesses. Otherwise, 
the marginalization of the LDCs in the global economy is likely to deepen.
This chapter is organized into five substantive sections, each of which 
identifies: (a) the overall pattern for the LDCs as a group; (b) regional differences 
between African, Asian and island LDCs; and (c) variations amongst individual 
LDCs. Section B describes trends in economic growth and sectoral growth rates, 
whilst section C focuses on trends in domestic savings and investment. Section D 
highlights trends in international trade, including commodity prices, the extent of 
export upgrading and the level of participation of the LDCs in world trade. Section 
E focuses on trends in external finance — including trends in official development 
assistance (ODA) and FDI inflows — whilst section F discusses trends in external 
debt, including the impact of the MDRI. The conclusion summarizes the major 
findings and policy implications. 
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B.  Trends in economic growth 
1. OVERALL GDP AND GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATES
 In 2005, the real GDP of the LDCs as a group grew by 7.9 per cent, which was 
the strongest growth performance since 1972. There was a slight slowdown of the 
growth rate in 2006 to 7.5 per cent.1 But this was still the second highest growth 
rate in more than three decades. The average annual growth rate in 2005–2006 
was almost 2 percentage points higher than the 5.9 per cent per annum achieved 
during 2000–2004, and almost double the average annual rate of 4 per cent 
achieved during the 1990s (table 1). The growth rate of the LDCs as a group 
achieved in 2005 and 2006 surpassed the goal of the Brussels Programme of 
Action for LDCs — namely a GDP growth rate of 7 per cent (United Nations, 
2001).2 But estimates suggest that the growth rate of the LDCs slowed down 
further to 6.7 per cent in 2007. This was mainly due to slower growth projected 
for oil-importing LDCs. 
The high growth rates of the LDCs in 2005 and 2006 coincided with robust 
growth in the global economy. Other developing countries also experienced 
very high growth rates during these years. It is notable that the LDC growth rate 
exceeded the average for other developing countries in both 2005 and 2006, 
and that this situation also prevailed during 2000–2004. However, population 
growth rates are high in the LDCs — 2.5 per cent per annum — almost double the 
average rate in other developing countries. Thus, even though the GDP growth 
rate in LDCs as a group exceeded the average in other developing countries, the 
GDP per capita growth rate of the former has continued to lag behind that of the 
latter in all years except 2005. This implies that, despite the record GDP growth 
performance, the LDCs as a group continue to diverge from the other developing 
countries in terms of income per capita. 
Table 1. Real GDP and real GDP per capita growth rates of LDCs, 
by country groups, other developing countries and OECD high-income countries, 1990–2007
(Annual weighted averages, per cent)
Real GDP Real GDP per capita
1990– 
2000
2000– 
2004
2005 2006 2007 
proj.a
1990– 
2000
2000– 
2004
2005 2006 2007 
proj.a
LDCs 4.0 5.9 7.9 7.5 6.7 1.3 3.4 5.3 5.0 4.3
African LDCs (and Haiti) 3.4 5.6 7.9 8.2 8.9 0.6 2.7 5.0 5.3 6.2
African LDCs less African oil exporters 2.5 4.4 6.1 6.5 6.2 -0.2 1.6 3.3 3.7 3.4
Asian LDCs 5.1 6.5 7.9 6.4 6.0 2.6 4.4 5.8 4.3 4.1
of which: Bangladesh 4.9 5.4 6.7 6.5 6.2 2.8 3.4 4.8 4.7 4.5
Island LDCs 4.3 3.6 2.4 7.5 6.9 2.3 0.5 -0.6 4.6 4.3
Other developing countries 5.0 4.9 6.5 6.9 6.4 3.4 3.5 5.2 5.6 5.2
OECD high-income countries 2.6 1.8 2.4 3.0 2.3 1.8 1.2 1.8 2.5 1.8
Memo items:
Oil-exporting LDCs 5.1 7.4 10.5 10.6 12.4 2.1 4.6 7.6 7.8 9.7
Oil-importing LDCs 3.7 5.4 7.0 6.5 6.1 1.1 2.9 4.5 4.0 3.7
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from United Nations/DESA Statistics Division; United Nations Population Unit; and UNCTAD 
estimates.
Note:  Data are available for all 50 LDCs, including Cape Verde. Data for Timor-Leste have been estimated backward and is available from 
1990.
a Growth rates for the year 2007 are taken from the Link Project Global Economic Outlook, Regional Data, online, January 2008; United 
Nations ESCAP data, direct communication; and OECD, African Economic Outlook 2007.
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2. DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AMONGST LDCS
African LDCs did particularly well in both 2005 and 2006, after Asian LDCs had 
outperformed African LDCs during the period 2000–2004. The real GDP growth 
rates in African and Asian LDCs were the same in 2005 (7.9 per cent), while in 
2006 the real GDP growth rate in African LDCs exceeded that in Asian LDCs by 
1.7 percentage points. African oil exporters pulled up the regional average. But 
an important feature of economic trends in 2005 and 2006 was the continued 
improvement in the growth performance of oil-importing African LDCs. Their 
average annual real GDP growth rate was only 2.5 per cent in the 1990s, but 
was 4.4 per cent in 2000–2004, and is estimated to have exceeded 6 per cent 
in 2005, 2006 and 2007. The GDP growth rates of the island LDCs appear to 
be highly volatile, as low as 2.4 per cent in 2005 and as high as 7.5 per cent in 
2006. The big increase is mainly due to the exceptional growth performance of 
the Maldives in 2006. 
A closer look at growth performance on a country-by-country basis shows that 
there are large variations amongst the LDCs. In 2006, the real GDP grew by 6 
per cent or more in 19 LDCs; between 3 and 6 per cent in 20 LDCs; by less than 
3 per cent in 9 LDCs; and it declined in two LDCs (table 2). It is notable that all 
the Asian LDCs were in the very high growth group (i.e. the first group), with the 
exception of Nepal — which experienced a major armed conflict over the period 
2002–2005 and continuing political instability in 2006 — and Yemen. Apart from 
Afghanistan, which received large aid inflows, the very high-growth Asian countries 
either specialized in manufactures exports or such exports constituted a significant 
component in a mixed export basket. Twelve of the 34 African LDCs were in the 
very high growth group, and eight of them were oil or mineral exporters, indicating 
the importance of buoyant oil or mineral prices. None of the francophone African 
LDCs was in the very high growth group, a trend perhaps related to the problems 
associated with their currencies being pegged to the appreciating euro. Amongst 
the island LDCs, only the Maldives was in the very high growth group. Its good 
performance reflects the bounce-back after the tsunami, helped by high levels of 
aid inflows.
If these growth rates can be sustained in the future, a few LDCs can be 
expected to reach the threshold to graduate from LDC status (box 1).  However, 
even supposing that the high growth rates of 2004–2006 would continue, only 
15 LDCs would have reached the graduation threshold by 2020, including eight 
which have already reached it.
To put the overall performance in a comparative perspective, only 11 LDCs 
were growing at such a pace that their GDP per capita was converging with the 
average of other developing countries in 2006. Despite the record overall GDP 
growth performance, GDP per capita stagnated or declined in nine LDCs, and 
grew by less than 1 per cent or declined in 16 LDCs (almost one third of the sample) 
(table 2).
3.  SECTORAL GROWTH RATES
During the period 2000–2006, the highest growth rate in the LDCs as a group 
was evident in non-manufacturing industries — including, in particular, mining 
industries, the exploitation of crude oil, and construction activities (chart 1). But 
there were significant differences amongst the sectoral growth rates in African, 
Asian and island LDCs. In African LDCs, the leading sector was non-manufacturing 
industrial activities, with an average annual growth rate of 10.3 per cent during 
the present decade. The leading sector in terms of growth rate in Asian LDCs 
All the Asian LDCs were 
in the very high growth group 
with the exception of 
Nepal  and Yemen.
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For LDCs as a group, the 
structure of production is 
changing, but only very 
slowly. 
The share of agriculture in 
GDP actually increased from 
1995–1996 to 2005–2006 
in 18 LDCs.
Box 1. Growth and graduation from LDC status
The recent high rates of the LDCs’ GDP growth raise the issue of how this affects their graduation prospects. This box makes 
a simulation of the likely future dates of graduation of LDCs if current growth rates were sustained in the future. 
It must be stressed that decisions about graduation from the LDC category — which the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council reviews every three years based on recommendations provided by the Committee for Development Policy — are 
based on three criteria: (a) low income; (b) human assets; and (c) economic vulnerability. A country needs to meet at least 
two of the three graduation thresholds to qualify for graduation. The focus on the first criterion is thus a partial analysis.
It should also be noted that the thresholds for graduation are reassessed from time to time. The present simulation is based 
on a low-income graduation threshold equal to $1,040 per capita GNI. This corresponds to the average for the low-income 
countries during the period 2004–2006 plus the customary extra 20 per cent. 
Under the assumption that the annual GNI per capita (assumed to grow at the same rate of GDP per capita) growth rates of 
the individual LDCs during the period 2004–2006 will continue in the future, it is possible to estimate the number of years 
that it will take them to reach the estimated income graduation threshold. 
Box table 1 lists the average GNI per capita of the LDCs, and the estimates of the number of years needed by each LDC to 
reach the graduation threshold if the current average annual growth rates are maintained. 
From the table, it is apparent that eight LDCs already meet the income threshold for graduation, while another three are close. 
Amongst the countries that have reached the graduation threshold, there are two oil-exporting LDCs and five island LDCs. 
Cape Verde has already graduated from the group, while the Maldives and Samoa are scheduled to graduate in 2011. 
The remaining 30 LDCs have been divided into two sub-groups: Countries that would reach the income graduation 
threshold in the medium term and those that would reach it in the long term. Twenty-one of the 28 oil-importing African 
LDCs are included in these last two sub-groups. The group of countries that would reach the income threshold in the long 
term includes thirteen countries that would reach the income graduation level in less than 50 years and another twelve that 
have been estimated as taking more than 50 years. Within the first sub-group, there are large differences among countries. 
On the one hand, Senegal, Solomon Islands and Zambia would reach the graduation threshold in 20 years, Ethiopia in 
25 years, and the United Republic of Tanzania in 30 years; on the other hand, Uganda and Mali would reach the income 
graduation level in 45 years. Since the estimation of the time period required to reach the income graduation threshold is 
based on the countries’ performance during the period 2004–2006, a worsening of the economic performance will increase 
the estimated number of years necessary to meet the income threshold level.
was manufacturing industries, which is estimated to have grown by 8 per cent 
per annum from 2000 to 2006. In island LDCs, services emerged as the leading 
sector, growing at 10.2 per cent per annum over the same period. On average, 
agricultural growth rates lagged behind the growth rates in other sectors in the 
major groups of LDCs during the period 2000–2006 (chart 1). 
The sectoral pattern of growth implies that, for LDCs as a group, the structure of 
production is changing, but only very slowly. Agriculture contributed 33 per cent 
of total GDP in 2005–2006, compared with 36 per cent 10 years earlier (table 
3). The share of manufacturing in total value added only increased marginally 
— from 10 per cent to 11 per cent of total GDP over this period — whilst the 
share of services declined marginally, from 42 to 40 per cent. Non-manufacturing 
industries (especially oil extraction and mining) are of increasing importance, 
particularly within African LDCs, where they are estimated to account for 19 per 
cent of total GDP.3
Within this overall pattern of sluggish structural change, there are significant 
differences amongst LDCs, and the share of agriculture in GDP actually increased 
from 1995–1996 to 2005–2006 in 18 LDCs. Only four of these LDCs were in the 
group of the 19 LDCs which achieved very high growth in 2006. At the other end of 
the spectrum, there were 18 LDCs where the share of agriculture in GDP declined 
by more than 5 percentage points, in some cases much more, over the 10-year 
period. In most cases, the decline in the economic importance of agriculture has 
been accompanied by a sharp increase in the relative importance of services (as 
in the cases of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Burundi, Mauritania, Samoa and 
Tuvalu) or non-manufacturing industries (as in the cases of Equatorial Guinea, 
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Box 1 (contd.)
Box table 1. Estimation of the number of years needed to meet 
the graduation threshold for LDCs, by country, 2004-2006
GNI per capitaa Yearsb
Countries that have reached the income threshold
Equatorial Guinea 5 620 Achieved
Vanuatu 1 580 Achieved
Kiribati 1 157 Achieved
Cape Verde 1 913 Achieved
Samoa 2 017 Achieved
Maldives 2 480 Achieved
Bhutan 1 253 Achieved
Angola 1 443 Achieved
Countries that are close to reaching to income thresholdc
Djibouti 1 013 1
Sudan 660 6
Mauritania 610 8
Countries that should reach the income threshold in the medium termc
Lesotho 893 10
Cambodia 430 11
Sao Tome and Principe 780 11
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 457 15
Bangladesh 463 17
Countries that should reach the income threshold in the long termc
Zambia 510 20
Senegal 683 20
Solomon Islands 630 20
Mozambique 307 24
Ethiopia 157 25
Sierra Leone 223 29
United Republic of Tanzania 337 30
Burkina Faso 413 34
Yemen 660 38
Chad 417 40
Guinea 430 40
Uganda 277 45
Mali 383 45
Gambia 290 > 50
Democratic Republic of the Congo 120 > 50
Rwanda 230 > 50
Madagascar 287 > 50
Malawi 163 > 50
Liberia 123 > 50
Niger 237 > 50
Central African Republic 340 > 50
Guinea-Bissau 177 > 50
Haiti 453 > 50
Nepal 270 > 50
Benin 500 > 50
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators, online data, March 2008.
Note: No data for Afghanistan, Myanmar, Somalia and Tuvalu.
Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Timor-Leste and Togo have been excluded from the computation as their real average annual growth 
rates are negative.
Countries have been ranked according to the number of years necessary to reach the income threshold of $1,040. See box text 
for an explanation of how the threshold was calculated.
a Calculated with the World Bank Atlas method.
b The years have been estimated using the formula ln(1,040) - ln(GNI pc
0
)/(GDP pc growth rate). It is assumed that real GNI pc 
and real GDP pc grow at the same rate.
c Assuming that the LDCs will grow at the same average annual growth rate as in 2004-2006 and that everything else stays con-
stant.
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Table 2. Real GDP and real GDP per capita growth rates of LDCs, by country, 2000–2007
(Annual averages, per cent)
Export
specialization
Real GDP Real GDP per capita
2000– 
2004
2005 2006 2007 
proj.
2000– 
2004
2005 2006 2007 
proj.
Countries with real GDP growth > 6% in 2006
Maldives S 7.5 -4.0 21.7 6.6 5.8 -5.6 19.7 4.8
Angola O 8.1 20.6 14.3 21.0 5.0 17.2 11.1 18.2
Mauritania MN 3.6 5.4 14.1 6.3 0.6 2.5 11.1 3.7
Sudan O 6.5 7.9 12.1 11.0 4.4 5.7 9.7 8.7
Afghanistan A 14.8 14.5 11.1 13.0 10.6 10.0 6.8 8.9
Ethiopia S 3.3 10.3 10.6 9.5 0.7 7.5 7.9 6.9
Sierra Leone MN 14.2 7.5 9.7 6.5 9.3 3.7 6.8 4.4
Mozambique MN 8.9 6.2 8.5 7.5 6.3 3.8 6.3 5.5
Malawi A 2.9 1.9 8.5 4.8 0.3 -0.7 5.8 2.2
Bhutan MF 8.0 6.5 8.5 17.1 5.1 4.2 6.5 15.6
Lao People's Democratic Republic MX 6.0 7.3 7.3 7.4 4.3 5.6 5.5 5.7
Cambodia MF 7.7 13.4 7.2 8.5 5.8 11.5 5.4 6.8
Liberia A -8.7 5.3 7.0 9.5 -10.6 2.4 2.9 4.7
Myanmar MX 12.7 13.2 7.0 4.2 11.7 12.3 6.1 3.3
Bangladesh MF 5.4 6.7 6.5 6.2 3.4 4.8 4.7 4.5
Democratic Republic of the Congo MN 3.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 0.7 3.2 3.2 3.2
Uganda A 5.7 6.5 6.2 6.0 2.4 3.1 2.8 2.7
Burundi MN 2.3 0.9 6.1 3.2 -0.9 -2.9 2.0 -0.9
Zambia MN 4.5 5.1 6.0 5.5 2.5 3.2 4.1 3.6
Countries with real GDP growth between 3% and 6% in 2006
United Republic of Tanzania 6.9 6.9 5.9 7.0 4.2 4.3 3.3 4.5
Burkina Faso A 6.3 5.9 5.9 6.0 2.9 2.6 2.7 3.0
Gambia S 3.2 5.0 5.6 7.0 0.0 2.0 2.7 4.3
Sao Tome and Principe S 4.0 3.0 5.5 5.5 2.2 1.3 3.8 3.9
Cape Verde S 5.1 5.8 5.5 7.0 2.6 3.3 3.1 4.7
Guinea MN 3.0 3.3 5.0 5.0 1.1 1.4 3.0 2.9
Solomon Islands A 0.9 5.0 5.0 5.4 -1.7 2.4 2.5 3.0
Madagascar MX 0.9 4.6 4.7 6.4 -1.9 1.7 1.9 3.7
Guinea-Bissau A -1.5 3.5 4.6 5.2 -4.5 0.4 1.5 2.2
Mali MN 6.3 6.1 4.6 5.4 3.2 3.0 1.5 2.3
Djibouti S 2.8 3.2 4.2 5.0 0.8 1.4 2.4 3.2
Togo MX 2.4 0.8 4.2 5.5 -0.5 -1.9 1.4 2.8
Senegal MX 4.2 5.5 4.0 5.4 1.5 2.8 1.4 2.9
Samoa S 3.4 5.1 4.0 3.0 2.6 4.4 3.1 2.1
Yemen O 3.8 4.6 3.9 3.7 0.8 1.5 0.9 0.7
Benin A 4.4 2.9 3.6 5.0 1.0 -0.4 0.4 1.9
Niger MN 4.1 7.1 3.5 4.0 0.5 3.4 0.0 0.4
Vanuatu S -0.5 3.1 3.4 2.5 -3.0 0.5 0.9 0.1
Central African Republic MN -2.2 2.2 3.2 4.0 -3.8 0.5 1.4 2.2
Rwanda S 5.1 6.0 3.0 4.8 2.5 3.9 0.5 2.0
Countries with real GDP growth < 3% in 2006
Chad O 15.5 8.6 2.9 2.5 11.3 5.0 -0.3 -0.5
Somalia A 2.9 2.4 2.4 -3.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -6.5
Haiti MF -0.9 1.8 2.3 3.5 -2.5 0.2 0.7 1.9
Eritrea S 3.5 4.8 2.0 2.0 -0.7 0.8 -1.6 -1.4
Nepal MF 2.7 2.7 1.9 2.6 0.5 0.7 -0.1 0.6
Lesotho MF 2.9 2.9 1.6 1.4 1.8 2.2 0.9 0.8
Comoros S 2.2 2.8 1.2 1.0 -0.5 0.2 -1.3 -1.5
Tuvalu A 6.2 2.0 1.0 2.5 5.7 1.6 0.6 2.1
Kiribati A 2.9 3.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.8 -0.9 -0.6
Equatorial Guinea O 28.3 9.3 -1.0 10.0 25.4 6.8 -3.3 7.6
Timor-Leste O -0.8 2.2 -1.6 32.1 -6.1 -2.9 -5.7 28.4
Source: UNCTAD secretariat estimates based on United Nations/DESA Statistics Division; United Nations/DESA Link Global Economic Outlook,
online, January 2008; United Nations ESCAP data and estimates; and OECD, African Economic Outlook 2006/07.
Note: A=agricultural exporter, MF=manufactures exporter, MN=mineral exporter, MX=mixed exporters, O=oil exporter, S=services exporter.
  Countries are ranked in decreasing order according to the real GDP growth rate in 2006.
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The share of manufacturing 
in GDP for the LDCs as a 
group continues to lag far 
behind the average in other 
developing countries and 
this gap is widening.
Chart 1.  Real GDP growth rates by major economic sectors, by country groups, 1990–2006
(Average annual growth rates, per cent)
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
Note: Non-manufacturing includes mining, utilities and construction.
United Republic of Tanzania, Bhutan, Chad and Mali). The relative decline in the 
importance of agriculture is associated with a significant rise in the importance 
of manufacturing in only three LDCs — Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic and Mozambique. Both Burkina Faso and Uganda exhibited a more 
balanced pattern of structural change, with the relative share of manufacturing, 
non-manufacturing industries and services all increasing while the relative share of 
agriculture in GDP declines.
The share of manufacturing in GDP during 2005–2006 for the LDCs as a 
group (11 per cent) continues to lag far behind the average in other developing 
countries (24 per cent). Indeed, this gap is widening. Moreover, from 1995–1996 
to 2005–2006, half of the LDCs experienced de-industrialization reflected in the 
declining importance of manufactures in GDP. These trends suggest that the recent 
growth surge in LDCs is not generally associated with a structural transition in 
which the share of manufactures in total output is growing (except for most Asian 
LDCs). It also indicates the failure to develop productive capacities in LDCs and 
the weak development of the productive base of their economies, irrespective of 
strong GDP growth. 
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Table 3.  Share of value added in main economic sectors in LDCs, by country and country groups, 1995–2006
(Per cent of value added)
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Manufacturing Non-manufacturinga
1995–1996 2005–2006 1995–1996 2005–2006 1995–1996 2005–2006 1995–1996 2005–2006
Countries with increasing share of manufacture in value added
Afghanistan 50.4 24.1 4.1 8.9 0.6 2.3 45.0 64.7
Bangladesh 27.1 22.9 15.9 17.4 9.6 11.9 47.4 47.8
Burkina Faso 36.2 26.5 12.1 15.2 5.3 8.5 46.4 49.8
Cambodia 46.8 33.4 8.2 18.8 6.8 10.3 38.2 37.6
Central African Republic 43.5 50.9 10.2 11.1 7.2 7.9 39.1 30.1
Djibouti 3.4 3.7 2.7 2.8 12.7 14.4 81.2 79.1
Equatorial Guinea 43.1 6.9 1.2 10.5 35.1 75.2 20.6 7.4
Eritrea 19.4 19.8 9.3 9.3 9.7 14.3 61.6 56.5
Ethiopia 59.0 53.0 3.5 3.6 4.8 6.0 32.7 37.4
Gambia 22.6 24.5 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.3 67.3 65.0
Guinea 23.6 25.0 4.5 4.7 29.2 31.2 42.6 39.1
Haiti 32.7 30.7 7.5 7.8 11.3 16.2 48.5 45.3
Lao People's Democratic Republic 54.5 45.9 15.0 20.4 5.2 8.1 25.3 25.6
Liberia 86.1 63.6 1.9 9.1 1.9 5.2 10.2 22.1
Madagascar 30.3 27.5 11.8 11.9 1.2 2.9 56.7 57.7
Mozambique 34.1 27.5 8.2 16.7 6.9 10.6 50.7 45.3
Myanmar 54.7 49.5 8.0 9.8 4.9 7.5 32.4 33.3
Sao Tome and Principe 31.4 32.6 4.1 4.1 13.4 13.4 51.1 49.9
Somalia 58.7 56.1 2.3 2.6 4.8 5.4 34.2 35.9
Sudan 42.3 49.6 7.9 8.2 7.7 16.9 42.1 25.2
Togo 42.4 43.8 6.2 6.4 16.4 16.7 35.0 33.1
Uganda 45.2 36.7 9.1 10.8 8.0 10.0 37.7 42.5
United Republic of Tanzania 46.3 41.3 7.9 8.7 8.0 12.0 37.7 38.1
Yemen 21.2 21.3 9.1 9.7 22.1 16.6 47.6 52.5
Zambia 26.7 23.2 35.4 39.9 5.2 -1.5 32.8 38.4
Countries with decreasing share of manufacture in value added
Angola 7.3 7.8 3.7 3.6 64.5 62.8 24.6 25.8
Benin 39.3 40.3 8.7 8.6 4.7 4.8 47.3 46.3
Bhutan 30.4 16.6 10.2 6.5 27.8 42.2 31.6 34.8
Burundi 54.4 46.9 13.1 7.5 4.2 3.8 28.4 41.8
Cape Verde 10.5 8.7 8.9 5.4 15.0 13.9 65.6 72.0
Chad 51.5 35.1 9.3 7.9 1.6 25.3 37.7 31.7
Comoros 39.9 48.8 4.5 4.2 7.8 6.8 47.9 40.2
Democratic Republic of the Congo 41.8 44.5 8.7 5.7 17.6 19.1 31.8 30.7
Kiribati 13.1 12.2 1.3 1.1 4.4 10.9 81.2 75.8
Lesotho 15.8 12.3 17.4 16.8 22.2 25.0 44.7 46.0
Malawi 52.7 54.3 15.9 12.3 9.6 13.0 21.7 20.5
Maldives 10.6 9.0 7.2 6.9 5.4 10.1 76.7 74.0
Mali 40.7 35.3 10.0 9.0 8.8 17.2 40.5 38.5
Mauritania 39.3 20.6 8.2 6.6 15.1 18.3 37.3 54.5
Nepal 42.5 41.0 9.0 8.3 10.8 11.3 37.7 39.4
Niger 37.9 41.8 7.0 6.0 8.4 7.0 46.7 45.2
Rwanda 43.9 46.4 14.3 12.1 5.8 10.4 36.0 31.1
Samoa 21.3 12.4 17.6 14.2 10.0 12.1 51.2 61.4
Senegal 18.4 14.4 15.7 15.2 7.2 8.4 58.7 62.0
Sierra Leone 39.5 44.9 3.7 3.0 7.9 10.9 48.9 41.2
Solomon Islands 46.3 45.8 4.1 4.0 6.1 3.7 43.5 46.5
Timor-Leste 25.2 36.5 3.3 2.7 23.7 14.2 47.8 46.6
Tuvalu 22.6 14.0 2.1 1.7 11.7 13.8 63.6 70.5
Vanuatu 15.7 16.3 3.3 2.7 5.8 5.2 75.2 75.8
Guinea-Bissau 46.4 52.7 .. .. .. .. 31.7 27.9
LDCs 35.9 33.2 10.4 11.2 12.1 16.0 41.6 39.6
African LDCs 37.7 35.9 8.9 9.1 13.5 19.2 39.8 35.8
Asian LDCs 33.2 29.1 13.0 14.7 9.6 11.1 44.1 45.2
Island LDCs 23.2 20.9 6.3 5.4 10.8 10.4 59.8 63.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
Note: The group averages are weighted averages.
a Includes mining, utilities and construction.
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C. Trends in investment and savings 
For the LDCs as a group, gross capital formation increased from 20 per cent 
of GDP in 2000–2002 to 22 per cent in 2006, and over the same period, gross 
domestic savings increased from 13 per cent of GDP to 21 per cent. However, a 
closer look at the trends country-by-country shows that the overall averages for the 
LDCs as a group mask a very mixed picture, with many of these countries unable 
to raise domestic savings, increasing their reliance on foreign savings (table 4).
From 2000 to 2006, gross capital formation actually declined as a share of 
GDP in 17 LDCs, and domestic savings also declined over that period in almost 
half of the LDCs, some 22 countries. The big jump in the domestic savings rates 
over this period were found in the oil- and mineral-exporting LDCs — Angola, 
Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Mozambique and Sudan — plus the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic.
In 2006, the highest domestic savings rates were found in Equatorial Guinea 
(91 per cent of GDP), Chad (52 per cent), Angola (41 per cent), Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (33 per cent), Maldives (32 per cent), Bhutan (29 per 
cent), Mozambique (28 per cent), Sudan (26 per cent), Yemen (24 per cent) and 
Mauritania (23 per cent). Oil- and mineral-exporting LDCs — in which the growth 
of domestic savings was highly correlated with rents from extractive activities — 
are prominent in this list. Fifteen LDCs — mostly small countries — had negative 
domestic savings rates in 2006 and thus were relying on foreign savings to finance 
not only domestic investment but also their domestic consumption. These countries 
included five very high-growth countries — Afghanistan, Burundi, Malawi, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. Only one third of the LDCs had gross domestic savings above 
15 per cent of GDP and savings rates remained very low in a number of African 
LDCs which have had relatively sustained growth performance over a number of 
years, including Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania 
and Senegal.
The overall trends of gross capital formation and gross domestic savings for 
the LDCs as a group suggest that the resource gap, which indicates reliance on 
foreign resources, has fallen quite significantly since 2000. It declined from 7 per 
cent of GDP in 2000–2002 to 1.6 per cent in 2006. However, the resource gap 
exceeded 10 per cent of GDP in 33 LDCs in 2006 and in 17 of these it exceeded 
20 per cent of GDP. The resource gap also increased by more than 1 percentage 
point in half the LDCs (25 countries), and by more than 5 percentage points in 
15 of these countries from 2000–2002 to 2006. The supply of external financial 
resources thus remains critical for capital formation (and in some cases even for 
consumption) in most LDCs, and the dependence on external sources of capital 
has also been increasing for many of them in recent years.
D.  Trends in international trade 
International trade is equivalent to over 50 per cent of the GDP of the LDCs 
as a group, and high rates of export growth have been a key driver of their strong 
GDP growth performance. However, their export structure remains concentrated 
on primary commodities and low-skill labour-intensive manufactures. Most LDCs 
are net food importers. Trade performance is highly dependent on commodity 
price trends. Trade deficits are increasing in most LDCs, particularly those which 
specialize in agricultural exports. Despite a high level of integration with the global 
...fifteen LDCs — mostly 
small countries — had 
negative domestic savings 
rates in 2006 and thus were 
relying on foreign savings to 
finance domestic investment 
and consumption.
LDCs’ export structure 
remains concentrated on 
primary commodities and 
low-skill manufactures, and 
most of them are net food 
importers.
For the LDCs as a group, the 
resource gap, which indicates 
reliance on foreign resources, 
has fallen from 7 per cent of 
GDP in 2000–2002 to 1.6 
per cent in 2006, but...
From 2000 to 2006, gross 
capital formation declined as 
a share of GDP in 17 LDCs.
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Table 4. Gross domestic savings, gross capital formation and resource gap in LDCs, by country and ODCs, 
2000–2006
(Per cent of GDP)
Gross capital formation Gross domestic savings Resource gapa
2000–2002 2005 2006 2000–2002 2005 2006 2000–2002 2005 2006
Countries with real GDP growth > 6% in 2006
Maldives 26.6 61.3 55.6 45.2 28.1 32.3 18.5 -33.2 -23.3
Angola 13.6 7.5 13.1 26.8 32.0 40.5 13.2 24.5 27.4
Mauritania 21.8 44.5 29.0 1.5 -14.9 23.1 -20.3 -59.4 -5.9
Sudan 18.5 22.4 23.8 12.9 18.2 26.2 -5.6 -4.1 2.3
Afghanistan 12.6 21.3 17.3 -24.1 -24.8 -30.8 -36.7 -46.1 -48.1
Ethiopia 20.4 20.5 19.8 3.8 6.4 7.6 -16.6 -14.1 -12.1
Sierra Leone -15.9 18.6 16.5 -48.7 -6.0 -5.5 -32.7 -24.6 -22.1
Mozambique 29.8 20.4 24.8 16.6 18.3 27.7 -13.2 -2.1 3.0
Malawi 13.6 11.0 10.5 1.0 -22.9 -20.6 -12.6 -33.9 -31.0
Bhutan 55.8 51.4 53.5 33.9 39.1 29.2 -21.9 -12.3 -24.3
Lao People’s Dem. Republic 17.0 32.0 30.7 12.1 28.2 33.2 -4.9 -3.7 2.5
Cambodia 18.6 19.7 19.3 9.2 11.1 7.5 -9.5 -8.5 -11.8
Liberia 5.5 15.9 12.3 -1.1 2.3 -0.4 -6.6 -13.6 -12.7
Myanmar 11.2 12.6 15.2 11.2 12.7 15.3 0.0 0.1 0.1
Bangladesh 23.2 24.9 25.6 18.3 20.6 21.0 -4.9 -4.3 -4.6
Democratic Republic of the Congo 9.5 14.2 16.7 10.0 6.5 5.4 0.5 -7.7 -11.2
Uganda 19.7 23.8 24.8 5.3 8.7 8.2 -14.4 -15.1 -16.6
Burundi 8.2 15.5 23.2 -7.0 -11.9 -10.0 -15.3 -27.4 -33.2
Zambia 20.6 25.6 25.9 14.7 17.7 18.3 -6.0 -7.9 -7.6
Countries with real GDP growth between 3% and 6% in 2006
United Republic of Tanzania 17.9 22.2 22.5 11.6 12.4 11.0 -6.4 -9.7 -11.4
Burkina Faso 25.8 22.7 24.5 10.6 8.5 9.6 -15.2 -14.3 -14.8
Gambia 20.9 26.0 24.1 13.6 7.8 5.7 -7.3 -18.2 -18.4
Sao Tome and Principe 34.8 34.5 67.6 -18.3 -24.9 -24.7 -53.0 -59.4 -92.3
Cape Verde 32.9 37.9 38.7 -6.1 3.9 3.2 -38.9 -34.0 -35.5
Guinea 21.0 17.4 21.5 17.3 7.5 10.6 -3.6 -10.0 -10.9
Solomon Islands 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Madagascar 16.0 21.5 21.7 10.4 13.0 9.0 -5.6 -8.6 -12.7
Guinea-Bissau 17.8 14.6 15.7 5.3 -2.8 1.5 -12.5 -17.4 -14.2
Mali 20.0 21.4 22.5 14.3 18.0 17.4 -5.7 -3.4 -5.1
Djibouti 19.4 20.2 19.7 7.6 9.6 8.7 -11.8 -10.7 -11.0
Togo 16.8 19.7 20.8 1.7 1.0 3.7 -15.1 -18.7 -17.1
Senegal 18.6 25.7 25.6 9.0 9.9 8.6 -9.6 -15.8 -17.0
Samoa 13.8 10.4 9.8 -12.7 -14.0 -13.9 -26.5 -24.4 -23.7
Yemen 19.0 21.9 21.5 21.3 21.4 23.8 2.3 -0.5 2.3
Benin 18.9 18.2 21.0 11.6 11.2 11.7 -7.3 -7.0 -9.3
Niger 15.1 19.3 22.8 6.5 8.0 9.1 -8.6 -11.4 -13.7
Vanuatu 21.1 20.4 20.2 18.5 15.8 15.9 -2.6 -4.6 -4.3
Central African Republic 8.4 6.0 5.7 0.9 -4.2 -4.9 -7.5 -10.2 -10.6
Rwanda 17.7 21.1 20.8 0.4 -1.4 -4.2 -17.3 -22.5 -25.0
Countries with real GDP growth < 3% in 2006
Chad 40.3 26.7 23.6 4.8 54.5 51.9 -35.5 27.8 28.3
Somalia 20.3 20.3 20.3 19.0 19.0 18.9 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4
Haiti 12.3 13.0 28.6 -9.5 -9.5 -0.3 -21.9 -22.5 -28.9
Eritrea 25.2 19.0 18.1 -31.7 -30.2 -19.0 -56.9 -49.2 -37.1
Nepal 24.2 28.9 30.3 14.1 12.4 11.1 -10.1 -16.5 -19.2
Lesotho 41.4 35.1 41.1 -20.0 -1.5 -2.0 -61.4 -36.6 -43.1
Comoros 12.4 10.9 13.8 -1.6 -6.9 -6.8 -14.0 -17.8 -20.6
Tuvalu 55.6 55.8 55.7 -45.3 -45.3 -45.3 -100.9 -101.2 -101.1
Kiribati 43.5 43.7 43.6 2.1 1.8 1.9 -41.4 -41.8 -41.6
Equatorial Guinea 53.0 36.0 33.2 80.1 88.9 90.7 27.1 52.9 57.4
Timor-Leste 29.2 19.1 19.0 -38.7 -17.3 -18.6 -67.9 -36.4 -37.6
LDCs 19.8 21.2 22.2 12.8 17.5 20.7 -7.0 -3.7 -1.6
ODCs 25.0 27.7 27.5 27.9 33.3 33.4 2.9 5.6 5.9
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
a Measured as the difference between gross domestic savings and gross capital formation.
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Table 5. LDCs' exports, imports and balance of merchandise trade, 
by country groups, 2003–2006
2003 2004 2005 2006 2004–2006
$ million % changea
Merchandise exports
LDCs total 43 535 55 878 76 514 99 295 77.7
African LDCs 27 078 36 288 51 874 69 448 91.4
Asian LDCs 16 078 19 118 24 098 29 244 53.0
Island LDCs 380 472 542 603 27.6
Oil exporters 17 007 23 837 38 301 51 731 117.0
Non-oil exporters 26 528 32 041 38 212 47 564 48.4
Agricultural exporters 2 984 3 236 3 977 4 413 36.4
Mineral exporters 5 942 7 741 9 192 13 000 67.9
Manufactures exporters 10 133 13 026 14 701 18 256 40.1
Services exporters 1 978 2 410 3 004 3 297 36.8
Mixed exporters 5 491 5 628 7 338 8 599 52.8
Merchandise imports
LDCs total 59 871 69 418 86 282 100 464 44.7
African LDCs 36 170 43 412 55 110 65 362 50.6
Asian LDCs 22 150 24 192 29 107 32 658 35.0
Island LDCs 1 551 1 814 2 065 2 443 34.7
Oil exporters 11 176 12 658 19 006 22 348 76.6
Non-oil exporters 48 694 56 760 67 276 78 116 37.6
Agricultural exporters 10 444 11 699 15 284 17 733 51.6
Mineral exporters 8 115 10 782 12 540 14 304 32.7
Manufactures exporters 16 179 18 358 20 666 23 858 30.0
Services exporters 7 055 8 113 10 406 13 244 63.2
Mixed exporters 6 901 7 809 8 380 8 976 14.9
Merchandise trade balance
LDCs total -16 335 -13 540 -9 769 -1 169 -91.4
African LDCs -9 092 -7 125 -3 237 4 086 N/A
Asian LDCs -6 073 -5 074 -5 009 -3 414 -32.7
Island LDCs -1 171 -1 342 -1 523 -1 841 37.2
Oil exporters 5 831 11 180 19 295 29 383 162.8
Non-oil exporters -22 166 -24 720 -29 064 -30 552 23.6
Agricultural exporters -7 460 -8 463 -11 306 -13 321 57.4
Mineral exporters -2 173 -3 041 -3 348 -1 304 -57.1
Manufactures exporters -6 046 -5 332 -5 966 -5 602 5.1
Services exporters -5 077 -5 703 -7 402 -9 947 74.4
Mixed exporters -1 410 -2 181 -1 042 -377 -82.7
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2007 and 
UNCTAD estimates.
Note:  Data for Afghanistan, Chad, Liberia, Somalia and Tuvalu have been estimated using mirror 
trade data.
a Percentage change in trade values between initial and end year.
economy and good export performance, the marginalization of the LDCs in global 
trade has declined only slightly if oil is excluded. Marginalization is rooted in the 
continuing failure of export upgrading. 
1. OVERALL TRENDS IN MERCHANDISE TRADE
In nominal terms, the value of LDCs’ merchandise exports has more than 
doubled since 2003, reaching a record level of $99.3 billion in 2006. This was $23 
billion above the level in 2005 and $43 billion above the value in 2004 (table 5). 
This improved export performance was largely attributable to rising international 
commodity prices. With oil and mineral prices rising, exports from the African 
LDCs almost doubled from 2004 to 2006, whilst they increased by 53 per cent in 
the Asian LDCs.
LDCs’ improved export 
performance was largely 
attributable to rising 
international commodity 
prices.
Despite a high level of 
integration with the global 
economy and the good 
export performance, the 
marginalization of the LDCs 
in global trade has declined 
only slightly if oil is excluded.
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As much as 64 per cent of the total increase in LDCs’ merchandise exports 
from 2004 to 2006 was attributable to oil exporters, and a further 12 per cent 
to mineral exporters. Manufactures exporters also managed to increase exports 
significantly over this period, contributing to a 12 per cent increase in LDCs’ total 
merchandise export revenues. But export growth was comparatively slow in LDCs 
agricultural exporters, constituting only 3 per cent of the increase in merchandise 
export revenues from 2004 to 2006. The latter group of countries achieved only 
a marginal expansion of $400 million in their merchandise exports between 
2005 and 2006, in sharp contrast with the booming export performance of other 
LDCs.
The evidence suggests that most of the LDCs’ merchandise exports came from 
a few countries and that the level of geographical concentration of exports is 
increasing. The top five LDC exporters — Angola, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sudan 
and Yemen — doubled their merchandise exports from 2004 to 2006, and in the 
latter year, they accounted for 63 per cent of the total merchandise exports of the 
LDCs. The exports of the 30 LDCs that exported least accounted for only 7 per 
cent of LDCs’ total merchandise exports in 2006, down from 10 per cent in 2004 
(table 6). 
Although imports have also been increasing, the merchandise trade balance 
of the LDCs as a group has improved significantly. Indeed, for the first time in 
over 30 years, their merchandise trade balance was close to equilibrium in 2006 
(table 5). However, this result masks large differences amongst the LDCs. The 
merchandise trade surplus of oil-exporting LDCs rose from $11 billion in 2004 
to $29 billion in 2006, whilst the merchandise trade deficit of oil-importing LDCs 
increased from $25 billion to $31 billion. The majority of the LDCs — 42 of the 
50 — had a merchandise trade deficit during the period 2005–2006; that deficit 
was greater than in 2003–2004 for 37 LDCs (chart 2).
Amongst the oil-importing LDCs, there were also significant differences. Mineral 
exporters reduced their merchandise trade deficit from 2004, and the deficit did 
not worsen by much in the manufacture exporters taken as a group. However, 
the merchandise trade deficit of the LDCs which specialize in agricultural exports 
considerably worsened in 2005 and 2006, when the deficit reached a record 
high of $13 billion. Their average merchandise trade deficit in 2005–2006 was 
equivalent to 18 per cent of their GDP.
Rising trade deficits are also evident in trade in services, despite healthy service 
export growth (box 2). 
2. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICES
The improved export performance of a large number of LDCs in 2005 and 
2006 has been driven by increased international demand for commodities, 
which is leading to much higher international commodity prices.4 The prices of 
some commodities of particular importance for the LDCs rose strongly in 2006, 
following another increase in 2005. However, there is notable difference between 
the price trends during this period for food and agricultural raw materials on the 
one hand, and mineral, ores, metals and crude petroleum on the other. Moreover, 
within each broad category, the prices of some commodities rose much more 
than others. 
The difference between agricultural products and minerals is evident both 
in 2005 and 2006 (table 7). From 2004 to 2005, the average price indices of 
food and agricultural raw materials only increased by 6 per cent and 4 per cent 
64 per cent of the 
total increase in LDCs 
merchandise exports 
from 2004 to 2006 was 
attributable to oil exporters, 
and a further 12 per cent 
to mineral exporters.
The merchandise trade 
surplus of oil-exporting LDCs 
rose from $11 billion in 
2004 to $29 billion in 2006, 
whilst the merchandise trade 
deficit of oil-importing LDCs 
increased from $25 billion to 
$31 billion. 
The improved export 
performance of a large 
number of LDCs in 2005 
and 2006 has been driven 
by much higher international 
commodity prices.
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Table 6. LDCs' merchandise exports and imports, by country, 2004–2006
Export
specialization
Exports Imports
$ million Annual percentage change $ million Annual percentage change
2006 2004 2005 2006 2006 2004 2005 2006
Largest 5 exporters
Angola O 33 795.0 40.5 78.9 45.6 6 908.9 4.9 43.2 35.0
Bangladesh MF 11 962.6 29.1 14.0 26.9 15 279.4 12.1 15.3 16.6
Yemen O 6 264.0 8.5 38.5 11.7 4 935.1 1.6 30.2 1.5
Sudan O 5 478.7 45.6 24.7 21.6 8 844.5 39.2 82.6 20.1
Myanmar MX 4 863.3 3.5 60.2 18.0 2 155.2 7.8 -12.3 9.0
Middle 15 exporters
Cambodia MF 3 990.5 32.1 12.4 26.9 2 996.2 16.2 20.1 20.9
Equatorial Guinea O 3 804.3 31.5 55.3 29.7 1 098.7 34.8 34.6 -3.3
Zambia MN 3 770.4 60.7 14.9 108.3 3 074.3 36.7 18.9 20.2
Mozambique MN 2 381.1 44.1 18.6 33.5 2 869.3 28.8 18.4 19.1
Democratic Republic of the Congo MN 2 300.2 34.6 18.4 5.0 2 799.5 24.6 14.3 23.3
Chad O 2 274.7 1 293.3 55.9 16.0 456.4 2.4 17.5 8.4
United Republic of Tanzania S 1 689.9 17.5 16.1 9.4 4 439.5 17.9 28.3 35.6
Senegal MX 1 491.6 13.9 11.8 1.4 3 671.0 18.4 23.2 5.0
Liberia A 1 490.2 15.6 42.0 3.7 6 446.3 8.1 15.7 30.7
Mali MN 1 476.6 -2.0 16.2 28.7 1 990.3 7.3 24.8 16.8
Mauritania MN 1 258.7 35.7 27.8 126.2 1 073.3 246.8 0.2 -20.0
Ethiopia S 1 043.0 19.9 50.7 12.6 5 207.3 7.0 42.5 27.2
Madagascar MX 1 008.2 -0.8 -13.9 20.6 1 760.3 25.3 2.1 4.4
Guinea MN 976.2 3.0 22.7 1.1 807.7 2.8 18.8 9.8
Uganda A 962.2 22.9 24.4 18.4 2 557.3 25.1 19.4 24.5
Smallest 30 exporters
Lao People's Democratic Republic MX 876.5 -4.5 52.2 59.5 752.3 -3.4 23.7 20.1
Nepal MF 759.7 15.8 9.7 -8.4 2 098.9 3.8 -0.6 12.9
Lesotho MF 671.9 36.9 -7.3 10.3 1 535.3 40.2 2.7 4.5
Malawi A 668.4 -8.7 8.0 34.9 1 209.2 18.2 25.5 3.8
Haiti MF 522.6 13.9 20.2 10.4 1 637.3 10.9 11.3 11.7
Burkina Faso A 482.9 23.2 -2.4 25.7 1 419.1 33.8 10.1 1.9
Togo MX 359.7 -17.4 -11.9 -0.1 637.4 -1.9 6.2 7.6
Niger MN 355.7 22.3 24.7 2.3 688.0 19.1 10.3 -6.5
Bhutan MF 348.2 15.8 41.0 60.3 310.4 22.1 -6.0 8.6
Benin A 283.1 9.9 -3.4 -1.8 1 011.3 0.2 0.5 12.5
Sierra Leone MN 216.6 51.1 14.4 36.3 388.9 -5.6 20.3 13.0
Afghanistan A 179.6 -8.5 25.4 -10.1 4 130.9 10.6 87.2 5.7
Somalia A 160.8 -41.1 107.7 -11.1 602.2 -28.7 101.0 5.4
Central African Republic MN 144.3 53.8 15.2 24.0 198.7 59.6 17.2 6.6
Maldives S 135.6 50.3 -9.2 -12.0 926.5 36.3 16.1 24.4
Rwanda S 135.4 94.6 27.8 8.1 496.4 8.8 41.7 23.3
Burundi MN 120.1 25.5 41.6 2.6 414.4 19.4 48.8 61.2
Timor-Leste O 114.1 84.1 47.1 45.3 104.6 -48.7 -10.5 2.9
Cape Verde S 110.3 21.9 488.4 23.3 538.2 21.0 2.1 22.8
Solomon Islands A 91.5 -3.9 8.2 14.3 165.3 21.9 51.6 8.9
Samoa S 84.9 -1.9 -0.6 0.0 275.0 39.5 13.9 15.1
Guinea-Bissau A 83.9 15.9 18.2 -11.3 91.4 18.8 27.4 -12.5
Vanuatu S 44.9 37.1 2.6 18.3 159.7 21.9 16.7 6.8
Djibouti S 18.9 0.0 4.0 39.7 215.8 1.8 6.1 21.1
Gambia S 11.5 256.3 -71.8 125.0 259.3 45.6 9.7 -0.1
Eritrea S 11.2 66.4 -4.2 5.6 552.7 9.1 3.1 13.5
Comoros S 7.5 16.6 -35.5 -17.4 102.5 24.5 15.4 16.8
Kiribati A 6.3 38.5 -80.1 77.3 61.4 21.3 29.8 -17.0
Sao Tome and Principe S 3.9 -46.4 -3.9 13.4 71.1 1.5 20.3 42.7
Tuvalu A 3.5 -24.9 -37.3 194.4 39.0 -3.5 73.5 34.4
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2007 and UNCTAD estimates.
Note: A=agricultural exporter, MF=manufactures exporter, MN=mineral exporter, MX=mixed exporters, O=oil exporter, S=services exporter.
  Countries have been ranked in decreasing order according to the value of their exports in 2006.
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Chart 2.  LDCs’ merchandise trade balance, 2003–2006
($ million, period averages)
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 Box 2.  Trends in trade in services
Data on trade in services are much less reliable and complete than data on merchandise trade. However, the available data 
indicate that the LDCs’ exports are at record levels and the balance of services trade is negative and worsening, as it is for 
most countries in merchandise trade.
Exports of commercial services from LDCs have been increasing rapidly in recent years. In 2006, they amounted to $14 
billion (box table 2). This was equivalent to about 12 per cent of total exports of goods and services for the LDCs as a group. 
But service exports are particularly important for island LDCs; services are estimated to be equivalent to 67 per cent of their 
total exports of goods and services. 
The service exports of LDCs in 2006 were $2 billion higher than in 2005 and $3.2 billion higher than in 2004. Two thirds 
of the increase in service export revenue is attributable to increases in commercial services exports from African LDCs. 
Although service exports are of crucial significance for island LDCs, they have been growing at a lower rate than in the 
African LDCs. 
Tourism is the most important service export of the LDCs. It constituted 33 per cent of the total service export receipts in 
2006 for the LDCs as a group. Tourism is even more important for the island LDCs, accounting for 65 per cent of the services 
exports for this group of countries in 2006. 
In spite of the large increase in total service exports, the LDCs remain net service importers. In 2006, LDCs spent an estimated 
$33 billion to finance their imports of services. Island LDCs export more services than they import, and their service trade 
surplus reached a record $546 million in 2006. On the other hand, the Asian and the African LDCs experienced a worsening 
of their service trade deficit between 2004 and 2006, from $1.2 billion to $1.7 billion and from $10.9 billion to $17.7 billion 
respectively. Payments for service imports absorbed 34 per cent of the total export revenue of the African LDCs from goods 
and services in 2006. Such payments are particularly high for the landlocked African LDCs, as shown in Least Developed 
Countries Report 2004 (UNCTAD, 2004:113). 
Box table 2.  Export and import of services in LDCs, by country groups, 2003–2006
($ million, per cent)
Total services ($ million) Tourisma (%)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006
Exports % of total exports of services
LDCs 8 959.0 10 747.3 11 855.2 13 985.0 36.6 38.2 35.3 33.2
African LDCs and Haiti 5 422.9 6 508.0 7 279.7 8 629.1 34.9 34.9 33.0 28.5
Asian LDCs 2 655.6 3 195.2 3 636.1 4 104.2 31.9 35.2 33.7 33.1
Island LDCs 880.5 1 044.1 939.3 1 251.7 61.4 67.8 59.8 65.4
Imports % of total imports of services
LDCs 17 936.0 22 405.0 27 833.2 32 856.3 9.1 9.9 10.4 11.4
African LDCs and Haiti 13 556.9 17 403.2 22 134.6 26 330.9 8.1 8.8 9.7 11.3
Asian LDCs 3 912.1 4 448.9 5 065.6 5 819.2 10.2 11.8 11.2 10.2
Island LDCs 467.0 552.8 633.0 706.2 28.0 27.5 25.0 25.3
Net exports
LDCs -8 977.1 -11 
657.7
-15
978.0
-18
871.3
African LDCs and Haiti -8 134.0 -10 
895.2
-14
854.9
-17
701.8
Asian LDCs -1 256.5 -1 253.7 -1 429.5 -1 715.0
Island LDCs 413.5 491.2 306.4 545.5
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments and International Investment Positions Statistics, CD-ROM, December 2007 and UNCTAD estimates.
Note:  No data for Afghanistan, Bhutan, Liberia, Somalia and Tuvalu.
a Includes travel and personal, cultural and recreational activities.
respectively, whilst the average price indices of minerals, ores and metals rose 
by 26 per cent. Between 2005 and 2006, the average price index of food and 
agricultural raw materials increased by more than the previous year — 16 per cent 
and 15 per cent respectively — but the average price index of minerals, ores and 
metals soared by 60 per cent. The crude petroleum price index increased by 41 
per cent and 21 per cent, respectively, during the same years. 
Underlying these broad trends, particular commodities of importance to 
LDCs behaved differently. The largest nominal price increases from 2004 to 2006 
occurred for copper, with grade A copper 135 per cent higher in 2006 than in 
2004. But strong hikes in iron ore and gold, and to a lesser extent aluminium, also 
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Table 7. Price indices of selected primary commodities of importance 
to LDCs, 1995–2006
(Index, 2000=100)
1995 2003 2004 2005 2006 Standard 
deviationa
% change
1995– 
2006
1995– 
2006
2000– 
2006
All food 139 107 121 128 149 .. 8 49
Wheat 139 127 115 109 129 23 -8 29
Rice 158 98 121 141 149 57 -6 49
Sugar 162 87 88 121 181 3 11 81
Fish meal 120 148 157 172 282 199 135 182
Coffee, Arabicas 174 74 93 132 132 39 -24 32
Coffee, Robustas 303 88 86 120 162 29 -47 62
Cocoa beans 161 198 174 173 179 13 11 79
Tea 71 78 80 87 97 29 37 -3
Agricultural raw materials 153 112 127 132 152 .. -1 52
Tobacco 88 89 92 93 99 273 12 -1
Cotton 164 107 104 92 97 15 -41 -3
Non-coniferous woods 108 118 136 144 165 21 53 65
Minerals, ores and metals 128 98 137 173 278 .. 117 178
Iron ore 97 112 132 226 269 16 176 169
Aluminium 117 92 111 123 166 346 42 66
Copper, grade A 162 98 158 203 371 748 129 271
Copper, wire bars 158 97 153 198 361 68 128 261
Gold 138 130 147 159 217 95 57 117
Memo items:
Crude petroleum 60 102 134 189 228 15 280 128
Unit value index of 
manufactured goods
exported by developed 
countries
123 111 121 125 130 .. 6 30
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on UNCTAD, Commodity Price Bulletin, various 
issues.
a Based on annual averages of free market prices.
The prices for most 
commodities show a high 
degree of variability which 
remains a critical problem 
for the LDCs.
The prices of tea, tobacco 
and cotton — key 
commodities for the LDCs 
which specialize in exporting 
agricultural commodities — 
were lower in 2006 than 
in 2000.
Primary commodities 
accounted for 77 per cent of 
the merchandise exports of 
the LDCs as a group 
in 2005–2006. 
drove up the average price index of minerals, metals and ores. The price of fish 
meat also rose by almost 80 per cent over this period. Coffee prices recovered, with 
Robustas up by 89 per cent and Arabicas up 42 per cent. Sugar prices increased 
by 106 per cent. But cotton prices were marginally lower in 2006 than in 2004, 
and tobacco prices were only marginally higher. The prices of tea, tobacco and 
cotton — key commodities for the LDCs which specialize in exporting agricultural 
commodities — were lower in 2006 than in 2000 (even in nominal terms). The 
price of coffee (both Arabicas and Robustas) was higher, but still lower than in 
1995.
Despite the trend towards higher commodity prices, the prices for most 
commodities over the period 1995–2006 showed a high degree of variability, 
gauged by the standard deviation of annual free market prices (table 7). The highest 
variability is evident in some of the commodities — namely copper, fish meat, gold, 
aluminium and tobacco — that are important to those LDCs which experienced 
the highest price increases in 2005 and 2006. The variability of commodity prices 
remains a critical problem for the LDCs, affecting macroeconomic stability, and 
also threatening debt sustainability and sustained growth. 
3. THE LEVEL OF COMMODITY DEPENDENCE
The latest UNCTAD data show that in 2005–2006, primary commodities 
constituted 77 per cent of the merchandise exports of the LDCs as a group (table 
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8). Fuel exports accounted for 53 per cent of total LDCs’ exports in those years, 
followed by manufactured goods, which made up 22 per cent, and minerals, 
ores and metals, which amounted to 11 per cent. A comparison with estimates 
for 2000–2003 shows a significant shift, with fuel exports rising in relative 
importance, up from 38 per cent of total LDCs’ exports in 2000–2003, and 
manufactures exports decreasing in relative importance, down from 34 per cent 
of total LDCs’ exports during that period. These shifts resulted mainly from the 
relative expansion of fuel exports prices (affecting all fuels exporters) and volumes 
(the latter particularly in Angola, Chad and Equatorial Guinea).
There is, however, a significant difference between the African and the Asian 
LDCs in terms of the composition of their exports. Fuels constituted 64 per cent 
of the exports of the African LDCs in 2005–2006, whilst manufactured goods 
accounted for only 8 per cent. This was almost a mirror image of the exports of 
the Asian LDCs, where manufactured goods made up 55 per cent, whilst fuels 
were 28 per cent. 
With a 10-year perspective, it is apparent that the Asian LDCs as a group 
continue to diversify their export structure away from primary commodities into 
manufactures, whilst the African LDCs are increasingly commodity-dependent, 
owing to increasing commodity prices and — to a lesser extent — to expanding 
volumes. During 2005–2006, 75 per cent of LDCs’ total exports of manufactured 
goods were from the Asian LDCs. Bangladesh alone exported an average of $7.3 
billion of manufactured goods per year, equivalent to 7.4 per cent of the LDCs’ total 
merchandise exports and 34 per cent of the LDCs’ total manufactured exports. 
Similarly, 83 per cent of LDCs’ total exports of fuel were from the African LDCs, 
and a similar 79 per cent of LDCs’ total primary commodity exports excluding
fuels was also from the African LDCs.
In 2003–2005, commodities constituted over 50 per cent of total exports of 
goods and services for over half of the LDCs for which data are available (24 of 
45 countries). Moreover, they accounted for 25 to 50 per cent of total export 
Table 8. Composition of merchandise exports and imports in LDCs, 
African and Asian LDCs, 2005–2006
(Per cent)
Merchandise exports Merchandise imports
LDCs African 
LDCs
Asian
LDCs
LDCs African 
LDCs
Asian
LDCs
% of country group exports
Total all products 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
All food items 8.6 8.3 8.6 15.6 15.4 15.8
Agricultural raw materials 4.8 4.7 4.7 1.8 1.2 3.0
Mineral, ores and metals 11.0 14.9 2.4 1.1 0.8 1.7
Fuels 52.7 63.7 28.4 13.6 12.9 14.9
Manufactured goods 22.4 8.0 55.3 66.0 67.7 63.4
     Chemical products 0.9 0.8 1.1 8.8 8.5 9.4
     Machinery and transport equipment 2.6 3.1 1.2 33.0 38.4 22.7
Primary commodities, including fuels 77.0 91.5 44.1 32.2 30.3 35.3
Primary commodities, excluding fuels 24.3 27.9 15.7 18.6 17.4 20.4
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2007 and 
UNCTAD estimates.
Note:  Data for Afghanistan, Chad, Liberia, Somalia and Tuvalu have been estimated based on 
mirror data.
  Goods categories according to SITC, rev. 3: All food items (0+1+22+4); agricultural raw 
materials (2-22-27-28); mineral, ores and metals (27+28+68+667+971); manufactures (5 
to 8 less 68 and 667);  fuels (3); chemical products (5); machinery and transport equipment 
(7); primary commodities including fuels (0+1+2+3+4+68+667+971).
In 2005–2006, fuel exports 
accounted for 53 per cent 
of total LDCs’ exports, 
followed by manufactured 
goods, which made up 
22 per cent.
Asian LDCs continue 
to diversify their export 
structure away from 
primary commodities into 
manufactures, whilst the 
African LDCs are increasingly 
commodity-dependent.
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earnings in a further nine countries. Commodity export dependence was stronger 
in the African LDCs, where they constituted over 25 per cent of total exports of 
goods and services in 23 of the 33 countries for which data are available. 
4. TECHNOLOGY CONTENT OF EXPORTS
The Least Developed Countries Report 2007 stresses the importance of 
technological progress and of catching up for the LDCs’ effort to develop their 
productive capacities (UNCTAD, 2007). The evolution of export patterns also 
depends on the technological level of the countries. Clearly, an export structure 
that is more technology-intensive is also more dynamic, and volumes and values 
tend to grow faster, while exports that use basic technologies tend to have more 
slowly-growing markets, as well as a smaller scope for technological upgrading 
(Lall, 2000). The technological content of exports is also likely to affect the current 
and future economic growth performance. Technology-intensive products offer 
better prospects for growth, not only because their products tend to be more 
dynamic in trade, but there are also more opportunities for dynamic productivity 
gains and externalities. Although basic technologies tend to be associated with 
more slowly-growing products and markets, they can still experience rapid trade 
growth, which could lead to high economic growth. This form of growth is not, 
however, likely to be sustainable in the long term, as it involves limited learning, 
technological upgrading and spillovers. Once its growth benefits are exhausted, 
countries should target other products with a higher technological content (Lall, 
2000).
Using the taxonomy provided by Lall (2000), manufactured exports are 
classified according to technological content into the following categories5:
(a) Resource-based, including simple and labour-intensive products that are 
applied to the production of processed agricultural goods and minerals;
(b) Low-technology, including those products that rely on basic and well-diffused 
technology;
(c) Medium-technology, including those products that use more complex, skill-
intensive technologies; and
(d) High-technology, including those products that use advanced, research and 
development-based, fast-changing technologies. 
This classification is used to highlight whether there has been technological 
upgrading of the export composition for the LDCs, and the extent of such 
upgrading compared with other developing countries and developed countries 
during 1995–2006. Data show that the export structure of the LDCs experienced 
a small shift away from resource-based into low-technology labour-intensive 
manufactures (chart 3). In 1995–1996, resource-based manufactures accounted 
for 58 per cent of LDCs’ total manufactures exports, against some 33 per cent for 
the low-technology manufactures. By 2005–2006, the latter category increased to 
41 per cent of the manufactures, while the share for resource-based manufactures 
decreased to 52 per cent. The share of medium- and high-technology manufactures 
declined slightly. 
In the case of the other developing countries as a group, the evidence of a 
technology-related change taking place is more evident. While the shares of 
resource-based and medium-technology manufactures remained stable over 
time at 18 per cent and 24 per cent of total manufactured exports of the group 
respectively, the share of low-technology manufactures decreased (from 30 per 
cent in 1995–1996 to 23 per cent in 2005–2006). This development has been to 
A more technology-intensive 
export structure is more 
dynamic, while exports that 
use basic technologies tend 
to have more slowly-growing 
markets and a smaller scope 
for technological upgrading.
The export structure of 
the LDCs experienced 
a small shift away from 
resource-based into low-
technology labour-intensive 
manufactures.
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the benefit of high-technology exports, whose share increased by 7 per cent during 
the 11 years considered. On the other hand, the technology-mature developed 
countries experienced no technology-related change in their composition of 
manufactured exports over the period. 
Using a more detailed classification of technology-based manufactured exports, 
the LDCs as a group have switched their manufacture exports into resource-based 
mineral manufactures and low-technology textile, garment and footwear. Together, 
these two categories accounted for 78 per cent of the LDCs’ total manufactured 
exports in 2005–2006, up from 69 per cent in 1995–1996. These averages mask 
the large difference that exists between African and Asian LDCs. Table 9 shows 
that the former have increased their technological specialization in the exports 
of resource-based minerals, driven by the buoyant international prices, while the 
latter have increased their specialization in low-technology manufactures, namely 
textiles, garments and footwear. Among the LDC sub-groups, the island LDCs 
have experienced the most upgrading of their manufactured exports. They have 
been the only group to experience a strong increase in their share of medium-
technology manufactures (from 15 per cent of total manufactured exports in 
Chart 3.  Distribution of manufactured exports of LDCs, other developing and developed countries according 
to technological categories, 1995–2006
(Per cent of total manufactured exports of the country groups)
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1995–1996 to 25 per cent in 2005–2006). But this is mainly attributable to one 
investment project in one country — exports of engineering manufactures from 
Samoa.
Although export diversification in some LDCs is welcome, there is no room for 
complacency regarding the trade prospects of those LDCs which have managed 
to reduce commodity dependence and increase manufactures exports. Given 
the high degree of competition in global markets for low-technology, low-skill 
manufactures, these countries remain vulnerable. The recent erratic growth 
experience of manufactures exporters such as Lesotho, Haiti and Nepal shows 
that export upgrading is critical to sustained competitiveness. 
5.  COMPOSITION OF MERCHANDISE IMPORTS
In 2005–2006, manufactured goods constituted 66 per cent of the merchandise 
imports of the LDCs. But both food and fuels are also important components 
of the LDCs’ import bill, accounting for 16 per cent and 14 per cent of total 
merchandise imports respectively (table 8).
The position of food imports in LDCs’ trade structure bears close attention, 
given its potential importance for food security and poverty. Because they are 
net food importers, most LDCs are particularly vulnerable to swings in the prices 
of food items and to the financial terms attached to food imports (i.e. their 
concessionality level). In 2005–2006, the food import bill of the LDCs as a group 
reached $14.6 billion, which was equivalent to 4.4 per cent of their GDP. This 
was $6.1 billion higher than in 2000–2002, an increase equivalent to some 2 per 
cent of their GDP in 2005–2006. During 2005–2006, the LDCs’ net food trade 
deficit was equivalent to $7.1 billion. African, Asian and island LDCs, considered 
as groups, were all net food importers. But two thirds of the total food trade deficit 
was attributable to the African LDCs. The majority (36) of LDCs were net food 
importers and net food imports increased in 40 LDCs between 2004 and 2006 
(table 10). 
The high level of food import dependence is a major feature of the vulnerability 
of LDCs and this issue, including the poverty impact of the rising prices in 2007 
and 2008, will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. 
Table 9.  Distribution of manufactured exports according to technological categories for LDCs 
and country groups, 1995–2006
(Per cent of total manufactured exports)
LDCs African LDCs Asian LDCs Island LDCs
1995–
1996
2005–
2006
1995–
1996
2005–
2006
1995–
1996
2005–
2006
1995–
1996
2005–
2006
Resource-based manufactures: Agro-based 19.1 11.1 16.2 8.7 19.2 13.2 62.6 36.8
Resource-based manufactures: Mineral 38.7 40.7 65.6 70.3 9.0 5.6 7.9 24.4
Low technology manufactures: Textile, garment and footwear 29.9 37.2 6.6 8.4 59.4 73.0 7.4 3.0
Low technology manufactures: Other products 2.9 3.4 2.3 4.4 3.6 2.4 4.3 2.5
Medium technology manufactures: Automotive 1.8 1.0 2.4 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.5 3.1
Medium technology manufactures: Process 3.8 2.6 3.0 2.7 4.6 2.4 7.0 5.4
Medium technology manufactures: Engineering 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.8 1.7 1.4 7.4 16.5
High technology manufactures: Electronic and electrical 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.8 2.1 2.8
High technology manufactures: Other 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.8 5.4
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2007 and estimates.
Note: No data for Afghanistan, Chad, Liberia, Somalia and Tuvalu.
  The classification by technological categories is drawn from Lall (2000). Data are grouped by 3-digits SITC, revision 3.
  The manufactured category is larger than in the usual classification as processed foods like sugar, cheese and vegetables are classified as 
resource-based manufactures (rather than commodities).
In 2005–2006, manufactured 
goods constituted 66 per 
cent of the merchandise 
imports of the LDCs. But 
both food and fuel are also 
important components of the 
LDCs’ import bill.
Because they are net food 
importers, most LDCs are 
particularly vulnerable to 
swings in the prices of food 
items and to the financial 
terms attached to food 
imports.
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Table 10.  Food imports and exports in LDCs, by country, 2000–2006
($ million,  per cent)
Food exports Food imports Food balance
$ million $ million % of total imports $ million
2000 2005 2006 2000 2005 2006 2000 2005 2006 2000 2006
Net food importers
 Afghanistan 52.7 89.0 85.7 294.9 827.6 965.4 37.0 21.2 23.4 -242.2 -879.7
 Angola 42.7 24.6 28.2 825.8 941.2 1 305.8 27.2 18.4 18.9 -783.1 -1 277.6
 Bangladesh 418.2 636.5 807.2 1 254.0 1 712.4 2 185.2 16.5 13.1 14.3 -835.9 -1 378.0
 Benin 37.8 69.6 58.0 119.6 268.1 281.4 21.9 29.8 27.8 -81.9 -223.5
 Burkina Faso 34.5 89.4 145.8 91.0 208.7 181.9 12.6 15.0 12.8 -56.5 -36.0
 Cambodia 13.3 146.2 146.0 136.8 225.8 237.7 9.5 9.1 7.9 -123.4 -91.6
 Cape Verde 2.0 12.4 15.6 73.6 133.7 157.0 31.0 30.5 29.2 -71.6 -141.4
 Central African Republic 8.4 0.9 1.6 20.7 31.9 39.8 29.3 17.1 20.0 -12.2 -38.2
 Chad 4.2 0.2 0.2 22.9 55.4 73.3 16.8 13.2 16.1 -18.8 -73.1
 Comoros 6.1 7.3 6.1 15.7 30.9 33.9 21.9 35.2 33.0 -9.6 -27.8
 Dem. Rep. of the Congo 25.9 34.4 29.3 192.2 601.3 729.1 27.6 26.5 26.0 -166.3 -699.8
 Djibouti 4.2 5.5 8.2 38.2 40.0 46.7 24.5 22.4 21.6 -34.0 -38.5
 Equatorial Guinea 36.4 1.0 1.2 44.1 170.4 169.0 9.8 15.0 15.4 -7.7 -167.8
 Eritrea 12.7 2.8 3.1 122.6 162.7 132.6 37.4 33.4 24.0 -109.9 -129.6
 Gambia 13.1 4.0 9.3 65.4 97.9 80.9 34.5 37.7 31.2 -52.3 -71.6
 Guinea 13.1 69.8 72.5 148.0 159.5 136.2 24.2 21.7 16.9 -135.0 -63.7
 Haiti 31.1 23.1 24.0 350.2 394.7 428.9 33.7 26.9 26.2 -319.2 -404.9
 Kiribati 10.2 2.9 4.6 14.4 27.0 20.7 36.7 36.4 33.7 -4.2 -16.2
 Lao People's Dem. Republic 25.7 33.3 37.6 74.5 87.5 93.4 13.9 14.0 12.4 -48.7 -55.7
 Lesotho 16.7 2.5 2.3 108.0 358.2 362.9 17.6 24.4 23.6 -91.4 -360.6
 Liberia 3.8 7.5 7.9 77.6 161.9 172.6 1.4 3.3 2.7 -73.8 -164.7
 Maldives 40.9 102.9 133.6 91.8 115.9 147.9 23.6 15.6 16.0 -50.9 -14.3
 Mali 8.2 55.4 103.1 121.9 219.5 275.8 15.1 12.9 13.9 -113.7 -172.7
 Mozambique 156.2 208.5 376.0 162.4 347.4 398.7 14.0 14.4 13.9 -6.2 -22.6
 Nepal 70.6 162.1 133.5 184.7 251.6 312.0 11.9 13.5 14.9 -114.2 -178.5
 Niger 127.7 67.1 87.1 135.1 251.6 224.8 35.1 34.2 32.7 -7.4 -137.7
 Samoa 4.5 17.5 18.5 25.9 43.5 51.0 24.4 18.2 18.6 -21.4 -32.6
 Sao Tome and Principe 2.7 3.2 3.7 9.2 19.2 21.8 30.8 38.5 30.6 -6.5 -18.1
 Senegal 363.3 423.9 495.4 361.9 984.2 858.4 23.3 28.1 23.4 1.4 -363.0
 Sierra Leone 11.9 14.2 16.5 33.6 53.8 80.3 22.5 15.6 20.6 -21.7 -63.8
 Somalia 100.5 128.7 97.9 153.4 257.2 303.1 47.3 45.0 50.3 -52.9 -205.2
 Sudan 272.9 299.2 298.6 360.0 921.7 1 053.0 21.7 12.5 11.9 -87.1 -754.3
 Timor-Leste 0.0 8.0 9.0 24.5 17.9 19.2 19.5 17.6 18.4 -24.5 -10.2
 Togo 37.5 77.2 79.7 59.5 92.0 99.7 18.4 15.5 15.6 -21.9 -20.0
 Tuvalu 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.4 3.8 3.1 34.2 13.0 8.0 -2.2 -3.1
 Yemen 87.5 247.2 273.5 829.1 1 154.5 1 044.1 35.6 23.7 21.2 -741.6 -770.6
Net food exporters
 Bhutan 13.7 32.8 79.3 31.4 29.6 26.1 17.9 10.4 8.4 -17.6 53.2
 Burundi 36.8 52.8 53.7 34.5 16.6 31.0 22.9 6.5 7.5 2.3 22.6
 Ethiopia 320.7 680.7 735.8 88.1 435.9 443.9 7.0 10.6 8.5 232.6 291.9
 Guinea-Bissau 31.7 76.6 67.9 12.1 25.8 24.6 24.7 24.7 26.9 19.5 43.3
 Madagascar 273.4 244.4 330.0 130.6 259.0 255.4 13.2 15.4 14.5 142.8 74.5
 Malawi 331.1 393.9 551.3 52.3 212.5 183.2 9.8 18.2 15.1 278.8 368.2
 Mauritania 71.2 137.7 356.4 66.1 137.2 268.6 18.7 10.2 25.0 5.1 87.7
 Myanmar 330.1 746.9 935.4 278.5 274.9 301.6 11.6 13.9 14.0 51.6 633.8
 Rwanda 29.7 74.8 79.6 44.0 42.8 61.6 20.8 10.6 12.4 -14.3 18.0
 Solomon Islands 21.7 20.3 17.2 12.8 17.9 18.6 13.0 11.8 11.3 9.0 -1.4
 Uganda 242.5 473.4 523.2 134.1 308.1 348.0 14.1 15.0 13.6 108.4 175.2
 United Republic of Tanzania 359.5 574.0 585.4 231.6 331.7 542.5 14.6 10.1 12.2 127.9 42.9
 Vanuatu 17.9 23.3 34.2 20.8 18.0 21.4 23.9 12.0 13.4 -2.8 12.8
 Zambia 83.6 239.4 226.1 71.8 159.0 233.5 8.1 6.2 7.6 11.9 -7.3
LDCs 4 261.0 6 849.0 8 196.0 7 853.9 13 699.6 15 487.3 17.3 15.9 15.4 -3 592.9 -7 291.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on United Nations/DESA Statistics Division and UNCTAD estimates.
Note: Countries have been classified according to a three-year (2004–2006) average of food balance.
  For SITC codes for food, see note to table 8.
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6. THE CONTINUING MARGINALIZATION OF LDCS IN WORLD TRADE
The net result of all the recent trends identified previously is that the LDCs are 
in a situation where they are highly integrated with the global economy through 
trade, but at the same time, their marginalization, as measured by their level of 
participation in world trade, remains significant. 
Total merchandise trade (including both exports and imports) of the LDCs as 
a group amounted to 56 per cent of their GDP in 2006. This was up from 44 per 
cent in 2000. But the share of the LDCs in world merchandise trade continued 
to remain tiny despite the recent export boom for the group as a whole. In 2006, 
LDCs generated only 0.8 per cent of world merchandise exports. Although this 
represented an important increase with respect to the 0.5 per cent of world 
merchandise exports in 2000, it was mainly driven by fuel exports. Excluding 
fuels, the share of LDCs’ exports in world exports only grew from 0.4 per cent in 
2000 to 0.5 per cent in 2006. 
Chart 4 shows the evolution of the share in world merchandise exports, by 
sectors, of the LDCs, the other developing countries (ODCs) and developed 
countries. Over the period considered, the LDCs increased their world share in 
fuels, from 2 per cent in 2000 to 2.5 per cent in 2006. Their world share of 
Chart 4.  Shares in world merchandise exports of LDCs, ODCs and developed countries, total and by sectors, 
1995–2006
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat estimates based on UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2007. No data available for Afghanistan, Chad, Liberia, Somalia 
and Tuvalu.
Note: The world shares do not add up to 100 as the economies in transition are not shown in a separate chart.
  For the SITC classification by products, refer to table 8.
In 2006, LDCs generated 
only 0.8 per cent of world 
merchandise exports, but 
excluding fuels, this share 
was only 0.5 per cent. 
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primary products excluding fuels also increased over time, from 1.1 per cent in 
2000 to 1.4 per cent in 2006. On the other hand, in spite of the rapid increase 
in manufactured exports of the Asian LDCs, the LDCs’ total share in world 
manufactured exports has stagnated over time at around 0.2 per cent. This is a 
major area where most LDCs are lagging behind other developing countries. The 
latter together accounted for 34 per cent of world manufactured exports, up from 
27 per cent in 2000.
?????????????????????????????6
The strong economic performance of the LDCs in recent years has been 
underpinned not only by record exports, but also by higher levels of long-term 
capital inflows than during the late 1990s and during the early part of the present 
decade. These capital inflows include both private capital inflows and official flows, 
mostly ODA. But whereas exports continued to surge between 2004 and 2006, 
the increase in long-term capital inflows slowed significantly during this period. 
International reserves have also increased significantly, reducing the availability 
of external resources for development and poverty reduction. The slowdown in 
the increase in long-term capital inflows also occurred along with increasing profit 
remittances on FDI and interest payment on long-term debt. As a consequence, 
aggregate net transfers to the LDCs actually declined over the period 2004–2006.7
This trend has been partially offset by rising workers’ remittances to the LDCs, 
though the developmental impact of remittances versus other type of inflows 
remains unclear. 
1. OVERALL PICTURE
Excluding debt forgiveness grants, aggregate net foreign resource flows 
increased during the period 2000–2003 from an annual average of $17.3 billion 
to $27 billion in 2004 (table 11). This was more than double the average level of 
long-term capital inflows of the second half of the 1990s. But the strong upward 
trend was broken in 2004 and these flows only increased marginally in 2005 and 
reached $28.9 billion in 2006.
 As in earlier years, the increase in aggregate net resource flows to the LDCs 
from 2004 to 2006 was mainly attributable to grants disbursements, which 
increased by $2.1 billion over this period (excluding debt forgiveness and technical 
cooperation), and also FDI inflows, which increased by about $3 billion. But as 
the more detailed analysis of ODA flows and FDI later in this section shows, both 
of these types of capital inflows are highly concentrated geographically. Moreover, 
ODA inflows are not oriented to building up the productive base of the economy 
which is essential for future growth sustainability.
Official net resource flows continue to be the main source of long-term capital 
inflows to the LDCs. Excluding debt forgiveness grants, they accounted for 61 per 
cent of aggregate net resource flows to the LDCs in 2006, up from an average 
of 57 per cent during 2000–2003. Grants (excluding technical cooperation and 
debt forgiveness) constituted 50 per cent of aggregate net resource flows to LDCs 
in 2006. Portfolio equity flows remained of marginal significance and the main 
source of debt flows was from multilateral creditors, whose net loans to the LDCs 
were equivalent to $3.7 billion in 2006, 13 per cent of aggregate net resource 
flows.
Whereas exports continued 
to surge between 2004 and 
2006, the increase in long-
term capital inflows slowed 
significantly during this 
period.
The increase in aggregate net 
resource flows to the LDCs 
from 2004 to 2006 was 
mainly attributable 
to grants disbursements 
and FDI inflows.
LDCs’ total share in world 
manufactured exports has 
stagnated over time at 
around 0.2 per cent.
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An important development in 2006 was that net debt flows from private 
creditors, which had always been small for the LDCs as a group, turned negative, 
and the negative net debt flows from bilateral creditors increased. Net debt 
flows to LDCs from both official and private creditors actually fell by $3.4 billion 
over the period 2004–2006. Excluding debt forgiveness grants, the slowdown 
in the increase in aggregate net resource flows to LDCs since 2004 was mainly 
attributable to the smaller increase in ODA grants to LDCs, as well as the already 
mentioned decline in net debt flows. 
The reliance of LDCs on external finance as measured by the ratio of aggregate 
net resource flows to GDP has declined somewhat in recent years (chart 5). 
Excluding debt forgiveness grants, this ratio was 8 per cent in 2006, down from 11 
per cent in 2004. But the reliance on external finance remains much higher than 
in other developing countries, for which the average ratio was 3 per cent in 2006. 
A regional breakdown shows that African and island LDCs were particularly reliant 
on external finance. Aggregate net resource flows were equivalent to 11 per cent 
of GDP in African LDCs and 12 per cent of GDP in island LDCs in 2006. 
A very significant emerging trend during the period 2004–2006 is the fall 
in aggregate net transfers to the LDCs. Excluding debt forgiveness grants, such 
transfers declined from $19.2 billion in 2004 to $14.7 billion in 2006 — this is a 
fall of almost one quarter. Given the high level of dependence of LDCs on external 
finance, this trend does not bode well for the future if it continues. 
The fall in aggregate net transfers is due to a combination of tendencies. 
However, it is striking that profit remittances on FDI have soared. They almost 
doubled between 2004 and 2006, from $6.6 billion to $12.4 billion. Interest 
payments on long-term debt also rose. The increase in interest payments on long-
term debt and profit remittances is such that for the LDCs group as a whole, the 
Table 11.  Long-term net capital flows and transfers to LDCs, 1995–2006
($ million)
1995–1999 2000–2003 2004 2005 2006
A. Aggregate net foreign resource flows 13 788 20 087 30 850 29 886 59 364
A’. Aggregate net foreign resource flows, excluding debt forgiveness grantsa 13 788 17 321 27 087 27 413 28 864
Official net resource flows 9 947 12 692 20 057 20 075 48 131
Official net resource flows, excluding debt forgiveness grantsa 9 947 9 926 16 295 17 602 17 630
Grants, excluding technical cooperation 7 586 10 018 16 270 16 421 45 134
Official debt flows 2 361 2 675 3 787 3 654 2 997
Bilateral -208 -545 -191 -590 -668
Multilateral 2 569 3 220 3 978 4 244 3 666
Private net resource flows 3 842 7 395 10 793 9 811 11 233
Foreign direct investment 3 744 7 040 9 331 7 783 12 334
Portfolio equity flows -6 16 18 55 42
Private debt flows 104 339 1 444 1 973 -1 143
Private, non-guaranteed -11 123 480 252 467
Private, guaranteed 115 216 964 1 720 -1 610
B. Aggregate net transfers (A–C–D) 11 260 15 328 22 960 18 650 45 171
B’. Aggregate net transfers, excluding debt forgiveness grantsa (A’–C–D) 11 260 12 561 19 198 16 177 14 671
C. Interest payments on long-term debt 1 131 1 058 1 276 1 399 1 914
D. Profit remittances on FDI 1 398 3 701 6 613 9 838 12 279
Memo item:
International reservesb -696 -2 882 -5 517 -2 976 -10 115
International reserves as % GDP 7.1 9.9 11.9 11.1 12.4
Source: UNCTAD secretariat estimates based on World Bank, Global Development Finance, online, April 2008.
Note: No data available for Afghanistan, Kiribati, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu.
a  From 2000 onwards.  b  Year-to-year change. A negative figure implies an increase in international reserves.
Aggregate net transfers to 
the LDCs declined by almost 
one quarter between 
2004 and 2006. 
Profit remittances on FDI 
soared and exceeded net 
FDI inflows in both 2005 
and 2006. 
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sum of these outflows was almost equivalent to ODA grants (excluding technical 
cooperation and debt forgiveness) to LDCs in 2006. Moreover, profit remittances 
on FDI actually exceeded net FDI inflows in 2005 and  were more or less equal 
to them in 2006. 
The rise in profit remittances was apparent between 2000 and 2004, but 
did not lead to declining aggregate net transfers to the LDCs because long-term 
capital inflows were rising sharply over this period, driven by increased aid 
inflows. However, with a pause in the sharp upswing of capital inflows, and also 
the rise in interest payments in spite of debt relief, aggregate net transfers have 
fallen significantly. 
Finally, an important emerging trend in the LDCs is that international reserves 
have increased markedly (table 11). According to available data, international 
reserves reached a record level of $43 billion in 2006, up from $15 billion in 2000. 
International reserves increased by 17 per cent per annum between 2000 and 
2004, and at an accelerated rate of 20 per cent per annum from 2004 to 2006. In 
2006, the international reserves of the LDCs as a group were equivalent to 12.4 
per cent of GDP, up from an annual average of 7.1 per cent during 1995–1999.
These trends mirror those in other developing countries. However, whilst 
the increase in international reserves in other developing countries has been 
prompted by the objective of avoiding the financial crises which were such a 
significant feature of the 1990s, the increase in such reserves in the LDCs is 
more associated with macro-economic advice and conditionality and as a buffer 
against aid volatility (see chapter 3 of this Report). The right level of international 
reserves for the LDCs, which face volatility of official flows more than volatility of 
private flows, is a complex issue. However, the build-up in international reserves 
means that the availability of external financial resources for promoting economic 
development and poverty reduction has been less than it could have been. The 
Chart 5.  Aggregate net foreign resource flows to LDCs, by country groups, and ODCs, 2000–2006
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tistics Division for GDP.
International reserves 
increased from from $15 
billion in 2000 to a record 
level of $43 billion in 2006.
The increase in such reserves 
in the LDCs is associated 
with macro-economic advice, 
conditionality and 
aid volatility.
26 The Least Developed Countries Report 2008
increase in international reserves has thus been another factor attenuating the 
developmental impact of increased capital inflows in recent years. 
2. TRENDS IN AID FLOWS
It is possible to get a more detailed picture of trends in official development 
assistance from the data of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee (DAC). These show 
that net ODA disbursements to the LDCs from all donors reporting to OECD/DAC 
increased to a record level of $28.1 billion in 2006 (table 12).8 This constituted 
26.7 per cent of total ODA disbursed to all developing countries by all donors, up 
from 25.3 per cent in 2000. In nominal terms, aid inflows to the LDCs are more 
than double the level in 2000. 
In real terms, net ODA disbursements to the LDCs have been increasing less 
dramatically. Real disbursements actually reached a plateau in 2003 after a strong 
surge from 1999 to 2003, and only increased again in 2006. Excluding debt relief, 
net ODA disbursements have been increasing steadily since 1999. However, the 
rate of increase has been slower from 2003 onward (chart 6). 
Taking a long-term view which goes back to 1990, it is clear that the recent 
nominal doubling of aid to the LDCs is actually reversing the 1990s downward 
trend in aid. In real terms, aid disbursements to the LDCs are now higher than 
they were in 1990. But in real per capita terms, they are still less than the 1990 
level. Indeed, in 2006, real net ODA disbursements to the LDCs per capita stood 
at $35, which was 17 per cent lower than it had been in 1990. 
(a) Geographical distribution of aid amongst the LDCs 
 A regional comparison shows that, in 2006, 74 per cent of aid inflows went to 
the African LDCs, which was roughly the same proportion as in 2000. Indicators 
of the economic importance of aid show that the African LDCs are much more 
aid-dependent than the Asian LDCs. In 2006, aid constituted 9.3 per cent of GDP 
in African LDCs, compared with 4.8 per cent of GDP in the Asian LDCs (or 2.7 
per cent if Afghanistan is excluded). Moreover, in 2006, aid inflows per capita to 
the African LDCs were double those to the Asian LDCs ($43 versus $20). But it is 
also clear that the island LDCs as a group are the most aid dependent of all LDCs. 
Although aid flowing to the island LDCs has been decreasing over time, in 2006 it 
still was equivalent to $181.9 per capita and 17 per cent of GDP.
Within these overall regional patterns, there are significant differences amongst 
the LDCs in terms of ODA trends. In 2006, 17 LDCs experienced a decrease in 
Table 12.  Net ODA disbursements to LDCs from all donorsa, by country groups, 2000–2006
($ million, per cent, $ per capita)
$ million % of GDP  $ per capita
2000 2005 2006 2000 2005 2006 2000 2005 2006
LDCs 12 621.4 25 882.0 28 181.3 7.2 8.5 7.9 18.6 33.8 35.9
  Excluding Afghanistan 12 485.4 23 129.9 25 181.5 7.1 7.8 7.2 19.0 31.2 33.2
  Excluding Afghanistan, Dem. Rep. of
  the Congo and Sudan
12 087.9 19 470.3 21 067.6 7.6 7.4 6.9 21.0 30.1 31.9
African LDCs 9 061.7 18 651.7 20 915.7 9.8 10.2 9.3 22.2 39.8 43.5
Asian LDCs 2 790.0 5 920.2 6 155.0 3.9 5.1 4.8 10.4 20.1 20.5
  Excluding Afghanistan 2 654.0 3 168.1 3 155.3 3.5 2.8 2.7 10.8 11.7 11.5
Island LDCs 561.3 799.1 709.3 21.5 21.2 17.0 172.3 210.6 181.9
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/DAC, online data, March 2008, and United Nations/DESA Statistics Division for GDP and 
population.
a This includes multilateral and bilateral aid from OECD/DAC member countries and non-DAC members reporting to OECD/DAC (see endnote 8).
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Chart 6.  Real net ODA disbursements to LDCs including and excluding debt relief, 1990–2006
(Million of 2006 dollars, $ per capita)
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real aid disbursements, while for 10 LDCs aid disbursements increased by 20 per 
cent or above. Of the 17 LDCs receiving less aid, 15 had increasing aid in the 
period 2000–2004. This is indicative of the instability in aid disbursements which 
Governments have to cope with.
One important feature of the geographical distribution of aid is the high level 
of concentration in ODA inflows for a few countries. In 2006, Afghanistan, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan accounted for one fourth of total 
net ODA disbursements going to the LDCs, while the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Sudan accounted for one fourth of total nominal ODA going to the 
African LDCs. 
Three countries accounted 
for one fourth of total net 
ODA disbursements to 
the LDCs in 2006.
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A second important feature is that from 2000 to 2006, real ODA disbursements 
flowed into post-conflict and post-disaster countries at a faster pace than in the 
other LDCs. ODA inflows to Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, Maldives, Somalia and Sudan, most of whom 
are in this category, increased at an average annual growth rate of 10 per cent or 
higher during this period. These nine countries, which in 2000 were receiving 
only 13.6 per cent of total ODA disbursements, received 38.1 per cent in 2006. 
During the same period, 2000–2006, ODA inflows into 19 LDCs were declining. 
In 2000, these countries (Angola, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Comoros, Eritrea, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste, 
Togo, Vanuatu and Yemen) were receiving 37.4 per cent of total disbursements; 
by 2006, they only received 20.4 per cent (table 13).
A third important feature of the geographical distribution of aid is that ODA 
disbursements seem to be inversely correlated with export performance. On the 
one hand, net ODA inflows to oil-exporting and manufactures-exporting LDCs, 
which are achieving stronger export growth, are falling. On the other hand, aid 
per capita to the LDCs which specialize in exporting agricultural commodities, 
where export growth has been sluggish, increased in real terms, from an annual 
average of $36 per capita in 2000 to $67 per capita in 2006. Aid as a share of GDP 
also rose for this group of countries over the same dates, from 13.5 per cent to 
21.4 per cent. This has certainly helped the LDCs which specialize in agricultural 
exports to sustain their growth in spite of weak trade performance. But the fact 
that decisions on aid allocation, may be responding to the trade performance of 
countries suggests that LDCs’ development partners are not facilitating mutual 
synergies between aid and trade in supporting development in the LDCs. In effect, 
a good export performance is associated with falling aid receipts rather than aid 
and trade working together to reinforce development. 
Finally, it is worth noting that a large number of the very high-growth LDCs in 
2006 received significant aid inflows in the previous year. Of the 19 very high-
growth LDCs in 2006, aid constituted over 10 per cent of GDP in 14 of them 
in 2005. The only exceptions to this pattern were two oil exporters (Angola and 
Sudan), two successful Asian manufactures exporters (Bangladesh and Cambodia) 
and Myanmar. 
(b) Type and purpose of aid
The type and purpose of aid has a strong influence on the impact of aid inflows 
on long-term growth. Table 14 shows a breakdown of ODA disbursements into 
grants and loans, and also indicates the allocation of grants between technical 
cooperation, debt relief, humanitarian aid and development food aid. In 
interpreting the table, it is important to note that the bulk of debt forgiveness 
grants in 2006 was due to the writing-off of ODA principal, in effect converting 
past ODA loans into grants. In order to avoid double counting, such ODA principal 
forgiveness is included as an offsetting entry for debt relief under net ODA loans. 
It is not new aid and, as is standard practice, is thus not included in the analysis of 
the composition of aid below. The remainder of debt forgiveness grants includes 
ODA interest forgiven and also the use of ODA for other debt forgiveness. It is this 
sum which is counted here as new aid and is used in estimating the share of aid 
going to debt relief. 
With this in view, four important features are clear from the table: 
(a) The proportion of net ODA disbursements provided in the form of grants 
continues to rise. It constituted 87 per cent of net ODA disbursements in 
2006, up from an annual average of 80 per cent during 2000–2004; 
ODA disbursements flowed 
into post-conflict and post-
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ODA disbursements seem 
to be inversely correlated 
with export performance 
negating synergies between 
aid and trade in supporting 
development.
A large number of the very 
high-growth LDCs in 2006 
received significant aid 
inflows in the previous year. 
The proportion of net ODA 
disbursements provided in 
the form of grants rose to 
87 per cent in 2006.
29How Sustainable is LDCs’ Growth?
Table 13. Real net ODA disbursements to LDCs, by country and country groups, 2000–2006
Average annual growth rates $ per capita  % of real GDP
2000–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2000 2005 2006 2000 2005 2006
Countries with real GDP growth > 6% in 2006
Maldives 0.5 178.5 -50.8 83.7 260.6 126.2 3.9 10.3 4.1
Angola 27.6 -62.8 -62.1 29.3 27.1 10.0 2.0 1.3 0.4
Mauritania -11.2 6.5 -6.4 109.9 66.2 60.3 18.4 10.5 8.6
Sudan 41.3 79.1 8.9 9.0 49.7 52.9 1.7 7.4 7.1
Afghanistan 82.1 23.7 5.9 9.2 109.8 111.7 5.1 40.2 38.4
Ethiopia 17.5 3.1 -0.8 13.0 24.2 23.4 10.4 16.8 15.1
Sierra Leone 4.5 -4.9 4.4 54.4 61.6 62.6 29.5 22.6 21.5
Mozambique -0.1 0.7 23.2 66.4 62.2 75.0 27.4 19.2 21.8
Malawi -1.8 12.2 12.4 49.8 43.7 47.8 31.4 27.8 28.8
Bhutan 2.5 13.2 4.5 126.8 140.7 144.4 12.2 10.7 10.3
Lao People's Democratic Republic -3.5 8.4 21.7 63.8 52.2 62.5 15.8 10.3 11.7
Cambodia 0.4 9.6 -3.0 38.7 38.7 36.9 12.4 8.7 7.9
Liberia 31.1 6.1 12.9 28.4 67.6 73.4 12.6 42.4 44.7
Myanmar 0.5 14.6 0.2 2.6 3.0 3.0 1.8 1.2 1.1
Bangladesh 1.0 -7.7 -11.3 10.6 8.7 7.6 3.0 2.1 1.7
Democratic Republic of the Congo 99.5 -1.8 9.4 4.9 31.1 33.0 4.2 25.7 26.4
Uganda 1.9 -3.8 28.0 45.3 40.7 50.4 16.2 12.8 15.4
Burundi 26.8 -1.4 10.8 19.1 46.5 49.5 17.7 45.8 47.9
Zambia 4.9 -18.8 48.5 102.2 81.5 118.7 18.4 12.8 17.9
Countries with real GDP growth between 3% and 6% in 2006
United Republic of Tanzania 7.7 -17.3 19.9 38.9 38.5 45.0 14.6 11.8 13.3
Burkina Faso 6.9 6.9 24.7 39.3 48.9 59.1 11.7 12.6 14.9
Gambia -2.6 8.7 19.3 45.9 37.9 44.0 16.6 13.3 15.0
Sao Tome and Principe -9.8 -6.6 -34.4 356.6 209.0 134.9 84.9 44.9 27.9
Cape Verde 6.5 10.7 -17.3 287.9 319.9 258.4 17.0 16.5 12.9
Guinea 3.7 -28.3 -19.3 23.8 22.1 17.5 7.8 6.8 5.2
Solomon Islands 3.5 51.5 1.6 246.0 419.6 416.1 29.4 53.0 51.3
Madagascar 27.5 -28.2 -19.2 25.6 49.0 38.5 8.8 17.3 13.4
Guinea-Bissau -1.4 0.5 1.0 84.6 49.5 48.6 38.2 26.3 25.4
Mali 6.2 19.9 15.1 48.3 60.2 67.2 12.0 12.7 14.0
Djibouti -5.9 17.2 49.9 125.9 94.9 139.8 15.0 10.8 15.6
Togo -7.4 25.2 -7.5 17.4 13.3 11.9 4.9 3.9 3.5
Senegal 11.7 -36.4 19.8 55.3 57.1 66.7 8.3 7.8 9.0
Samoa -7.3 35.8 9.3 212.9 239.1 259.1 11.0 10.5 11.1
Yemen -13.2 30.8 -17.5 18.7 15.9 12.8 2.6 2.1 1.7
Benin 2.3 -12.2 5.6 45.7 40.8 41.8 9.3 7.9 8.1
Niger 19.0 -7.3 -23.5 25.0 38.5 28.5 10.7 15.7 11.6
Vanuatu -10.7 -0.9 22.5 335.3 183.3 219.0 18.7 11.4 13.5
Central African Republic -1.0 -14.8 36.0 24.5 22.8 30.5 6.8 7.2 9.5
Rwanda 1.7 14.9 -0.3 53.6 61.8 60.2 27.2 27.4 26.5
Countries with  real GDP growth < 3% in 2006
Chad 14.3 13.8 -27.4 20.9 37.7 26.5 6.0 6.5 4.6
Somalia 7.1 13.9 59.8 20.4 28.9 44.9 7.1 10.2 16.0
Haiti 1.7 86.2 11.8 30.0 53.9 59.3 6.3 12.6 13.7
Eritrea 1.8 30.4 -64.6 64.0 78.4 26.8 29.7 36.6 12.7
Nepal -1.8 -2.6 18.4 19.6 15.7 18.2 7.4 5.7 6.6
Lesotho 14.6 -29.9 2.2 28.1 34.6 35.1 4.2 4.7 4.7
Comoros -4.0 -4.3 18.8 38.5 31.2 36.1 7.9 6.5 7.6
Tuvalu 1.5 6.5 76.3 587.1 860.1 1 509.6 31.6 36.1 62.9
Kiribati -3.4 59.4 .. 266.6 302.6 .. 34.9 37.3 ..
Equatorial Guinea 0.4 26.2 -32.9 76.7 79.5 52.1 1.5 0.5 0.4
Timor-Leste -16.1 10.0 11.2 410.3 173.1 184.5 100.5 52.8 59.7
LDCs by export specialization
Oil 14.4 7.4 -8.2 21.2 37.4 33.5 2.8 3.7 3.1
Agricultural 15.9 11.7 13.7 35.9 61.1 67.2 13.5 20.1 21.4
Mineral 19.1 -4.1 14.6 33.5 44.4 49.5 14.3 16.9 18.2
Manufactures 0.9 4.9 -0.8 15.1 14.4 14.0 4.3 3.5 3.3
Services 8.5 -0.1 0.8 28.3 35.6 35.0 14.4 15.5 14.6
Mixed 13.0 -24.6 0.7 18.4 23.4 23.1 6.9 6.9 6.5
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/DAC online, March 2008, and United Nations/DESA Statistics Division for population and GDP.
Note: Real GDP figures have been re-based to 2005 using an implicit GDP deflator. Country ranking as in table 2.
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(b) Technical cooperation grants amounted to almost a fifth of net ODA 
disbursements to LDCs in 2006;
(c) Humanitarian aid and food aid are also important components of aid to 
LDCs. They together accounted for as much as 18 per cent of net ODA 
disbursements in 2005 and 15 per cent in 2006; and
(d) Debt relief was a lower share of net ODA disbursements in 2005 and 2006 
than in the period 2000–2004, falling to 8 per cent in 2006.9
Together, grants for technical cooperation, debt relief (excluding ODA principal 
forgiveness), humanitarian aid and food aid absorbed 42 per cent of net ODA 
disbursements in 2006. This was around the same share as during 2000–2004. 
But it meant that only 58 per cent of ODA disbursements were available as 
financial resources for development projects and programmes within the LDCs. 
In 2006, this was equivalent to $16.4 billion out of net ODA disbursements of 
$28.2 billion.
It is possible to get an idea of the trends in the sectoral distribution of aid using 
OECD/DAC data on ODA commitments. These clearly show that multilateral and 
bilateral aid commitments are increasingly concentrated on social infrastructure 
and services. ODA commitments to social infrastructure and services constituted 
42 per cent of net ODA disbursements to the LDCs in 2006, up from an average 
of 34 per cent during the period 2000–2004 and 31 per cent in the second half 
of the 1990s. In 2006, the share of aid going to education, health, population 
programmes, water supply and sanitation, Government and civil society all were 
higher than during the period 2000–2004. This reflects the impact of the focus 
on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as the concern to improve 
governance.
In contrast, aid to build productive sectors and economic infrastructure has 
continued to receive less priority. The share of aid committed to economic 
infrastructure and production sectors (including multisector) constituted just 25 
per cent of total ODA commitments to the LDCs in 2006. This was similar to 
the level during the period 2000–2004. Despite all the rhetoric of a renewed 
interest in economic infrastructure, the share of aid committed to transport and 
storage and energy was less in 2006 than in 2000–2004. The share committed 
Table 14. Net ODA disbursements from all donors to LDCs, by aid type, 
2000–2006
(Million 2006 dollars)
2000–2004 2005 2006
ODA total net 22 919.2 26 588.9 28 181.3
ODA grants, total 19 172.0 23 825.3 52 707.9
Of which:
   Technical cooperation 4 119.5 5 151.2 5 438.6
   Debt forgiveness grants 3 508.3 2 461.3 30 500.5
 Of which:
        ODA principal forgiven 694.7 1 449.0 28 267.2
        Other 2 813.5 1 012.4 2 233.4
   Humanitarian aid 2 266.7 4 114.7 3 555.9
   Development food aid 719.7 679.1 587.6
ODA loans total net 3 747.2 2 763.7 -24 526.6
Of which:
      Net loansa 4 437.0 4 212.8 3 740.6
      Offsetting entry for debt relief -694.7 -1 449.0 -28 267.2
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/DAC online, April 2008.
a Represents the difference between loans extended and loans received.
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to agriculture (including forestry and fishing) and industry (including mining and 
construction) also declined over that period. The share of aid committed to 
economic infrastructure and production sectors was also much lower than during 
1995–1999, when it was 38 per cent. Aid commitments to improve economic 
infrastructure decreased from 18 per cent of total commitments to the LDCs 
in 1995–1999 to 12 per cent in 2006. Commitments to transport and storage 
infrastructure decreased from 11 per cent of total commitments to the LDCs in 
1995–1999 to 6 per cent in 2006, and disbursements to energy-related sectors 
shrank from 5 per cent to 2 per cent in 2006 (table 15). Earlier estimates in the 
Least Developed Countries Report 2006 showed that economic infrastructure and 
production sectors constituted as much as 48 per cent of total aid commitments 
during 1992–1994 (UNCTAD, 2006: 16–20). 
It is impossible to get a clear picture of the sectoral composition of aid 
disbursements before 2002, owing to data unreliability. However, the recent 
data show that the share of aid disbursements to economic infrastructure and 
production sectors is even lower than the commitments data indicate. In 2006, 
just 19 per cent of net ODA disbursements to the LDCs went to economic 
infrastructure and production sectors. 
To conclude, it is apparent that the upsurge in aid to the LDCs since 1999 has 
been associated with a major shift away from production sectors and economic 
infrastructure to social infrastructure and services. The support to sectors that could 
best facilitate the economic capability-building process in the LDCs has been 
drastically downsized in relative terms. The increased share of aid going to social 
sectors reflects donors’ approach to poverty reduction. But poverty reduction 
depends on both private incomes and public services. The focus on improving 
and extending public services in health and education is certainly important. 
But sustainable poverty reduction also requires the expansion of employment 
Table 15. Total sectoral allocation of nominal ODA disbursements 
and commitments to LDCs, bilateral and multilateral, 1995–2006
(Per cent)
Commitments Disbursements
1995–
1999
2000–
2004
2005 2006 2005 2006
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Social infrastructure and services 31.0 33.7 35.0 42.3 36.4 41.0
   Education 7.7 8.3 6.8 9.4 7.5 8.0
   Health 6.6 5.1 8.0 7.4 6.4 7.7
   Water supply and sanitation 5.2 3.9 2.9 5.6 2.3 2.6
   Government and civil society 6.7 9.4 10.4 11.5 10.2 13.5
Commodity aid 12.9 15.2 12.5 13.1 10.0 11.4
Action relating to debt 10.0 13.6 11.0 7.4 11.6 11.2
Emergency assistance and reconstruction 7.2 10.5 14.8 11.6 18.2 15.6
   Sub-total 61.4 73.7 73.3 74.4 76.2 79.2
Economic infrastructure 18.7 12.9 12.5 11.6 8.8 8.9
   Transport and storage 10.8 7.0 8.1 6.3 5.6 5.0
   Communications 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2
   Energy 5.1 3.3 3.0 1.9 1.7 0.9
   Banking and financial services 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.4
Production sectors 10.7 6.6 6.7 6.8 4.1 4.0
Multisector 8.1 5.9 5.8 6.4 4.2 5.7
   Sub-total 37.3 24.7 25.0 24.7 17.1 18.6
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD, Creditor Reporting System, online, May 
2008.
Note: The shares do not add up to 100 as aid in support to NGOs, administrative costs of donors, 
support for refugees and unallocated aid are not shown.
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and income-earning opportunities, and for this, aid for productive sectors and 
economic infrastructure is vital (see chapter 2 of this Report).
(c) Progress on aid commitments of the Brussels Programme of Action
The aid effort of all DAC member countries, as measured by the ODA to gross 
national income (GNI) ratio, stood at 0.09 per cent in 2006, up from 0.08 per cent 
in 2005 and 0.06 per cent in 2002. In 2006, more DAC member countries met the 
Brussels Programme of Action targets for aid. Eight DAC members (Luxembourg, 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium and United Kingdom) 
met the programme target of making net ODA disbursements equal to or higher 
than 0.15 per cent of their GNI, whilst six of these countries (the above countries 
except Belgium and United Kingdom) met the higher target of 0.20 per cent of 
GNI. Belgium and the United Kingdom both managed to increase their net ODA 
disbursements as shares of GNI between 2005 and 2006. Of the countries that 
did not meet the target, Spain and Italy decreased their net aid disbursements as 
a share of GNI between 2005 and 2006. 
Among the DAC member countries, the United States is still the largest donor 
to the LDCs in absolute terms. In 2006, its net aid disbursements amounted to 
$6.4 billion, which accounted for 21.8 per cent of total DAC donors’ aid. With 
$3.8 billion, the United Kingdom became the second largest donor to the LDCs 
in absolute terms in 2006, up from $2.7 billion in 2005. The European Union as 
a whole provided aid disbursements equivalent to $16.3 billion in 2006, 56 per 
cent of total DAC disbursements to the LDCs in 2006 and 28 per cent of their 
total aid (table 16). 
One of the important commitments of the Brussels Programme of Action was 
the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to 
the Least Developed Countries. OECD progress reports on the implementation 
of this recommendation indicate that substantial progress has been made in 
implementing the recommendation. However, progress with expanding the 
coverage of the recommendation to include food aid and technical cooperation 
has been limited (OECD, 2008a). Moreover, a large proportion of contracts 
financed by untied aid are still going to donor country suppliers (OECD, 2008b). 
This is mainly because of practical constraints on local firms’ participation in donor-
funded procurement, including weak supply capacities and limited knowledge of 
international tendering. There are still gaps in data availability which limit analysis 
of progress on untying. But OECD/DAC statistics on the tying status of bilateral aid 
show that over 90 per cent of aid commitments (excluding technical cooperation 
and administrative costs) were untied in 2006 in all DAC members except Austria, 
where the untying ratio stood at 89.5 per cent, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
(OECD 2008b: 187). No data were reported to the DAC statistical reporting 
system for Australia and the United States, though the United States Millennium 
Challenge Account provides aid in untied form. 
3. TRENDS IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
UNCTAD data show that FDI inflows into the LDCs fell in 2004 and 2005 after 
reaching a peak of $10.6 billion, but subsequently jumped again to $9.4 billion 
in 2006. Despite this recovery, the share of world FDI inflows going to the LDCs 
fell from 1.9 per cent in 2003 to 0.7 per cent in 2006 (chart 7). In contrast, 27 per 
cent of world FDI inflows went to developing countries. 
Of the total FDI inflows to the LDCs, 88 per cent went to African LDCs in 
2006. There has been little change in this proportion since 2000–2003 (table 
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17). However, the share of FDI inflows to the LDCs going to oil-exporting LDCs 
actually declined between 2004 and 2006, from 56 per cent to 47 per cent of 
total LDC inflows over that period. This reflects the volatility of FDI inflows for 
natural resource extraction. In contrast, the share of the LDCs’ FDI inflows going to 
manufacture-exporting LDCs increased considerably over this period, mainly due 
to increasing FDI inflows to Bangladesh, Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic.
The five LDCs receiving the greatest volume of FDI inflows in 2006 are three 
oil-exporting LDCs, namely Sudan, Equatorial Guinea and Chad, followed by 
two manufactured-good exporting LDCs, namely Bangladesh and Cambodia. 
Together, these five countries received 75 per cent of the total FDI inflows to the 
LDCs in 2006. 
FDI inflows were equivalent to about 15 per cent of gross fixed capital formation 
of LDCs as a group in 2006. But it constitutes around 23 per cent of such capital 
formation in the African and island LDCs. Moreover, it accounted for over 50 per 
cent of gross fixed capital formation in 2006 in seven LDCs –– Burundi, Chad, 
Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Sudan and Vanuatu. Given the low levels of 
investment by private domestic investors, FDI contributes a significant share of 
gross fixed capital formation even in LDCs where FDI inflows are small. 
Table 16.  Net aid disbursements from OECD/DAC member countries to LDCsa, 2005–2006
($ million, per cent)
$ million % of total DAC LDCs’ share (%) % of donor's GNI
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Countries meeting the Brussels aid target in 2006
Luxembourg 105.6 123.4 0.4 0.4 42.4 45.2 0.35 0.38
Norway 1 029.1 1 128.6 4.2 3.8 38.6 40.1 0.35 0.34
Denmark 814.1 878.4 3.3 3.0 41.6 42.1 0.31 0.32
Sweden 1 100.6 1 151.7 4.5 3.9 34.0 30.1 0.31 0.30
Ireland 364.7 524.5 1.5 1.8 53.8 54.6 0.21 0.28
Netherlands 1 657.5 1 394.7 6.7 4.7 33.2 26.3 0.26 0.21
Belgium 609.3 729.3 2.5 2.5 31.5 37.5 0.16 0.18
United Kingdom 2 709.2 3 827.2 11.0 13.0 25.8 31.4 0.12 0.16
Countries not meeting the Brussels aid target in 2006
Finland 245.4 296.0 1.0 1.0 28.2 38.3 0.13 0.14
Portugal 209.7 240.2 0.9 0.8 56.9 62.2 0.12 0.13
France 2 392.3 2 624.0 9.7 8.9 23.6 23.6 0.11 0.12
Switzerland 404.9 452.6 1.6 1.5 23.6 28.5 0.10 0.11
Canada 1 047.8 1 243.5 4.3 4.2 30.0 36.4 0.09 0.10
Germany 1 883.5 2 641.7 7.7 9.0 19.0 25.7 0.07 0.09
Austria 244.6 252.3 1.0 0.9 15.7 17.0 0.08 0.08
New Zealand 69.6 74.0 0.3 0.3 27.6 31.6 0.07 0.08
Japan 2 326.1 3 340.1 9.5 11.3 18.5 31.1 0.05 0.07
Spain 816.6 767.0 3.3 2.6 27.6 21.7 0.07 0.06
Australia 419.0 451.5 1.7 1.5 25.6 21.6 0.06 0.06
United States 4 661.1 6 416.2 18.9 21.8 18.2 27.9 0.04 0.05
Italy 1 406.8 789.0 5.7 2.7 29.2 22.5 0.08 0.04
Greece 79.5 102.7 0.3 0.3 21.3 25.2 0.03 0.03
Total DAC 24 597.2 29 448.5 100.0 100.0 24.0 28.9 0.08 0.09
Of which: EU-15 14 639.5 16 342.0 59.5 55.5 26.8 28.2 0.11 0.12
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/DAC, online, March 2008, and United Nations/DESA Statistics Division for GNI.
Note:  The countries have been ranked according to their aid as share of donor's GNI for the year 2006.
a Includes imputed multilateral flows.
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The increasing flow of FDI into some LDCs which specialize in manufactures 
exports is a positive trend, as FDI in extractive industries has tended to be focused 
on enclaves with weak linkages to the rest of the economy and few spillovers into 
it. However, the balance of FDI inflows into the LDCs in the form of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions on the one hand, and in the form of greenfield investment 
on the other hand, has also shifted considerably in recent years. Cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions accounted for 42 per cent of FDI inflows into the LDCs 
in 2006, up from 15 per cent over 2000–2003. Whilst the ownership changes 
associated with cross-border mergers and acquisitions can have a beneficial 
impact on productivity and links along value chains, their overall developmental 
impact, particularly on the development of productive capacities, may be less 
than FDI which involves greenfield investment. 
4. TRENDS IN WORKERS’ REMITTANCES
Workers’ remittances to the LDCs continuously increased over the recent 
period. The precise situation is difficult to gauge, owing to the fact that many of 
these private transfers were unrecorded. The available evidence shows that, in 
nominal terms, workers’ remittances reached a record of $13.2 billion in 2006, 
compared with average annual remittances of $4.8 billion during 1995–1999 
(table 18). As a share of GNI, workers’ remittances to the LDCs increased from 2.9 
per cent during 1995–1999 to 3.8 per cent in 2004, and have stayed around that 
level since. This was about twice as important as they were in other developing 
countries, where workers’ remittances constituted 1.7 per cent of GNI on 
average.
Chart 7.   FDI inflows into LDCs, 1995–2006
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database.
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Table 17. FDI inflows into LDCs, by country and by country groups, 2000–2006
($ million, per cent of GFCF)
$ million % of GFCF
2000–2003 2004 2005 2006 2000–2003 2004 2005 2006
Sudan 757 1 511 2 305 3 541 29.2 39.7 44.8 65.3
Equatorial Guinea 705 1 651 1 873 1 656 56.0 91.5 125.7 105.5
Chad 553 495 613 700 56.1 32.5 50.5 54.7
Bangladesh 403 460 692 625 3.4 3.0 4.6 3.9
Cambodia 132 131 381 483 17.8 11.4 32.3 38.9
United Republic of Tanzania 325 331 448 377 18.3 13.6 15.8 12.6
Ethiopia 301 545 221 364 24.4 30.1 8.9 13.9
Zambia 112 364 380 350 14.7 27.3 21.2 18.5
Uganda 180 222 257 307 15.1 12.2 12.7 14.3
Burundi 3 0 1 290 4.2 0.0 0.5 127.8
Madagascar 83 95 86 230 11.5 11.3 7.0 17.8
Lao People's Dem. Republic 26 17 28 187 9.1 3.9 5.8 37.1
Mali 145 101 224 185 22.7 9.5 19.1 15.0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 95 10 -79 180 17.9 0.8 -9.5 20.5
Haiti 9 6 26 160 2.3 1.3 5.2 30.4
Mozambique 270 245 108 154 28.4 19.6 7.1 9.6
Myanmar 221 251 236 143 22.8 22.3 18.8 10.8
Cape Verde 19 20 76 122 10.1 6.5 22.4 26.7
Djibouti 6 39 22 108 8.0 28.0 23.2 107.6
Guinea 31 98 102 108 6.8 18.1 23.2 23.3
Somalia 0 -5 24 96 0.0 -1.1 5.4 20.6
Gambia 34 49 45 70 46.0 49.5 38.2 56.8
Benin 40 64 53 63 8.2 8.1 6.3 7.1
Vanuatu 17 18 13 61 32.5 27.9 19.8 86.2
Senegal 56 77 45 58 5.4 4.2 2.3 2.8
Lesotho 32 53 57 57 8.6 9.6 11.0 10.4
Togo 48 59 77 57 17.1 13.6 17.3 12.1
Sierra Leone 17 61 59 43 31.5 29.1 24.4 16.9
Guinea-Bissau 2 2 9 42 5.0 3.1 14.3 65.7
Malawi 28 22 27 30 13.3 12.5 13.5 14.4
Burkina Faso 18 14 34 26 2.4 1.2 2.7 1.9
Central African Republic 7 25 29 24 11.5 45.3 39.8 32.0
Niger 11 20 30 20 4.1 4.3 5.6 3.6
Solomon Islands -3 6 19 19 -6.1 10.9 32.6 31.3
Rwanda 5 8 11 15 1.6 2.1 2.3 3.1
Maldives 13 15 9 14 7.3 5.4 4.6 6.4
Kiribati 16 19 1 12 73.8 65.6 2.5 36.7
Bhutan 1 3 9 6 0.3 0.8 1.4 0.9
Eritrea 20 -8 -3 4 11.1 -3.7 -1.2 1.4
Timor-Leste 30 3 0 3 20.1 3.0 0.1 2.4
Afghanistan 1 1 4 2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2
Comoros 1 1 1 1 2.6 2.1 2.8 2.2
Tuvalu 6 0 0 0 74.7 0.3 -0.1 0.1
Sao Tome and Principe 3 -2 -1 0 16.3 -7.3 -2.4 -1.7
Samoa 0 2 -4 -2 -0.1 5.5 -7.6 -3.3
Mauritania 72 392 864 -3 52.5 220.4 392.8 -1.5
Nepal 7 0 2 -7 0.7 0.0 0.2 -0.4
Liberia 101 237 -479 -82 269.6 355.4 -951.7 -153.9
Yemen 62 144 -302 -385 3.3 5.3 -11.5 -13.9
Angola 2 050 1 449 -1 303 -1 140 139.4 80.4 -40.1 -33.3
LDCs 7 064 9 320 7 326 9 375 17.9 17.5 12.5 15.1
African LDCs and Haiti 6 141 8 251 6 238 8 212 29.7 28.1 18.2 22.6
Asian LDCs 875 1 010 1 050 1 058 4.9 4.3 4.4 4.2
Island LDCs 48 59 39 104 14.0 12.6 9.1 23.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on UNCTAD FDI/TNC database.
Note: Negative FDI flows indicate that one of the three components of FDIs (equity capital, reinvested earnings, intra-company loans) is negative 
and not offset by the positive amounts of the remaining components.
Countries have been ranked in decreasing order according the value of FDI inflows in 2006.
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Table 18.  Workers' remittances to LDCs, by country, and to the other developing countries, 
1995–2006
($ million, per cent)
$ million % of GNI
% of LDC 
remittances
1995–1999 2000–2002 2005 2006 1995–1999 2000–2002 2005 2006 2006
Countries with remittances >10% of GNI
Haiti 253.2 626.0 985.0 985.0 8.1 18.8 24.7 21.3 7.4
Lesotho 349.8 218.3 327.0 327.0 28.1 23.0 18.6 18.7 2.5
Nepal 60.2 312.0 1 211.0 1 211.0 1.3 5.5 15.9 16.2 9.1
Cape Verde 87.0 84.3 137.0 137.0 16.9 14.9 15.2 12.6 1.0
Gambia 11.6 9.3 58.0 58.0 2.9 2.5 13.0 12.0 0.4
Countries with remittances between 5% and 10% of GNI
Guinea-Bissau 2.0 10.0 28.0 28.0 0.9 5.2 9.7 9.2 0.2
Uganda 233.0 333.7 450.0 845.0 3.8 5.8 5.0 8.7 6.4
Togo 22.4 69.0 179.0 179.0 1.5 5.0 8.2 7.9 1.4
Bangladesh 1 497.2 2 310.3 4 314.0 5 485.0 3.2 4.4 6.3 7.6 41.4
Yemen 1 161.6 1 292.3 1 283.0 1 283.0 18.9 13.8 8.8 7.5 9.7
Senegal 155.8 294.0 633.0 633.0 3.0 5.9 7.3 6.8 4.8
Kiribati 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.9 7.6 5.4 5.4 0.1
Countries with remittances < 5% of GNI
Cambodia 52.4 131.3 200.0 200.0 1.6 3.5 3.4 3.2 1.5
Vanuatu 22.8 32.0 11.0 11.0 9.6 13.7 3.3 3.2 0.1
Mali 97.0 99.3 177.0 177.0 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.1 1.3
Comoros 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 5.4 5.4 3.2 3.0 0.1
Sudan 468.0 786.3 1 016.0 1 016.0 4.7 6.4 4.3 3.0 7.7
Sao Tome and Principe 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.8 0.0
Niger 12.6 18.3 60.0 60.0 0.7 1.0 1.9 1.8 0.5
Guinea 2.8 8.3 42.0 42.0 0.1 0.3 1.5 1.5 0.3
Benin 84.8 82.4 63.0 63.0 3.7 3.3 1.5 1.4 0.5
Ethiopia 22.6 34.7 174.0 172.0 0.3 0.5 1.5 1.3 1.3
Mozambique 53.6 44.0 57.0 80.0 1.7 1.2 0.9 1.2 0.6
Rwanda 8.2 7.3 21.0 21.0 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.2
Myanmar 125.4 109.0 117.0 117.0 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9
Burkina Faso 80.0 55.7 50.0 50.0 2.6 2.0 0.9 0.8 0.4
Solomon Islands 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.0
Samoa 43.8 30.3 1.0 1.0 19.6 12.8 0.3 0.2 0.0
Maldives 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0
Madagascar 12.0 13.0 11.0 11.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
United Rep. of Tanzania 8.2 11.7 16.0 16.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Sierra Leone 19.4 12.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Mauritania 3.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
Malawi 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 31.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Djibouti 12.0 .. .. .. 2.4 .. .. .. ..
Eritrea 3.5 3.0 .. .. 0.4 0.4 .. .. ..
LDCs 4 823.4 7 064.1 11 651.0 13 238.0 2.9 3.8 4.0 3.9 100.0
ODCs 62 552.0 90 998.5 171 971.0 189 090.4 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.7 ..
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on World Bank, Global Development Finance, online, March 2008 and United Nations/DESA 
Statistics Division for GNI.
Note: Data not available for Afghanistan, Angola, Bhutan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Somalia, Timor-Leste and Zambia.
  Countries have been ranked according to their share of remittances in GDP (from the highest to the lowest) for the year 2006.
For the LDCs as a group, the scale of workers’ remittances is such that they were 
40 per cent higher than FDI inflows to the LDCs in 2006. This is a significant feature 
of the form of integration of the LDCs into the global economy. Whilst they are 
marginalized from private international capital markets, their integration through 
international labour markets is increasingly important for their economies. 
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As with FDI inflows, workers’ remittances are highly concentrated in a few 
LDCs. Workers’ remittances going to the Asian LDCs account for over 60 per 
cent of the total workers’ remittances flowing to the LDCs. Bangladesh alone 
received 41 per cent of the total workers’ remittances to the LDCs in 2006, and 
Yemen and Nepal together received a further 19 per cent. Workers’ remittances 
accounted for more than 5 per cent of GNI in almost a third of the LDCs for which 
data were available (12 of the 38 countries). Moreover, they accounted for over 
10 per cent of GNI in five countries — Haiti, Lesotho, Nepal, Cape Verde and 
Gambia. This highlights the high degree of dependency on workers’ remittances 
that characterizes the economies of some LDCs. However, there are some LDCs 
for which workers’ remittances do not play a significant role. For almost a third of 
LDCs for which data are available (once again 12 countries), workers’ remittances 
accounted for less than 1 per cent of their GNI in 2006 (table 18).
The increasing dependence of LDCs on workers’ remittances can be seen as 
offsetting the decline in aggregate net transfers discussed earlier in this chapter. 
However, the developmental, rather than poverty-alleviating, impact of workers’ 
remittances remains to be proven, and the big differences amongst LDCs in 
terms of their significance implies that their role varies considerably amongst the 
countries in the group. They should not be seen as a substitute for long-term 
capital inflows and deliberate policies are required to enhance the development 
impact of remittances. 
F.  Trends in external debt 
The LDCs’ total debt stock reached a record level of $163 billion in 2004, 
after three successive annual increases. As shown in previous Least Developed 
Countries Reports, most of these increases was attributable to an expansion in the 
multilateral debt stock. But the total debt stock fell moderately in 2005, to $157.4 
billion, and more dramatically in 2006, to $131.5 billion. 
Country data show that the debt stock fell in 17 out of 46 LDCs, including 16 of 
the 33 African LDCs for which data are available. African LDCs still accounted for 
65 per cent of the total debt stock of the LDCs in 2006, but this was down from a 
high of 77 per cent in 1998. Both multilateral and bilateral debt fell between 2004 
and 2006, but the former declined at a faster rate. Multilateral debt constituted 58 
per cent of total LDC debt stock in 2004, but fell to 53 per cent in 2006. 
In contrast to other developing countries, most of the debt of LDCs is owed 
to official creditors. In 2006, for example, debt arising from concessional loans 
constituted 73 per cent of the total debt stock in LDCs, as against 22 per cent in 
other developing countries. As a consequence, trends in debt stock are strongly 
influenced by official debt relief initiatives. 
The recent debt stock trends in LDCs reflect, in particular, the continued 
implementation of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 
and also the adoption of the MDRI in 2006. The latter Initiative goes further than 
the former by providing additional resources for the cancellation of multilateral 
debt contracted with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
African Development Bank for countries which have passed the completion point 
of the HIPC Initiative (see box 3). As a result of the MDRI, grants for ODA principal 
forgiveness increased from $1.5 billion in 2005 to $28.2 billion in 2006. In effect, 
such debt forgiveness retrospectively converted earlier concessional loans into 
grants (see subsection E.2 above). Of this sum ($26.9 billion), 97 per cent was 
related to the MDRI. 
Workers’ remittances 
accounted for over 10 per 
cent of GNI in Haiti, Lesotho, 
Nepal, Cape Verde and 
Gambia.
Workers’ remittances are not 
a substitute for long-term 
capital inflows and deliberate 
policies are required to 
enhance their development 
impact.
LDCs’ total debt stock 
has fallen dramatically, 
reflecting the continued 
implementation of the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative 
and also the adoption 
of the MDRI in 2006.
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Table 19.  LDCs covered by the HIPC initiative
(As of October 2007)
Completion point
(date of completion point)
Decision point
(date of decision point)
Pre-decision 
point
Benin (2003) Afghanistan (2007) Comoros
Burkina Faso (2002) Burundi (2005) Eritrea
Ethiopia (2004) Central African Rep. (2007) Liberia
Madagascar (2004) Chad (2001) Nepal
Mali (2003) Dem. Rep. of the Congo (2003) Somalia
Malawi (2006) Gambia (2000) Sudan
Mauritania (2002) Guinea (2000) Togo
Mozambique (2001) Guinea-Bissau (2000)
Niger (2004) Haiti (2006)
Rwanda (2005)
Sao Tome & Principe (2007)
Senegal (2004)
Sierra Leone (2006)
Uganda (2000)
United Rep. of Tanzania (2001)
Zambia (2005)
Source:  World Bank.
Box 3.  The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
In 2005, the G-8 countries, during the summit in Gleneagles, proposed to cancel the entirety of the debt of the eligible 
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) contracted with the International Development Association (IDA) — the concessional 
facility agency of the World Bank — before 1 January 2004, and with the IMF and the African Development Fund before 
1 January 2005. The Inter-American Development Bank joined in 2007. Such an initiative led to the creation of the MDRI, 
whose objective is “to provide additional support to HIPCs to reach the MDGs while ensuring that the financing capacity of 
the IFIs is preserved” (World Bank, 2006b: 2). The MDRI became effective on 1 January 2006 for the IMF and the African 
Development Fund, and 1 July for the IDA. 
Analysts have shown that, to preserve the IFI financing capacity, the MDRI applies the criterion of additionality in aid, which 
implies that debt cancellation will involve additional financing by the international community. 
The MDRI is particularly important for LDCs because multilateral debt accounts for such a high level of their overall debt 
stock. LDCs which have received debt cancellation under MRDI have experienced major reductions in indicators of their 
debt burden. But the additionality of the debt relief is not as great as it might be because of how it works. The way in which 
the World Bank debt cancellation works is that if a country paid IDA debt service of $10 million, this would be cut by $10 
million, but at the same time the country would receive an equivalent cut of $10 million in new finance from IDA. Donors 
would then compensate IDA for this $10 million write-off and this money would be distributed amongst all IDA-only countries 
according to their score on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment index. For example, the country getting the 
debt relief might get $5 million back from this process. Analysis suggests that this considerably reduces the additionality of 
the MRDI (Hurley, 2007). 
Countries become eligible for debt relief under the MDRI once they reach the HIPC completion point. This requires that 
they meet all of the following conditions: 
(a) Satisfactory macroeconomic performance under an IMF poverty reduction and growth facility programme;
(b) Satisfactory progress in implementing a poverty reduction strategy; and
(c) An adequate public expenditure management system that meets minimum standards for governance and transparency 
in the use of public resources (World Bank, 2006a; World Bank, 2006b).
Furthermore, all post-HIPC completion point countries “will be required to maintain reasonable governance standards” 
(World Bank, 2006b: 6), as well as high standards for transparency and public expenditure management. MDRI recipient 
countries are subject to a three- to five-year assessment of their public financial management.
Source: Djoufelkit-Cottenet (2007), World Bank (2006a) and World Bank (2006b).
Table 19 shows the status of LDCs within the HIPC Initiative as of October 
2007. Sixteen LDCs had reached completion point and were receiving irrevocable 
debt relief under the terms of the initiative. Of these countries, four LDCs — 
Malawi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia — reached the HIPC completion 
point in 2005 or 2006 and Sao Tome and Principe in 2007. All of these 16 LDCs 
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have also benefited from MDRI debt cancellation. This has radically changed their 
debt burden and opens a window of opportunity.
Progress in debt relief remains slow for the other LDCs eligible for HIPC. 
Various conditions have to be met, both to reach the HIPC decision point and to 
proceed to completion point. The time between decision point and completion 
point has been increasing since the early batch of countries reached decision-
point before end–2003. For the five LDCs which reached completion point in 
2005 and 2006, the time between completion point and decision point was 4.3 
years for Zambia and Rwanda, 4.7 years for Sierra Leone, 5.7 years for Malawi 
and 6.2 years for Sao Tome et Principe (IMF and World Bank, 2007: figure 1). Of 
the nine LDCs that have passed the decision point, but not reached completion 
point, four reached decision point in 2001 and one in 2003. These countries — 
Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Democratic Republic of the Congo 
— have all experienced interruptions in their IMF-supported programmes and 
have faced difficulties in meeting completion-point triggers. But Burundi, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea adopted 
a full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) by the end of 2007, a condition for 
reaching the completion point. 
Of the seven LDCs which have been judged eligible for HIPC according to their 
debt sustainability criteria, but have not reached decision-point, four — Liberia, 
Somalia, Sudan and Togo — have large arrears to multilateral institutions and have 
not been able to engage in IMF- and IDA-supported programmes, three years’ 
participation in which is a condition for reaching the decision point.10 Moreover, 
other LDCs which are not judged eligible for the HIPC Initiative remain outside 
the debt forgiveness process. 
The effect of these initiatives on the debt burden for the LDCs as a group 
and for individual LDCs is shown in table 20. For the LDCs as a group, there has 
been a major reduction in the overall debt burden since 2000–2002. LDCs’ debt 
stocks fell from 86 per cent of GNI during 2000–2002 to 58 per cent in 2005, and 
then dropped further to 42 per cent in 2006. But within the overall trend, some 
countries are doing much better than others. 
From the table, it is apparent that there has been a major improvement in 
the debt situation in those LDCs which have received debt cancellation under 
the MDRI. The debt stock in these countries was cut from $54.7 billion in 2005 
to $25.7 billion in 2006. In almost all of these countries, the total debt stock as a 
share of GNI was halved between 2005 and 2006. Nevertheless, the debt service 
payments of these countries actually increased, from $1.1 billion in 2005 to $1.3 
billion in 2006. As a ratio of exports of goods, services and workers’ remittances, 
debt service payment for this group of countries fell marginally, from an average of 
6.8 per cent in 2005 to 5.7 per cent in 2006.
At the other end of the spectrum, it is clear that the debt burden remains very 
high in most of those LDCs which are eligible for HIPC debt relief, but have not 
reached the decision point or the completion point. The debt stock as a share of 
GNI is increasing in nine LDCs, including five LDCs which have reached the HIPC 
decision point — Burundi, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Haiti. Moreover, of 
the 45 LDCs for which data are available, the debt stock in 2006 was higher than 
the GNI in nine LDCs and over 50 per cent of GNI in a further 13 countries.
Despite overall improvement in the debt situation, the debt burden for the 
LDCs as a group remains much higher than in other developing countries — on 
average 42 per cent of GNI in 2006 in the LDCs, compared with 26 per cent in 
other developing countries. Moreover, although the debt relief provides important 
breathing space for those countries which have reached HIPC completion point 
LDCs which are not judged 
eligible for the HIPC Initiative 
remain outside the debt 
forgiveness process. 
For the LDCs as a group, 
the overall debt burden fell 
sharply from 86 per cent 
of GNI in 2000–2002 to 
42 per cent in 2006. 
The debt stock in 2006 was 
higher than the GNI in nine 
LDCs and over 50 per cent of 
GNI in a further 13 countries.
Sixteen LDCs had reached 
completion point and were 
receiving irrevocable debt 
relief under the 
HIPC Initiative.
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Table 20.  Selected indicators on debt burden in LDCs, by country, and ODCs, 2000–2006
(Per cent)
Total debt stock as % GNI Total debt stock as % exportsa Total debt service as % exportsa
2000–2002 2005 2006 2000–2002 2005 2006 2000–2002 2005 2006
Coutnries with debt > 100% of GNI in 2006
Liberia 524.5 619.2 541.3 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sao Tome and Principe* .. .. 295.8 1 819.5 1 540.6 .. 25.5 .. ..
Guinea-Bissau 374.7 239.6 241.2 959.3 564.2 .. 22.0 .. ..
Samoa 87.8 172.2 205.5 .. 527.4 693.5 .. 17.3 19.9
Burundi 172.1 170.3 179.7 2 493.8 1 440.9 1518.9 49.4 41.5 40.4
Gambia 136.8 150.0 145.2 .. 459.1 .. .. 11.8 12.4
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 253.1 156.8 137.5 .. 484.0 487.0 .. .. ..
Sierra Leone* 174.6 141.8 101.0 1 526.3 704.9 .. 63.1 9.3 9.6
Guinea 109.8 98.9 100.2 419.8 .. .. 16.0 .. ..
Countries with debt between 50% and 100% of GNI in 2006
Lao People’s Dem. Republic 155.5 103.0 99.5 542.0 .. .. 8.5 .. ..
Togo 108.5 81.7 82.8 278.2 175.7 .. 4.9 1.6 ..
Bhutan 56.6 79.7 77.1 209.5 202.7 .. 0.0 .. ..
Eritrea 64.8 76.5 74.1 349.3 .. .. 3.1 .. ..
Comoros 112.8 75.6 70.3 538.7 423.6 410.7 .. .. ..
Central African Republic 93.3 74.3 68.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mauritania* 201.7 121.8 58.9 570.5 346.3 .. .. .. ..
Sudan 140.4 71.0 56.0 629.1 309.9 278.5 7.9 6.4 4.1
Djibouti 48.3 53.1 55.3 .. .. .. 5.1 4.6 6.4
Cape Verde 65.7 56.3 54.7 162.9 125.9 108.3 6.6 6.5 4.7
Maldives 39.9 50.7 52.3 50.1 75.7 65.6 4.5 7.0 4.9
Solomon Islands 64.2 55.8 51.3 188.2 116.2 97.9 8.3 8.9 2.0
Cambodia 71.6 59.1 51.1 123.0 83.1 68.0 1.1 0.7 0.6
Countries with debt < 50% of GNI in 2006
Mozambique* 159.4 72.3 47.1 584.3 216.2 114.7 9.1 3.8 1.9
Nepal 50.0 42.4 41.4 201.3 132.1 144.5 6.7 4.7 5.1
Malawi* 154.9 156.6 38.8 598.6 585.7 121.6 10.1 .. ..
Lesotho 68.2 37.7 37.6 118.9 64.2 60.8 11.6 7.4 4.0
Haiti 33.5 30.3 34.7 114.6 83.5 88.2 3.0 3.2 3.2
Chad 73.1 33.6 34.2 488.5 51.7 .. .. .. ..
United Rep. Tanzania* 71.8 62.8 33.3 395.4 262.8 130.3 8.9 4.3 3.4
Yemen 57.9 35.3 31.6 99.3 66.5 60.7 4.3 2.6 2.4
Bangladesh 32.6 30.0 31.4 171.9 127.4 110.5 7.8 5.4 3.7
Madagascar* 106.8 69.9 26.8 355.1 177.5 65.2 6.5 5.7 ..
Angola 110.0 41.0 24.5 113.3 48.5 .. 23.5 10.7 12.8
Vanuatu 34.6 24.0 24.1 47.8 45.8 42.5 1.1 1.3 1.7
Mali* 111.3 59.6 23.4 304.5 190.6 .. 9.3 5.6 ..
Zambia* 182.6 79.0 23.3 619.1 253.4 56.6 19.6 10.9 3.6
Senegal* 83.4 47.9 22.4 222.4 130.1 .. 12.8 .. ..
Niger* 86.5 58.3 22.1 488.1 307.0 .. 7.6 5.9 ..
Burkina Faso* 52.1 35.9 18.3 473.1 348.3 .. 13.3 .. ..
Ethiopia* 77.1 55.2 17.5 564.9 299.7 97.1 12.9 4.1 6.8
Benin* 69.2 43.5 17.5 268.2 222.1 .. 9.5 7.4 ..
Rwanda* 77.0 71.6 16.9 960.9 551.5 145.9 15.3 8.1 9.6
Uganda* 65.6 51.7 13.8 371.7 243.1 55.5 6.2 9.3 4.8
Equatorial Guinea 26.5 7.6 5.3 14.9 3.8 .. .. .. ..
Myanmar .. .. .. 208.7 158.2 .. 3.5 2.5 1.7
LDCs 86.2 58.2 42.4 261.4 140.2 92.0 8.8 6.0 6.3
ODCs 37.3 27.6 25.7 94.8 61.5 56.2 16.6 12.8 13.2
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on World Bank, Global Development Finance, online data, March 2008.
Note: Data not available for Afghanistan, Kiribati, Somalia, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu.
  Group averages have been weighted according to the denominator and are subject to data availability.
a Includes all exports of goods and services, and workers' remittances.
* HIPC countries that have reached the completion point.
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and have received debt cancellation under the MDRI, the long-term sustainability 
of debt remains a problem. 
This point was clearly made by the evaluation update of the HIPC Initiative, 
which was undertaken before the MDRI. It pointed out the limits of debt relief 
as a means of assuring debt sustainability and showed that “debt ratios have 
deteriorated significantly since completion point in the majority of countries, 
with the increase in debt ratios correlated quite closely to the length of time 
since completion point” (IEG, 2006: 21). Before the MDRI, Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda were all expected to be unable to maintain debt 
sustainability above the HIPC thresholds in the nine years following completion 
point. Moreover, the evaluation found that the forecasts underlying predictions of 
future debt sustainability for these countries, and also those which were expected 
to remain below the sustainability threshold, continued to be based on forecasts 
of GDP and export growth which were far higher than historical trends.
The MDRI has improved this situation. However, according to the latest IMF-
World Bank assessment of debt sustainability, debt distress is low in only seven 
post-completion point LDCs. It is moderate in Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe and Sierra Leone, and remains 
high for Rwanda (IMF and World Bank, 2007). A simulation of the first 16 post-
completion point HIPCs to participate in the MDRI also finds that, in the absence 
of MDRI, the net present value of the external debt stock of these countries is 
expected to rise from 74 per cent of exports in 2004 to 236 per cent by the 
end of 2015. With the MDRI, it is expected to rise much less, but — at 176 per 
cent of exports — still be unsustainable according to HIPC thresholds in 2015 
(Nwachukwu, 2008). 
These results reflect the assumption of the simulation. They depend on 
estimates of the grant component of new disbursements, as well as forecasts of 
domestic savings and foreign exchange receipts. However, the model also clarifies 
the key conditions for growth with external debt. These are that: (a) the projected 
marginal savings rate exceeds the fixed investment ratio required to achieve the 
target rate of growth; (b) the anticipated rate of growth of imports should not 
exceed the growth of exports; (c) the estimated growth of external debt and 
interest payments should not continuously exceed the real growth rate of exports; 
and (d) the marginal product of foreign capital should be greater than the cost of 
international borrowing. 
The key to ensuring debt sustainability is to develop productive capacities. 
The problem with the current situation and the focus on social sectors is that 
this is not being done. On the contrary, the MDGs build up fiscal obligations for 
Governments without generating at the same time a sound fiscal base to raise 
these revenues. Similarly, they increase import requirements without building 
up export receipts to pay for these imports. Unless there is a shift in emphasis 
to building up the productive base of poor economies and promote structural 
change to reduce vulnerability to commodity price shocks, they will inevitably 
become unsustainably indebted again. 
Despite debt forgiveness, 
the debt burden for the 
LDCs (42 per cent of GNI) 
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G. Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the LDCs as a group achieved the strongest 
growth performance in 30 years in 2005 and 2006, with the average growth rate 
surpassing the Brussels Programme of Action growth target (7 per cent) in those 
years. Improvement in their growth performance was underpinned by a record of 
level of exports, which was particularly associated with high commodity prices for 
oil and minerals, and record levels of capital inflows, particularly aid. In nominal 
terms, the value of merchandise exports from the LDCs rose by some 80 per cent 
between 2004 and 2006, reaching $99 billion in the latter year. Annual long-term 
capital inflows excluding debt forgiveness grants were about 60 per cent higher 
than during 2000–2003, and double the level of the second half of the 1990s. Net 
aid disbursements reached the record level of $28.1 billion in 2006. Moreover, 16 
LDCs also received significant debt relief in 2006, with $26.9 of ODA principal 
being forgiven for 16 of them through the MDRI. FDI inflows recovered to $9.4 
billion in 2006, slightly down from the peak in 2003, whilst recorded migrant 
remittances reached the record level of $13.2 billion in 2006. 
Although the high GDP growth rates are very positive, the sustainability of 
the growth performance in 2005 and 2006 remains questionable. The recent 
growth surge is generally not associated with a structural transition in which the 
share of manufactures in total output is growing (except for most Asian LDCs). In 
fact, as compared with 10 years earlier, half of the LDCs have experienced de-
industrialization, reflected in a declining share of manufacturing in GDP. The level 
of domestic savings continues to be low in many LDCs, including good performers. 
In 2006, only one third of the LDCs had gross domestic savings rates above 15 per 
cent and 15 LDCs had negative domestic savings rates, meaning that they were 
relying on foreign savings not only to finance domestic investment, but also their 
domestic consumption.
Other sources of vulnerability arise from: (a) increasing merchandise trade 
deficits in many LDCs, particularly those which specialize in exporting agricultural 
commodities; and (b) increasing pressures from rising oil and food prices. Oil 
and food together constituted 31 per cent of LDC merchandise imports by value 
in 2006. Another particularly disturbing trend is that aggregate net transfers 
(excluding debt forgiveness grants) to the LDCs declined by one third from 2004 
to 2006. This was due to a slowdown in the rate of increase in capital inflows 
into the LDCs, as donors slowed the pace of aid scale-up and FDI inflows briefly 
faltered, at the same time as profit remittances soared and interest payments on 
loans also rose. This decline makes the LDCs particularly vulnerable to external 
prices shocks and interruptions to the commodity boom. 
The chapter also shows that there is a high degree of variation amongst the 
LDCs. Not all of them are experiencing rapid growth. In 2006, the real GDP 
grew by 6 per cent or more in 19 LDCs, by between 3 and 6 per cent in 20 
LDCs, by less than 3 per cent in 9 LDCs, and declined in two LDCs. Most LDCs 
have high population growth rates (2.5 per cent per annum on average) and as 
a result, even though they outperformed other developing countries in terms of 
GDP growth rates, their average per capita income has continued to diverge from 
other developing countries in all years since 2000 except 2005. GDP per capita 
stagnated or declined in nine LDCs in 2006 and grew by less than 1 per cent in 
almost one third of the LDCs. 
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For the LDCs as a group, dependence on commodities has increased since 
2000, along with the growth acceleration. Primary commodities increased from 59 
per cent of total merchandise exports in 2000-2002 to 77 per cent in 2005-2006. 
But within this overall pattern, there is considerable divergence between the 
African, Asian and island LDCs. The Asian LDCs continue to diversify their 
economies away from commodities towards manufacturing, while the African 
LDCs increase dependence on primary commodities. The Island LDCs remain 
primarily dependent on service exports which also exhibit high levels of volatility. 
The widening regional divergence between the African and Asian LDCs in 
terms of the form of their integration into the global economy is evident in their 
different export structure. In the 2005-2006 period, 92 per cent of all exports 
from the African LDCs consisted of primary commodities, including fuels, while 
in the Asian LDCs, this figure was 44 per cent. This type of specialization renders 
the Asian LDCs much less vulnerable to external fluctuations. Some of them have 
also achieved high rates of export growth based on manufactures. However, the 
share of medium and high tech manufactured exports originating from the LDCs 
remains very small (8.4 per cent). The slowness of the process of export upgrading 
in the Asian LDCs remains an issue of concern.
Accelerated growth underpinned by fluctuating prices of primary commodities 
cannot guarantee sustainable growth in an increasingly open, globalized 
economy. Those LDCs which have diversified into low-skill manufactures face 
increasing global competition. The LDCs must build economic resilience through 
diversification and technological upgrading. Otherwise, their growth will remain 
fragile. Investment in productive sectors remains the key lever for robust growth 
that increases domestic savings, creates employment opportunities and stimulates 
local demand. Only then can external risks be mitigated and growth made more 
sustainable.
A virtuous circle of sustained growth can be catalyzed by aid inflows. 
Even though they are rising, however, aid disbursements remain below donor 
commitments in the Brussels Programme of Action. Moreover, they are more 
focused on social sectors and social infrastructure than on increasing investment 
in economic infrastructure and developing productive sectors. In some LDCs, a 
good export performance is associated with falling aid receipts rather than aid and 
trade working together to reinforce development. 
With the global economy slowing down and downside risks of the future 
outlook increasing, the LDCs will face major challenges in the period ahead. This 
will require renewed efforts to promote not simply accelerated GDP growth, but a 
type of economic growth which is sustainable. More attention needs to be given to 
the form of integration into the global economy, rather than the level of integration 
and the degree of openness per se. It is clear from recent experience that there 
is no automatic relationship between increasing exports, the development of 
productive capacities and structural change. Increasing dependence on primary 
commodities and low-skill manufactures has not translated into catch-up growth 
with other developing countries. More emphasis needs to placed in the future on 
efforts to develop the productive base of the LDC economies and to address their 
continuing structural weaknesses.
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Notes
1 The figures in this section are based on data from the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Statistics Division. World Bank data show slightly 
lower real GDP growth rates for the LDCs as a group — 7 per cent in 2005 and 6.8 per 
cent in 2006. But these are still the highest growth rates for over 30 years. 
 2 The Brussels Programme of Action for LDCs was agreed at the end of the Third United 
Nations Conference for LDCs, which was held in Brussels, Belgium, in May 2001. 
 3 These estimates are based on sectoral value added as a share of total value added of 
the economy. 
 4 For a discussion of the causes of the current upswing in the commodity prices cycle, 
see IMF, 2008 and UNCTAD, 2008.
 5 Under this classification, the “manufactures” category is larger than in the trade classification 
used elsewhere in this report, as processed foods such as sugar, cheese and vegetables 
are classified as resource-based manufactures (rather than as commodities).
 6 This section draws on three different data sources to identify trends in capital flows: (a) 
World Bank Global Development Finance Online for the overall picture; (b) Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) for aid flows; and (c) UNCTAD for FDI flows. These are not wholly consistent, 
but together they can provide the best overall picture of what is happening.
 7 Aggregate net resource flows are the sum of net resource flows on long-term debt 
(excluding IMF) plus net direct foreign investment, portfolio equity flows and official 
grants (excluding technical cooperation). Net flows (or net lending or net disbursements) 
are disbursements minus principal repayments. Aggregate net transfers are equal to 
aggregate net resource flows minus interest payments on long-term loans and foreign 
direct investment profits. (Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, online, 
April 2008).
  8 This section refers to assistance from DAC member countries and also from a number 
of non-DAC donors, including Hungary, Iceland, Republic of Korea, Poland, Slovakia, 
Thailand, Turkey and Arab countries, for which data are also recorded by DAC. There are 
other donors to LDCs, including China, which is also rapidly expanding its development 
cooperation programme. The “Beijing Action Plan” of November 2006 calls for a doubling 
of aid to Africa from 2006 and 2009. Unfortunately, data on aid from China are not 
published and is therefore excluded from the discussion in this section.
 9   This excludes the forgiveness of ODA principal, which is not counted as it has already 
been recorded as an aid disbursement at an earlier point in time and its inclusion would 
thus involve double-counting.
 10 This condition has been relaxed for Liberia.
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Trends in Poverty and 
Progress Towards 
the MDGs
A.  Introduction
It is clear from chapter 1 of this Report that since 2000, many least developed 
countries (LDCs) have achieved higher rates of economic growth than in the 1990s 
and even higher growth of exports. There is a widespread perception, however, 
that this is not translating effectively into poverty reduction and improved human 
well-being for the 785 million people who now live in LDCs. This chapter 
assesses the extent to which this is true and identifies some of the policy-related 
factors which influence the degree to which economic growth is translating into 
improvements in human well-being.
The chapter shows that the basic feature of poverty in most LDCs is that it is 
“generalized”, that is to say, it is not something which affects a small section of the 
population. Rather, “a major part of the population lives at or below income levels 
sufficient to meet their basic needs and the available resources in the economy, 
even when equally distributed, are barely sufficient to cater for the basic needs 
of the population on a sustainable basis” (UNCTAD 2002: 40). This Report finds 
that 75 per cent of people in LDCs subsist on less than $2 a day and that average 
private consumption per capita per day in 2006 was just 76 cents per day (when 
estimated using market exchange rates). 
Progress in reducing “$1-a-day poverty” (extreme or absolute poverty) and 
“$2-a-day poverty” (“total poverty” hereafter) in LDCs has been very slow and 
there has been very little improvement in the rate of progress since the adoption 
of the Millennium Declaration in 2000. The number of people living on less than 
$1 a day in LDCs was higher in 2005 than in 2000. The chapter also finds that 
although a few countries have made great progress in relation to some human 
development MDGs, particularly primary education and gender equality in 
education, most LDCs are off track to meet the MDGs on the majority of human 
development indicators for which data are available. The soaring food prices of 
2007 and 2008 will have particularly adverse consequences for the LDCs and 
they are likely to slow down — and in some countries reverse — not only progress 
towards reducing hunger but also progress towards poverty reduction and the 
achievement of other human development goals.
The reasons why high GDP growth in LDCs is not translating very effectively 
into improvements in human well-being are complex. But the chapter is founded 
on what Graham Pyatt has called “a structuralist approach to poverty analysis” 
(UNCTAD, 2002: 192). This approach starts from the insight that household 
living standards depend primarily on the generation and sustainability of jobs 
and livelihoods. From this perspective, poverty trends are related to trends in 
income-generating and employment opportunities, which are in turn related 
to the changing structure of the economy and its relationship to the rest of the 
world. Locating livelihoods within the structure of the economy focuses attention 
on the influence on living standards of such factors as the sectoral and regional 
structure of the economy, the importance of, and connections between, formal 
and informal sector activities, the division of value added between capital and 
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labour, and the influence of macroeconomic policies. In this approach, both the 
level and distribution of living standards are jointly determined through the way 
in which production is organized. Moreover, the generation and sustainability of 
livelihoods and the structural dynamics of the economy are related to the form of 
the integration of the national economy into the global economy through trade, 
aid, private capital flows and debt dynamics. In this way, international economic 
relations are intimately linked to national poverty dynamics.
Using this structuralist approach, the chapter argues that the weak relationship 
between economic growth and improvements in human well-being in most LDCs 
is related to the type of growth which is occurring. The high rates of economic 
growth in LDCs cannot generally be equated with an inclusive process of 
development. In most of them, the majority of the population are employed in 
agriculture but agricultural labour productivity is very low and growing very slowly. 
As it is difficult to make a living in agriculture, more and more people are seeking 
work in other sectors of the economy, but remunerative employment opportunities 
are not being generated quickly enough to meet this growing demand for non-
agricultural work. 
The trends which are occurring are related to policy choices and in particular 
the development model which has been pursued in most LDCs. This has sought to 
deepen the integration of the LDCs into the world economy, increase the efficiency 
of resource allocation and free markets. Global integration is vital for development 
and poverty reduction in LDCs. However, without the development of productive 
capacities and associated employment, external integration does not lead to 
inclusive development. Export-led growth by itself leads to an exclusive pattern 
of economic growth. The adverse impact of the soaring international food prices 
illustrates the vulnerability of LDCs following the current approach, underlining 
the need for a policy change towards inclusive development. 
The chapter is organized in five substantive sections. Section B describes trends 
in average private consumption per capita. This is a very crude initial proxy for 
living standards which does not address the multidimensionality of poverty and 
ignores the effects of distribution on living standards. It does, however, provide 
an initial overview of material living standards in LDCs. Section C deepens the 
analysis by examining trends in income poverty, presenting the results of a new 
internationally comparable data set on income poverty in LDCs which uses both 
household surveys and national accounts data. This section updates and extends 
the analysis of poverty trends using the international $1-a-day and $2-a-day 
poverty lines in The Least Developed Countries Report 2002 (UNCTAD, 2002). 
Section D discusses some reasons why the growth–poverty relationship is weak. 
Section E analyses progress towards achieving the human development goals 
which are part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It draws on the 
results of the United Nations system-wide effort to track progress towards the 
MDGs, presenting an overview of progress towards human development goals in 
LDCs for which data are available. Section F discusses the impact of rising food 
prices in 2007–2008 on LDCs and examines the policy implications of the food 
crisis which many are experiencing. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the major 
findings.
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B.  Trends in private consumption 
1. OVERALL TRENDS
If the real GDP of an economy grows at 7.2 per cent per year for 10 years, 
the value of goods and services produced in that economy should double in real 
terms. What this means at the household level and for individual lives depends 
critically on how economic growth translates first, into rising household incomes 
and consumption expenditure, and second, into improved supply of public 
services, particularly in education, health, water and sanitation.
Trends in average private consumption per capita, as recorded in the national 
accounts of all countries, provide a general indication of whether household 
consumption is rising or falling within a country and at what rate, offering a crude 
indicator of trends in living standards. However, some caution must be exerted, 
when analysing this variable. First, the national accounts provide aggregates, from 
which individual averages can be derived by using population data. They do not, 
however, provide information on the distribution of private consumption among 
households or within them. Neither do they — in the case of most LDCs — 
provide any information about the distribution of consumption among different 
geographical regions (e.g. rural vs. urban areas) within one country. Second, 
national accounts estimates of private consumption are, conceptually speaking, 
not exactly the same as those of household consumption expenditure, as they 
include spending by other institutions besides households, namely the non-
profit institutions serving households. Third, private consumption is calculated 
as a residual from estimates of other macroeconomic aggregates, after the 
computation of aggregate output, imports, purchases by firms and Government 
and so on. It is thus far from an error-free number. Despite these shortcomings, 
trends in private consumption per capita do provide a crude, initial picture of 
how overall economic performance translates into changes in material well-being 
at the household level. 
Trends in GDP per capita per day and private consumption per capita per 
day in the LDCs are shown in table 21. The table shows that the record growth 
performance of the LDCs as a group in 2005 and 2006, with GDP growth exceeding 
7 per cent per annum, has resulted in an increase in real private consumption per 
capita per day of only 5 cents per day ($0.05 in constant 2000 dollars) between 
2004 and 2006. This increase has occurred in the LDCs as a group and also in 
African and Asian LDCs. However, private consumption per capita in island LDCs 
stagnated over those years, albeit at a higher level.
Table 21. Real GDP, private consumption and domestic resources available for finance, per capita, 1995–2006
(Constant 2000 dollars/day)
Daily GDP per capita Daily private consumption 
per capita 
Daily domestic resources 
available for finance per capita
1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006
LDCs 0.78 0.89 1.02 1.07 1.13 0.60 0.63 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.33 0.36
African LDCs 0.82 0.91 1.02 1.07 1.13 0.63 0.65 0.73 0.76 0.78 0.19 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.35
Asian LDCs 0.72 0.85 1.00 1.06 1.11 0.55 0.59 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.17 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.38
Island LDCs 1.69 1.87 1.92 1.91 2.00 1.19 1.30 1.33 1.34 1.33 0.50 0.57 0.60 0.58 0.66
Memo item:
Mineral exporters 0.64 0.62 0.68 0.69 0.72 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.23
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
Note: Domestic resources available for finance per capita are estimated as the difference between GDP and private consumption per capita.
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The growth of private consumption per capita in the LDCs as a group has 
certainly been much higher since 2000 than in the 1990s (chart 8). But these rates 
of growth are occurring from a very low base. The level of private consumption 
per capita remains pitifully low by international standards. In 2006, average daily 
private consumption per capita in the LDCs as a group was only $0.76. It was 
slightly higher in African LDCs ($0.78) and slightly lower in Asian LDCs ($0.73). But 
the island LDCs stand out as having a much higher level of private consumption 
per capita — $1.33 per day (table 21).
These figures are based on market exchange rates rather than the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) exchange rates used in international comparisons of income 
and poverty. However, although prices for non-tradable goods and services may 
be cheaper in LDCs than in other countries, with the opening of their economies, 
more people in LDCs increasingly depend on imported goods and most local 
prices are affected by international fuel prices. Daily consumption figures give an 
indication of the real command of households over resources in an open economy 
setting where imports represent a rising share of GDP and consumption. From this 
perspective, 76 cents per day is an abject consumption standard and an increase 
of 5 cents per day is simply a slight improvement of this abject consumption 
standard.
It is also significant to note that the difference between average GDP per capita 
in LDCs and private consumption per capita, when measured at market exchange 
rates, was only 36 cents per person per day in 2006 (table 21). What this means 
is that the domestic resources which were on average available in LDCs to finance 
public and private investment, to pay to run all public services including health, 
education, the provision of water and sanitation and to finance good governance, 
including the maintenance of a civil service and the enforcement of law and order, 
amounted to 36 cents per person per day. It is clear therefore that not only are 
consumption standards very low in LDCs, but there are also very few domestic 
resources available to finance good governance, to provide the public goods 
which support the achievement of basic needs, and to invest in creating a better 
future. Moreover, there is little — if any — surplus to deal with economic shocks.
Chart 8. Real GDP, GNI and private consumption per capita in LDCs, 1980–2006
(Per cent, 2000 dollars)
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2. DIFFERENCES AMONG LDCS
The relationship between private consumption per capita and GDP per 
capita varies between the LDCs (chart 9). Table 22 classifies the LDCs into four 
major groups according to whether the changes in GDP per capita and private 
consumption per capita in 2000–2006 were positive or negative. From the table, 
it is apparent that most LDCs (35 out of 50) are in the group which experienced 
both increasing GDP per capita and increasing private consumption per capita 
(group 3 in table 22). However, there are nine LDCs where both GDP per capita 
and private consumption per capita fell (group 1) and a further three (Chad, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Sierra Leone — group 4) where private 
consumption fell even though GDP per capita rose. The final three LDCs — 
Eritrea, Comoros and Madagascar (group 2) — had increasing private consumption 
per capita with decreasing GDP per capita, a pattern which is not sustainable 
without a continuing inflow of external resources. In all, there are 20 LDCs where 
private consumption per capita in 2006 was less than in 2000, or where private 
consumption per capita increased at less than 0.5 per cent per annum during that 
period.
Focusing on the largest of the four groups, there are 10 LDCs in which private 
consumption grew faster than GDP per capita (group 3b). This is not likely to 
be sustainable in the long run as the domestic resources available for financing 
development are diminishing in relative terms. There are 18 LDCs in which GDP 
per capita and private consumption per capita both rose, but the latter rose at a 
slower rate than the former so that domestic resources for financing development 
also expanded. However, private consumption grew quite slowly in most of these 
countries. Indeed, only 13 LDCs feature the virtuous combination of rising GDP 
per capita, private consumption per capita rising at more than 2 per cent per year 
and rising domestic resources available for finance per capita (estimated as the 
Chart 9.  Real GDP and private consumption per capita growth in LDCs, 2000–2006
(Average annual growth rates, percentage)
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difference between GDP and private consumption per capita).1 If present trends 
persist, average private consumption per capita will double (or more) by 2020 as 
compared to 2000 in only nine LDCs.
In general, it is striking that if LDCs are classified according to their export 
specialization, private consumption per capita grew most slowly in mineral-
exporting LDCs (at 1.2 per cent per annum). Despite their recent growth surge 
driven by high commodity prices, average private consumption per capita in 
mineral-exporting LDCs was actually lower in 2006 than in 2004, and in 2006 
it was 36 per cent below the average of the LDCs as a group (table 21). This 
clearly illustrates that there is no automatic relationship between growth and rising 
consumption standards while indicating that the type of growth matters for the 
nature of the relationship. 
C.  Poverty trends
1. NATURE OF POVERTY ESTIMATES
One of the paradoxical features of the current moment in development thinking 
and policy is that poverty reduction is at the heart of national and international 
development policies but internationally comparable data to identify and analyse 
poverty trends remains inadequate. This is particularly so in the case of the LDCs. 
The World Bank publishes internationally comparable poverty estimates based on 
Table 22. Classification of countries according to GDP and private consumption per capita performance, 
2000–2006
(Comparison between the average annual rate of growth of GDP and private consumption per capita in 2000-2006; 
the latter figure is provided in percentage)
Decreasing GDP per capita Increasing GDP per capita
Decreasing private 
consumption per capita
Increasing
private
consumption
per capita 
Increasing private consumption per capita 
(3)
Decreasing private 
consumption per capita Private consumption per 
capita increasing slower than 
GDP per capita 
Private consumption per 
capita increasing faster than 
GDP per capita 
Private consumption per 
capita increasing at the 
same rate as GDP per 
capita 
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (4)
Somalia -0.3 Eritrea 5.9 Equatorial Guinea 12.0 Angola 18.2 Afghanistan 10.0 Chad -0.8
Vanuatu -0.3 Comoros 1.2 Myanmar 10.1 Malawi 5.2 Bhutan 5.3 Lao People's Dem. Rep. -0.8
Togo -0.5 Madagascar 0.4 Cambodia 6.9 Burkina Faso 4.4 Tuvalu 4.0 Sierra Leone -0.9
Haiti -1.9 Sudan 4.2 Samoa 4.0 Ethiopia 3.4
Burundi -2.0 Bangladesh 2.4 Zambia 3.6 Sao Tome & Principe 2.4
Central African Rep. -2.0 United Rep. of Tanzania 2.0 Gambia 3.0 Solomon Islands 0.4
Guinea-Bissau -3.3 Uganda 1.9 Guinea 2.5
Timor-Leste -5.7 Cape Verde 1.9 Dem. Rep. of the Congo 2.4
Liberia -6.1 Maldives 1.8 Nepal 1.2
Mauritania 1.8 Kiribati 0.4
Mozambique 1.7
Senegal 1.5
Rwanda 1.4
Lesotho 1.3
Yemen 0.6
Mali 0.4
Niger 0.3
Djibouti 0.2
Benin 0.0
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
Note: Calculations are based on data in constant 2000 dollars.
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household surveys of income or consumption for just 16 LDCs during the period 
2000–2006. Within this sample, there are only 10 countries which have at least 
three household surveys enabling a description of trends over a 10-year period.
Because of the lack of available data, The Least Developed Countries Report
has introduced innovations in the measurement of poverty in the LDCs, allowing 
it to provide insights into the dynamics of poverty in these countries. The Least 
Developed Countries Report 2002: Escaping the Poverty Trap used national 
accounts data to make the first internationally comparable estimates of $1-a-day 
and $2-a-day poverty in LDCs. The present Report updates and refines these 
estimates.
In The Least Developed Countries Report 2002, poverty estimates were made 
on the basis of the close cross-country relationship between the level of private 
consumption per capita measured in constant PPP dollars and the incidence of 
$1-a-day and $2-a-day poverty. The closeness of this statistical relationship enabled 
the generation of poverty estimates using national accounts data for countries in 
which there were estimates of private consumption in purchasing power dollars. 
The estimates in the current Report follow the same logic but refine the method 
by establishing the relationship between household survey estimates of private 
consumption per capita and national accounts estimates of private consumption 
per capita, seeking to base the poverty estimates on “calibrated survey means” 
(Karshenas, 2008).2 Using this method, poverty estimates were made for 28 LDCs 
in Africa and Asia from 1980 to 2005.3 The population of these countries accounts 
for 73 per cent of the population of all LDCs. The poverty estimates in these 28 
countries is therefore representative of the trends in poverty for the LDC group as 
a whole.
It should be noted that because national accounts estimates of private 
consumption per capita deviate from household survey estimates of private 
consumption, this method results in international comparable poverty estimates 
which diverge from those of the World Bank. Table 23, which includes the 
UNCTAD and World Bank $1-a-day and $2-a-day estimates for selected LDCs, 
shows the magnitude of the divergence. In some cases, the UNCTAD estimates 
are higher than the World Bank estimates, while in other cases the reverse is 
true.
The discrepancies between the two sets of estimates arise because of the 
difference between the household survey means and the calibrated survey means 
of private consumption per capita. The latter are regarded as being as plausible 
as the household survey data. Indeed, they can be said to be more representative 
in the sense that they utilize all available information on private consumption, 
including both household survey and national accounts data. Significantly, 
however, as compared to household-survey based poverty estimates, the new 
method allows for a much wider coverage of internationally comparable poverty 
estimates, as well as estimates over time. Indeed, as stated in The Least Developed 
Countries Report 2002 (UNCTAD, 2002: 45–51), it would be impossible to 
undertake the international comparative analysis of poverty in LDCs without such 
a method. 
Finally, in reviewing the poverty trends described below, three features of the 
new estimates should be kept in mind. 
First, these are internationally comparable estimates based on the international 
$1-a-day and $2-a-day poverty lines. They do not necessarily conform to 
poverty estimates based on national poverty lines. Moreover, in no sense is it 
argued here that these international estimates are more accurate than national 
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estimates of poverty. They are simply different types of estimates. The importance 
of the estimates on international poverty lines is that they enable international 
comparative analysis which can help us better understand the interplay between 
national and international factors in poverty dynamics. But national authorities 
should have discretion to define poverty lines in their own way.
Second, the poverty estimates are based on estimates of private consumption 
using publicly available PPP exchange rates in constant 1993 dollars. Such rates 
are used to ensure that the purchasing power of a dollar is comparable between 
countries. The updated estimates do not take into account the revision of the 
PPP exchange rates (with base year 2005) published in early 2008 (when our 
estimates had already been made). These can have significant implications for 
poverty estimates in LDCs and in other countries. However, determining the 
consequences of the new set of PPPs will involve another round of calculations in 
which the poverty estimates are further updated and refined.
Third, the poverty estimates describe the two most usual poverty thresholds, 
namely $1 a day and $2 a day (in 1985 PPP dollars), which we refer to as the 
$1-a-day and $2-a-day poverty lines for brevity.4 This does not imply, however, 
that higher standards should be excluded in the international analysis of poverty. 
With globalization, the consumption patterns to which people aspire are defined 
not simply by national norms but also by global norms. Thus, what people 
consider minimally acceptable is shifting with globalization. But this is not pointing 
downwards to the standards of living in the poorest countries, where $1 a day or 
$2 a day may be a poverty line, but rather upwards to the standards of living in 
the rich countries, where $10 a day or more may be the poverty line. In short, 
Table 23. Private consumption per capita and poverty rates in LDCs
Country
Year
of latest
household
survey
Per capita consumption expenditure
Poverty rate
   $1-a-day poverty line    $2-a-day poverty line
Survey
National
accounts
Calibrated
survey mean
New
World
Bank
New
World
Bank
(1993 PPP dollars a day) (Per cent of population)
Bangladesh 2000 1.54 2.19 1.89 26.4 41.3 74.8 84.2
Benin 2003 1.96 2.76 2.21 24.0 30.8 65.8 73.0
Burkina Faso 2003 2.06 1.75 1.65 42.3 28.7 81.1 71.3
Burundi 1998 1.32 .. .. .. 54.6 .. 87.6
Cambodia 2004 1.19 .. .. .. 66.0 .. 89.8
Cape Verde 2001 7.29 7.84 5.16 8.6 1.9 32.3 19.0
Central African Republic 1993 1.35 2.45 2.04 52.7 66.6 73.9 84.0
Ethiopia 2000 1.83 0.86 1.14 60.6 21.6 94.0 76.6
Gambia 1998 3.04 2.98 2.33 38.6 27.9 65.6 55.9
Lao People’s Dem. Republic 2002 1.90 .. .. .. 27.4 .. 74.2
Lesotho 1995 3.96 2.84 2.26 51.1 36.4 70.5 56.0
Madagascar 2001 1.32 2.44 2.03 41.6 61.0 71.4 85.1
Malawi 2004 2.36 2.00 1.79 36.8 20.8 77.6 63.0
Mali 2001 1.87 1.59 1.56 46.0 36.4 80.2 72.7
Mauritania 2000 2.23 1.26 1.37 51.5 25.9 85.1 63.1
Mozambique 2002 2.10 2.06 1.82 44.5 36.2 79.9 74.1
Nepal 2003 2.65 2.45 2.04 40.1 24.7 76.3 64.8
Niger 1994 1.36 1.71 1.62 45.0 54.8 80.4 86.1
Rwanda 2000 1.34 1.63 1.58 51.6 60.3 83.0 87.8
Senegal 2001 2.73 4.00 2.90 14.1 16.8 52.3 55.9
Sierra Leone 1989 1.61 1.27 1.37 60.7 57.0 78.6 74.4
Uganda 2002 1.88 3.04 2.37 42.1 82.3 77.7 95.7
United Republic of Tanzania 2000 1.20 1.04 1.24 54.4 57.0 89.8 90.2
Yemen 1998 2.84 .. .. .. 9.4 .. 43.5
Zambia 2004 1.35 1.52 1.52 54.6 60.0 81.8 84.9
Source: UNCTAD secretariat compilation based on Karshenas (2008).
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although we focus on $1-a-day poverty and $2-a-day poverty, these are actually 
minimal international standards to which we should be aspiring when we discuss 
poverty reduction. 
2. LEVEL AND DYNAMICS OF POVERTY IN LDCS SINCE 1990
(a)  Overall trends
The three basic features of the incidence of poverty in the LDCs since 1990 
can be summarized as follows:
?? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????? ???????? ? ???????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??? ????
population living on less than $1 a day as a share of total population) has 
decreased continuously since 1994, reaching 36 per cent of the population 
in 2005 (chart 10A);
?? ??????????????????????? ?? ??????? ??????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ??????????
of the population living on more than $1 a day  but less than $2 a day has 
remained constant at around 40 per cent of the total population (chart 10B); 
and
Chart 10.  Poverty rates in LDCs according to different poverty lines, by region, 1990–2005
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Note:   Based on the sample of 28 LDCs mentioned in table 24.
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slowly, but in 2005 over three quarters (76 per cent) of the total population 
was still living on less than $2 a day (chart 10C and table 24). 
As indicated in past Least Developed Countries Reports, these figures mean 
that absolute poverty is not a marginal phenomenon. Rather, there is a situation of 
generalized poverty in the LDCs. A large share of the population lives at or below 
income levels sufficient to meet their basic needs, and in which the available 
resources in the economy, even when equally distributed, are barely sufficient to 
cater to the needs of the population on a sustainable basis. In this situation, the 
economic freedom of the majority of the population is seriously constrained by 
the inadequate purchasing power to meet basic needs. 
Although the incidence of poverty has been falling, the high rate of population 
growth means that the number of people living in extreme poverty (i.e. on less 
than $1 a day) has increased over the long term. However, the rate of growth 
of the number of extremely poor people has been slowing, falling from 3.1 per 
cent per annum during the period 1990–1995 to 1.1 per cent per annum during 
2000–2005. After 2003, the number of $1 poor people living in LDCs stopped 
rising (chart 11). However, the incidence of extreme poverty is much higher than 
in most other developing countries and the number of extremely poor people 
remains significant. It is estimated that 277 million people were living in extreme 
poverty in LDCs in 2005 (table 24). 
While the number of people living in extreme poverty has stopped increasing, 
the rise in the number of people living above $1 a day but below $2 a day 
accelerated sharply during the second half of the 1990s and has decelerated only 
slightly since 2000. This pattern is similar to the one observed in other developing 
countries. There, most people who manage to escape extreme poverty situate 
themselves between the two poverty lines, thus swelling the figures of this second 
group (Chen and Ravallion, 2007). But leaving this second group is much more 
difficult than exiting from absolute poverty. In the case of the LDCs, the transfer 
from the lowest to the second poverty threshold is taking place in relative terms. 
Although the number of people living on less than $1 a day has not yet fallen (as 
has occurred in other developing countries) and stopped increasing only recently, 
Table 24. Poverty in LDCs, 1990–2005
(Percentage and million)
Population living on:
less than $1 a day between $1 and $2 a day less than $2 a day
Percentage of total populationa
1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005
LDCs 40.4 40.8 38.9 36.1 41.2 39.6 39.8 39.6 81.6 80.4 78.8 75.7
African LDCsb 49.7 49.3 46.9 43.9 34.2 33.7 35.3 36.0 83.9 83.1 82.2 79.9
Asian LDCs 26.9 28.3 26.9 24.0 51.4 48.1 46.7 45.2 78.3 76.4 73.6 69.2
Millionc
LDCs 212.4 245.2 264.6 277.0 216.4 237.8 270.5 303.8 428.8 483.0 535.1 580.8
African LDCsb 154.9 176.1 192.0 205.6 106.5 120.5 144.4 169.0 261.4 296.5 336.4 374.6
Asian LDCs 56.9 68.4 71.9 70.6 108.7 116.1 124.8 133.3 165.6 184.5 196.7 203.9
Island LDCsd 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from Karshenas (2008) and United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
a Percentage data refer to a sample of 28 LDCs: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.
b Includes Cape Verde.
c The total number of poor people in the LDCs has been estimated by assuming that the African LDCs for which data are not available have 
the same incidence of poverty as those for which data are available, and that the Asian and island LDCs for which data are not available 
have the same incidence of poverty as Asian LDCs for which data are available.
d Excludes Cape Verde.
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the rate of growth of the population living on between $1 and $2 a day has 
exceeded the rate of growth of the extremely poor since the mid-1990s. Indeed, 
from 1995 onwards, the number of people living between the two poverty 
lines has grown at approximately the same pace as total population (table 25). 
As a consequence, the number of poor people between the two poverty lines 
continues to increase and largely exceeds the absolute increase in the number of 
the $1 poor. It is estimated that 304 million people in LDCs lived on between $1 
and $2 a day in 2005 (table 24). 
Trends in $2-a-day poverty are of course the combination of the trends in 
$1-a-day poverty and in poverty between the two ranges discussed above. The 
absolute number of $2-a-day poor continues to rise in LDCs, though the rate 
of growth slowed in 2000–2005 compared with 1990–1995. In 2005, it was 
estimated that 581 million people lived on less than $2 a day in the LDCs as a 
whole (table 24).
(b)  Regional trends 
The overall picture of the incidence and dynamics of poverty in the LDCs 
masks a sharp contrast between African and Asian countries.5 First, the incidence 
of extreme poverty is much higher in African LDCs than in Asian ones. In 2005, the 
average incidence of extreme poverty in African LDCs was almost 20 percentage 
points higher than in Asian LDCs (chart 10A). Second, the ranking is the opposite 
in the case of the population living on between $1 and $2 a day, whose share of 
the total population is higher in Asia than in Africa. The gap has however been 
narrowing since the early 1990s (chart 10B). Third, progress in reducing the 
incidence of poverty (in both brackets) has been much faster in Asian LDCs than 
in African LDCs. 
Chart 11. Estimated number of poor in LDCs, 1990–2005
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In African LDCs, the overall incidence of extreme poverty is estimated to have 
fallen from 50 per cent in the early 1990s to 44 per cent in 2005 (chart 10A). 
However, the number of extremely poor people continues to increase, though 
at a slowing rate of 1.5 per cent per annum in the period 2000–2005 compared 
with 2.8 per cent per annum in the period 1990–1995 (table 25). In 2005, an 
estimated 206 million people lived in extreme poverty in African LDCs. In Asian 
LDCs, by contrast, the pace of growth of the extremely poor population has 
declined sharply since the early 1990s, to the point that the absolute number 
of $1-a-day poor has stabilized since 2000. The incidence of extreme poverty 
fell continuously from 29 per cent in 1994 to 24 per cent in 2005 (chart 10A), 
when the number of extremely poor people is estimated to have been 71 million
people.
The rate of growth of the contingent of people living on more than $1 a day 
but less than $2 a day accelerated in both African and Asian LDCs during the 
second half of the 1990s, but by much more in the former than in the latter. 
Since 2000, the population between the two poverty lines has been expanding by 
3.2 per cent per annum in African LDCs, well above the pace of 1.4 per cent in 
Asian LDCs (table 25). The proportion of the total population living between the 
poverty lines continued to rise in African LDCs, reaching 36 per cent in 2005. In 
Asian LDCs, by contrast, the corresponding incidence fell by six percentage points 
between 1990 and 2005, when it reached 45 per cent (chart 10B and table 24). 
The combination of divergent developments in the two brackets of poverty 
in African and Asian LDCs has resulted in different trends in total (i.e. $2-a-day) 
poverty. The incidence of $2-a-day poverty is declining faster in Asian LDCs 
than in African LDCs. In the former, an estimated 204 million lived under these 
conditions in 2005, whereas in Africa the corresponding figure was 375 million 
(table 24). As a result of contrasting developments in the level and trends of the 
two brackets of poverty, the gap between the total poverty rates is smaller than 
that within these brackets. In African LDCs, total poverty incidence was 80 per 
cent in 2005, while in Asia it was 69 per cent (chart 10C). Despite some reduction 
in incidence since the 1990s, this means that the vast majority of the population 
of LDCs in both regions continue to live in poverty.
(c)  Poverty trends and export specialization 
Apart from regional contrasts in patterns of poverty in the LDCs, there are also 
strong differences in the level and dynamics of poverty among these countries, 
Table 25. Poverty and population dynamics in LDCs and country groups, 1990–2005
(Average annual growth rates of the number of people, per cent)
1990–1995 1995–2000 2000–2005 1995–2005
A . $1-a-day poverty LDCs 3.1 1.7 1.1 1.6
African LDCsa 2.8 1.9 1.5 1.9
Asian LDCs 3.9 1.4 -0.2 0.8
B. Poverty above $1 a day and below $2 a day LDCs 1.7 2.7 2.4 2.5
African LDCsa 2.4 3.8 3.2 3.3
Asian LDCs 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.5
C. $2-a-day poverty (A+B) LDCs 2.4 2.2 1.7 2.0
African LDCsa 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.5
Asian LDCs 2.1 1.5 0.8 1.2
D. Total population LDCs 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6
African LDCsa 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8
Asian LDCs 2.6 2.2 2.0 2.1
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from Karshenas (2008) and United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
Note: Sample composition as in table 24. a  Includes Cape Verde.
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depending on export specialization. The categories of export specialization into 
which we have classified LDCs (table A) reflect different forms of insertion of these 
countries in the international economy, in particular the trade and investment 
links between their domestic economy and the international environment.6
These international trade and investment linkages, in turn, are closely related to 
the productive structure of the domestic economy and the amount and quality 
of employment that it can generate. The productive structure and the patterns 
of employment generation determine the level and the distribution of income 
among domestic agents. Therefore, changes in production and employment 
through time have a direct impact on income distribution. By the same token, 
the dynamics of foreign trade and investment, together with those of domestic 
output and employment, determine the level of poverty in each country and its 
developments through time. 
Specialization of production and trade in capital-intensive commodity-
producing sectors typically tends to generate rising GDP and exports, particularly 
during periods of rising commodity prices — as has been the case for most of 
the present decade. However, this type of economic development tends also to 
increase income inequality within the country and can therefore have a limited 
poverty-reducing impact.7 This is typically the case of specialization of trade and 
output in natural resource extraction. 
The opposite case is that in which the international trade and investment 
links of a developing country are related to an output structure that leads to a 
virtuous circle of employment creation and income generation for a wider share 
of the population. This is typically the case of trade and output specialization 
in labour-intensive manufacturing. Given its employment-creating impact, this 
specialization pattern typically has a poverty-reducing impact, particularly at the 
Table 26. Poverty and population dynamics in LDCs and country groups by export specialization, 1990–2005
(Average annual growth rates of the number of people, per cent)
Export specialization 1990–1995 1995–2000 2000–2005 1995–2005
A. $1-a-day poverty Oil 15.2 2.1 1.9 3.1
Agricultural 0.7 1.1 2.5 2.1
Mineral 4.1 1.8 1.7 1.9
Manufactures 3.1 1.5 -0.2 0.6
Services 2.1 2.0 0.8 1.5
Mixed 0.9 1.4 2.4 3.5
B. Poverty above $1 a day and below $2 a day Oil 3.1 2.8 3.2 3.1
Agricultural 5.0 3.1 3.4 3.1
Mineral 1.4 2.8 2.6 2.7
Manufactures 0.7 1.5 1.2 1.3
Services 0.6 5.5 4.0 4.7
Mixed 6.7 2.5 1.3 1.1
C. $2-a-day poverty (A+B) Oil 7.6 2.5 2.6 3.1
Agricultural 2.5 2.0 2.9 2.6
Mineral 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.2
Manufactures 1.6 1.5 0.7 1.0
Services 1.6 3.2 2.0 2.7
Mixed 3.8 2.0 1.8 2.2
D. Total population Oil 3.9 3.0 3.1 3.1
Agricultural 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1
Mineral 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.6
Manufactures 2.3 2.1 1.9 2.0
Services 2.6 3.1 2.6 2.8
Mixed 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.9
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from Karshenas (2008) and United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
Note: As in table 24.
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initial phases of development. Similarly, countries with a diversified trade and 
production structure tend to create jobs in a wider range of sectors, which mostly 
has a poverty-reducing impact.
The different categories of LDCs according to export specialization have 
divergent levels and growth rates of poverty (table 26). Commodity-dependent 
countries typically have much higher rates of poverty than either those that are 
specialized in manufacturing or services or those that have a more diversified 
export structure. As chart 12 shows, in agricultural-, mineral- or oil-exporting LDCs, 
three-fourths or more of the population lives on less than $2 a day. This situation 
of generalized poverty in oil- and mineral-exporting countries is explained by 
their type of insertion in the international economy and by the domestic output 
and employment patterns, as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. Poverty is 
also generalized in agriculture-exporting countries due to low and almost stagnant 
agricultural productivity and the incapacity of the agricultural sector to absorb 
gainfully the still rapidly increasing rural population (see sub-section D.3 of this 
chapter). In commodity-exporting countries, the poverty rate has been declining 
slowly since 1994, although the trend for oil-exporting countries has been 
somewhat erratic.
In manufactures and mixed exporters, by contrast, the incidence of $2-a-day 
poverty was ten percentage points lower than in commodity-exporting LDCs 
in 2005 (chart 12). Moreover, it has been declining at a stronger pace than in 
the latter countries. Manufactures and mixed exporting LDCs have successfully 
diversified economic production, employment and exports out of the primary 
Chart 12. $2-a-day poverty rate by export specialization, 1990–2005
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sector into industry and/ or services, allowing them to expand and widen the 
employment base. This has brought about a much steeper decline in poverty 
incidence than in commodity-producing LDCs. Moreover, these are the only two 
groups where the absolute number of extremely poor stopped growing, in 2000 
(manufactures exporters) and 2003 (mixed exporters), respectively. The strongest 
decline in the incidence of poverty is in manufactures exporters. There, the 
activity of foreign investors in the garment and textile industry has led to a strong 
expansion of industrial employment and manufactured exports.8 This is the only 
group of export specialization where the absolute number of the extremely poor 
has declined on average since 2000 and the one with the lowest rate of expansion 
of the $2-a-day poor population (table 26). 
Divergent patterns of poverty levels and pace of change were already reflected 
in The Least Developed Countries Report 2002 (UNCTAD 2002: 101-135). 
However, a major difference between the poverty estimates contained in that 
Report and those contained in the present Report is that the former reflected 
falling international commodity prices during the most recent years for which 
estimates had been made (i.e. the late 1990s). By contrast, the new set of estimates 
presented in this Report reflects rising international commodity prices in the most 
recent years for which estimates were made (i.e. up to 2005). It was expected 
that higher export prices would lead to stronger economic growth rates, and this 
has indeed been the case (see chapter 1 of this Report). It could additionally have 
been expected that stronger economic growth would have implied significant 
poverty reduction. The previous paragraphs have shown that this has not been the 
case. Section D of this chapter analyses the reasons for this. 
D.  The growth–poverty relationship in the LDCs
The rate of economic growth is an important determinant of poverty reduction 
in the LDCs, as in other developing countries. Indeed, the improved performance 
of LDCs in terms of poverty reduction since 1994 is related to the acceleration of 
economic growth. However, the continuing slow progress in poverty reduction 
despite very high growth rates implies that the type of growth which is occurring 
in most LDCs does not have a strong impact on poverty reduction.
The overall relationship between the annual percentage change in GDP per 
capita and in the incidence of $1-a-day and $2-a-day poverty during the period 
1995–2005 is shown in chart 13. This covers the period in which the LDCs were 
most successful in reducing poverty (1995–2005). From the charts, it is apparent 
that:
?? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????? ???? ?????????? ??????????????? ???? ??????? ????
declined. This is typically the case for $1-a-day poverty;
?? ?????????????????????????????????? ????? ????????????????????????????????????
period, the incidence of $1-a-day poverty also increased. The incidence of 
$2-a-day poverty generally fell when GDP per capita increased, but it rose 
in one-fifth of the GDP growth countries;
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
poverty fell, most were unable to raise the rate of poverty reduction above 
2 per cent per year. Out of the sample of 28 countries, in only six of them 
did $1-a-day poverty fall at that pace or faster, and in only three countries 
did $2-a-day poverty fall at that rate or faster. If poverty continuously shrinks 
at 2 per cent per annum, it will take 34 years to halve the poverty rate. 
It could have been expected 
that stronger economic 
growth would have implied 
significant poverty reduction, 
but this has not been 
the case.
Within the LDCs where 
GDP per capita increased 
and poverty fell, most were 
unable to raise the rate of 
poverty reduction above 2 
per cent per year. At this rate, 
it will take 34 years to halve 
the poverty rate. 
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The correlation between GDP growth and poverty reduction in our sample 
of LDCs has been weakening since the early 1990s. Moreover, economic growth 
has translated into falling poverty rates only for people living on less than $1 a 
day. It has not had an impact on the poverty incidence of those living on between 
$1 a day and $2 a day. In the 1990–1995 period the correlation between GDP 
per capita growth and the rhythm of reduction in $1-a-day poverty was -0.38 
(and statistically significant), indicating that GDP growth led to a reduction in the 
extreme poverty rate. In the 2000-2005 period, by contrast, the correlation had 
fallen to -0.20 (and become statistically insignificant), pointing to a weakening 
of the economic growth–poverty reduction connection. In the case of poverty 
between the two poverty lines in our sample of LDCs, there has been no connection 
since 1990. The correlation is weak (less than 0.1), changes signs in different sub-
periods and is never statistically significant. This is due to the already mentioned 
fact that in relative terms people transfer from the lower (below $1-a-day) to the 
higher bracket of poverty (between $1- and $2-a-day).
Chart 13. Economic growth and poverty in LDCs, 1995–2005
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat estimations based on data from Karshenas (2008) and United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
Note: Poverty rate is the number of people living in each threshold as a share of the total population.
  $1 poverty refers to people living on less than $1 a day.
  $1-2 poverty refers to people living on more than $1 a day, but less than $2 a day.
  $2 poverty refers to people living on less than $2 a day.
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The weak correlation between growth in GDP per capita and poverty reduction 
in the LDCs can be attributed to a number of factors, notably: (1) the relationship 
between GDP growth and private consumption growth; (2) population growth and 
employment; (3) the patterns of economic growth; and (4) income distribution. 
Hereafter, we examine each one in turn.
1. GROWTH OF GDP AND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION
The immediate link between growth in GDP per capita and poverty reduction 
is that the former leads to higher household consumption per capita, which in 
turn is closely associated with poverty reduction (UNCTAD, 2002: 39–49). It is 
for this reason that the previous Least Developed Countries Reports have been 
arguing that what matters is not GDP growth per se, but a type of GDP growth 
which expands average household living standards. However, the acceleration of 
economic growth in the LDCs since the early 2000s has not been accompanied 
by a proportional strengthening of private consumption in most LDCs (see section 
B of this chapter).
In countries where the pace of private consumption increase lags behind the 
growth rate of GDP, the share of private consumption in GDP is shrinking. This 
is the case in more than half of the LDCs (table 27). However, this share fell 
particularly sharply between 2000 and 2006 in a number of countries, notably 
Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mozambique and 
Sierra Leone, where it declined by at least 20 percentage points. In three of these 
countries — Chad, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Sierra Leone — this 
shrinking share resulted from a combination of contracting private consumption 
with expanding GDP (group 4 in table 22), leading to a stagnation in the incidence 
of extreme poverty despite high economic growth.
Over the long run, the fall in the share of private consumption in GDP must 
be seen as a positive development if it results in the mobilization of domestic 
resources for financing development. In the short run, however, there is a trade-
off between poverty reduction and increased domestic savings. It is this trade-
off which makes the availability of external financial resources in the form of 
official development assistance (ODA) so important for starting a sustainable 
process of poverty reduction in very poor countries. There is certainly a stratum 
of rich people in very poor countries (see subsection 4 below) and they can play 
an important role in initiating a domestic accumulation process. However, in 
situations of generalized poverty where the majority of the population are very 
poor, the impact of the trade-off between using resources to meet immediate 
basic needs and mobilizing resources to invest in creating a better future can be 
considerably lessened through access to external resources. This is one reason 
why aid is so important for poverty reduction in the LDCs. 
2. POPULATION GROWTH AND LABOUR FORCE GROWTH
Demographic growth is faster in the LDCs than in other developing countries. 
Between 1990 and 2005, total population of LDCs increased at an annual rate 
of 2.5 per cent, higher than that of other developing countries in Africa (the 
continent with strongest demographic growth), but also in the other regions. 
Population in all other developing countries grew by 1.5 per cent per annum 
during the same period. The higher rate of population growth means that in order 
to reduce poverty, LDC economies must not only grow at a sustained higher pace 
but also generate new jobs and remunerative income-earning opportunities at 
an accelerated rhythm. Increasing employment is therefore a precondition for 
The acceleration of economic 
growth since the early 2000s 
has not been accompanied 
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consumption in most LDCs.
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Table 27. Private consumption as a share of GDP in LDCs 
and country groups, 1995–2006
(Per cent)
1995 2000 2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan 102 119 122 115 121
Angola 24 17 50 49 44
Bangladesh 74 67 64 63 62
Benin 79 81 80 79 78
Bhutan 41 49 47 45 54
Burkina Faso 67 51 53 54 55
Burundi 92 91 85 88 84
Cambodia 99 87 84 83 81
Cape Verde 93 98 98 93 92
Central African Republic 85 85 89 84 88
Chad 50 60 35 33 34
Comoros 83 80 88 88 88
Democratic Republic of the Congo 66 62 64 64 65
Djibouti 49 68 62 62 62
Equatorial Guinea 61 52 30 36 33
Eritrea 80 58 111 90 82
Ethiopia 89 81 82 84 82
Gambia 74 79 82 83 84
Guinea 85 88 98 95 94
Guinea-Bissau 71 59 59 57 58
Haiti 125 124 124 124 123
Kiribati 77 61 62 62 62
Lao People's Democratic Republic 93 85 69 65 59
Lesotho 128 87 91 83 82
Liberia 70 87 96 92 96
Madagascar 90 92 92 88 96
Malawi 87 102 117 126 124
Maldives 38 31 27 28 24
Mali 75 76 73 66 63
Mauritania 72 74 74 92 59
Mozambique 94 77 66 64 56
Myanmar 80 65 64 63 61
Nepal 76 76 77 77 79
Niger 73 72 74 68 72
Rwanda 71 62 58 59 59
Samoa 81 85 91 92 92
Sao Tome and Principe 95 102 88 108 102
Senegal 76 73 73 72 73
Sierra Leone 87 110 99 88 84
Solomon Islands 52 51 51 51 51
Somalia 72 73 73 73 73
Sudan 82 72 70 69 69
Timor-Leste 81 65 62 63 62
Togo 80 88 89 91 88
Tuvalu 91 91 91 91 91
Uganda 85 86 83 83 84
United Republic of Tanzania 84 79 72 69 69
Vanuatu 56 62 65 66 66
Yemen 64 58 61 60 57
Zambia 63 63 58 60 59
Total LDCs 76 70 70 69 68
African LDCs 76 71 72 71 69
Asian LDCs 77 69 67 66 66
Island LDCs 71 70 69 70 67
LDCs by export specialization:
Oil 64 57 61 60 58
Agricultural 82 82 85 85 87
Mineral 76 75 74 72 68
Manufactures 78 71 68 67 67
Services 84 77 77 77 76
Mixed 81 74 71 70 69
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
Note: Calculations are based on data in constant 2000 dollars.
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generating raising household incomes and consumption and hence a requisite of 
poverty reduction. 
The working-age population of the LDCs has been increasing at an annual 
pace of 2.6 per cent since the 1980s, a rhythm that is projected to continue 
unabated until 2020. In order to bring about a significant dent in poverty, it is 
necessary to strongly increase employment opportunities and labour productivity. 
Yet in almost all LDCs there is an imbalance between the rate of growth of the 
labour force, which is very rapid, and the rate of capital accumulation and 
technological progress, which is generally slow. As a result, most workers have to 
earn their living using their raw labour, with rudimentary tools and equipment, 
little education and training, and poor infrastructure. Labour productivity is low 
and underemployment is widespread (UNCTAD, 2006: 167–192). 
The impact of economic growth on poverty in LDCs has been seriously 
reduced because of the failure to generate sufficient employment opportunities 
(particularly in the formal sector) and to raise labour productivity, especially that of 
people working in informal sector activities both inside and outside agriculture. 
3.  PATTERN OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
(a) Export-led growth
Most LDCs since the 1990s have been following an export-led growth strategy 
of which an open trade regime is an important component. This strategy may 
be conducive to export expansion and overall economic expansion, which has 
actually taken place in LDCs in recent years (see chapter 1 of this Report). In The
Least Developed Countries Report 2004, however, we showed that the pursuit 
of export-led growth in very poor countries is not generally inclusive (UNCTAD 
2004: 123–160; 179–217). 
One reason for this is that export sectors may have few linkages with the rest 
of the economy and therefore have limited multiplier and job-creating effects. 
In extreme cases, these sectors may develop as enclaves and therefore have 
little positive impact on other segments of the population and territory. This 
development pattern is typical where exports are based on natural resource 
extraction. But it may also be present in the development based on secondary 
sectors, for example in export processing zones, and tertiary sectors, for example 
tourism enclaves. 
The failure of export-led economic growth to translate into significant poverty 
reduction is particularly evident in those LDCs where growth has been propelled 
by investment in the capital-intensive mining and oil industries. It is striking that, 
in the oil-exporting LDCs of our sample, growth of private consumption per capita 
accelerated sharply between 1995–2000 and 2000–2005 from 0.4 per annum to 
9.6 per cent per annum. By contrast, this was accompanied by an only marginally 
lower rhythm of expansion of the number of people living in extreme poverty, 
which changed from an annual rate of 2.1 per cent to 1.9 per cent during the 
same periods. Oil exporters experienced the fastest pace of expansion of total 
poverty between 1995 and 2005 (3.1 per cent per annum — table 26). Similar 
developments took place in the mineral-exporting countries of our sample: their 
private consumption per capita growth accelerated from an annual pace of 0.9 
per cent to 1.6 per cent between those periods but the rhythm of expansion 
of absolute poverty remained almost unchanged, passing from 1.8 per cent per 
annum to 1.7 per cent per annum (table 26). 
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The group with the second highest growth rates in per capita consumption 
is that of manufactures exporters. Given their specialization in low-skill but 
labour-intensive activities, economic growth has been accompanied by significant 
employment creation in industry. This largely explains why this group of countries 
has been the one most successful in curbing the expansion of poverty (both 
$1-a-day and $2-a-day) since the 1990s and the only one where the number of 
extremely poor stopped rising in 2000.
As argued in both The Least Developed Countries Report 2004 and The Least 
Developed Countries Report 2006, it is possible to see a more inclusive pattern 
of economic growth in countries where the demand-side sources of economic 
growth are more balanced between domestic demand and export expansion. This 
does not mean that exports do not matter. But what is required is adequate export 
growth along with expansion of domestic demand. 
(b) Weak agricultural development 
An important feature of the growth pattern in many LDCs is that agricultural 
growth has been very weak. This is important for poverty reduction trends, as 
agriculture is still the major source of employment in LDCs. As we shall see below, 
this situation is changing, quite rapidly in some countries. In 2004, however, 69 
per cent of the economically active population was employed in the agricultural 
sector in the LDCs as a group.
Weak agricultural development is clearly reflected by a number of key trends. 
First, both food production and agricultural production have barely kept pace with 
population growth since the early 1990s (chart 14). The growth of food production 
per capita and agricultural production per capita has been much stronger in Asian 
LDCs than in African LDCs, where food production has actually declined since 
the early 1990s.
Second, agricultural productivity growth has been very slow. Estimates 
in fact suggest that the LDCs as a group experienced a decline of total factor 
productivity in agriculture of 0.1 per cent per annum between 1963 and 2001 
(Nin Pratt quoted in Fan, 2008). Agricultural labour productivity, which is a major 
Chart 14. Agricultural and food production per capita in LDCs, 1990–2004
(Index, 1999–2001 = 100)
A.  Agricultural production per capita
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
LDCs LDCs Africa LDCs Asia
1995–1997 2002–2004
B.  Food production per capita
LDCs LDCs Africa LDCs Asia
1990–1992 1995–1997 2002–2004
Source:  UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from FAO.
A more inclusive pattern of 
economic growth occurs 
where the demand-side 
sources of economic growth 
are more balanced between 
domestic demand and export 
expansion.
Manufactures exporters have 
been the most successful 
group in curbing the 
expansion of poverty.
65Trends in Poverty and Progress Towards the MDGs
determinant of farm incomes, was just $380 per worker in 2003 (in constant 2000 
prices). This was almost one-fifth of the average in other developing countries 
($1,630 per worker). Moreover, it was only 20 per cent higher than the level in 
LDCs in 1981 ($319 per worker) (Fan, 2008). Generalized poverty in the LDCs is 
not surprising given that the majority of people work in agriculture and average 
agricultural labour productivity in LDCs was a little over $1 per day in 2003. The 
failure to achieve higher rates of poverty reduction in these countries is directly 
related to the failure to increase agricultural productivity more rapidly.
Third, frequently LDC farmers have been negatively affected by trade 
liberalization. As indicated in chapter 1 of this Report, the agricultural trade 
balance of the LDCs and also the food trade balance has been continually 
worsening since the mid-1970s. This, of course, is not bad in itself if LDCs can 
more effectively use their domestic resources to produce other products which 
they can trade internationally. In practice, however, most LDCs face increasing 
balance-of-payment problems, which are caused by the combination of worsening 
agricultural trade balances coupled with a failure to generate other internationally 
competitive activities except extractive industries and manufacturing in a few 
cases. The agricultural trade balance has worsened particularly strongly since the 
mid-1990s, as a high number of LDC producers have found it difficult to compete 
in their own markets for many key foodstuffs following trade liberalization. 
These trends reflect policy decisions. In particular, public expenditure on 
agriculture has been neglected. Fan (2008) estimates that public spending on 
agriculture as a share of agricultural GDP was just 4.2 per cent in LDCs in 2004, 
less than half the level in other developing countries (10.7 per cent). Public 
expenditure on agricultural research and development (R&D) was also very low 
in most LDCs (UNCTAD, 2007: 174–177). Falling ODA for agriculture has been a 
critical element of the low levels of public expenditure on agriculture in LDCs in 
recent years. This trend runs counter to the findings of case studies, which show 
that better welfare indicators are prevalent in areas where farmers have higher 
adoption rates for improved technology (Minten and Barret, 2008). 
(c) Urbanization and deagrarianization
The final and important aspect of the pattern of growth is that not only has 
agricultural development been weak, but more and more people are seeking work 
outside agriculture. This is evident in the accelerating trend towards urbanization. 
Although the share of the economically active population in agriculture is still high, 
it is declining sharply in a number of LDCs. As argued in The Least Developed 
Countries Report 2006, this reflects a situation in which it is increasingly difficult 
to make a living in agriculture, as average farm sizes are getting smaller and poor 
people cannot get access to the inputs which they need to increase productivity. 
Many children finish primary school, then seek work outside agriculture (UNCTAD, 
2006: 167–189).
Some observers have described what is happening as “deagrarianization” 
(Bryceson, 1996). In this process, people living in rural areas increasingly survive 
through multiple activities, not simply farming, and more and more people also 
seek work outside agriculture. Like urbanization, this is occurring at an accelerating 
rate. Thus, even though agriculture is still the major employer in most LDCs, the 
annual increase in the number of people seeking work outside agriculture is 
starting to exceed the annual increase in the number of people seeking work 
within agriculture, marking a major change from the 1980s and 1990s. The Least 
Developed Countries Report 2006 estimates that this employment transition will 
affect more than half the LDCs in the present decade and the rest during the next 
decade (UNCTAD, 2006: 167–189). 
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Such a transformation in the structure of employment could be seen as positive 
if people are pushed out of agriculture by rising productivity and pulled into other 
sectors by new employment opportunities being created outside agriculture. Yet 
only some Asian LDCs, which have managed to combine progress in the Green 
Revolution in agriculture with expansion of manufacturing exports, show signs of 
this kind of structural transformation. For most LDCs, however, deagrarianization 
is a negative process in which people are pushed out because they cannot make 
a living in agriculture or find remunerative work elsewhere. This is leading to the 
other face of poverty in LDCs — unemployed youth in the cities — which now 
coexists alongside the poverty associated with long-standing agricultural neglect.
4. INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Finally, the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction is 
mediated by the level of income distribution and the way in which it changes 
during the growth process. In turn, the level of inequality is related to the economic 
structures and patterns of specialization prevailing in each country (see subsection 
C.2(c) of this chapter).
Data on income inequality in LDCs is patchy.  However, available estimates 
from household surveys indicate a mixed pattern: some LDCs have very high 
income inequality, while others have low inequality. Interestingly, the lower-
income LDCs are at both ends of the spectrum. As table 28 shows, there are a few 
LDCs, including Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Haiti, Zambia, 
Cape Verde and Gambia, where the Gini index (an indicator of inequality) is 
higher than 50. In these countries, the level of inequality is such that the growth 
impact on poverty is likely to be strongly attenuated. 
There are very few estimates of changes in inequality. However, in order to 
test whether the recent growth spurt has been accompanied by rising inequality 
with an adverse impact on poverty reduction, we have made two additional 
poverty estimates for our sample of countries, besides the main estimate. The 
first additional estimate is obtained by calculating what the poverty incidence 
would have been if each country had had a Gini index constant at the lowest level 
actually reached during the 1980–2005 period. This provides the lower bound 
of estimates (the “Minimum Gini” curve in chart 15). The second hypothetical 
Table 28. Income inequality in LDCs, 2005
(Gini index)
Low inequality Medium inequality High inequality
(Gini index < 30) (40 < Gini index < 50) (Gini index > 50)
Burkina Faso 39.5 Madagascar 47.5 Sierra Leone 62.9
Mauritania 39.0 Mozambique 47.3 Central African Rep. 61.3
Malawi 39.0 Nepal 47.2 Lesotho 60.0
Benina 36.5 Rwanda 46.8 Haiti 59.2
Chad 35.0 Uganda 45.7 Zambia 50.8
Lao People's Dem. Rep.b 34.6 Burundi 42.4 Cape Verde 50.5
United Rep. of Tanzania 34.6 Cambodia 41.7 Gambia 50.2
Togo 33.8 Niger 41.5
Bangladesh 33.4 Senegal 41.3
Yemen 33.4 Guinea 40.4
Ethiopia 30.0 Angola 40.2
Mali 40.1
Source: UNCTAD secretariat compilation based on data from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, online, May 2008.
a Data for 2003.
b Data for 2002.
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poverty rate is obtained by keeping the Gini index constant at the highest level 
actually reached during that period. This yields the upper bound of poverty 
estimates (the “Maximum Gini” curve in chart 15). The main estimate fluctuates 
between these two bounds. If it converges towards the lower bound, this means 
that falling income inequality is contributing to poverty reduction. On the other 
hand, if it approaches the upper bound, this means that a worsening income 
distribution is slowing poverty reduction. These interpretations hold irrespective 
of whether poverty is increasing or falling. 
This analysis has yielded two types of findings. First, while distributional factors 
seem to have a relatively important effect on $1-a-day poverty, the effect in the 
case of $2-a-day poverty is not noticeable. This is explained by the fact that when 
total poverty reaches the 70 per cent to 90 per cent ranges (as is the case in most 
LDCs), it is clear that changes in the shape of the distribution curve cannot have 
much impact on poverty in either direction (Karshenas, 2003). 
Second, in most countries of our sample, the main $1-a-day poverty estimates 
have moved from the lower bound towards the higher bound. The typical pattern 
is that income distribution has worsened along with growth, slowing down poverty 
reduction. This is exemplified by Bangladesh and Uganda, two of the countries 
Chart 15. Absolute poverty rates under different income distribution assumptions in selected LDCs, 1980–2005 
(Share of population living on less than $1 a day, per cent)
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with the steadiest and most sustained good growth performance during the period 
considered (charts 15A and 15B and table 21). There are a few exceptions — 
cases where distributional changes have contributed to reduce poverty (or at least 
partly offset other factors that would otherwise have worsened it). Ethiopia and 
Burkina Faso are the main examples (charts 15C and 15D).
E.  Progress towards the MDGs 
Income poverty is only one dimension of poverty, and this section extends 
the analysis by introducing a broader range of human development indicators. It 
assesses the extent to which LDCs are achieving selected Millennium Development 
Goals.
As with the analysis of poverty trends, there is a serious lack of data to monitor 
progress towards internationally agreed goals in LDCs. Chart 16 shows the 
availability of data on the status of LDCs with regard to 48 indicators which are 
used to monitor the MDGs. The indicators refer to 2004–2005, the latest years 
for which international data are available, and are taken from the Millennium 
Development Goals Indicators site of the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division,9 the prime source for monitoring 
progress towards MDG achievement. From the chart, it is apparent that coverage 
of countries is woefully inadequate. There are only 13 targets for which more than 
45 LDCs have recent data. For 32 out of the 48 indicators, less then ten LDCs 
have recent data. Moreover, for the 13 indicators for which there is recent data, 
there are only five which enable trend analysis back to 1990.
Given the dearth in data on both level and progress towards most MDGs, this 
section focuses on a few selected MDG targets, namely: 
Halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income 1.
is less than $1 a day (MDG 1);
Halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people suffering from 2.
hunger (MDG 1);
Ensuring that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, are able 3.
to complete a full course of primary schooling  (MDG 2);
Eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably 4.
by 2005, and at all levels of education no later than 2015 (MDG 3);
Reducing, by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-5 mortality 5.
rate (MDG 4);
Halving, by 2015, the proportion of people without access to safe drinking 6.
water (MDG 7); and
Halving the proportion of people without access to sanitation (MDG 7). 7.
The assessment of progress towards the $1-a-day poverty target uses the new 
poverty estimates presented in section C of this chapter. The other indicators are 
based on a mix of sources. They mostly draw from the official MDG Indicators data 
set available on the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Statistics Division website. This is the product of the Inter-agency and Expert 
Group (IAEG) on MDG Indicators, and it reports a mix of national level surveys, 
Government data and IAEG estimates. We have supplemented this with country-
level “MDG Profile” narratives. These data are supplied by national Governments 
and UNDP country offices but cover only 40 out of 50 LDCs. 
Income poverty is only one 
dimension of poverty, and 
the Millennium Development 
Goals target a broader range 
of human development 
indicators.
Data coverage of MDG 
indicators in LDCs is woefully 
inadequate.
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Chart 16. Number of LDCs with data on the MDG indicator, 2004–2005
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from United Nations/DESA Statistics Division, Millennium Development Goals Indicators 
(unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/default.aspx), downloaded in May 2008.
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1. OVERALL PATTERN
LDCs are generally off track to achieve the few poverty and human 
development MDGs for which it is possible to monitor progress. This is exemplified 
by the progress they have achieved in poverty reduction and in combating child 
mortality. Chart 17 shows that there is a widening gap between the progress 
actually achieved by the LDCs and the path that they would have to follow in 
order to reach the respective MDGs by 2015. 
With regard to $1-a-day poverty, it is apparent that the LDCs as a group are 
seriously off track to meet this goal. The critical date in the poverty trend is 1994, 
the year in which the incidence of extreme poverty started to slowly decline 
in LDCs. However, there has been only a marginal improvement in the rate of 
poverty reduction since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration. Moreover, 
even with the very high rates of economic growth achieved in recent years, the 
rate of poverty reduction is still much slower than that required to achieve the 
relevant MDG. 
For the MDG target to be achieved, the incidence of extreme poverty in the 
LDCs must fall from 40.4 per cent in 1990 to 20.2 per cent in 2015. Yet if the 
incidence of extreme poverty declines from 2006 to 2015 at the same rate as 
during the period 1990–2005, it will only reach 33.4 per cent in 2015. Moreover, 
even if it declines at the higher rate achieved over the period 2000–2005, the 
incidence of extreme poverty is projected to reach only 31.7 per cent. This means 
that the extreme poverty rate will have decreased by 25 per cent rather than 
50 per cent in 2015. Moreover, there will be 116 million more people living in 
extreme poverty in 2015 than there would have been had the MDG target been 
met.
Similarly, chart 17B indicates for child mortality that, for the LDCs as a group, 
there has been no change in the slow downward trend in child mortality rates. 
The overall child mortality rate fell from 167 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 138 
per 1,000 in 2005. If anything, however, the rate of progress towards this goal has 
slowed slightly since 2000.
Chart 17.  Poverty and child mortality in LDCs: Actual and MDG-compatible incidence, 1980–2005
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat estimations and projections based on data from Karshenas (2008) and United Nations/DESA Statistics Division. Poverty 
data are based on the sample of LDCs mentioned in table 24. Child mortality data are the unweighted average for all the LDCs.
Note: The MDG-compatible incidence is the hypothetical path that poverty and child mortality incidence would need to follow if the LDCs were 
to achieve the respective MDG targets by 2015.
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 Still, there are a few countries which are making significant progress on specific 
indicators. However, the pattern is very mixed and only a handful of countries are 
making progress across a broad front. 
In general, it is possible to see an emerging pattern in which significant progress 
is being made to achieve targets which depend primarily on public services and 
can be achieved with some increase in public expenditure. However, there is 
a distinct hierarchy in the rate of achievement which reflects the priorities of 
Governments and also donors who are funding the scale-up in provision. In 
this regard, achievements in increasing primary education enrolments outstrip 
progress  in improving access to water, which in turn exceeds accomplishments in 
improving sanitation. Thus:
?? ????? ????????????? ????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ?????? ???
achieve the primary education enrolment goal;
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
track to achieve the goal of access to safe water; and
?? ????? ????????? ??????????????? ????? ?????????????????????? ???????????????????
the sanitation goal. 
Where progress also depends on cultural factors, such as the gender equality 
in education target, relative progress has also been slower. Between one-third and 
half of LDCs for which data are available are on track to achieve this goal. 
Leaving aside quality-related issues, progress towards the primary education 
enrolment goal shows what is possible where government and donor policy 
commitment is combined with appropriate levels of financial and technical 
assistance in the cases of goals that depend primarily on public services and 
expenditure. However, progress towards targets that depend more on household 
incomes has been slower. In this regard, there is very slow progress in reducing 
the incidence of extreme poverty. Less than 15 per cent of the countries for 
which data are available are on track. In relation to the hunger target of MDG1, 
one-quarter of the LDCs are not simply off track but are experiencing reversal or 
stagnation. Moreover, this situation will certainly be exacerbated by recent food 
price increases. It is proving very difficult for LDCs to keep on track in reducing 
child mortality, which is affected by trends for both private incomes and public 
services. Only 20 per cent of the LDCs for which data are available are on track 
with regard to this indicator.  
The following sections provide some details on these trends and identify 
some LDCs which have performed well with regard to progress towards MDG 
achievement.
2. PROGRESS IN REDUCING $1-A-DAY POVERTY
Country-level trends suggest that just four countries out of a total of 28 in our 
sample are likely to achieve the target on the basis of poverty reduction trends of 
1990–2005, namely Cape Verde, Guinea, Malawi and Senegal. On the basis of 
poverty reduction trends of a more recent and generally more favourable period 
(2000–2005), Cambodia, Cape Verde, Guinea and Senegal are likely to achieve 
the goal. 
The distance between projected achievements and the target is quite different 
between African and Asian LDCs, as are developments in their poverty trends. 
The goal for the African LDCs in the sample of countries for which we have made 
poverty estimates (table 24) is to reach a poverty rate of 24.7 per cent in 2015. 
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Our projections indicate that they will reach a poverty rate of 38.5 per cent even 
if poverty reduction occurs at the same rate as during the period 2000–2005. The 
projected poverty rate is just slightly higher if poverty reduction occurs at the same 
rate as in 1990–2005. The target of the Asian LDCs of our sample is to reduce 
extreme poverty to 13.5 per cent in 2015. Our projections indicate that they will 
also miss the target, but by a narrower margin than the African LDCs. The two 
alternative scenarios for Asian LDCs yield a greater variation than those for the 
African countries. Asian LDCs are projected to achieve rates of between 19.6 per 
cent in 2015 if they reduce poverty incidence at the same rate as in 2000–2005, 
and 23.2 per cent in 2015 if they reduce it at the same pace as in 1990–2005. 
These outcomes are regarded as being representative for the LDCs as a group. 
However, the actual outcome in terms of poverty reduction is likely to be worse 
than those mechanically projected on the basis of past trends because of the 
impact of sharply rising food prices since 2007. This issue is discussed in section 
F of this chapter.
3.  PROGRESS TOWARDS OTHER HUMAN DEVELOPMENT TARGETS
Most LDCs are also off track as a group to meet the Millennium human 
development targets for which it is possible to gather data for a wide group of 
countries (table 29). Nevertheless, some countries have made progress towards 
specific targets. 
(a) Hunger
Given the high incidence of extreme poverty in LDCs, the incidence of hunger 
is also high. In one third of the LDCs for which data are available (14 out of 42 
countries), average food consumption is below 2,100 calories per day, which is 
considered the minimum adequate for proper bodily functioning. For the LDCs as 
a group, the share of the population which is estimated to be undernourished in 
2002 was 31 per cent, compared with 17 per cent in other developing countries. 
In half of the LDCs for which data are available, over one-third of the population 
is estimated to be undernourished. The incidence of hunger is particularly high 
in conflict-affected countries (such as Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Somalia), but it is also high in some countries which have sustained high growth 
rates since the mid-1990s. For example, it is estimated that over 40 per cent of the 
population was undernourished in 2002 in Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania. 
In Bangladesh, 30 per cent of the population is estimated to be undernourished 
despite steady growth since the early 1990s. In general, the incidence of hunger is 
highest in mineral-exporting LDCs.
The proportion of the population which is undernourished in the LDCs as a 
group is declining very slowly. It has decreased from an average of 33 per cent in 
1991 to 31 per cent in 2002 (unweighted averages). Within the overall trends, 
however, the picture is mixed. Out of a sample of 42 LDCs, 19 countries are 
on track to achieve the hunger reduction target and three are projected to have 
achieved the target by 2007. The top best performers are indicated in chart 18A. 
Yet there is only slow progress in eight countries and reversal or stagnation in 
a further 12 countries. Of those on track to achieve the target in terms of the 
incidence of hunger, the average level of food consumption remains very low. It is 
close to the 2,100 calories threshold in seven out of the 19 on-track countries.
(b) Primary education
With regard to the target of ensuring that by 2015 children everywhere are 
able to complete a full course of primary schooling, the overall picture is more 
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encouraging. According to “MDG Profile” data, 19 out of 35 LDCs are on track 
to achieve the target and Maldives has already achieved it (table 29). According 
to the MDG Indicators data of the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Statistics Division, average net enrolment in primary education in 
LDCs jumped from 47 per cent in 1991 to 76 per cent in 2005. Net enrolment 
rates exceed 75 per cent in 18 out of 30 countries for which data are available. 
Particularly big leaps in net primary enrolment rates have been achieved in a 
few countries. Net enrolment rates increased by over 7 per cent per annum 
in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Benin, between 2000 and 2005. At the same time, 
however, Cape Verde, Malawi and Mauritania reported a decline in the annual 
rate of net enrolment in primary education over the same period. The top 10 best 
performers are shown in chart 18B.
Primary school completion rates are also increasing, and were up from 34 
per cent in 1991 to 57 per cent in 2005. Mozambique, Cambodia, Benin and 
Niger all achieved high rates of progress on raising primary school completion 
rates. The weakest performers were in Africa. The intractable groups to reach with 
primary education remain girls, particularly those from ethnic, religious or caste 
minorities.
Beyond these quantitative measurements, qualitative aspects should also be 
taken into account.10
(c) Gender equality in education
It is estimated that for LDCs as a group, the ratio of girls’ to boys’ enrolment 
in primary school increased from 0.79 in 1991 to 0.89 in 2005. As increasing 
numbers of students finish primary education, demand for secondary education 
is growing in LDCs. LDC gender disparities in access to education at this level are 
also diminishing. For the LDCs as a group, the ratio of girls’ to boys’ enrolment 
in secondary school increased from 0.77 in 1999 to 0.81 in 2005 (UNESCO, 
2007).
As with the primary education enrolment as a whole, it is clear that quick 
progress can be made on aspects of this indicator (chart 18C). For example, the 
ratio between girls’ and boys’ primary enrolment increased from 0.08 in 1999 
to 0.59 in 2005 in Afghanistan and during the same period from 0.62 to 0.86 
in Ethiopia (UNESCO, 2007). However, important disparities affecting girls still 
prevail in some countries.
The higher one goes up the education system, the greater the disparities. A 
third of the countries with data available in 2005 had achieved gender parity in 
primary education, compared with a fifth in secondary education and only a tenth 
in tertiary education.
(d) Child mortality
As with hunger, child mortality rates are much higher in LDCs than in other 
developing countries. In 2006, 14 out of every 100 children born alive in the 
LDCs died before their fifth birthday as against 8 out of every 100 in all developing 
countries. According to the MDG Indicators database of the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistic Division, 26 LDCs are off 
track to achieve the child mortality target and child mortality is either going up 
or stagnant in a further 13 LDCs. During the period 1990 to 2005, impressive 
reductions in annual under-5 mortality rates were recorded in Timor-Leste, 
Maldives, Bhutan, Nepal, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Bangladesh 
(chart 18D). Yet child mortality increased in Lesotho and Cambodia despite 
Net enrolment in primary 
education in LDCs jumped 
from 47 per cent in 1991 to 
76 per cent in 2005.
The ratio of girls’ to boys’ 
enrolment in primary school 
increased from 0.79 in 1991 
to 0.89 in 2005. 
The higher one goes up the 
education system, the greater 
the gender disparities.
In 2006, 14 out of every 100 
children born alive in the 
LDCs died before their fifth 
birthday as against 8 out of 
every 100 in all developing 
countries.
74 The Least Developed Countries Report 2008
Table 29. Progress towards selected human development targets in LDCs
Target LDC data 
availability
Achieved by 
2007
Achievable 
by 2015
Low
progress
Reversal/ 
stagnation
Hunger
(undernourished)
42
3 19 8 12
Djibouti Angola Bangladesh Burundi
Myanmar Benin Burkina Faso Comoros
Samoa Cambodia Central African Republic Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Chad Mali Gambia
Guinea Nepal Guinea-Bissau
Haiti Rwanda Liberia
Kiribati Sudan Madagascar
Lao PDR Zambia Senegal
Lesotho Sierra Leone
Malawi United Rep. of Tanzania
Maldives Vanuatu
Mauritania Yemen
Mozambique
Niger
Sao Tome and Principe
Solomon Islands
Timor Leste
Togo
Uganda
Primary education 35
1 19 15
Maldives Angola Benin
Bangladesh Burkina Faso
Bhutan Central African Republic
Cambodia Comoros
Chad Gambia
Djibouti Guinea
Equatorial Guinea Haiti
Guinea-Bissau Liberia
Lao PDR Malawi
Lesotho Mali
Madagascar Samoa
Mauritania Somalia
Myanmar Sudan
Senegal United Rep. of Tanzania
Sierra Leone Togo
Timor Leste
Uganda
Yemen
Zambia
Gender equality in 
educationa
24
4 6 10 4
Lesotho Ethiopia Afghanistan Eritrea
Malawi Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Benin Madagascar
Mauritania Nepal Burkina Faso Mali
Myanmar Senegal Burundi United Rep. of Tanzania
Solomon Islands Chad
Sudan Djibouti
Guinea
Mozambique
Niger
Togo
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Target LDC data 
availability
Achieved by 
2007
Achievable 
by 2015
Low
progress
Reversal/ 
stagnation
Child mortality 50
1 10 26 13
Samoa Bangladesh Afghanistan Angola
Bhutan Benin Burundi
Cape Verde Burkina Faso Cambodia
Comoros Djibouti Central African Republic
Eritrea Ethiopia Chad
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Gambia Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Malawi Guinea Equatorial Guinea
Maldives Guinea-Bissau Lesotho
Nepal Haiti Liberia
Timor Leste Kiribati Rwanda
Madagascar Sao Tome and Principe
Mali Somalia
Mauritania Zambia
Mozambique
Myanmar
Niger
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Tuvalu
Uganda
Vanuatu
Yemen
Access to safe water 37
4 12 15 6
Guinea Afghanistan Angola Comoros
Malawi Burkina Faso Bangladesh Ethiopia
Nepal Burundi Benin Maldives
Tuvalu Central African Republic Dem. Rep. of the Congo Samoa
Chad Djibouti Vanuatu
Eritrea Haiti Yemen
Kiribati Liberia
Myanmar Madagascar
Rwanda Mali
Senegal Mauritania
Uganda Mozambique
United Rep. of Tanzania Niger
Sudan
Togo
Zambia
Access to improved 
sanitation
36
3 9 19 5
Myanmar Afghanistan Angola Burundi
Samoa Bangladesh Burkina Faso Lesotho
Tuvalu Benin Central African Republic Liberia
Kiribati Chad Tanzania
Madagascar Comoros Togo
Malawi Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Nepal Djibouti
Senegal Eritrea
Zambia Ethiopia
Guinea
Haiti
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Rwanda
Sudan
Uganda
Yemen
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from United Nations/DESA Statistics Division, Millennium Development Goals Indicators (unstats.un.org/unsd/
mdg/default.aspx) and UNDP, UNMDG Monitor (www.mdgmonitor.org), both downloaded in May 2008.
Note:  An LDC has achieved the target when the actual value of the indicator has already met the MDG target. An LDC is considered to have stagnated (reversed) when 
the actual value is equal to (worse than) the value at the beginning of the period. An MDG target is considered achievable for an LDC when the average actual 
rate of progress experienced to date is equal to (or better than) the required rate to achieve the target. An LDC is considered to have made low progress towards 
a MDG target when the average actual rate of progress experienced to date is less than the required rate to achieve the target.
a Gender equality is measured using the Gender Parity Index (GPI) of the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) for primary level education in LDCs.
Table 29 (contd.)
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Chart 18. Top 10 LDC performers in terms of progress towards selected MDGs
A. Undernourished population
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E. Population without improved drinking water
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F. Population without improved sanitation
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from United Nations/DESA Statistics Division, Millennium Development Goals Indicators.
(unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/default.aspx), downloaded in May 2008.
high economic growth rates. The slow pace of progress reflects a combination 
of factors, including hunger and ill-health. Widespread malaria, the lack of basic 
health services and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS may in part explain the slow 
progress on average for LDCs.
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(e) Drinking water and sanitation
During the period 1990 to 2004, there was steady progress towards halving 
the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water in LDCs. The 
proportion of people without such access fell from 47 per cent in 1991 to 37 per 
cent in 2004. Four LDCs have already met the drinking water target — Guinea, 
Malawi, Nepal and Tuvalu — and a further 12 countries are on track to achieve 
the goal in 2015. Tuvalu and Guinea have made the fastest progress of the 37 
countries for which data are available (chart 18E). The LDCs that have performed 
poorly in trying to achieve this target include Ethiopia, which has significant water 
supply and climate-change-related problems. 
Progress on sanitation, by contrast, has lagged. The proportion of the population 
without access to improved sanitation fell from 70 per cent in 1990 to 60 per cent 
in 2004. This is some 23 percentage points lower than the average rate of access 
to clean water, and is probably related to the fact that ODA for water supply and 
sanitation declined significantly from the mid-1990s to 2002 (World Bank, 2007). 
The top 10 performers in improving access to sanitation include Samoa, Bhutan, 
Myanmar and Maldives (chart 18F).
F.  Impact and policy implications of 
soaring international food prices
1. IMPACT OF RECENT FOOD PRICE INCREASES
As indicated in chapter 1 of this Report, the main surge in international 
commodity prices in the early part of this decade was for oil and minerals rather 
than agricultural commodities. International food prices rose sharply in 2006 and 
2007, however, with a further price spike in the first half of 2008. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) food price index was on 
average 8 per cent higher in 2006 than in 2005. Yet it was 24 per cent higher 
in 2007 than in 2006, and a further 53 per cent higher in the first three months 
of 2008 than the first three months of 2007 (FAO, 2008a). Particularly strong 
price surges have occurred in oils and fats and cereals. Price indices for these 
commodity groups in March 2008 were almost three times the level during the 
period 1998–2000. By March 2008, international prices of wheat and rice were 
twice their levels of a year earlier, while prices of maize were more than one third 
higher (FAO, 2008a).
The global sharp increase in international food prices and the food riots that it 
provoked have given rise to an array of explanations for the current situation. The 
factors usually singled out to explain the price rises include growing food demand 
in emerging markets, the flow of speculative capital into commodity markets, 
increasing biofuel production, weather incidents and global warming. However, 
in order to understand the impact of the global food crisis on the LDCs and on 
their social developments, it is perhaps more important to examine the structural 
causes of the current crisis, the global interdependence that they highlight, and 
the type of insertion of these countries in the international economy. Using this 
perspective, the following factors become equally — if not more — important: 
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
since the 1980s, resulting in underinvestment in infrastructure, withdrawal 
of domestic support measures to farmers, etc.;
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?? ????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cope with foreign competition, particularly smallholders producing staple 
food for local consumption;
?? ?????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
policies in developed countries, which magnify the preceding factors; and
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The combination of these developments has resulted in low agricultural 
productivity level and growth in several developing countries, particularly in Africa 
(UNCTAD, 2008). 
The above features apply to the majority of LDCs and are consistent with the 
policy model of outward orientation, trade openness and withdrawal of public 
support to production that LDCs have been following since the 1980s. In the 
1980s, LDCs as a group were net food exporters but became net food importers 
in the 1990s, after the implementation of this policy package. The shift to food 
deficits was particularly marked in the African countries. LDCs as a group are still 
net food importers at present, as are almost three fourths of these countries (table 
30). Current high international food prices are bringing about yet another episode 
of food import surges, which have become more frequent in the LDCs in the post-
trade liberalization era (UNCTAD, 2004: 271-272).  
Rising food prices will have negative effects on poverty trends in LDCs and 
also slow progress towards MDGs. The negative effects will arise partly because 
the food price hikes threaten economic growth and partly because of the direct 
impact of rising domestic food prices on the ability of households to meet 
essential subsistence needs. These effects are likely to be more severe in the LDCs 
than in other developing countries. First, most LDCs are net food importers and 
already have large trade deficits. Second, levels of poverty and food insecurity are 
already high, and many people spend 50–80 per cent of their household income 
on food. Third, quite apart from generalized poverty, many LDCs are already 
dealing with food crises which require external assistance owing to such factors as 
natural disasters, concentrations of internally displaced persons and localized crop 
failures. These factors are analysed separately hereafter.
(a) Impact on food import bills
The immediate impact of the rising international food prices will be a worsening 
of the balance-of-payment problems of most LDCs. In 2004–2006, 36 out of 50 
LDCs were net food importers (table 30). Moreover, using a narrow definition of 
food which excludes cash crops, processed food and seafood, only seven LDCs 
— Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Myanmar, Somalia, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Zambia — 
were net food exporters in 2004–2005 (Ng and Aksoy, 2008).
Not only are most LDCs net food importers, but food imports constituted a 
significant share of total merchandise imports and total exports in many of them 
even before the recent international price spike. In 2006 food imports constituted 
over 20 per cent of total merchandise imports in 20 LDCs and more than 20 per 
cent of merchandise exports in 33 LDCs (table 30). Over half of total merchandise 
export earnings were used to purchase imported food in 17 LDCs in 2006, in 10 
of them the totality of export earnings were not enough to meet the food import 
bill.
The aggregate food import bill of the LDCs as a group is estimated to have 
risen by 26 per cent between 2006 and 2007, much in line with the increase in 
the overall food price index. The increase in the food import bill was equivalent to 
1 per cent of the GDP of the LDCs in 2006.11
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Table 30. Indicators of food security in LDCs
Undernourished
population
Food 
consumption
Change in 
per capita 
Agricultural
Production
Food aid 
Food imports as % of:
%
Calories per 
capita/day
food
consumption 
%
Instability
Indexa
% of  total 
food imports
Total 
merchandise
imports
Total 
merchandise
exports
Food 
consumption
2004 2002–2004
1995–1997 to 
2002–2004
2004 2006 2006 2006 1996-2001
Net food importers and net importers of agricultural raw materials 
Angola 40 2 120 1.01 4.68 0.8 18.9 3.9 11.4
Bangladesh 30 2 200 0.97 3.47 2.2 14.3 18.3 7.8
Cape Verde 2.5 .. .. 15.96 5.3 29.2 > 100 32.7
Comoros 62 1 770 -0.35 2.87 0.0 33.0 > 100 12.7
Djibouti 27 2 270 1.18 8.81 2.0 21.6 > 100 43.9
Eritrea 73 1 500 .. 18.76 3.3 24.0 > 100 11.8
Gambia 27 2 240 0.23 18.42 7.2 31.2 > 100 38.1
Haiti 47 2 110 1.12 2.73 10.3 26.2 82.1 19.6
Kiribati 6 2 800 0.03 12.55 0.0 33.7 > 100 26.5
Maldives 11 2 600 0.64 4.00 1.1 16.0 > 100 31.0
Nepal 17 2 430 0.88 3.95 3.7 14.9 41.1 2.7
Niger 34 2 150 0.73 12.98 8.4 32.7 63.2 5.8
Samoa 4 2 930 1.31 7.52 0.0 18.6 60.1 18.5
Sao Time and Principe 13 2 490 1.08 7.03 0.0 30.6 > 100 14.9
Senegal 24 2 360 0.46 16.53 0.9 23.4 57.6 21.1
Sierra Leone 50 1 910 -0.61 5.46 11.8 20.6 37.1 10.0
Somalia 61 .. .. 9.12 1.5 50.3 > 100 8.6
Tuvalu 3 .. .. 21.10 0.0 8.0 88.5 24.7
Yemen 36 2 010 -0.08 5.21 2.1 21.2 16.7 31.2
Net food importers and net exporters of agricultural raw materials 
Afghanistan 56 .. .. 15.36 5.5 23.4 > 100 6.1
Benin 15 2 590 0.59 6.48 1.9 27.8 99.4 5.3
Burkina Faso 19 2 500 0.39 7.76 14.7 12.8 37.7 10.4
Cambodia 33 2 070 1.13 8.01 0.2 7.9 6.0 3.4
Central African Republic 43 1 960 0.59 3.89 7.6 20.0 27.6 2.3
Chad 71 1 590 -1.08 3.72 0.0 26.0 31.7 2.2
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 9 0 0.00 6.78 2.0 15.4 4.4 5.6
Equatorial Guinea 26 .. .. 3.48 0.0 16.9 14.0 8.7
Guinea 22 2 370 0.99 8.16 5.3 12.4 10.7 1.8
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 12 2 580 0.18 7.56 1.4 23.6 54.0 19.0
Lesotho 46 1 930 -0.66 11.28 0.0 2.7 11.6 12.9
Liberia 47 2 080 1.13 7.30 2.3 13.9 16.7 7.2
Mali 27 2 270 -0.25 8.42 4.6 11.9 19.2 4.7
Mozambique 34 2 130 1.06 7.81 9.2 16.1 3.2 2.0
Sudan 27 2 270 -0.25 8.42 3.9 11.9 19.2 4.7
Timor-Leste 7 2 750 0.22 4.88 9.8 18.4 16.9 ..
Togo 29 2 200 0.20 6.13 0.1 13.9 18.7 3.7
Net food exporters and net exporters of agricultural raw materials 
Ethiopia 46 1 850 .. 14.28 149.2 8.5 42.6 2.0
Guinea-Bissau 6 2 940 0.55 4.97 23.0 14.0 6.2 1.9
Madagascar 35 2 030 -0.66 4.26 15.4 26.9 29.4 11.4
Malawi 37 2 050 0.18 2.25 10.6 14.5 25.3 3.3
Myanmar 33 2 120 0.39 10.12 0.2 15.1 27.4 3.6
Solomon Islands 19 2 370 0.67 3.27 1.5 13.6 36.2 2.9
Tanzania 20 2 230 0.11 9.68 0.7 11.3 20.3 14.1
Uganda 44 1 960 0.44 3.97 6.5 12.2 32.1 4.6
Vanuatu 12 2 600 0.23 8.81 0.0 13.4 47.7 13.7
Zambia 49 1 950 0.14 9.86 1.4 7.6 6.2 4.5
Net food exporters and net importers of agricultural raw materials 
Bhutan 23 .. .. 6.32 0.0 8.4 7.5 3.4
Burundi 68 1 660 -0.23 5.64 28.0 7.5 25.8 0.8
Mauritania 10 2 740 0.17 3.40 1.9 25.0 21.3 32.9
Rwanda 37 2 110 1.42 13.58 4.5 12.4 45.5 5.9
LDCs 36 2 033 0.39 8.14b 3.7 15.4 15.6 23.6
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from FAO, OECD/DAC and United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
Note:  The classification of LDCs according to their net exports of food and agricultural raw materials is based on a three-year (2004–2006) aver-
age of data from UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2007 and on UNCTAD estimates.
  The definition of food and agricultural raw materials is the same as in table 8.
aCalculated according to the methodology of the Committee for Development Policy's Economic Vulnerability Index.  b Unweighted average.
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The bigger food import bills will widen further the already high trade deficits 
of the LDCs. This will affect all food-importing LDCs, and the balance-of-payment 
impact will be accentuated as countries also have to deal with rising energy prices. 
The countries which are particularly vulnerable are those in which food imports 
already constitute over 20 per cent of total merchandise imports and food imports 
also account for a high share of total food consumption, namely Cape Verde, 
Djibouti, Gambia, Haiti, Lesotho, Kiribati, Mauritania, Samoa, Senegal, Sao Tome 
and Principe and Yemen.
(b) Poverty and household food security
The impact of rising international food prices on poverty and household food 
security depends on whether price rises in international markets pass through to 
national markets and the extent to which households, particularly poor households, 
depend on purchased food.
In this regard, one factor which works in favour of some LDCs is that imported 
food is not a significant proportion of total food consumption. There are no 
up-to-date data on this. During the period 1996–2001, however, food imports 
represented less than 10 per cent of total food consumption in two-thirds of the 
LDCs. Part of total food consumption in rural areas is met from the household’s 
own production. Moreover, in many African LDCs, a large share of staple food 
consumption is based on low-value, high bulk crops which are semi-tradable 
internationally, such as cassava, plantains, yams, millet, sorghum and white maize 
(UNCTAD, 1998: 141). At the same time, however, it is clear that dependence 
on imported food products is increasing in many LDCs. Moreover, even where 
imports are not a large proportion of total food consumption, local food prices are 
rising because of higher fuel and transport costs.
Table 31. Food insecurity in LDCs, by type of insecurity and region, 2008
Country Type of insecurity
Africa
Lesotho Multiple-year droughts until last season
Somalia Conflict, adverse weather
Eritrea IDPs, economic constraints
Liberia Post-conflict recovery period
Mauritania Several years of drought
Sierra Leone Post-conflict recovery period
Burundi Civil strife, IDPs and returnees
Central African Republic Refugees, insecurity in parts
Chad Refugees, conflict
Democratic Republic of Congo Civil strife, returnees
Ethiopia Insecurity in parts, localized crop failure
Guinea Refugees
Guinea-Bissau Localized insecurity
Sudan Civil strife
Uganda Civil strife in the north, localized crop failure
Asia
Afghanistan Conflict and insecurity
Bangladesh Past floods and cyclone, avian influenza
Nepal Poor market access, conflict and past floods
Timor-Leste IDPs, past drought and floods
Latin America
Haiti Past floods
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/
ai465e/ai465e02.htm). Data downloaded in May 2008.
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Chart 19.  Domestic food prices in selected LDCs
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Source: FAO (2008a) Crop Prospects and Food Situation. ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ai465e/ai465e00.pdf
Note: Mozambique: SIMA, Monthly average wholesale prices in Maputo.
  Malawi: Lilongwe local market price MoAFS & FEWSNet, 
  Madagascar: Observatoire du riz.
  BDT=Bangladesh Taka; MGA=Malagasy Ariary; MWK=Malawi Kwacha; MZN=Mozambican Metical; SDG=Sudanese Pound; $=US dollar.
The available evidence indicates that for cereals, rising international food prices 
are already being felt strongly in domestic markets in the LDCs. The International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2008) reports that in Senegal, wheat 
prices by February 2008 were twice the level of a year ago and sorghum was up 
56 per cent. In Somalia, the price of wheat flour in the northern areas has almost 
tripled over twelve months, and in Sudan (Khartoum) it increased by 90 percent. 
The price of maize in Uganda (Kampala) was 65 percent higher in March 2008 
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than in September 2007. In March 2008, maize prices in Mozambique (Maputo) 
were 43 percent higher than a year ago. FAO (2008a) also reports that wheat 
and maize prices increased by more than 33 per cent in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia 
between March 2007 and March 2008, and that maize prices more than doubled 
over the same period in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. In Malawi, the prices of white 
maize and rice almost tripled between mid-2007 and March 2008. Wheat and 
rice prices both increased by more than 50 per cent over this same period in 
Bangladesh (chart 19). 
These rising food prices complicate an already precarious food security 
situation in the LDCs. Not only are nutritional standards already low, but a 
number of LDCs already face complex food emergencies associated with such 
factors as droughts and floods, or specific challenges of market access, such as 
the inability to circulate in a country owing to conflict, or severe localized food 
insecurity due to an influx of refugees or internally displaced people. Of the 37 
countries which the FAO identifies as facing such complex food emergencies and 
thus requiring external assistance, 20 are LDCs (table 31). Significantly, in relation 
to the analysis of chapter 1 of this Report, nine of these countries are in the group 
of LDCs which achieved real GDP growth over 6 per cent in 2006. These are: 
Bangladesh, Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda 
and Afghanistan. 
The countries with complex food emergencies may well be affected by the 
declining ability of the food aid system to meet needs. However, the food security 
of households in all LDCs will be affected in some way by the large price rises 
which are now occurring. The magnitude of this effect will be large because such 
a large share of the population is very poor and already faces food insecurity and 
hunger. In this regard, it is important to note that almost half of total individual 
consumption expenditure in the LDCs is intended for the acquisition of food, 
according to the World Bank’s 2005 household survey for the International 
Comparison Programme (World Bank, 2008b). This share is double the share in 
other developing countries and more than five times as much as that of high-
income OECD countries. In general, the poorer the household income, the higher 
the share that is devoted to food acquisition. FAO (2008b) argues that large shares 
of the population in LDCs spend 70–80 per cent of their income on food. 
A critical issue which affects the impact of the food price spike is whether 
or not households are net food buyers. In this regard, the negative impact on 
people living in urban areas will be greater than the impact on those living in 
rural areas. However, available evidence indicates that a large proportion of rural 
inhabitants are net food buyers in many LDCs. Estimates suggest that the share 
of rural households which are net staple food sellers is limited to 19 per cent in 
Bangladesh, 12 per cent in Malawi, 27 per cent in Ethiopia, 30 per cent in Zambia 
and 44 per cent in Cambodia (FAO, 2008a).  
The minority of households that are net sellers of staple food should benefit 
from higher domestic consumer prices provided these are passed through to 
farmgate prices. If this is the case, farmers should reap higher earnings from their 
produce. This should provide an incentive for rising output and/or productivity 
over the medium term. However, their supply response is constrained by the 
weakness of agricultural development in the LDCs and by the consequences 
of long-standing neglect of agriculture by policy-makers in these countries (see 
subsection D.3 of this chapter).
A number of simulations have been undertaken to estimate the impact of price 
increases on different income groups. These indicate that the poorest households 
are most vulnerable in all situations unless they are sellers of foodstuffs whose 
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prices have risen. FAO simulations using household data from Malawi indicate 
that a 10 per cent increase in food prices leads to a 1.2 percent income loss for 
the poorest quintile in rural areas and a 2.6 percent income loss for the poorest 
urban quintile. According to this analysis, only the richest rural quintile gains 
from an increase in food prices. This will obviously have a negative impact on 
poverty. If the actual 200-per-cent increase in the white maize price in Malawi 
were representative of all food prices, this would imply an income loss of some 
20 per cent. Ivanic and Martin (2008), using a sample of household data for nine 
low income countries analysing the impact of higher food prices of key staple 
foods on poverty, show that in Cambodia, Malawi, Zambia and Madagascar, the 
rise in food prices between 2005 and 2007 is estimated to have increased poverty 
by 3 percentage points. In the case of Yemen, World Bank estimates show that 
the doubling of wheat prices over the last year could reverse all gains in poverty 
reduction achieved between 1998 and 2005. Moreover, similar estimates of the 
impact of the rising food prices on poverty have been made by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
(c) Second-round effects on economic growth
The immediate impact of rising food prices on poverty and food security 
is also likely to be compounded by second-round effects of these changes on 
economic growth. In this regard, the social unrest and riots associated with 
rising food prices have occurred in eight LDCs — Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, 
Guinea, Haiti, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal and Yemen — and this has 
already had a destabilizing effect. Yet rising food prices will also squeeze profits 
in formal businesses, as wage increases occur to maintain minimum subsistence 
living standards. In addition, a large proportion of the working population is self-
employed, and its accumulation activity, to the extent that it occurs, is directly 
related to its food consumption costs (Wuyts, 2001). As the price of food rises, any 
dynamic momentum of economic growth can therefore stall. 
It is possible that rising food prices offer an opportunity for renewed agricultural 
growth. It is debatable, however, if this can occur after such a long period of 
agricultural neglect. Widespread poverty in the agricultural sector is itself a 
major constraint on vigorous supply response, as poor farmers cannot command 
sufficient land, labour resources or modern inputs to increase production and 
productivity. The configuration of price changes, whereby not only food prices but 
also fuel prices and fertilizer prices are rising, may mean that even those farmers 
in a position to respond are also facing a production cost squeeze.
2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
LDC Governments are responding to the rising food prices in different ways. 
Measures taken include the following:
?? ????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
rice stocks to curb rising domestic prices (Cambodia);
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
subsidy schemes to foster cereal production (Zambia);
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
?? ????????????????????????????????????????
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?? ???????? ??? ???????? ??? ????????????? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ? ????? ???
300,000 tons of maize (Tanzania) (FAO, 2008a).
These are all stop-gap measures to deal with a short-term crisis in a situation 
to which there has been no strong international response as yet. From a long-term 
perspective, however, soaring food prices and their impact raise serious questions 
as to the advisability of the current development model being pursued in most 
LDCs and point to the need for a development policy paradigm shift. Earlier Least 
Development Countries Reports have argued that there is a need for such a shift. 
The unfolding events associated with soaring food prices bear out this view.
For some observers, the paradigm shift which is now required is a return to 
agricultural development. The earlier analysis in the chapter of the weaknesses 
of LDC agriculture reinforces this view. However, while this is part of the policy 
change required, a dynamic development perspective indicates that sustained 
and inclusive growth cannot be achieved without some form of structural 
transformation. It will be difficult to avoid balance-of-payment problems and 
achieve higher rates of economic growth unless there is a process of diversification 
in which new sectors and products which can accelerate capital accumulation and 
technological learning are introduced into economies. This can build on existing 
strengths in commodity production and major efforts should be made to increase 
agricultural productivity. With accelerating urbanization, however, there is also 
a need to generate productive employment opportunities outside agriculture as 
well as to improve agricultural performance.
Rather than a shift in sectoral focus, a deeper change in approach is required. 
In brief, there is a need for policy change in three dimensions (table 32). 
First, policy should focus on production, productivity and productive capacities 
rather than international trade per se. International trade is essential for productive 
development, and productive development is essential for international trade. But 
policy should start at the development end, rather than the trade end, of the 
relationship between trade and development.
Second, policy should focus on employment rather than only social services 
as the royal road to poverty reduction. This does not mean that social sector 
spending and human development goals are unimportant. Improved health and 
education standards are essential in the LDCs. However, there is a need for a 
better balance between the role in private incomes (based on employment) and 
public services (through which health and education are still primarily provided) 
in poverty reduction. 
Third, there is a need for a better balance between States and markets in 
promoting development and reducing poverty. The persistence of generalized 
poverty and the food price bubble indicate massive market failure. While 
Governments are not omnipotent, there is a need for creative solutions based on 
public action which mobilizes key stakeholders, including in particular the private 
sector, to resolve common development problems and create development 
opportunities.
Table 32. Key dimensions of a paradigm shift in development policy
From To
International trade Production and international trade
Social services Employment and social services
Markets State and markets 
Source: UNCTAD secretariat.
Policy should focus on 
production, productivity 
and productive capacities 
rather than international 
trade per se and ...
... it should also focus on 
employment rather than only 
social services as the royal 
road to poverty reduction.
There is a need for a better 
balance between States 
and markets in promoting 
development and reducing 
poverty.
Soaring food prices and their 
impact raise serious questions 
as to the advisability of the 
current development model 
being pursued in most 
LDCs and point to the need 
for a development policy 
paradigm shift.
85Trends in Poverty and Progress Towards the MDGs
As chapter 3 of this Report shows, it is clear that LDC Governments are 
seeking to place poverty reduction and the achievement of MDGs within a broad 
economic development framework. However, there is a lack of development 
strategy, which is being reinforced by donor preferences and their tendency to 
favour the separate pursuit of individual MDG sectors. 
To the extent that there is a coherent development strategy in place in the 
LDCs, it can be described as “export-led growth with a human face” (UNCTAD, 
2004: 271–314). In this strategy, the export-led component is founded on 
trade liberalization and deepening behind-the-border measures, such as trade 
facilitation, to tackle internal rather than border constraints to international trade, 
and also to increase the export supply response to trade liberalization, which 
focuses on privatization and financial liberalization. Great emphasis is also placed 
on attracting FDI in order to break into international markets. At the same time, 
the basic needs part of the strategy concentrates on providing basic social services 
to the population and meeting the MDGs, and also ensuring that there is a minimal 
safety net to offset the heavier adjustment costs of liberalization borne by poor 
groups. This part of the strategy is financed by the LDC development partners, 
who are increasingly allocating development assistance to meet social needs.
This strategy is proving to be neither sustainable (as argued in chapter 1 of this 
Report) nor a guarantee of high rates of social progress (as argued in the present 
chapter). The current food crisis is revealing more clearly the weaknesses of the 
current approach. The basic policy implication is that it is high time for a change.
G.  Conclusions
The main finding of this chapter is that although economic growth has 
accelerated in LDCs in recent years, the rate of progress in terms of poverty 
reduction and human development remains very low. The incidence of poverty 
and deprivation remains very high, and most LDCs are off track to meet the MDGs 
on indicators for which data are available. There is no evidence of a significant 
break in key trends since 2000 after the adoption of the Millennium Declaration 
and more socially oriented policy reforms. Moreover, soaring international food 
prices will have a particularly serious negative impact in the LDCs and are already 
jeopardizing recent progress in poverty reduction and human development in 
some LDCs.
The incidence of extreme poverty (measured as the proportion of the people 
living on less than $1 a day) has decreased from a peak of 44 per cent in 1994 to 
36 per cent in 2005. Yet the number of extremely poor people continued to rise 
in the LDCs until 2003, when the upward trend levelled off. Poverty reduction 
has been much faster in Asian LDCs than African LDCs, and in the latter group 
of countries, the number of extremely poor people continues to rise. In 2005, it 
is estimated that there were 277 million people living on less than $1 a day in 
all LDCs, including 206 million in African LDCs, 71 million in Asian LDCs and 1 
million in island LDCs.
Although the incidence of extreme poverty is declining, the proportion of the 
population living on more than $1 a day but less than $2 a day has remained the 
same. Moreover, the proportion of the population living on less than $2 a day has 
only been declining very slowly. In 2005, three-quarters of the population in the 
LDCs were living on less than $2 a day. 
The development strategy in 
place in the LDCs is neither 
sustainable nor a guarantee 
of high rates of social 
progress.
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The relatively weak relationship between growth in GDP per capita and poverty 
reduction in LDCs can be attributed to a number of factors. The limited evidence 
suggests that economic growth has been associated with rising income inequality 
in the LDCs for which trends can be identified. However, the Report singles 
out the type of economic growth as the central reason why poverty reduction 
has been so slow. Agriculture is the major source of employment in LDCs, but 
agricultural productivity is very low and rising only slowly. On top of this, there 
are accelerating trends of urbanization and deagrarianization in which more and 
more people are seeking work outside agriculture. However, few LDCs have been 
able to generate sufficient productive employment opportunities for the growing 
numbers of young job-seekers. Because population growth is high, the expansion 
in the number of people seeking work either in agriculture or outside agriculture 
has been very rapid. Yet export-led growth has not generally been inclusive, owing 
to weak linkages between export sectors and the rest of the economy. 
Deagrarianization, a process in which more and more people seek work 
outside agriculture, could be positive if people are pushed out of agriculture 
by rising productivity and pulled into other sectors by the new employment 
opportunities being created outside agriculture. There are signs of such a 
structural transformation in a few Asian LDCs, which have combined rising food 
productivity based on a Green Revolution with steady industrialization founded on 
expansion of manufacturing exports. For most LDCs, however, deagrarianization 
is a negative process in which people are pushed out because they cannot make 
a living in agriculture and they also cannot find remunerative work elsewhere. As 
a result, there are now two faces of poverty in LDCs — poverty associated with 
long-standing agricultural neglect and urban poverty, most dramatically evident in 
growing numbers of unemployed youth. 
Very low material living standards are associated with very low levels of well-
being in terms of a broad range of social indicators. As with the analysis of poverty 
trends, data availability seriously hampers analysis of progress towards human 
development MDGs. However, for the few indicators for which it is possible to get 
information for a wide range of countries, a clear pattern is emerging. 
This pattern has four basic features. First, some LDCs are making significant 
progress towards achieving some specific MDGs, but very few LDCs are making 
progress on a broad front encompassing more than three targets. Second, more 
progress is being made on targets which depend primarily on the level of public 
service provision, and Governments and donors are committed to increasing 
public expenditure. In this regard, progress towards universal primary school 
enrolment shows what can be done. But, third, there is a distinct hierarchy of 
achievement. This hierarchy reflects the priorities of Governments and also of 
those donors who are funding the scale-up. It also reflects the magnitude of the 
necessary investments in physical infrastructure and human capital, and the time 
scale for such investments. In this regard, achievements in increasing primary 
education enrolments outstrip achievements in improving access to water, which 
in turn outstrip progress in improving sanitation. Finally, progress towards targets 
that depend more on household incomes rather than mainly on public service 
provision has been slowest. In this regard, there is slow progress in reducing the 
incidence of extreme poverty and also of hunger. It has also proved difficult to 
keep on track in reducing child mortality, which reflects trends in both private 
incomes and public services. 
The overall implication of these trends is that broad-based success in achieving 
progress towards the MDGs is as yet elusive in the LDCs. It is also likely to remain 
so unless the achievement of MDGs is placed in an economic development 
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framework and efforts are focused on generating jobs and livelihoods as well as 
increasing the provision of public services directly linked to the MDGs.
 Rising international food prices in 2007 and early 2008 will have negative 
effects on poverty trends in LDCs and slow progress towards the MDGs. These 
negative effects will arise partly because the large increases in food prices threaten 
economic growth through rising import bills, partly because of the direct impact 
of rising food prices on the ability of households to meet essential subsistence 
needs and partly because of the second-round effects of rising food prices on 
economic growth. The overall impact is likely to be particularly severe in the LDCs 
because most of them are net food importers and already have large trade deficits 
and because levels of poverty and food insecurity are already high, with many 
spending 50–80 per cent of their household income on food. Moreover, for 20 
LDCs, the prices rises will exacerbate pre-existing food emergencies which require 
external assistance owing to such factors as natural disasters, concentrations of 
internally displaced persons and localized crop failures. Food price riots had 
already occurred in eight LDCs by June 2008.
Some LDC Governments are taking short-term measures to mitigate the 
impact of the food price shock. From a long-term perspective, however, soaring 
international food prices and their impact raise serious questions as to the 
advisability of the current development model being pursued in most LDCs and 
the need for a development policy paradigm shift. The food price shock reveals 
the weakness of the current development approach. The basic policy implication 
is that it is high time for a change.
For some observers, the paradigm shift which is required now is a return to 
agricultural development. However, whereas improving agricultural productivity 
is vital, it is also important to strengthen activities outside agriculture generating 
productive employment. What is required is not a shift in sectoral focus but rather 
a deeper change in approach, with a renewed focus on developing productive 
capacities and generating employment through a better balance between States 
and markets. 
Making such a change towards a more sustainable and inclusive development 
model depends on the decisions and political will of LDC Governments. But they 
are also engaged in a development partnership for poverty reduction with donors. 
The terms of this development partnership affects both the nature of the current 
strategic approach and policies, and the potential to change it. This issue is taken 
up in chapter 3 of this Report. 
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Annex:
Poverty estimates: Methodological updates and further considerations
The poverty estimates for 28 LDCs (24 African LDCs and 4 Asian LDCs) used in this chapter update the previous 
estimates described in the Least Developed Countries Report 2002 (UNCTAD, 2002). The new estimates were calculated 
using a methodology different from the one discussed in The Least Developed Countries Report 2002. The estimates are 
also based on 1993 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate estimates (not in the public domain when the previous 
estimates were made) rather than 1985 PPP estimates. In addition, they draw on more country-based household 
surveys. The new dataset is based on 408 observations, which make it four times larger than the one used in 2002. New 
2005 PPP estimates became available in early 2008, but have not been incorporated into the analysis. 
Unlike the 2002 estimation, where the distribution information contained in household surveys was combined 
with the scale variables from national accounts, the new poverty estimates were calculated by calibrating survey means 
using national accounts statistics. Survey means are calibrated to reduce the large measurements errors derived from 
different survey definitions and coverage across country and over time. In practice, this implies that a smooth curve is 
fitted to national accounts per capita household consumption data and that the calibrated survey means (for income 
and consumption surveys individually) are read off the fitted curve (annex chart 1). 
This new estimation method was used since the previous national accounts-based method led to poverty reduction 
rates that overestimated the actual rates. The new poverty estimates for those countries where changes in poverty could 
be observed during a long period show more modest declines in poverty rates compared to the previous method. The 
empirical estimation technique has also improved its accuracy since the one used for The Least Developed Countries 
Report 2002 (more details given below). 
Annex chart 1. Surveys versus national accounts consumption means with fitted regression lines
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Some argue that poverty estimates should only be based on household survey data. However, as argued in The Least 
Developed Countries Report 2002 (UNCTAD, 2002: 51), the use of national accounts information provides as plausible 
estimates as purely household survey-based estimates. The new poverty estimates deviate from those of the World Bank 
but are not systematically below them. Out of 56 comparable observations of $1-a-day headcount figures, the new 
estimates are lower in 32 cases and higher in 24 cases than those of the World Bank. 
As in The Least Developed Countries Report 2002, poverty trends for those LDCs and those years where household 
surveys are not available have been estimated empirically using poverty curves. Such curves represent the relationship 
between poverty and mean income, which has been proxied by consumption expenditure (m), at different income levels 
(annex chart 2). Headcount poverty is estimated as the function, f(m/z), which represents the share of the population 
living below the poverty line, z. The shape of the poverty curve depends on how income distribution and per capita 
income change with respect to a country’s development path. Poverty curves represent how poverty reduction occurs 
as a country moves along its development path as household consumption increases. They have been calculated on the 
basis of data available for 45 countries (low- and middle-income countries and LDCs).
Annex chart 2.  Poverty curves
(Private per capita consumption and poverty incidence in developing countries)
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Poverty estimates have been derived relying on a more sophisticated fixed-effect econometric model than the one 
used in The Least Developed Countries Report 2002. While the latter model only included household consumption data 
as well as a regional and a time dummy as independent variables, the new model includes Gini indices (g) and cross 
products of the income means and the Gini index. In the new formulation, consumption data has been normalized by 
the poverty line (m/z). The econometric model has a high explanatory power, which achieves almost perfect fit. Using 
the coefficients from the model, together with their Gini indices and their mean calibrated consumption, it is possible 
to calculate poverty trends for 28 LDCs from 1990 to 2005, and for 26 LDCs from 1980. 
Source: Karshenas, 2008.
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Notes
1 Angola, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Sudan, Tuvalu, United Republic of 
Tanzania and Zambia.
2 The annex to this chapter provides a more detailed explanation of the methodology 
used to estimate poverty. 
3 We made poverty estimates for the 1990–2005 period for the following LDCs: Angola, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia. Our estimates go back to 1980 for 
the sample, except for Cambodia and Yemen. 
4 The actual threshold used is $1.08 and $2.17 in 1993 PPPs, as is standard practice to 
ensure comparability with the original $1-a-day and $2-a-day poverty lines, which were 
estimated in 1985 PPP dollars.
5 Poverty estimates for island LDCs have not been made due to lack of the necessary 
data, except for Cape Verde. For the current chapter, this country has been included 
in the African LDCs aggregate. This is different from what has been done elsewhere in 
this Report, where Cape Verde is part of the island LDCs group. 
6  In the case of Africa, Geda (2006) claims that trade is the most significant channel through 
which global interdependence impacts the welfare of ordinary African citizens. 
7 Specialization in capital-intensive commodity-producing sectors does not necessarily lead 
to income concentration if strong and effective policies of economic re-specialization 
towards other sectors and/or income redistribution are implemented. However, this has 
generally not been the experience of developing countries specialized in capital-intensive 
commodity production and trade. 
8 The operations of TNCs in the garment and textile sector of LDCs have led to a strong 
expansion of employment and exports, but have generally not been accompanied by 
another expected benefit of FDI, namely technological learning and spillovers in the 
domestic economy (UNCTAD, 2007: 30-42). 
9 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/default.aspx.
10 LDCs have achieved significant progress towards the quantitative MDG target on primary 
education, as mentioned in the text. However, concerns are being raised about the 
qualitative aspects of the education being provided to children. These arise from failings 
in several dimensions that contribute to the quality of education, particularly: pupil/
teacher ratio, training of teachers, teacher’s pay, learning materials (e.g. textbooks), 
school facilities and infrastructure, annual hours of teaching and functioning of school 
systems (UNESCO, 2004).
11 While rising food import bills have an adverse impact on countries’ balance of payment, 
they do not necessarily mean that more food is being imported (which is especially true 
for grains) (FAO, 2008b). This is particularly the case if the food import bill has been 
increasing at the same pace as international food prices, as has been the case in the 
LDCs.
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Changes in the 
Terms of Development 
Partnership
A. Introduction
Achieving more sustainable economic growth, accelerated poverty reduction 
and better progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) requires 
action by both the least developed countries (LDCs) and their development 
partners. The fundamental priority for LDC Governments is to formulate and 
implement national development strategies that effectively promote development 
and poverty reduction. Their development partners need to (a) scale up aid 
flows to meet their commitments within the Programme of Action for the Least 
Developed Countries for the Decade 2001–2010; (b) align aid flows with the 
priorities expressed in LDCs’ national development strategies; and (c) deliver aid 
in ways which respect country leadership in the formulation and implementation 
of national development strategies and help to strengthen their capacity to 
exercise such leadership. Moreover, the international community needs to design 
international regimes for trade, investment and technology which address the 
special needs of the weakest members of the international community and which 
reinforce, rather than work against, the positive impact of national development 
strategies and official development assistance (ODA). 
This chapter examines some recent policy trends in LDCs which are at the 
heart of balanced and effective development partnerships between LDCs and 
donor countries. It focuses in particular on progress towards country-owned 
development strategies in LDCs and seeks to identify ways to enhance country 
ownership.
The notion of country ownership is complex, and difficult to define and 
monitor. However, it is at the heart of the partnership approach to development 
cooperation which has been elaborated since 2000. There is a broad consensus 
amongst policy analysts that country ownership of development strategies and 
policies is essential for the effectiveness of those strategies and also for aid 
effectiveness. The principle of respecting country ownership has also received 
strong political support at the highest level. Thus, for example, at the G8 summit 
at Gleneagles in 2005, in addition to bold commitments to cancel debt and scale 
up aid, the following was agreed: “It is up to developing countries themselves 
and their Governments to take the lead on development. They need to decide, 
plan and sequence their economic policies to fit with their own development 
strategies, for which they should be accountable to all their people” (Gleneagles 
Communiqué, “Africa”, para. 31). Moreover, enhanced country ownership is one 
of the main components of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the 
implementation of which will be assessed in Accra, Ghana, in September 2008.
This chapter contributes to the policy debate on country ownership in LDCs 
in three ways. Firstly, it focuses on aspects of progress towards country ownership 
which are contained within the Paris Declaration but which are not currently 
being assessed in the monitoring of its implementation. Secondly, it provides a 
brief overview of the second-generation poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) 
and synthesizes evidence from case studies within the published literature which 
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indicate processes through which PRSPs in LDCs are designed and implemented 
and how aid works. These studies, which cover 12 LDCs, were in all but one case 
not prepared specifically for UNCTAD, but together they enable the identification 
processes which are working to strengthen or weaken country ownership and 
their consequences.1 Thirdly, it makes proposals to enhance country ownership, 
in particular through the introduction of recipient-led aid management policies at 
the country level. 
This chapter shows that all parties agree that country ownership of development 
strategies is essential for development effectiveness and aid effectiveness, and 
significant steps are being taken to enhance country ownership within the 
partnership approach to development cooperation. However, its major message 
is that various processes continue to weaken country ownership in LDCs and that 
this is having adverse consequences for development effectiveness, but that there 
are practical measures which can rectify this situation. 
The first part of the chapter — sections B and C — summarizes key features of 
the partnership approach to development cooperation and looks at the changes 
in the PRSPs written in LDCs, which are the main operational instrument of 
the partnership approach and the key locus where country ownership is being 
forged. The second part of the chapter — sections D, E, F and G — focuses on 
evidence relating to country ownership. Section D summarizes the assessment 
of country ownership in LDCs according to the monitoring process used in 
the Paris Declaration, as well as assessing the adequacy of the indicator used 
to monitor ownership. Sections E, F and G are based on a broader concept of 
country ownership, which is still compatible with the Paris Declaration, and uses 
the case studies to identify the major processes through which country ownership 
can be weakened in the formulation and implementation of the poverty 
reduction strategies. The next part of the chapter — section H — identifies some 
adverse outcomes of these processes, which are indicative of a malfunctioning 
of development partnership. Finally, section I discusses some possible ways to 
increase ownership, focusing in particular on country-level coordination of aid 
through recipient-led aid management policies, a policy innovation which 
is encouraged by the Paris Declaration. The conclusion summarizes the major 
messages of the chapter. The annex provides a road map, based on the innovative 
experience of a few LDCs, of the steps which other LDCs might take to introduce 
aid management policies at the country level. 
B. Country ownership and 
the partnership approach to development 
1. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP APPROACH
Since 2000, a new approach to development cooperation has been introduced. 
The roots of the approach can be traced to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (OECD’s) report, Shaping the Twenty-first Century: 
The Contribution of Development Co-operation, which was published in 1996. 
That report not only argued that aid should be focused on achieving a limited set 
of international poverty reduction and human development targets (a list which 
later formed the basis for the Millennium Development Goals), it also stated that 
the key to making a difference in achieving those targets was the establishment 
of development partnerships between donor and recipient Governments. The 
basic principle, as the report put it, was that “locally-owned country development 
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strategies, according to DAC good practice principles, emerge from an open and 
collaborative dialogue by local authorities with civil society and with external 
partners, about shared objectives and their respective contributions to the 
common enterprise. Each donor’s contributions should then operate within the 
framework of that locally-owned strategy in ways that respect and encourage 
strong local commitment, participation, capacity development and ownership” 
(OECD, 1996: 14). 
In 1999, the World Bank launched the Comprehensive Development 
Framework, which was also based on the partnership approach. Ownership 
was one of the four key principles of this approach. It is clear that “ownership 
is essential”, the World Bank’s then-President James Wolfensohn said, adding, 
“Countries must be in the driver’s seat and set the course. They must determine 
goals and the phasing, timing and sequencing of programs” (Wolfensohn, 
1999:9).
A major practical impetus to these proposals was provided when it was 
decided in late 1999 that qualification for debt relief under the Enhanced Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative would be conditional upon a recipient 
country preparing a PRSP. One of the key principles of the PRSP approach was 
that these documents would be prepared within the countries and be country-
owned, including broad participation of civil society (IMF and World Bank, 1999). 
Although the PRSP approach was initially linked to debt relief, the application 
of its basic principles has since widened. As the OECD (2000: 21) insightfully 
and succinctly put it, “The decision to place the implementation of the Enhanced 
HIPC into the larger context of the new development partnership paradigm has 
in effect leveraged political support for debt relief into a reform of the whole 
concessional financing system”. In effect, the PRSPs have become the main 
operational instrument for implementing the development partnership approach, 
and enhancing national ownership of strategies and policies.2
2. THE PARIS DECLARATION AND THE DRIVE TO IMPROVE AID EFFECTIVENESS
One important reason for the shift to the new approach to development 
assistance was the realization that both development effectiveness and aid 
effectiveness had been undermined during the 1980s and 1990s by policy 
conditionality and all-pervasive coordination failures in the delivery of aid. 
Traditional policy conditionality did not work well, firstly, because the local 
commitment to implement the externally-devised policies was low; and secondly, 
because the policies were inappropriate for the local context.3 Aid inflows were 
also very volatile, with conditionality triggering disruptions and uncertainty. On 
top of this, the dismantling of the institutions and capabilities of development 
planning, which occurred particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, opened a vacuum 
in which donors had no national framework into which to fit their assistance. 
The lack of coordination and integration of the aid system led to a fragmentation 
of decision-making and a proliferation of projects and procedures, which put 
increasing pressure on the meager human resources of recipient countries. 
Moreover, a vicious cycle often began to set in, as the internal brain drain from 
Government service to donor projects further undermined State capacity and 
further encouraged donors to set up parallel systems and institutions to ensure 
effective implementation of their own projects and programmes as a response. 
As analysed in The Least Developed Countries Report 2000, many LDCs found 
themselves during this period in a very complex situation, in which country 
ownership was very weak. They faced, on the one hand, a budgetary squeeze 
arising from policy conditionalities which sought to control public expenditure and 
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bring down the domestic budget deficit, and on the other hand, a proliferation of 
fragmented aid projects, often financed through parallel channels and procedures, 
sometimes bypassing any government oversight and aligned with donor priorities 
rather than national priorities. While the projects and programmes being 
implemented were often controlled by donors, the debt service on aid funds 
was very much “owned” by the central government budget (UNCTAD, 2000: 
171–207).
Strengthening development partnership has been at the heart of the drive to 
improve aid effectiveness. The development partnership approach was endorsed 
in 2002 in the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, which states: 
“Effective partnerships among donors and recipients are based on the recognition 
of national leadership and ownership of development plans and, within that 
framework, sound policies and good governance at all levels are necessary to 
ensure ODA effectiveness” (United Nations, 2002: 14). Important further 
milestones in this process were the Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003 
and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 (OECD 2005a), which 
identified the following key principles for enhanced aid effectiveness:
(a) Ownership: Support for developing country leadership on development 
strategies, plans and policies;
(b) Alignment: Linking donor support to developing country strategies, greater 
use of country systems and capacity-building;
(c) Harmonization: Improved donor coordination, rationalized procedures, and 
common arrangements;
(d) Managing for results: Improving management of resources and decision-
making in support of development results; and
(e) Mutual accountability: Shared accountability for development results (chart 
20).
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF COUNTRY OWNERSHIP
As the discussion of the introduction and deepening of the partnership 
approach to development cooperation shows, it is universally agreed that country 
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ownership is the foundation of balanced and effective development partnerships. 
However, there are many different ways of understanding what country ownership 
means in practice (box 4). 
This chapter is particularly concerned with country ownership in the sense 
that national Governments have the ability to freely choose the strategies which 
they design and implement, and to take the lead in both policy formulation and 
implementation. Assessing country ownership in this sense is very difficult. The 
degree of ownership of development strategies and policies cannot be solely 
attributed to the practices of donors per se, or to recipients per se; rather, it 
depends on the nature of the aid relationships, involving the practices of both 
parties. Moreover, the nature of that relationship is an active ongoing process in 
which the various representatives of each party are constantly negotiating and 
bargaining in relation to their interests, needs and concerns. These interests, needs 
and concerns are not necessarily held in common by all participants on each side 
of the bargaining process. To get at this process requires intense anthropological 
analysis and access to normally-closed discussions. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to identify some of the mechanisms by which country ownership is weakened 
through the nature of the aid relationship. Moreover, it is possible to identify the 
outcomes of these processes, which are indicative of dysfunctionality within the 
development partnership. 
It must be stressed that whilst this Report identifies mechanisms which are 
weakening country ownership, it is not arguing that donors or international financial 
institutions (IFIs) are intentionally undermining country ownership of development 
strategies and policies. It is clear that there is a strong conviction on the part of 
IFIs and donors that they should stand back and give country authorities greater 
policy space for formulating and implementing their own strategies, and strong 
efforts are being made to do this. However, there is a constant tension between 
country ownership and the need for IFIs and bilateral donors to be assured that 
their assistance will be used to support what they regard as credible strategies. 
Ensuring that high levels of aid dependence do not result in donor domination is 
a very complex challenge for both aid donors and aid recipients. Understanding 
how development partnership actually works in a context where there are major 
inequalities between the parties in terms of resources, capabilities and power can 
provide the basis for effectively strengthening country ownership, an outcome 
which all parties wish for and intend through their practices.
??????????????????????????????????
1. THE EARLY PHASES OF THE PRSP APPROACH
Most LDCs undertook policy reforms financed by the IMF’s Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in the 1990s (UNCTAD, 2000: 101–134). Borrowers 
from this facility were required to prepare a Policy Framework Paper which set 
out the country’s overall policy objectives and strategy as a basis for support from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Although it was supposed 
to be the country’s own document, it was usually prepared in Washington by the 
staff of the World Bank and IMF, with help from country authorities (Broughton, 
2003). In 1999, ESAF was replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) and borrowers from that facility were required to prepare a PRSP in the 
country itself with broad participation from civil society. Concessional lending 
from the IMF and World Bank were conditional on endorsement of the PRSPs as 
satisfactory by the boards of the IMF and World Bank. 
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Box 4. The elusive concept of country ownership
Although almost all analysts agree that country ownership of development strategies and policies is the foundation for effective 
development partnerships, the concept of country ownership is difficult to define and also to measure.1 Indeed, behind the 
consensus that “ownership is essential”, there are different interpretations of what country ownership means. It is possible 
to identify at least five different approaches to defining country ownership within the literature. These are:
(a) The existence of local commitment to the policy reforms of international financial institutions; 
(b) The existence of national development strategies which are “operational”;
(c) The ability of national Governments to choose freely the strategies and policies which they design and implement;
(d) The ability of national Governments to choose freely these strategies and policies, including consideration of “home-
grown” solutions; and
(e) The ability of national Governments to choose freely strategies and policies and the exercise of that choice through a 
democratic process. 
The first approach is exemplified by the definition of national ownership put forward by the IMF Policy Development & 
Review Department as “a willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed programme of policies, by officials in a borrowing 
country who have responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies, based on an understanding that the programme 
is achievable and is in the country’s own interest (IMF, 2001:6). This definition follows the critique of policy conditionality 
in the 1990s which found that it did not work if local agents responsible for implementing policies were not committed 
to them (see Broughton, 2003). Against this background, country ownership was considered vital for the success of policy 
reform. But in essence, ownership here is equivalent to the acceptance and assumption of responsibility for programmes 
and their associated conditionalities.
A second approach is the way in which ownership is monitored in the context of the Paris Declaration. The basic indicator of 
ownership is that a country is judged to have an operational development strategy. In this approach, evidence of ownership 
is provided by “a track record of sound policy implementation” (World Bank, 2005: 28). A strategy is defined as operational 
when it is “a prioritized outcome-oriented national development strategy that is drawn from a long-term vision and shapes 
a country’s public expenditures” (World Bank, 2007: 4). The judgment as to whether a country has such a strategy is made 
by the World Bank and it is in effect centred on the quality of a country’s PRSP (see annex to World Bank, 2007).
The third approach is exemplified by Killick (1998) who defines government ownership as “at its strongest when the political 
leadership and its advisers, with broad support among agencies of State and civil society, decide of their own volition that 
policy changes are desirable, choose what these changes should be and when they should be introduced, and where these 
changes become built into parameters of policy and administration which are generally accepted as desirable” (Killick, 1998: 
87). From this perspective, ownership is not necessarily about who designs the programme, with different degrees of ownership 
related to the level of active participation of nationals and outsiders in programme design. It is rather a question of freedom 
of choice. In this vein, for example, Johnson (2005) writes that, “ownership is about (i) the right of county representatives 
to be heard in the process of diagnosis and programme design; and (ii) the freedom and ability of the country to choose 
the programme to be implemented, without coercion” (Johnson, 2005: 3). This approach to defining country ownership is 
also closely related to the concerns expressed in the Paris Declaration that countries should “exercise leadership” in policy 
design, policy implementation and aid coordination. 
The fourth and fifth approaches accept this view of ownership, but go further. In the fourth approach, it is argued that local 
ownership must be based on “home-grown solutions”. This approach is founded on the view that the sound policies are 
locally-specific rather than universal, and that local actors are best situated to mobilize indigenous knowledge effectively. 
From this perspective, home-grown solutions “mean the generation, by local actors, of knowledge and policy interventions 
that are specific to the local environment” and ownership is defined as “acceptance of, commitment to and responsibility 
for the implementation of home-grown solutions” (Girvan, 2007: 2). Such ownership is evident in a wide degree of policy 
heterodoxy vis-à-vis the role of the State as well as a trial-and-error approach to development policy which adapts best 
practices to local circumstances though policy learning. 
Finally, in the fifth approach, the process of policy choice must be democratic to be fully owned. This approach is adopted by 
some NGOs that criticize the degree of participation in the PRSP process. ActionAid International (2006: 9) argues that “to 
be truly owned, government policies should be adopted through democratic means involving a wide range of stakeholders 
in society, and Governments should be accountable to citizens when implementing policies”. The emphasis in the Paris 
Declaration on the importance of developing and implementing development strategies through broad consultative processes 
also relates to this democratic view of ownership. 
This chapter focuses on the third approach.
1 See Buiter (2004) for a critical deconstruction which argues that it is simply too difficult to be meaningful. 
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As of 7 May 2008, 39 LDCs had prepared some kind of PRSP document and 
presented it to the boards of the World Bank and IMF. Only four of these countries 
— Comoros, Liberia, the Maldives and Togo — are at the earliest stage of the process, 
having presented interim PRSPs. Moreover, of the 35 LDCs that have prepared full 
PRSPs, 17 have now finalized a second PRSP document (table 33).
Table 33.  Progress in preparation of PRSPs in LDCsa
Country Region I-PRSP PRSP PRSP II
Afghanistan Asia 25 May 2006 9 May 2008
Angola Africa
Bangladesh Asia 19 June 2003 26 January 2006
Benin Africa 13July 2000 20 March 2003 28 June 2007
Bhutan Asia 08 February 2005
Burkina Faso Africa 30 June 2000 05 May 2005
Burundi Africa 22 January 2004 13 March 2007
Cambodia Asia 18 January 2001 20 February 20003 17 July 2007
Cape Verde Island 09 April 2002 25 January 2005
Central African Republic Africa 18 January 2001 17 November 2006
Chad Africa 25 July 2000 13 November 2003
Comoros Island 16 May 2006
Dem. Rep. of the Congo Africa 11 June 2002 31-May-07
Djibouti Africa 27 November 2001 08 June 2004
Equatorial Guinea Africa
Eritrea Africa
Ethiopia Africa 20 March 2001 17 September 2002 28 August 2007
Gambia Africa 14 December 2000 16 July 2002 19 July 2007
Guinea Africa 22 December 2000 25 July 2002 21 December 2007
Guinea-Bissau Africa 14 December 2000 10 May 2007
Haiti Island 21 November 2006 01 March 2008
Kiribati Island
Lao People’s Dem. Republic Asia 24 April 2001 30 Novermber 2004
Lesotho Africa 6 March 2001 12 September 2005
Liberia Africa 12 February 2007
Madagascar Africa 19 December 2000 18 November 2003 06 March 2007
Malawi Africa 21 December 2000 29 August 2002 16 January 2007
Maldives Island 23 January 2008
Mali Africa 7 September 2000 06 March 2003 03 April 2008
Mauritania Africa 06 February 2001 16 January 2007
Mozambique Africa 06 April 2000 25 September 2001 19 December 2006
Myanmar Asia
Nepal Asia 18 November 2003
Niger Africa 20 December 2000 07 February 2002 05 May 2008
Rwanda Africa 21 December 2000 08 August 2002 06 March 08
Samoa Island
Sao Tome and Principe Island 27 April 2000 25 April 2005
Senegal Africa 20 June 2000 23 December 2002 30 January 2007
Sierra Leone Africa 25 September 2001 06 May 2005
Solomon Islands Island
Somalia Africa
Sudan Africa
Togo Africa 25 April 2008
Tuvalu Island
Uganda Africa 02 May 2000 28 July 2005
United Rep. of Tanzania Africa 04 April 2000 30 November 2000 09 May 2006
Vanuatu Island
Yemen Asia 27 February 2001 01 August 2002
Zambia Africa 04 August 2000 23 May 2002 21 August 2007
Source: World Bank and IMF, online.
Note: The date indicates when the PRSP was presented to the Boards of the IMF and the World Bank.
  I-PRSP is an interim PRSP. PRSP II is a second-generation PRSP.
a As of May 2008.
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In the initial phases of the process, even though IFIs and donor countries 
stepped back somewhat from the policy formulation process, it proved difficult 
to promote country ownership. As The Least Developed Countries Report 2002
put it, the PRSP process was “a compulsory process in which Governments that 
need concessional assistance and debt relief from the IFIs find out through the 
endorsement process... the limits of what is acceptable policy. In such a situation, 
it is very difficult for governments to take the risks which would enable the 
full potential of the PRSP approach to be realized. Even if there is no outside 
interference in the PRSP preparation process, and also no sign of threat to interfere 
in the process, the mere awareness of dependence on the Joint Staff Assessment 
and on endorsement by the Boards of the IMF and World Bank places constraints 
on freedom of action of those designing the PRSPs. In effect, the country owns the 
technical process of policy formulation, but it still lacks the freedom which would 
release the creative potential of the approach” (UNCTAD, 2002: 193). Moreover, 
the report went on to state that, unless the international financial institutions 
have total open-mindedness as to what is regarded as a credible strategy, “the 
consequences for governance will be adverse as politicians and policymakers will 
feel inhibited from saying and doing certain things, and thus the political qualities 
of a free-thinking society, which are meant to be encouraged through the PRSP 
process, will atrophy” (ibid.: 193).
The initial PRSPs thus just added a social dimension to the structural adjustment 
programmes of the 1990s by focusing on increasing public expenditure in social 
sectors (UNCTAD, 2000 and 2002). However, after mid-2002, there has been 
a significant shift towards growth-oriented PRSPs. As The Least Developed 
Countries Report 2004 put it, “the PRSPs are evolving away from the old structural 
adjustment programmes towards new growth strategies which seek to include the 
poor” (UNCTAD, 2004: 273). But the transition at that time was still incomplete. 
The first batch of the later PRSPs tended to have a common template with four 
basic pillars: (a) ensuring strong and sustainable growth; (b) developing human 
resources; (c) improving the living conditions of the poor; and (d) ensuring good 
governance.
2. THE SECOND-GENERATION PRSPS
The evolution of the PRSP approach has gone even further now in many of 
those countries which have prepared a second full PRSP. With these second-
generation PRSPs, many LDCs are striving to transform their poverty reduction 
strategies into national development strategies. 
The shift towards a development orientation is signaled in the names, the 
time-horizon and the policy content of the second-generation PRSPs. Of the 17 
which have been prepared, only five still name themselves “Poverty Reduction 
Strategies” — those of Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania and Senegal. 
Mozambique and Uganda call their strategies “an Action Plan for the Reduction 
of Absolute Poverty”, and “a Poverty Eradication Action Plan”, respectively. The 
other countries describe their PRSPs as development plans, growth strategies or 
development and poverty reduction strategies.4
 The second-generation PRSPs also have a different time-horizon than the 
earlier PRSPs. Of the 17 which have been prepared, only five now retain the 
three-year planning horizon of the first generation PRSPs. The rest have five-
year planning horizons. These documents appear to be a return to five-year 
development planning in a new guise. This is explicitly expressed in the Zambian 
PRSP, where it is argued that “the resurgence of planning to tackle wealth creation 
and poverty reduction is both timely and imperative”; and that “one of the 
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important lessons learnt from the 1990s was the realization that, in a liberalized 
economy, development planning is necessary for guiding priority setting and 
resource allocation” (Republic of Zambia, 2007:1). 
The policy content of the second-generation PRSPs is also evolving. All the 
second-generation PRSPs are based on a balance between economic and social 
pillars, and they also all give priority to improved governance as a third basic 
strategic pillar. The economic pillar is concerned with promoting macroeconomic 
stability and accelerating economic growth and development. The social pillar is 
concerned with human resource development and social service provision. Good 
governance is included as the third pillar, including public administration reforms 
as well as the institutionalization of the rule of law. 
In effect, the second-generation PRSPs are seeking to place poverty reduction 
and the achievement of the MDGs within a broad economic development 
framework. Most of the PRSPs now include actions for the development of 
productive sectors and economic infrastructure. Agricultural development 
is identified as critical in all the PRSPs. But other sectors are also referred to. 
Increased investment in economic infrastructure, particularly power and transport, 
is also a ubiquitous priority. Some also identify building science, technology 
and innovation capabilities as important concerns. Employment generation is 
identified as a key challenge for poverty reduction in some of these documents. 
Moreover, local development initiatives are often identified as a key mechanism 
to promote employment and also link economy-wide growth to household-level 
poverty reduction. 
This shift in the policy content of the recent PRSPs is indicative that countries 
have been emphasizing country ownership and seeking to take a greater lead in 
the design of their poverty reduction strategies. This has also been encouraged by 
shifts by the IFIs. Following the review of the poverty reduction strategy process 
in 2004, the Joint Staff Assessment assumed a lower profile advisory status and 
the PRSPs are now less formally received by the two institutions (Marshall, 
2008). Moreover, international financial institutions have also been signaling 
their willingness and desire to work with more ambitious and less one-size-
fits-all strategies. This is particularly evident in the 2005 Review of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy approach (IMF and World Bank 2005). The review argues that 
(a) the poverty reduction strategy approach provides a framework for countries 
to elaborate comprehensive medium-term development programmes (p. 31); 
(b) they should be incorporate productive sectors as well as social sectors (pp. 
77–78); (c) they should include growth diagnostics as well as poverty diagnostics 
(p. 79); and (d) overall, they should support “ambitious development plans” (p. 
79) and provide a framework for scaling up aid, using alternative scenarios (p. 81) 
and discussing macroeconomic policy options (p. 49).
3. THE CHALLENGE OF REINVENTING DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE
As the PRSPs evolve into national development strategies, major policy 
and institutional challenges arise. These go far beyond poverty-oriented public 
expenditure and budgeting, which were critical for the early PRSPs, and concern 
the role of the State in national development. Seeking to put poverty reduction 
and the achievement of the MDGs in a broad economic development framework, 
the second-generation PRSPs are in effect a return to development planning. But 
what is required now is not a return to the past; rather, it is necessary to devise 
new modes of development governance which do not repeat the weaknesses of 
old forms of development planning. These should also be tailored to the context 
of weak State capacities which is prevalent in LDCs.
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The term “development governance” is used here to refer to refer to the political 
processes and institutional arrangements which are dedicated and devoted to 
the purposeful promotion of economic development, poverty reduction and 
the achievement of internationally-agreed development goals. Development 
governance occurs whenever people and their organizations interact to solve 
development problems and create new development opportunities. It involves 
defining problems, setting goals, choosing strategies, identifying appropriate policy 
instruments, creating institutions and allocating resources. The State must play an 
active role in this process, and in particular seek to animate and channel the 
energies of the private sector, driven by the search for private profits, towards the 
achievement of publicly-agreed national development goals.
This is a major challenge. But, in general, the second-generation PRSPs are 
only just beginning to address the complex policy issues involved in the shift 
from poverty reduction strategies to development strategies. Three weaknesses in 
meeting the challenge seem to characterize most second-generation PRSPs. 
Firstly, there is little discussion in the second-generation PRSPs of the question 
of choice of development strategy. This is a critical issue which affects the priorities 
given to different sectors and courses of action. It was a central issue of the old 
development planning, and gave rise to discussions on the role of agriculture, 
relative importance of domestic and external sources of growth, intersectoral 
dynamics and sequencing of global integration (Lewis, 1986). But this is absent 
in the second-generation PRSPs. Discussion of the relationship between short-
term macroeconomic stabilization goals and long-term development goals is also 
absent.
Secondly, the rebalancing of the poverty reduction strategies to cover not 
only social sectors but also economic infrastructure, private sector development 
and productive sectors has major implications for development governance. It is 
no longer possible to envisage this process solely in terms of public expenditure 
allocation. It is also necessary to focus on the policies which will shape the 
incentives and capabilities of private sector actors in order to achieve the 
objective and targets of the strategy. But the current strategies still largely rely on 
privatization and liberalization as major tools for productive sector development, 
and are founded on the expectation that, even in LDC-type economies, the 
reduction of fiscal deficits and low rates of inflation will “crowd in” the private 
sector. There is no discussion of the validity and relevance of this development 
model in circumstances where private sector capabilities are very weak and the 
majority of the population is very poor. 
Thirdly, there is weak analytical discussion of the relationship between growth, 
poverty and the achievement of the MDGs in general. Instead, more emphasis is 
generally placed on description of poverty profiles. Placing poverty reduction and 
the achievement of the MDGs into a broader economic development framework 
is proving difficult to accomplish.
To sum up, the increasing diversity of the second-generation PRSPs is an 
indication of increased ownership of the formulation of the documents. However, 
the generally weak treatment of the complex issues of development governance 
listed above raises questions as to how much progress towards country ownership 
has been made and what processes are impeding such progress. 
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D.  The Paris Declaration assessment 
of progress towards ownership
One source of evidence for assessing progress toward country ownership in 
the LDCs is the systematic appraisal that is conducted as part of the monitoring of 
the Paris Declaration. In this context, country ownership is assessed according to 
whether aid recipients have an “operational national development strategy”. Their 
national development strategy (including poverty reduction strategy) is operational 
when it has “strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework 
(MTEF) and annual budgets”. This involves: (a) having “a long-term vision and 
medium-term strategy derived from that vision which is common reference point 
for policy makers, nationally, locally and at the sector level”; (b) “the long-term 
vision and medium-term strategy identify objectives and targets linked to MDGs 
but tailored, with some specificity to local circumstances” and “the medium-
term strategy focuses on a prioritized set of targets” and “adequately addresses 
cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, environment and governance”; 
(c) “the government is progressing towards performance-oriented budgeting to 
facilitate a link of the strategy with the medium-term fiscal framework”, and (d) 
“institutionalized participation of national stakeholders in strategy formulation 
and implementation (World Bank, 2007: A5). The results of the World Bank’s 
evaluation of country ownership for 37 LDCs on the first three of these assessment 
criteria are summarized in table 34. Progress is graded according to (a) whether 
little action has been taken; (b) elements for progress exist; (c) action has been 
taken and some progress, though not enough, is being made; (d) significant 
action is being taken and so progress on the criteria is largely developed; and (e) 
significant progress has been made and it is sustainable. 
According to the World Bank’s evaluation, no LDC yet has a “sustainable” 
operational development strategy and only six of the 37 LDCs have “largely 
developed” operational development strategies (World Bank, 2007). These 
countries are Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, the United Republic of 
Tanzania and Zambia. However, some action to develop operational development 
strategies has been taken in 23 of the 37 LDCs, and there are elements to build on 
in the remaining eight LDCs in which progress is least advanced. These countries 
are all designated as fragile states by the World Bank assessment and include 
Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sudan. In terms of the 
three criteria used to assess the status of operational development strategies, more 
progress has been made in terms of elaborating a unified strategic framework and 
prioritization rather than making a strategic link to the budget. The weak progress 
on the latter criteria is particularly evident in countries which are described as 
fragile States. Nevertheless, a number of LDCs are identified by the World Bank 
as examples of best practices in the elaboration of operational development 
strategies according to the Paris targets. These countries are Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (box 5).
The finding by the World Bank that none of the current PRSPs for LDCs can 
be described as “operational development strategies” is very important in itself. 
It indicates the very weak State capacities of most LDCs. However, the current 
approach to assessing ownership within the framework of the Paris Declaration is 
limited. The evaluation and judgments reflect a particular view of what constitutes 
an operational national development strategy. It is striking, for example, that 
Bangladesh is not assessed as having an operational development strategy, even 
though its strategic approach has been one of the most successful of all the 
LDCs and its PRSP is amongst the most technically sophisticated of the PRSPs 
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Table 34. Progress of LDCs towards operational national development 
strategies: The Paris Declaration assessment
Overall
score
Unified
strategic
framework
Priorization Strategic link 
to budget
PRSP II countries:a
Benin 3 3 3 3
Burkina Faso 2 2 2 3
Cambodia 3 3 2 3
Ethiopia 2 2 2 3
Gambia 3 3 3 4
Guinea 3 3 3 3
Madagascar 3 2 3 3
Malawi 3 3 3 3
Mali 3 3 3 3
Mauritania 3 3 2 3
Mozambique 3 3 2 3
Niger 3 3 3 3
Rwanda 2 2 2 2
Senegal 3 3 2 3
Uganda 2 2 2 2
United Rep. of Tanzania 2 2 3 2
Zambia 2 2 2 2
Other countries:
Afghanistan 4 4 4 4
Bangladesh 3 3 3 3
Bhutan 3 2 2 4
Burundi 3 3 3 4
Cape Verde 3 3 3 3
Central African Republic 4 4 4 4
Chad 3 3 3 3
Dem. Republic of Congo 4 3 4 4
Djibouti 3 3 3 4
Guinea-Bissau 4 3 4 4
Haiti 4 4 4 4
Lao People’s Dem. Republic 3 3 3 4
Lesotho 3 3 3 3
Liberia 4 4 3 4
Nepal 3 3 3 3
Sao Tome and Principe 4 4 4 4
Sierra Leone 3 3 3 4
Sudan 4 4 4 4
Timor-Leste 3 3 3 3
Yemen 3 2 2 4
Source: World Bank (2007).
Key:   Level 1: sustainable, Level 2: developed, Level 3: actions taken, Level 4: elements exist, 
and Level 5: little action.
a These countries have prepared two PRSPs.
produced by LDCs. The evaluation and judgement also reflect a particular view 
of ownership. 
In the current approach, a major aspect of what is being monitored is the 
actions which recipient countries should take in order to increase the confidence 
of donors that their financial aid will be well-managed. Such confidence is of 
course critical for country ownership in the sense that, if donors think that aid 
will be mismanaged they will set up parallel implementation systems which 
may not be well-aligned with country priorities. But, in effect, what ownership 
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Box 5. Paris Declaration review of operational development strategies in LDCs: Examples of best practices
In the latest World Bank review, six LDCs — Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambia — are identified as having "largely developed" operational development strategies.
Burkina Faso has used the medium-term strategy to achieve the goals identified in an existing vision and long-term sectoral plans. 
It has conducted yearly reviews to adjust strategy targets in accordance with lessons learned and resource availability.
Ethiopia has merged multiple strategies into a unified strategic framework that builds on MDG needs assessments to base 
its objectives on country reality.
Rwanda has used existing sector strategies to inform its medium-term strategy. This has facilitated linking the strategy to the 
budget, on the basis of sector strategies, line ministries prepare sectoral MTEFs. 
United Republic of Tanzania has shifted toward an outcome-oriented strategy that includes cluster strategies as the road map 
to achieve development objective. This shift is promoting greater use of performance data in the budget process, requiring 
sectors to justify their bids in terms of the relevant cluster strtegies. Sector policymakers thus have a material incentive to 
develop outcome-oriented rationales for their budget submissions.
Uganda has built strongly on a well established planning tradition to move incrementally toward a stronger focus on results. 
It has progressively improved its development data set, complementing this with participatory poverty assessments that 
have brought the perspective of the poor into planning. Better and more comprehensive data have in turn fed into strategy 
revision, making the strategy more balanced and focused, and have helped to inform budgetary allocations.
Zambia has used MDG needs assessments to fine-tune the focus and balance of the strategy and better cost it. This in turn 
has created a stronger basis to move toward a closer link between the budget and the strategy.
In addition the following countries are identified as examples of good practices in relation to relation to (a) developing a 
consolidated strategic framework; (b) prioritization; and (c) linking strategies and budgets:
Unified Strategic Framework:
Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Rwanda, United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda have built on existing long-term vision 
studies to guide the preparation of a medium-term strategy linked to the country's long-term goals. Madagascar has built 
on the revision of their medium-term strategy to align it with existing the long-term vision. Ethiopia, Yemen and Zambia 
have consolidated parallel medium-term strategies into a single national development strategy. Ethiopia has build on sector 
strategies under implementation to revise the medium-term strategy. 
Prioritization:
Zambia has built on MDG needs assessment and MDG progress reports to help improve costing and financial projections 
for its second PRSP. Bhutan, Ethiopia, Mauritania and Yemen have used information on progress toward meting the 
MDGs to better tailor MDG targets to country circumstances. Ethiopia has it has built strongly on sector strategies under 
implementation to revise their medium-term strategy. In Cambodia, detailed assessments of challenges toward meeting the 
MDGs have shaped the choice of country-specific goals and medium-term targets that inform the medium-term strategy. 
Clarity on the country objectives has in turn made it easier to prioritize strategy in line with expected resources. Burkina,
Faso, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia have taken into account implementation 
progress and lessons learned to achieve a better balance within their medium-term goals and short-term priorities, focusing 
on sectors and themes relevant for country development, including productive sectors, governance, gender , HIV/AIDS and 
the environment. 
Link to budget:
Rwanda has conducted bi-annual review assessing expenditures against planned outputs and future budget allocation. 
Tanzania has introduced a Strategic Budget Allocation System that, when combined with timely information on outturns, 
shows some promise to link strategy to budget. The government has developed a Local Government Planning and Reporting 
Database to allow local governments to formulate MTEF plans and budgets linked to the national strategy and better monitor 
local expenditures. Uganda has established a clearer link between budget ceilings and strategy objectives, with sector working 
groups identifying sectoral outcomes, outputs, and targets based on the medium-term strategy, to justify budget ceilings. 
Zambia has introduced an activity-based budget classification, which informs summary tables presented to the National 
Assembly during the budget submission.
Source:  World Bank (2007).
means here is local commitment to a process conditionality in relation to how a 
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financial governance is being reinforced. At the same time, the deeper issues of 
freedom of choice of national Government, as well as the exercise of leadership, 
are sidelined. 
This approach to monitoring ownership ignores the other important aspects of 
ownership which are identified in the Paris Declaration. In the Declaration, under 
the principle of ownership, aid recipients committed to:
?? ????????? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ? ??????????? ?????? ?????????
development strategies through broad consultative processes;
?? ???????????????? ???????? ??????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
programmes as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks and 
annual budgets; and
?? ????? ???? ????? ??? ????????????? ???? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ????????????????? ??????
development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the 
participation of civil society and the private sector.
Donors also agreed to “respect country leadership and help strengthen their 
capacity to exercise it” (OECD 2005a: 3). The systematic monitoring of progress 
towards country-led development strategies now examines only the second of the 
aid recipient’s commitments. 
The rest of this chapter focuses on the extent to which LDCs are exercising 
– and, given the complex nature of the aid relationship, are able to exercise – 
leadership in the design and implementation of their development strategies, as 
well as the extent to which they are taking the lead in coordinating assistance at the 
country level. It also identifies factors which weaken country ownership, as well 
as some adverse consequences for meeting the new challenges of development 
governance.
E. Processes weakening country ownership — 
policy formulation 
Evidence from the case studies referred to at the start of this chapter show that 
some LDCs are certainly beginning to exercise leadership in the policy formulation 
process and establishing complex institutional mechanisms to get inputs to the 
process from national stakeholders. This has progressed to a different extent in 
different countries. However, AFRODAD (2007e: 28), in its synthesis of African 
case studies, notes that “recipient Governments have particularly demonstrated 
greater realism and assertiveness about national objectives and priorities” and 
“have shown encouraging progress in assuring the realization of ownership and 
leadership within the context of the Paris Declaration”. It exemplifies this with the 
cases of Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania. It also 
indicates that participation in policy dialogue has broadened and is becoming 
institutionalized, although “participation by the mass media and the parliament 
are not sufficiently developed” (AFRODAD, 2007e: 29).
This overall picture of progress must be tempered by two factors which 
weaken country ownership. Firstly, weak national technical capacities continue 
to undermine the ability of countries to exercise leadership in designing and 
implementing their national development strategies, meaning that countries have 
to rely heavily on donor support in the design of the national strategy. EURODAD 
(2008b: 17), for example, reports the case of one LDC where, following the 
request from the national PRSP secretariat for help from donors, 15 Government 
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representatives from the LDCs were flown to Washington, D.C., where they 
met officials from the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), European Commission, Belgium and IMF for a working session to draft 
their second PRSP. Following this, the World Bank contacted a consultant from a 
neighbouring country who had worked on his own country’s PRSP to help finalize 
the PRSP. In another country, it was observed that — although the PRSP unit had 
benefited from increased financial, material and human resources — there was a 
“chronic problem of weak capacity in macroeconomic and strategic development 
planning” (Bergamaschi, 2007: 10). The PRSP unit has no macroeconomist and 
the Ministry of Finance has no capacity to undertake macroeconomic planning. 
The second-generation PRSP’s growth model was elaborated by a consultant hired 
by the German cooperation agency (ibid.: 10). The general weakness of national 
technical capacities means that donors can exercise an important influence on 
the design and implementation of national development strategies through the 
technical cooperation which they provide. 
Secondly, even for countries that take the lead in formulating their strategies, 
the content of those strategies can be influenced through the inequality of power 
and resources, as well as the potential sanctions which donors can bring to bear 
if the recipients stray away from what donors regard as a realistic and credible 
strategy. Studies in three LDCs in which country ownership is generally regarded 
as quite well developed and where Governments have reached a general policy 
consensus with donors — but at the same time have publicly disagreed with the 
donors — have found that the formulation of the policy agenda is still influenced 
by the high level of reliance on assistance and the past history of continual 
oversight of policies.5 In effect, freedom of action in policy design is constrained 
by the need to mobilize aid inflows, and the sense, justifiable or not, that signs of 
lack of commitment to the types of policies which donors and IFIs believe are the 
best ones, can work against aid mobilization. 
One area where these factors seem particularly important is in the design of 
the macroeconomic framework. In most PRSPs, the macroeconomic framework 
conforms to that of the IMF’s PRGF (AFRODAD, 2007a, b, c, and d). AFRODAD 
(2006) reports how the first-generation PRSPs which were tightly linked to the 
HIPC Initiative were rushed and “there was no evidence that the PRSP fed into 
the PRGF realistically” (AFRODAD, 2006: 11). But the relationship between 
the PRGF and PRSPs in the second-generation PRSPs remains ambiguous. For 
example, AFRODAD notes that, in the case of Mozambique — because access 
to IMF resources requires the Government to comply with macroeconomic 
conditions in the PRGF which are binding commitments — these commitments 
are reflected in government plans which then feed into the PRSP. Whatever the 
case, the macroeconomic framework is usually “owned” at the country level, but 
only by a narrow circle of officials who are concerned with such policies (Working 
Group on IMF Programmes and Health Spending, 2007). There is often strong 
opposition from civil society to the macroeconomic framework, and the limited 
exploration of macroeconomic policy options means that there is limited scope 
for choice and political debate.6
One important tendency which the case studies show is that donors increasingly 
demand to have representation and a voice in forums where decisions regarding 
the utilization of aid are made. This tendency is observed in both Liberia, which 
has little experience in elaborating a poverty reduction strategy, and Uganda, 
from which the very idea of a poverty reduction strategy was originally derived 
(AFRODAD, 2007e: 26–27). In one country, which is regarded as a demonstration 
case for how an aid-dependent country can negotiate and create space for 
pursuing its own policy agenda, government officials and donors have increasingly 
come together “to negotiate and plan development activities from macroeconomic 
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management to specific thematic initiatives” (Hayman, 2007: 20). This is regarded 
as one of the “the perverse outcomes of an aid system which aims at increasing 
local ownership but which leads to heightened external entanglement in internal 
policy processes” (ibid.: 20).
 It should be noted that these interactions do not necessarily infringe upon 
domestic interests.7 However, an outcome of this involvement is that the PRSPs can 
be seen as an amalgam of policy elements that include some strongly related to a 
donor development agenda and others that are related to a national development 
agenda. With this view, Furtado and Smith (2007) have proposed that the overall 
policy agenda of a PRSP can be conceptualized as having three spheres: (a) a core 
policy agenda which is strongly owned by the national Government; (b) a policy 
agenda which is directly or indirectly negotiated with donors and around which 
there is broad consensus and agreement; and (c) a part of the policy agenda which 
is donor-originated and donor-driven and which enjoys very little or very narrow 
country ownership (see chart 21). In effect, there is an ownership frontier within 
the PRSPs. 
Their broad scope is one of the key features of the second-generation 
PRSPs. The location of ownership frontier — and the size of the area of strong 
country ownership — may be expected to vary between countries according to 
their technical capacity and also leadership in designing the PRSPs. The issues 
which are matters of dispute also vary between countries. But it is notable 
that, in the case studies where it is possible to identify areas of disagreement, 
primary areas of disagreement often related to productive sector development. In 
Mozambique, areas of disagreement in 2006 were related to land privatization, 
the creation of a development bank and governance (De Renzio and Hanlon, 
2007). In Ethiopia, the areas embraced by donors but enjoying little government 
support were liberalization of the fertilizer distribution system, financial sectors 
and telecommunications, whilst the areas which the Government supported but 
the donors did not share the same view were approaches to the financial sector, 
industrial development and support for agriculture. In all these cases, Government 
believed in a more proactive role for the State (Furtado and Smith, 2007).
Chart 21.  The ownership frontier within PRSPs
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Source: Based on Furtado and Smith (2007: figure 3).
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F. Processes weakening country ownership — 
policy implementation 
The fact that the new PRSPs cover a very broad policy agenda and include 
an ownership frontier within them is a critical feature of how ownership is 
now working in LDCs. Even though the strategies contain priorities which are 
expressed in their key pillars, these now cover so many issues that it is possible 
for conditionalities to be drawn from the strategy and for donors to allocate aid 
in ways which are aligned and harmonized with their priorities but focus more 
on the donor priorities within the national agenda. Policy implementation is thus 
critical to how ownership works in practice. 
1. POLICY CONDITIONALITY
In the past, policy conditionality was a principal mechanism through which 
country ownership was undermined. However, both the World Bank and IMF 
have made major efforts in the last few years to reduce the intrusive and negative 
effects of policy conditionality. The IMF issued new Guidelines on Conditionality in 
2002 which reaffirmed that the key purpose of conditionality is to ensure that fund 
resources are used to assist a member resolve its balance of payments problems. 
The design of conditionality should be formulated through a mutually acceptable 
process led by the country itself and programmes supported by the PRGF should 
normally be based on the PRSP. Policy conditionality should be parsimonious, 
focusing on conditions that are critical to the achievement of programme goals, and 
should be integrated within a coherent country-led framework. Since 2000, the 
World Bank has sought to streamline conditionality and exercise more selectivity 
by focusing its support on countries which were committed to the policies it was 
advocating. In 2006, following an extensive review of conditionality, the World 
Bank adopted five “Good Practice Principles” that are intended to govern the way 
Bank staff apply conditionality, namely: (a) reinforce country ownership; (b) agree 
up-front with the Government and other financial partners on a coordinated 
accountability framework (harmonization); (c) customize the accountability 
framework and modalities of bank support to country circumstances; (d) choose 
only action critical for achieving results as conditions for disbursement; and (e) 
conduct transparent progress reviews conducive to predictable and performance-
based financial support.
There is only limited evidence of how the switch from the old-style 
conditionality, which was applied in the 1980s and 1990s, to the new-style 
conditionality is working out in practice. The IMF Independent Evaluation Office 
(IEO) (IMF, 2007a) evaluation of progress found that “there is no evidence of a 
reduction in the number of structural conditions following the introduction of the 
streamlining initiative” (p. 24) and “arrangements continued to include conditions 
that do not appear to have been ‘critical to programme objectives’” (p. 26). A 
sectoral analysis shows that “programmes contained a large number of structural 
conditions dealing with many aspects of policymaking” and “often these conditions 
were quite detailed, even when they covered areas over which the Fund had 
little expertise and that were outside its core areas of responsibility” (p. 14). It 
also found that the use of specific structural conditions in the period 2004–2005 
were no better justified than in 1999–2003, and that “well-specified medium-
term roadmaps were present in PRGFs only in those countries whose Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper contained a well-developed medium-term policy 
assessment” (p. 26). Mozambique was the only example which the evaluation 
found in the countries it studied. 
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The Review of World Bank Conditionality found that, in the early 2000s, there 
was a drop in the number of binding conditionalities but a rise in the number 
of indicative benchmarks which guide rather than compel policy action. Public 
sector governance was the fastest-growing conditionality theme in IDA loans, 
with half of public sector governance conditions relating to public expenditure 
management, financial management and procurement-related conditions. 
The share of social sector conditionality is also growing and public expenditure 
management conditions are used more in countries with lower social sector 
spending, lower social conditions, and higher poverty. Compared with the 1990s, 
there has also been a shift to tailor conditionality in ways more appropriate for 
very poor countries (World Bank, 2005a). 
From the country cases studies within the published literature, a number of 
tendencies associated with new-style conditionality can be discerned in LDCs. 
Firstly, compliance with IMF macroeconomic conditions is still of major importance 
for bilateral donors. ODA inflows to both Malawi and Zambia were cut in 2003, 
owing to failure to meet macroeconomic targets (AFRODAD, 2006: 13) and the 
same thing occurred in Sierra Leone in 2007 (EURODAD, 2008a). Compliance 
with the conditions within the PRGF is also becoming an entry-level condition for 
budget support, as the Sierra Leone case shows.
Secondly, IMF macroeconomic conditionality is strongly oriented towards 
achieving macroeconomic stability and, with this in view, it has been targeting 
low financial deficits and inflation lower than 5 per cent, and also setting wage bill 
ceilings. These policies are often vigorously opposed by civil society groups. They 
are usually strongly supported by a narrow circle of officials. But the scope for 
choice and political debate about the costs and risks of alterative macroeconomic 
frameworks has been limited because of the limited exploration of more 
expansionary but feasible policy options (Working Group on IMF Programmes 
and Health Spending, 2007). 
Thirdly, there is a greater division of labour between the World Bank and 
IMF, and together they continue to recommend privatization and liberalization. 
AFRODAD (2006) reports that, in Ethiopia, conditionalities under PRGF are 
greater than under ESAF and encompass (a) liberalization of the external sector 
and interest rates; (b) the reorientation of spending to poverty alleviation; and 
(c) the speeding up of tax reform, privatization and the strengthening of the 
private sector, including removing barriers to foreign bank entry.  EURODAD 
(2007) found that the overall number of conditions the World Bank is attaching 
to its development finance (including legally binding conditions and structural 
benchmarks) is falling in poor countries. However, this is related to the practice 
of bundling a number of policy actions related to one objective as one condition. 
Moreover, “more than two thirds of loans and grants (71 per cent) from the IDA 
still have sensitive policy reforms attached to them” (ibid.: 3). In this context, 
privatization and liberalization remain important themes, often now classified as 
part of public sector reform. The research found that, on average, loans contained 
six privatization-related conditions each (ibid.: 17). Examples are Bangladesh 
(privatization of health), Rwanda (privatization of tea plantations), Burkina Faso 
(private management of electricity sector) and Afghanistan (privatization of State-
owned enterprises). 
Using a broad definition of policy conditionality, Molina and Pereira (2008) 
show that there has been an increase in IMF structural conditionality recently. 
But for the LDCs in their sample of countries, their data indicate there has been 
a very slight decline in the number of structural conditions attached per IMF 
programme between the periods 2003–2004 and 2005–2007 — from 13.5 to 
13 per programme. This analysis includes prior actions (policy reforms that have 
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to be acted upon prior to receiving funds), performance criteria (policy reforms 
that have to be acted upon during a PRGF in order to gain access to subsequent 
disbursements) and structural benchmarks (which are not legally binding but are 
used to assess performance of a loan). The total number of binding conditions per 
loan has stayed almost constant at seven per programme. Nevertheless, a third of 
all structural conditions attached to PRGFs approved for LDCs since 2005 focus 
on “sensitive” policy reforms. “Sensitive” policy reforms are defined as reforms 
which limit fiscal space conditions, increase regressive taxation conditions, or 
require public sector restructuring, banking and financial sector privatization and 
liberalization, or other kinds of privatization and liberalization. The share of sensitive 
reforms is significantly down from a half in 2003–2004. But the share is higher 
in some countries. For example, in Benin, 7 of 13 conditions in 2005 required 
privatizing State-owned enterprises in the infrastructure, telecommunications and 
cotton sectors (Molina and Pereira, 2008).  Both privatization and liberalization of 
the banking and financial sectors remain key conditionalities for LDCs (table 35). 
Fourthly, there is a tendency for policy conditionality to be increasingly drawn 
from Government documents. But the tensions between conditionality and 
ownership still remain. The IMF IEO interviews with national authorities found 
that some LDCs saw IMF structural conditionality as being imposed on them 
and not adapted to the country’s institutional circumstances, implementation 
capacity or political constraints, whilst others saw it as excessive and inflexible in 
the face of shocks (IMF, 2007a: 20). Case studies of conditionality in relation to 
privatization and liberalization in Bangladesh, Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia 
found a range of interactions (Bull, Jerve and Sigvaldsen, 2006). In Zambia, 
pressure was put on the Government to privatize State-owned banks and utilities. 
In Bangladesh, privatization of parts of the energy sector was viewed as aligned 
with governmental priorities and earlier reviews of the sector. However, the World 
Bank was heavily involved with those reviews, and some government officials said 
that the policy agendas did not reflect government priorities and pressure was 
Table 35.  Structural conditionalitya attached to PRGF loans in LDCs: 
2003–2004 and 2005–2007
2003/2004 2005/2007
Number of programmes 11 15
Total conditions 149 196
of which:
Binding 77 104
Non-binding 72 92
Total non-sensitive 100 139
Total sensitive 49 57
of which:
Banking and financial sector liberalisation 19 19
Limiting fiscal space 0 8
Regressive taxation 2 3
Privatisation related 18 15
Public enterprise restructuring 3 7
Liberalisation related 7 5
Total sensitive privatization and liberalisation conditions 44 38
by sector:
Bank and financial sector 20 19
Trade and prices 7 4
Natural resources 6 4
Telecommunications 1 3
Energy and water utilities 1 2
Infrastructures and transport 0 5
Other 9 1
Source: Personal communication with EURODAD, based on database of Molina and Pereira (2008). 
a Includes prior actions, performance criteria and structural benchmarks.
A third of all structural 
conditions attached to 
PRGFs approved in LDCs 
since 2005 focus on 
“sensitive” policy reforms.
Macroeconomic
stabilization, privatization 
and liberalization are 
still important types of 
conditionality, and these are 
now being complemented 
with more governance 
conditionalities.
112 The Least Developed Countries Report 2008
applied to implement the policies. In Mozambique, the World Bank was a major 
proponent of privatization of the energy sector, but moved away from this when 
government priorities shifted away from privatization. In Uganda, privatization and 
liberalization are not major elements of current reforms and all Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Credit (PRSC) conditionalities are jointly decided by government and 
donors. AFRODAD (2007b:22) states that in Mozambique, some privatizations 
which are conditionalities are not clearly spelt out in the PRSP but, nevertheless, 
are being implemented. These are private concession for management of the 
major port, private management of water in five cities and private concessions on 
energy, telecommunications and transport services.
To sum up, it can be said that there have been major shifts in the practice of 
policy conditionality but much less shift in its content. There is little clear public 
evidence that conditionalities are imposed on countries and there is an increasing 
tendency for policy conditionalities to be negotiated based on government 
documents. There is also a greater shift towards administrative guidance through 
benchmarks rather than legally binding conditionality related to clearly-specified 
variables and measures which, in case of non-observance, lead to the interruption 
of disbursements. Macroeconomic stabilization, privatization and liberalization 
are still important types of policy conditionality, and these are now being 
complemented with more governance conditionalities. 
Policy conditionality has not been conducive to policy pluralism. One effect 
of the content of policy conditionality is to ensure that the strategic thrust at the 
heart of the national development strategies of LDCs is still liberalization and 
privatization within a tight fiscal and monetary policy. As indicated in the last 
chapter, in an LDC context, this development model has not been leading to 
sustainable and inclusive growth. 
The degree of detail of conditionality is also a problem. For example, the 
structural conditionality attached to the PRGF in Sierra Leone included the 
introduction of a photo verification system for civil servants and teachers as part 
of structural measures to strengthen wage bill policies (Fedelino et al., 2006: 
Appendix 3). Whatever the merits of this as a measure to eliminate ghost workers, 
the example illustrates the level of detail of conditionality and raises the question of 
whether or not such actions should be a major priority for development planning 
in Sierra Leone. The effect of conditionality is to focus the tempo and content 
of policy actions. In the process of policy implementation, what happens is that 
the task of meeting the conditions must take precedence over the promotion of 
development.
2. DONOR FINANCING CHOICES
Given the broad policy agenda contained in the PRSPs, donor financing 
choices are an important determinant of which programmes within the PRSP get 
financed. In one case study, it is suggested that because of the broad nature of the 
PRSP, any aid money can be aligned to the PRSP and thus “donors select and fund 
their own priorities from the PRSP as they narrow down what they will focus their 
spending on” (EURODAD 2008a). In another case, it is reported that the PRSP 
involves “a vastness of areas and activities, to such as degree that almost all donor 
areas and activities find a place” (IPAM, 2008: 35).
Donor involvement in what gets financed occurs even when donors commit 
to general budget support. In that case, performance assessment frameworks are 
negotiated to set priorities in the way in which budget money is spent. In the best 
case, this involves mutual commitments, as they have in Mozambique (Castel-
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Branco, 2007). However, in another country, one donor official is reported as 
stating that “initially the donors do a draft to agree on the conditions and then 
these are taken to the Government to be discussed” (EURODAD, 2008a: 17). In 
that country, the targets in the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) priorities 
were extremely wide-ranging, including (a) specified targets for rural feeder 
roads in good condition; (b) number of bed nets with long-lasting insecticide 
distributed annually; (c) improvement in primary school pass rate; (d) civil service 
reform; (e) implementation of decentralization; (f) the submission of legislation 
on financial sector reform; and (g) procurement reform to increase international 
competitive bidding. These are not necessarily undesirable per se, but they orient 
the direction and pace of national development planning in the same way the 
policy conditionality does.
One of the hallmarks of the PRSPs written since mid-2002 is that they are no 
longer narrowly focused on increased social expenditure, but also include the 
development of productive sectors. However, there are various processes through 
which the financing of productive sectors is currently getting neglected in the 
implementation process.
Firstly, although productive sectors often appear among the priority policy 
objectives, they do not receive the necessary attention in the action matrices 
which focus policy actions. This has been observed for science and technology 
intervention in Mozambique and also on rural productive development in Malawi 
(Warren-Rodriguez, 2007; Cabral, 2006). In the case of Malawi, the outcome is 
related to the difficulty of achieving a policy consensus on agriculture and rural 
development. In the case of Mozambique, the marginalization of science and 
technology is related to the low priority given by donor agencies to science and 
technology as well as “the fragmented nature of development aid in Mozambique, 
with a plethora of donor agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
international development organizations operating in the country, each using a 
variety of funding and technical assistance mechanisms and most aid funds, as well 
as associated technical assistance, being disbursed directly to sectoral ministries 
or, even, specific projects in priority sectors” (Warren-Rodriguez, 2007:31). Such 
fragmentation makes it difficult to treat cross-sectoral issues such as science and 
technology in the action matrix, even though they are identified as central in the 
plan.
Secondly, as noted above, active policies to promote productive sector 
development are often on the wrong side of the ownership frontier. In the case 
of Malawi, strategy disagreements over agricultural development meant it was 
difficult to get donor support. A lack of policy pluralism in relation to private 
sector development is also weakening discussion of alternatives. Box 6 illustrates 
how private sector development and the promotion of structural change were 
marginalized in the preparation of Mozambique’s second-generation poverty 
reduction strategy.  
Thirdly, donor efforts to support productive sector development are sometimes 
misaligned. Shepherd and Fritz (2005) reported that large shares of donor funds 
for rural productive sectors were made available through off-budget projects and 
programmes. They quote a World Bank review of alignment of its PRSC and the 
rural priority activities in the action matrices of the PRSPs of 12 countries published 
in 2005 which found that there was very low alignment. Out of 189 rural priority 
activities, only 38 per cent were taken up in the PRSC.
Fourthly, even where aid is aligned with government priorities through budget 
support, the allocation of aid is oriented towards social sectors. In Mozambique, 
for example, the crucial role of small-scale agriculture for income generation 
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Box 6. The treatment of private sector development, technology issues and manufacturing 
in Mozambique’s second-generation PRSP
Mozambique’s second-generation PRSP, PARPA II, has made some progress in incorporating productive considerations 
in the Government’s poverty reduction efforts, including those related to private sector development, especially when 
compared to Mozambique’s first PRSP. But the discussions on private sector development — in which representatives of 
the Government, the business community and aid agencies participated — essentially focused on investment climate issues, 
largely leaving aside other considerations. Questions relating to international trade and investment policy, infrastructure 
development, industrial capacity-building or institutional reform — which could have provided an opportunity to address 
issues relating to science and technology development — were, for the most part, absent in these discussions. As a result, 
the document put forward by the PARPA II private sector working group basically consisted of some key measures relating 
to major investment climate constraints, plus an amalgamation of initiatives put forward by the various ministries involved 
in these discussions — tourism, agriculture, mineral resources, energy, fisheries, and trade and industry. These initiatives not 
only did not respond to any coordinated effort to formulate a consistent strategy for private sector development; in addition, 
their quality was considerably impaired by the weak institutional and — in particular — planning and policy formulation 
capacities that exist in many of these ministries. 
Furthermore, the organization of the PARPA II preparation process into working groups of a sectoral nature, together with 
lack of effective intersectoral coordination mechanisms prior and during the preparation of PARPA II, made it difficult to 
address issues cutting across the various policy spheres intervening in the promotion of private sector development. For 
instance, the private sector’s concerns on the lack and cost of investment finance in Mozambique were not incorporated, 
or even taken into account, in the PARPA II discussions regarding macroeconomic policy considerations, an issue which is 
largely driven by the Government’s PRGF negotiations with the IMF. Similarly, the discussion and definition of initiatives in 
the spheres of TVET or infrastructure development undertaken by the PARPA II working groups dealing with education and 
infrastructures did not include the participation of members of the private sector working group, nor explicitly incorporate 
the private sector’s concerns in each of these areas. The same was the case with the incorporation in the PARPA II private 
sector development strategy of the recommendations made by the science and technology working group, which were 
generally not explicitly addressed during this process.
The PARPA II strategy for private sector development largely neglects technical capacity and technology upgrading considerations, 
essentially focusing on investment climate issues. Despite several references in the text to the need to “promote the creation of 
a strong, dynamic, competitive and innovative private sector”, measures to do this are largely absent in the matrix of strategic 
initiatives included at the end of the PARPA II document, against which the implementation of this strategy is monitored and 
assessed. The overall outcome reflects the little clout that issues relating to industrial technological development currently 
hold in the Mozambican policy agenda, as well as the predominance of privatization and liberalization, together with an 
improved investment climate, as the key policy mechanisms to promote productive development. 
Source:  Warren-Rodriguez (2007).
and survival of the majority of the population is widely recognized, but public 
investments in agriculture and rural development are marginal. Agriculture and 
rural development are identified as priority poverty-reducing sectors in the 
budget. But in 2006, amongst the priority poverty-reducing sectors, 20 per cent of 
the budget went to education, 15 per cent to health, 16 per cent to infrastructure, 
13 per cent to governance and the judicial system, and only 3.3 per cent went 
to agriculture and rural development (IPAM, 2008: table 2). The annual average 
share of the budget going to agriculture and rural development between 2004 
and 2005 was 3.9 per cent. To what extent this is a government preference is 
unclear. AFRODAD (2007f) notes that in Mozambique some sectors get more 
assisted than others and the education and health sectors appear to be “donor 
sectors” (p.23).
Finally, “there are often serious capacity constraints at the sector level 
that affect the quality of policy development and analysis, planning, costing, 
budgeting, implementation and M&E” (AFRODAD, 2007e: 28). 
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 G. Processes weakening country ownership — 
the continuing problem of aid misalignment 
In the 1990s, as indicated above, country ownership was undermined by a 
combination of traditional policy conditionality, the misalignment of aid with 
national priorities and government processes, and all-pervasive coordination 
failures in the delivery of aid. These problems are being addressed through the Paris 
Declaration and the most recent progress will be assessed later this year. However, 
the OECD/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 2006 Survey on Monitoring 
the Paris Declaration summarized its chief finding with the judgement that, “in 
half of the developing countries signing on to the Paris Declaration, partners and 
donors have a long road ahead to meet the commitments they have undertaken” 
(OECD/DAC, 2006:9). The report also notes “a strong disconnect between 
headquarters policies and in-country (donor) practices” (ibid.: 10). A recent 
civil society report, financed by DFID to increase the perspectives of southern 
civil society on the aid effectiveness process, finds that donors are progressing 
in some areas but: (a) too little aid is still provided through national systems; (b) 
parallel management systems continue to proliferate; (c) aid disbursements are 
still unpredictable, disrupting development planning and implementation; and (d) 
even though some positive actions are being taken, an accountable aid system 
is still a distant prospect (EURODAD, 2008b: 7). Similarly, the synthesis study of 
cases studies of aid effectiveness in Africa found that “there is a clear difference 
between the structure of central government budget allocation and aid allocation, 
particularly when off-budget aid flows are included” (AFRODAD, 2007e: 28). 
The degree to which assistance to LDCs remains off-budget, off-plan and 
uncounted varies between countries. Box 7 illustrates the situation in Afghanistan 
between 2003 and 2006, a case in which the national Government made 
strenuous efforts to ensure that aid was well-aligned with government priorities. 
This is obviously a special case given the security situation. But it is not necessarily 
untypical of what happens in other LDCs. 
In one country, for example, donors provided $361.3 million in 2006, 
funding 265 different projects at an average of approximately $1 million per 
project (EURODAD, 2008a). This aid is meant to support the work of ministries, 
departments and agencies. But the vast majority of this money does not appear 
in the government budget and is not managed by any government body. Rather, 
it is spent through separate projects, so-called project implementation units. It 
is estimated that two thirds of donor project aid is not reflected in the budget. 
The Government also has incomplete information of how much aid has been 
spent and on what. Moreover, donors disbursed less than half of the aid that 
they had committed to the country in 2006. In this country, only 18 per cent of 
aid is provided as budget support. But access to budget support is conditional 
upon (a) continued good macroeconomic performance, as evidenced by 
satisfactory progress under an IMF programme; (b) satisfactory progress in PRSP 
implementation; and (c) continuous improvements in public finance management, 
as well as in implementing actions agreed in the PAF. Overall, the authors of this 
case study argue that the current situation reflects high levels of aid dependence, 
together with a major Government capacity gap after years of conflict and brain 
drain. The Government has made some progress in improving aid coordination 
and information through the establishment of the Development Assistance 
Coordination Office. But owing to mutual distrust, donors continue the practice 
of “heavily conditioning their aid, setting up parallel project units to control their 
aid and trying to mould policymaking” (EURODAD, 2008a: 4). 
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 Box 7. Aid delivery in Afghanistan, 2001–2006
The Government formulated a national development strategy, identified priority programmes, established a set of principles 
and rules for donor interaction and set up a number of institutional mechanisms for managing donors (including the 
Afghanistan Development Forum and consultative group process). Its approach to aid implementation had the following 
characteristics:
(a) Pooling of financing to the budget, either directly or through trust fund or common programming mechanism. The 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was established to pool donor financing behind a single set of policies and 
implementation mechanisms, creating cost-effective modalities and policy coherence;
(b) Alignment behind the Government’s strategy and policy agenda, most notably through the adoption of the National 
Development Framework and the budget as the policy basis;
(c) Programme implementation through Government-managed national projects and programmes, tendered through 
transparent mechanisms to the most effective organization for the job, whether private sector, NGO or international 
organization;
(d) Reporting on implementation of the budget through a single annual report that was shared with the population, Parliament, 
media and international community (Lockhart, 2007: 18–19).
Some international organizations and donors aligned behind this approach. But the largest bilateral donors and United 
Nations agencies, and the humanitarian funding system, did not follow this model. Instead, they adopted a project-based, 
donor-managed approach whose key characteristics were that:
(a) Financing flows went directly from each donor agency to the respective implementation agency, and not through the 
Government of Afghanistan;
(b) Strategy and policy for the financing programme was determined by the donor, usually in national or international 
headquarters, and is not included in the Afghanistan budget process;
(c) Implementation (procurement, accounting, management) took place through projects managed by international staff 
and project units outside the Government of Afghanistan; and
(d) Reporting took place from the implementing agency to the donor agency and is not incorporated in the national annual 
report (Lockhart, 2007: 19).
A number of donors provided part of their assistance through the Government’s preferred modality but continued to finance 
“a significant proportion of their assistance through parallel mechanisms” (Lockhart, 2007: 20). 
 That the Government approach was followed at all depended on: (a) the leadership and vision of the Government of 
Afghanistan; (b) the quality of the programmes prepared by the Government and consistent progress in implementing them; 
and (c) trust between national leaders and international counterparts. Donors who did not have a record of channeling 
money through donor support mechanisms and who met core costs through percentages from projects were more likely to 
use parallel mechanisms. Those that had experience with budget support, were interested in the cost-effectiveness of aid and 
which recognized the links between aid for security, humanitarian assistance and economic development were more willing 
to support the government-led approach. In 2004, it is estimated that international actors spent $15 billion on security and 
$2 billion on economic and humanitarian assistance; of the latter, $200 million was directed to the Government. 
This case shows the high cost to the Government of donor practices. For aid delivered through the second donor-managed 
approach, it is estimated that “anything between 40 and 90 per cent of a project cost is spent on overheads abroad” and 
“given the long contractual chain of many donor-managed projects, the resources that were available for a project on the 
ground would often be a fraction of that allocated to a particular project” (Lockhart, 2007: 25). Technical assistance is also 
very expensive. In 2005, Afghanistan received $600 million a year in technical assistance, which outweighed the costs of 
the entire civil service of 260,000 people. There is also a high cost in terms of the effectiveness of state institutions. Firstly, 
international staff deployed in the country required drivers, translators, secretaries and guards. Because of the high salaries 
which the Government could not match, these were often recruited from the civil service, where they had previously 
worked as teachers, doctors and managers. Secondly, the hundreds of different projects each came with specific internal 
rules for procurement, managing and reporting, and this undermined the coherence of laws and procedures in the country 
(ibid.:26). Thirdly, government authorities could not focus on formulating and implementing their own policy agenda. “To 
try to limit the negative impact of one of the parallel processes put into effect in competition with the national budget 
process, eight senior managers of the Afghanistan Coordination Assistance Authority had to spend six weeks during budget 
preparation time to review $1.8 billion projects prepared by United Nations agencies, instead of using their time to prepare 
and implement the national budget. Sixty per cent of these projects were subsequently rejected on the basis of World Bank 
rules” (Lockhart, 2007: 28). 
Source: Lockhart (2007).
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This situation is illustrative of what OECD (2003) calls “the low ownership 
trap”. This arises when there is low capacity of the Government in a recipient 
country and donors fear aid will not be well-managed by the Government, either 
because of inadequate policies or inadequate management. Donors reduce this 
risk by bypassing Government and setting up parallel structures, for example, 
management units run by consultants. The Government has low ownership of 
what is happening and does not participate. This reduces trust on the part of 
donors, which reinforces their orientation not to integrate their activities with 
those of the Government. The parallel implementation units also pull scarce skills 
away from Government, and this further undermines capacity and reinforces the 
tendency of donors to seek to bypass government systems. 
However, the problems of poor integration of aid with government plans and 
budgets are not simply confined to countries which could be described as being 
caught in a low ownership trap. This is evident in the overview to the Rwanda Aid 
Policy, published in 2006, which lists the following problems in terms of the way 
in which aid was being delivered in Rwanda:
(a) “Excessive conditionality arises and this may result in problems of 
predictability;
(b) “High transactions costs lower the real value of assistance  — donors continue 
to place significant demands on Government in terms of time, reporting needs, 
and use of other resources through numerous missions and meetings;
(c) “Incomplete reporting of ODA to the Government reduces transparency, 
and hinders the ability of Government to monitor and manage the assistance 
Rwanda receives. This information is critical to the planning and budgeting 
process, as well as the execution of the development budget. It is difficult to 
obtain a complete picture of external assistance to Rwanda, as some donors are 
unwilling or unable to meet the Government’s request for information;
(d) “Too frequently donors continue to promote their own, often political 
objectives at the expense of Government ownership. Much assistance remains 
off-plan and off-budget, reflecting a lack of alignment with Government 
priorities and systems;
(e) “The existence of large vertical funds, while beneficial to development in 
some areas, may have a distortionary effect in the allocation of resources 
across sectors and subsectors; and
(f) “Technical assistance is not always effective, and in some instances is perceived 
to undermine local capacities rather than improving them” (Government of 
Rwanda, 2006: 1–2).
However, the document also acknowledges that the Government itself has 
major capacity problems, which result in poor coordination and implementation, 
and that “the lack of clear process in some cases leads line ministries and 
decentralized entities to negotiate directly with donors” and that the Government 
may also put unstructured demands for information on their development 
partners” (ibid.: 1–2).
To sum up, it is clear that, although progress is being made, the slow alignment 
of aid with recipient countries’ priorities, systems and procedures remains a 
problem which weakens ownership in a range of LDCs. 
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H. Adverse consequences of 
weak country ownership 
Weak country ownership has adverse consequences for the effectiveness 
of the poverty reduction strategies in promoting economic growth, reducing 
poverty and achieving the MDGs. There are in particular three features of their 
design and implementation which can be related to weak ownership but which 
undermine their effectiveness. These are related to (a) the weak integration of the 
macroeconomic framework with sectoral and trade policies; (b) the downscaling 
of ambition in relation to increased aid inflows; and (c) the inadequate level of 
financing for productive sector development.
1. THE WEAK INTEGRATION OF THE MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
WITH SECTORAL AND TRADE POLICIES
It is widely recognized that the macroeconomic frameworks which LDCs 
have agreed with the IMF have helped to promote macroeconomic stability, in 
particular to bring down inflation. However, there is much more controversy 
about the effects of the macroeconomic framework on economic growth, poverty 
reduction and the achievement of the MDGs. Results from an IMF survey of 
views on PRGF design in sub-Saharan Africa found that only 55 per cent of IMF 
respondents and only 20 per cent of World Bank respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed that the programmes focused on economic growth (IMF, 2007b). Still 
fewer IMF respondents believed that they focused on poverty reduction or the 
MDGs (38 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively), and the numbers were still 
fewer for World Bank respondents (12 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively). 
Respondents from national authorities held more or less the same views as the 
IMF respondents, but a slightly higher proportion agreed or strongly agreed that 
they were focused on growth and 26 per cent believed that they were focused on 
MDGs (table 36).
Fiscal and monetary policies generally target low fiscal deficits and inflation 
at 5 per cent of below. The evidence from African countries indicates that there 
has been increasing flexibility with the shift from ESAF to PRGF programmes. The 
PRGF programmes since 2003 have targeted a small (1 per cent) increase in the 
fiscal deficit before grants, whereas the ESAF programmes targeted substantial cuts 
(by 3 per cent of GDP over the three-year programme period). But a number of 
qualified analysts believe that despite the looser policy stance, these targets are 
still too conservative in relation to economic growth, poverty reduction and the 
achievement of the MDGs.8
Wherever one stands in relation to these economic debates, an important 
adverse consequence of the narrow ownership of the macroeconomic policies 
is that there is a lack of integration between macroeconomic policies and 
sectoral policies, and also with trade policies. The lack of integration between 
Only 20 per cent of World 
Bank respondents agreed 
or strongly agreed that IMF 
PRGF programmes in Africa 
focused on growth.
Table 36. The design of IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
in sub-Saharan Africa: Survey views on growth and poverty orientation
Design of PRGF 
programmes focused on:
Percentage of respondents  “Agreeing” or “Strongly Agreeing”:
IMF National Authorities World Bank Donors
Macro stability 100 98 98 97
Growth 55 57 20 53
Poverty reduction 38 36 12 23
MDGs 13 26 3 13
Source: Adapted from IMF (2007b), table A5.3.
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the macroeconomic policies and sectoral policies means that different policy 
options cannot be adequately explored. For example, the impact of different 
spending choices on domestic prices depends on sectoral parameters (such as 
the composition of spending, the extent of spare capacity, and the ability of 
public spending to crowd in private investment). In assessing the potential for 
public spending, it is necessary to integrate sector-level information on costs and 
consequences (Working Group on IMF Programs and Health Spending, 2007). 
The lack of integration of the macroeconomic framework with the trade policies 
is a further adverse consequence of the narrow ownership of the macroeconomic 
policies. In this regard, it was proposed in The Least Developed Countries Report 
2004 that the key to integrating trade into poverty reduction policies was through 
the export and import forecasts which are part of the macroeconomic framework. 
The detailed trade policies need to be realistically related to these forecasts and 
export and import policies geared to achieving these goals. However, in practice, 
despite the increase in trade policy content in the PRSPs, the trade objectives in 
the macroeconomic framework float freely, having no connection with the more 
detailed trade objectives and policy measures contained in the main text of the 
PRSP. This disarticulation is related to weak integration of the macroeconomic 
framework with the rest of the document.
2. THE DOWNSCALING OF AMBITION IN RELATION TO INCREASED AID INFLOWS
A second adverse consequence of weak ownership is the downscaling of 
ambition in relation to increased aid inflows. It is clear that most LDC Governments 
want increased aid inflows. But there is a fundamental mismatch between this 
desire and the way in which PRSPs are written. This arises once again because the 
macroeconomic framework is usually based on projections of future aid inflows 
which dampen expectations of both donor and recipient countries in the scaling 
up of aid. This results in minimalist poverty reduction strategies rather than poverty 
reduction strategies which explore the effects of the scaling-up of aid. 
In general terms, it is possible to project future aid inflows on the basis of (a) 
the minimum requirements for viable macroeconomic programmes; (b) past aid 
trends; (c) normative financing requirements to achieve growth, poverty reduction 
or MDG targets; or (d) the third approach adjusted for absorptive capacity 
constraints. In general, IMF (2007b) finds that, in African countries with PRGF 
programmes, the first and second approaches have been followed. Moreover, 
in general, very modest short-term projections of aid inflows are made because 
aid inflows are volatile, because there is past experience of actual disbursements 
falling short of commitments and because the major concern is to ensure that 
programmes are not underfinanced. 
Where the forecasts come from is not entirely clear. IMF (2007b) says that 
IMF staff generally took the forecast of the authorities for the programme year, 
validated through discussion with donors. But in post-conflict countries where 
government capacity was limited, IMF staff played a more active role in working 
with authorities to aggregate donor plans in the context of the programme’s 
macroeconomic framework. Interviewed staff said that the authorities were 
in many cases very conservative about future aid flows and, for medium-term 
forecasts, staff often triangulated between the authorities’ forecasts, to which they 
added a premium, and indications from donors. 
The consequence of the general approach to forecasting aid inflows is that 
development strategies are downscaled to be realistic in terms of past aid inflows 
rather than upscaled to explore how increased aid inflows can be effectively used 
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Box 8. The use of increased aid inflows in African countries with PRGF programmes 
A recent IMF Independent Evaluation Office Report on how aid is used in African countries which have PRGF programmes 
indicates that macroeconomic policies have tended to favour using additional aid to reduce domestic debt or rebuild external 
reserves rather than to increase public spending (IMF 2007b). The IEO study found that (a) if external reserves are less than 
2.5 months of imports, virtually all aid is programmed to be saved in the form of higher reserves; (b) if reserves are above 
this level but inflation is above 5 per cent, 85 cents in every extra dollar of aid is channeled into reducing domestic debt; 
and (c) if reserves are above the 2.5-month threshold and inflation below 5 per cent, most additional aid is programmed 
for higher public spending. 
The consequence of these rules of thumb have been that, across all countries experiencing aid increases during the PRGF 
programme period, only 27 cents of each dollar of the anticipated aid increases were programmed to be used for expansion 
of public expenditure. Some adjustments are made during the programme. But for the period 2004–2006, 91 cents of each 
additional dollar of aid over the level of the pre-programme year was “saved” in international reserves in Mozambique and 
47 cents of each additional dollar of aid was “saved” in Zambia over the same period. Between 13 and 20 per cent of all 
aid which was received in these countries over this period went into international reserves, and 19 per cent of all aid was 
saved in that way in Rwanda in 2002–2004 (Working Group on IMF and Health Spending, 2007). 
Recommendations concerning how unanticipated aid inflows are dealt with further reduce the pass-through of aid inflows to 
increased public expenditures. This is important because aid projections are often wrong, particularly given the unpredictability 
of aid inflows. The case studies of Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia show that the IMF programmes initially required that 
in the short term, higher-than-projected aid was saved while public expenditure was cut if aid fell short. However, there is 
some evidence of increasing flexibility in these countries (ibid.: 39). Similarly, a study of eight African countries found that 
episodes of lower-than-programmed budget aid led to lower public investment, while higher-than-projected aid did not 
lead to high investment but instead was saved (Celasun and Walliser, 2005).
These practices in dealing with aid inflows at the country level are a major reason for the increase in international reserves in 
LDCs noted in chapter 1. Whether or not they are the right policy is an economic judgement. But these practices may work 
to discourage commitments to scale up aid, reinforcing the signaling effect of the unambitious macroeconomic forecasts.
to promote economic growth, poverty reduction and the achievement of the 
MDGs. Recently, the IMF has undertaken some in-depth analyses of alternative 
scenarios to scale up aid in some countries – Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Rwanda and Zambia (Goldsbrough and Elberger, 2007). However, in general, 
Governments are placed in a very difficult dilemma in drafting their PRSPs. To 
be realistic in terms of expected aid inflows, a development strategy cannot draw 
attention to the vast needs of the LDCs in pursuing MDGs, which is necessary to 
catalyse the extra flows. This catch-22 leads to a downscaling of ambition by both 
LDC Governments and their development partners. 
The Working Group on IMF Programs and Health Spending (2007) argues 
that the projections have also risked sending confused signals to donors. The case 
studies of Rwanda, Mozambique and Zambia also indicate that the notion that 
an increase in aid levels is undesirable may also have influenced the projections. 
When only conservative projections are presented, donors may conclude that this 
means that more resources cannot be usefully absorbed from a macroeconomic 
perspective. Donors will only disburse aid if the macroeconomic framework is 
certified to be sound by the IMF. But the macroeconomic framework, through its 
aid projections, may at the same time discourage the scale-up of aid. Goldbrough 
and Elberger (2007: 19) state that “the IMF initially sent signals that tended to 
discourage a substantial increase in aid. Of the 27 IMF programmes and reviews 
in sub-Saharan Africa that were completed in the 18 months after the Gleneagles 
Summit, aid projections in only two were as optimistic as the Gleneagles 
commitments”.
The discouragement of aid scale-up is also apparent in the practices which 
have been adopted in relation to how actually increasing aid inflows are dealt 
with and what happens to aid windfalls when forecasts are not right (box 8). 
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3. THE INADEQUATE LEVEL OF FINANCING OF PRODUCTIVE SECTORS
AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE
A final adverse consequence of weak ownership is that there is now a 
growing disconnect between the content of the PRSPs, which are emphasizing 
the importance of productive sectors and economic infrastructure, and the 
composition of aid disbursements which, as analyzed in chapter 1 of this Report, 
are still focused on social sectors and social infrastructure. This mismatch between 
the changes in the policy content of the PRSPs without a change in the composition 
of aid is a primary indicator of weak country ownership of national development 
strategies as they are implemented. 
This pattern of allocation is related to donor preference for financing social 
sectors. These financing choices, coupled with the thrust of policy conditionality, 
mean that the strategic orientation of the PRSPs in practice is basically a 
combination of policies promoting stabilization, privatization and liberalization, 
together with increased donor financing for social sectors. The inadequate 
financing of productive sectors and economic infrastructure implies that, although 
the PRSPs aspire to place poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs 
within a broad economic development framework, in practice they do not 
succeed. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 2 of this Report, it is unlikely that this 
development model can result in sustained and inclusive development.
I. Practical policy mechanisms 
to enhance country ownership
Increasing country ownership of national development strategies should be 
a major priority for improving development and aid effectiveness in LDCs. This 
is a complex issue which depends on changing relations between donors and 
recipients. This section focuses on the potential of recipient-led aid management 
policies and identifies some elements for a broader agenda to enhance country 
ownership.
1. THE POTENTIAL OF RECIPIENT-LED AID MANAGEMENT POLICIES
One first step which can be made to increase country ownership is the 
adoption of an aid management policy within LDCs. This can play an important 
role in reducing the multiple ways in which aid delivery is undermining ownership 
through being unaccounted, off-budget or unaligned with the Government 
priorities.
An aid management policy is different from a national development strategy. 
The national development strategy identifies goals, objective and targets, and the 
actions needed to achieve them. The aid management policy does not cover this 
ground. Rather “it is designed and used to ensure that assistance received is of 
such a type, and is so deployed, as to maximize its contribution to the priorities 
set out in the country’s statements of development strategy” (Killick, 2008: 5). 
As we have seen, the PRSPs were actually introduced initially as a debt relief 
management policy instrument, and they still may be used as an instrument 
for attracting and channeling aid. By adopting an aid management policy, it is 
possible to separate, but interrelate the role of the development strategy and the 
aid management policy. 
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Significantly, the Paris Declaration encourages recipient countries “to take 
the lead in coordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development 
resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil 
society and the private sector” (OECD 2005a: 3). LDC Governments should seize 
the opportunity of the Paris Declaration and seek to elaborate aid management 
policies. The Declaration also seeks to promote mutual accountability. This idea is 
an essential element of more equal development partnership, and it directly seeks 
to address the imbalance of bargaining strength of donors and recipients. As the 
Declaration puts it, “[b]ecause demonstrating real progress at the country level is 
critical, under the leadership of the partner country we will periodically assess, 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively, our mutual progress at country level in 
implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness. In doing so, we will make 
use of appropriate country level mechanisms” (ibid.: 3). The Paris Declaration 
thus encourages countries to take the lead in developing locally appropriate 
mechanisms to ensure mutual, rather than one-sided accountability. 
Following Killick (2008), a well-working aid management policy should:
 (a) Improve the coordination of assistance and reduce uncertainties about actual 
and prospective aid inflows; 
(b) Avoid or reduce the proliferation of sources of assistance and of discrete 
donor initiatives;
(c) By this and other means, increase the policy space of Governments, reduce 
the proliferation of conditionalities and raise the predictability of receipts;
(d) As a result of improved Government–donor relations and better harmonization 
and alignment, reduce transactions costs;
(e) Provide a platform for greater mutual accountability; and
(f) Provide a framework through which technical assistance can become 
increasingly demand-driven and oriented to recipient capacity development 
needs.
Some developing countries have taken the lead in elaborating aid management 
policies. Indeed, a few LDCs are global leaders in the adoption of such policies. The 
countries which have done so include Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic 
of Tanzania, whose experience is summarized in box 9, as well as Afghanistan and 
Mozambique.
From the experiences of LDCs thus far, it is apparent that aid management 
policies can offer a powerful bottom-up approach to better aid coordination 
(Menocal and Mulley, 2006; De Renzio and Mulley, 2006). The evaluation 
of the process of country-led aid coordination in the United Republic of 
Tanzania indicates a number of positive developments in the nature of the aid 
relationship. These include (a) better data on aid inflows; (b) increased levels of 
trust; (c) increasing assertiveness on the part of the Government in expressing 
its preferences; (d) greater rationalization and harmonization of processes and 
procedures amongst donors; (e) increased predictability of aid, with donors making 
multi-year aid commitments; (f) reduced transaction costs as donors support a 
joint assistance strategy; and (g) increased mutual accountability, as performance 
indicators not only relate to Government actions but also donor actions in relation 
to aid disbursements (Wangwe et al. 2005). The introduction of jointly agreed 
monitoring indicators at the country level in relation to donor practices seems to 
be a particularly powerful way to reduce transaction costs and promote alignment 
and harmonization. 
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Nevertheless, there are limits to improvements. The case of Afghanistan shows 
that, even where a country implements a strong aid management policy, success 
is not necessarily assured (box 7). In both Uganda and the United Republic of 
Tanzania, a number of donors remain outside the joint assistance strategies and, 
in Mozambique, the aid management policy only covers aid which is provided 
through budget support. Experience also suggests that country-level efforts to 
improve aid management are very time-consuming and thus could crowd out 
thinking and action on effective development strategies. It might be added that 
aid recipients have no sanctions to bring to bear when donors underperform 
in relation to agreed goals; this means that there may be an asymmetry in 
accountability, even when performance indicators are mutually agreed. The main 
sanctions which recipient countries can use to influence donor behaviour seem 
to be the donors’ sense of reputation and also peer pressure, whilst the recipient 
is always facing the possibility that aid will be withdrawn. Recipients may have 
greater leverage in the aid relationship if they have access to multiple sources 
of aid and also historical relationships with like-minded donors (De Renzio and 
Mulley, 2006). 
Box 9. Aid management policies in Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania
Rwanda:
The Government formally adopted its Rwanda Aid Policy in 2006. However, this was the culmination of a number of prior 
steps, including the creation of a central machinery for aid coordination, the preparation of a PRSP and sector development 
strategies, and the establishment of a development partners coordination group. In preparation for the drafting of the aid 
policy, in 2005 it initiated an independent “Baseline Survey of Donor Alignment and Harmonization” to provide a necessary 
factual base. Although the aid policy document is clearly a statement of government positions, the manner of its preparation 
was designed to build consensus. It was the outcome of several rounds of consultation, both within the Government and 
with its principal donors. Designed to give local effect to the Paris Declaration, its goals are stated to be to increase aid 
effectiveness and to provide a basis for mobilizing the additional assistance sought by the Government. There is a special 
unit within the Ministry of Finance responsible for implementation of the policy and one of its first steps was to request 
donors to undertake a systematic self-assessment of the extent to which their existing policies and practices were in line 
with the aid policy guidelines. 
Uganda:
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, public investment in Uganda was characterized by a large number of donor-driven 
projects, which resulted in significant duplication and chronic recurrent expenditure shortfalls. Thus, the Government of 
Uganda progressively developed sector strategies that set a coherent framework and established clear priorities for donor 
support. This facilitated “first-order” harmonization efforts among donors (e.g. common reporting, disbursement and 
auditing arrangements for basket funds). Sector strategies were then integrated into the PRSP and unified in a medium-term 
expenditure framework. The Government also centralized donor coordination in one ministry and in 2003 developed a set 
of “Partnership Principles” as a framework for coordination and dialogue. This included undertakings by the Government 
on such matters as corruption and public service reform, set out clear preferences for the types of aid it wished to receive, 
and proposed a variety of other changes to raise aid effectiveness and lower transactions costs. Both the existence of a 
strong, competent central ministry driving the process forward and sustained support by development partners have been 
crucial for the Government’s ability to play a strong role in managing relations with its donors. In 2005, the Government 
and several major donors took what they saw as a logical next step and agreed to a Joint Assistance Strategy for 2005–2009. 
This built on the principles of the Paris Declaration, committed partners to important changes in behaviour intended to raise 
aid effectiveness and further aligned donors’ support with the country’s poverty reduction strategy.
United Republic of Tanzania:
In 1994, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania commissioned an independent group of advisers to investigate 
the crisis that then existed between the Government and donors, and to propose solutions. Its report facilitated the definition 
of specific commitments on both sides to improve aid outcomes. Progress against these commitments has been regularly 
monitored through a formally constituted independent monitoring group. In 2002 the Government’s strategy for managing its 
aid was formalized in the form of the United Republic of Tanzania Assistance Strategy. The strategy was a government initiative 
“aimed at restoring local ownership and leadership by promoting partnership in the design and execution of development 
programmes” and outlined the undertakings of the Government and its donors. There were annual implementation reports 
and it was subsequently used as the basis for the development of a Joint Assistance Strategy. Finalized in 2006, this is viewed as 
providing a more inclusive set of principles to which donors and the Government can be held accountable. It aims to further 
improve donor coordination, including through the identification of donors’ comparative advantages and the introduction 
of a single review cycle. It is intended to replace individual donor assistance strategies.
Source: Killick (2008).
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Despite these caveats, the introduction of an aid management policy can offer 
a practical way to reduce those processes weakening country ownership which 
are arising from aid being off-budget, unaccounted, unpredictable and unaligned 
with government priorities. It can also be a keystone to building trust and mutual 
understanding between donors and recipients which are essential to tackle the 
other processes which are weakening the ability of countries to take the lead in 
the design and implementation of their national development strategy. The annex 
to this chapter thus includes a roadmap for LDCs to set up an aid management 
policy.
2. ELEMENTS OF A BROADER AGENDA
Whilst it is possible to make some progress at the country level, there 
remain systemic issues which must be addressed in a full approach to enhance 
country ownership. Elements of a broader agenda would include: (a) technical 
cooperation to rebuild State capacity to formulate and implement national 
development strategies; (b) further thinking on policy conditionality; (c) enhanced 
systemic efforts to increase the predictability of aid; (d) addressing systemic biases 
against aid for productive sectors; and (e) the enhancing of alternative voices, and 
particularly developing country and LDC perspectives and local knowledge, in the 
production of knowledge about development processes and practices. 
(a)  Rebuilding State capacity
Establishing capable States is essential for enhanced country ownership of 
national development strategies. There is a need to rebuild State capacity in 
relation to the broader agenda of growth and development to which the latest 
PRSPs aspire. This involves major questions of development governance, which 
should encompass both the formulation and the implementation of development 
strategies and, in particular, new forms of development planning. At the same 
time, sound financial governance is needed to assure donors that aid money is 
used effectively.
(b)  Policy conditionality
Although there has been a major shift in practices related to policy 
conditionality, there is a need for further debate on its rationale and effectiveness, 
and how donors’ legitimate concerns about how money is spent are balanced 
with recipients’ legitimate concerns that policy conditionality is still over-detailed 
and sometimes intrusive, effectively setting the pace and strategic direction of the 
policy agenda, and doing so in ways which ensure the implementation of what 
IFIs consider the best policies. The content of policy conditionality needs to be 
tempered by its possible negative effects on country ownership and tailored to 
its underlying rationale. The original purpose of IMF conditionality was to ensure 
that IMF resources are used to assist a member resolve its balance of payments 
problems, and do so in a way which ensures repayment and thus does not threaten 
the collective interest. This has also been reaffirmed recently. The question is: 
what implications does this have for the content of conditionality? Moreover, if aid 
is provided in the form of grants, what is the rationale for conditionality and how 
can its scope be focused on that rationale? 
(c)  Aid predictability and volatility
Increasing the predictability of aid is a key goal to improve country ownership, 
as the unpredictability of aid makes it very difficult to plan and programme 
activities in countries which are highly aid-dependent. Aid volatility and the 
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unpredictability of aid inflows contribute to macroeconomic instability, undermine 
effective financial management and reduce aid effectiveness. The central issue for 
Governments is how to prepare effective development strategies with a meaningful 
financial resource envelope when they are highly dependent on aid, yet ignorant 
of future aid flows, which are highly volatile. Recent research shows that this 
remains a significant problem and the disconnect between aid commitments 
and disbursements is particularly strong in poor countries (Bulir and Hamann, 
2006). Although an aid management policy can help to alleviate these problems, 
there is a need for systemic measures as well, in particular the exploration of ways 
and means to have more long-term aid commitments. This should also address 
legitimate constraints on donors, such as their own budget cycles, which make it 
difficult for them to make forward commitments. 
(d)  Addressing systemic bias against aid for productive sectors
The shift in aid allocation away from productive sectors raises the question 
of whether there is a systemic bias in current aid practices which is leading to 
this. It is possible to suggest a number of ways such a systemic bias could arise. 
Firstly, a higher proportion of aid for economic infrastructure and production 
sectors is financed by loans rather than grants (UNCTAD, 2006: 18–20). With 
the shift from loans to grants, there has been an implicit shift towards social 
infrastructure and services. Secondly, tied aid was often associated with aid for 
economic infrastructure and production sectors, and shift away from tied aid has 
similarly led to an implicit shift away from aid to production sectors and economic 
infrastructure. Thirdly, the MDGs are leading to specific focus on a few sectors 
which are deemed particularly important for their realization — education, 
health, population programmes, water supply and sanitation. Fourthly, the whole 
aid system is geared to a model of aid based on Government–to–Government 
transfers, which are particularly appropriate for using aid to increase public 
expenditure.
Rebalancing the composition of aid may actually need a radical shift in aid 
practices towards a different paradigm in which it is not seen as Government–
to–Government transfers but as a catalyst for a development process which 
involves a broad range of stakeholders and is animated in a particular by the 
private sector (Cohen, Jaquet and Reisen 2005). Such a new approach to aid 
would not necessarily involve budget support, but would nevertheless have to be 
well-aligned with Government priorities.
(e)  The production of development knowledge
Finally, enhanced country ownership does not simply depend on improved 
technical capacities, but also the deeper exploration of theoretical and policy 
alternatives for development. In this regard, the way in which knowledge is 
produced is crucial (Zimmerman and McDonald, 2008). A growing number 
of eminent scholars from developing countries argue that ownership requires 
independent thought based on the interplay between local knowledge, 
experimentation, and trial and error (Girvan, 2007). Country ownership of 
development policies needs to reflect the local realities and conditions. But 
these perspectives are marginalized by the current way in which the production 
of development knowledge is dominated by research carried out in developed 
countries and also IFIs (Wilks and Lefrancois, 2002; Utting, 2006).
A major goal of development assistance which seeks to enhance country 
ownership should thus be to support and the accumulation of indigenous 
capabilities in developing countries, particularly LDCs. Independent policy 
approaches require capacities that most developing countries do not yet possess 
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in abundance. This capacity of developing countries needs to be strengthened 
through acceptance of intellectual pluralism and critical debate. International 
agencies and donors need to support the evolution of stronger domestic knowledge 
systems and promote networking to share experiences. This will provide a sound 
basis for greater policy pluralism.
J. Conclusions 
All parties agree that country ownership of development strategies is essential 
for development effectiveness and aid effectiveness. Since the late 1990s, there 
have been significant changes in the nature of the aid relationship between LDCs 
and their development partners. In the context of the PRSP approach, significant 
steps have been taken to enhance country ownership. But this chapter shows 
that various processes continue to weaken country ownership in LDCs and this is 
having adverse consequences for development effectiveness. 
The processes weakening country ownership come into play at the level of 
policy formulation or at the level of policy implementation. The latter may arise 
because donors deliver part of their aid in ways which are off-plan, off-budget 
or simply unknown. Alternatively, it may also arise because, even when aid is 
integrated with Government priorities, processes and systems, the way in which 
PRSPs are implemented is strongly influenced by policy conditionality, monitoring 
benchmarks or donor financing choices. 
Although progress is being made in the context of the drive to improve aid 
effectiveness, the case studies reviewed in this chapter show a continuing problem 
of poor alignment and harmonization of aid with government plans and budgets. In 
the process of policy formulation, weak technical capacities undermine the ability 
of countries to exercise effective leadership, meaning that countries sometimes 
have to rely heavily on donor support in the design of national strategies. Freedom 
of action in policy design is also constrained by the need to mobilize aid inflows 
and the sense, justifiable or not, that signs of lack of commitment to the types 
of policies which donors and IFIs believe are the best ones can work against aid 
mobilization. The second-generation PRSPS are now very broad documents 
with an amalgam of elements which include (a) a core policy agenda strongly 
owned by the national Government; (b) a policy agenda which is directly or 
indirectly negotiated with donors, and around which there is broad consensus 
and agreement; and (c) a policy agenda which is more closely aligned with donor 
preferences and which enjoys very little or very narrow country ownership. There 
is thus an ownership frontier within the PRSPs. It is possible, therefore, for aid to 
be aligned and harmonized with the document but to do so in a way which is 
more oriented to donor priorities within the national plan. 
A consequence of this is that processes of policy implementation are now a 
very important mechanism through which country ownership can be strengthened 
or weakened. This chapter shows that there have been major shifts in the practice 
of policy conditionality. There is an increasing tendency for policy conditionalities 
to be drawn from Government documents and there has also been a shift towards 
administrative benchmarks rather than legally binding conditionality. However, 
macroeconomic stabilization, privatization and liberalization are still important 
types of conditionality. Policy conditionality is not conducive to policy pluralism 
and the degree of detail is also a problem. The effect of conditionality is to focus 
the tempo and content of policy actions.
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Given the broad policy agenda contained in PRSPs, donor financing choices are 
also an important determinant of how PRSPs work out in practice. This happens 
even when donors give budget support, as this usually involves performance 
assessment framework negotiated to set priorities. Donors are particularly oriented 
to financing social sectors and social infrastructure. 
The second-generation poverty reduction strategies in LDCs are seeking to 
place poverty reduction and the achievement of MDGs within a broad economic 
development framework. In many LDCs, these strategies have the potential to 
become effective development strategies. However, realizing this potential 
depends on broader development governance challenges than merely focusing 
on poverty-oriented public expenditure and budgeting, which have been the 
key concerns in the first generation poverty reduction strategies up to now. The 
weak country ownership is having negative consequences for addressing these 
challenges and also for development effectiveness. 
There are three major adverse consequences of weak ownership. Firstly, 
the macroeconomic frameworks of the poverty reduction strategies are weakly 
integrated with sectoral policies and trade policies. Secondly, despite the desire 
on the part of LDC Governments to receive more aid, the PRSPs are devised 
in a way which is failing to encourage aid scale-up and explore its possibilities. 
Thirdly, there is a mismatch between the new emphasis on productive sectors and 
economic infrastructure in the latest PRSPs and the composition of aid to support 
the building of productive capacities. The strategic thrust of the PRSPs reflects the 
combination of policy conditionality focused on stabilization, liberalization and 
privatization, together with donor financing choices oriented to social sectors. As 
discussed in chapter 2 of this Report, it is unlikely that this development model 
can result in sustained and inclusive development.
 One positive feature of the current situation is that aid management policies 
are being adopted in a few LDCs as part of the process of elaborating new 
development partnerships. These policies are designed and used to ensure that 
foreign financial and technical assistance is of such a type and is so deployed that 
it maximizes its contribution to the priorities set out in a country’s statements of its 
national development strategy. Initial experience with these innovative practices 
suggests that they can be an effective tool to tackle some dysfunctional features of 
the way in which aid is currently delivered, notably donor coordination failures 
and lack of alignment with national priorities, and to improve aid effectiveness 
through mutual rather than one-sided accountability. LDC Governments are 
therefore encouraged to adopt such policies. 
However, in the end, enhanced country ownership will depend on systemic 
measures, as well as country-level action. It is necessary to rebuild State capacities 
for promoting growth and development. Renewed attention needs to be given 
to the nature of policy conditionality and the problem of aid predictability and 
volatility. It is also necessary to assess whether there are systemic biases against 
using aid in a catalytic way to develop productive sectors. Action to promote 
alternative perspectives — especially from developing-country and LDC voices 
— in the production of knowledge about development will also be important in 
order to promote policy pluralism.
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Annex:
A roadmap for devising aid management policies in LDCs
This annex sets out a roadmap for devising aid management policies in LDCs. This roadmap includes a structured 
checklist of the parameters which could be included in a statement and the initial steps which could be taken to devise 
an aid management policy. Overall, it is stressed that the policy should be formed through a consultative process with 
donors and with strong domestic political leadership if it is to be successful. Constructing an aid management policy 
is not simply a technocratic exercise undertaken by a small coterie of officials and advisers; it is also the result of a 
process of building greater institutional trust, transparency and capacity through effective negotiation and political 
commitment.
1.  Elements of the policy statement
The following sets out a possible structure and set of guidelines that might go into a policy statement: (a) background 
and rationale; (b) objectives and guiding principles; (c) a statement of mutual commitments and obligations; (d) a 
statement of specific policies relating to volume and effectiveness of aid; (e) the organization of aid mobilization and 
management; and (f) implementation.
(a)  Background and rationale
This should include the need for a brief history of aid and assessment of the current situation in an LDC as a first 
step, as well as an inventory of recent and ongoing initiatives and an assessment of impact and sustainability. 
(b)  Objectives and guiding principles
This could include a restatement of the objectives and principles of the Paris Declaration as they relate to the 
country. The policy statement could be viewed as a ‘living’ document, to be reviewed periodically.
(c)  Statement of mutual commitments and obligations
This would be comprised of two key components: (i) commitments by Government; and (ii) Government 
expectations concerning the contribution of its donor partners to more effective aid. Regarding the former, this might 
involve a restatement of the commitments outlined in the Paris Declaration and governance transparency, the pursuit 
of poverty reduction and other development goals, greater mobilization of domestic resources, Government leadership 
in promoting aid harmonization and institutional capacity-building. Regarding Government expectations concerning 
the contribution of its donor partners to more effective aid, this could be based on local agreements with donors and 
include institutional provisions for the conduct of dialogue between Government and its development partners. 
(d)  Statement of specific policies relating to volume and effectiveness of aid
This would be comprised of four key components: (i) the volume of assistance; (ii) donor numbers and specialization; 
(iii) inclusivity and concessionality; (iv) aid modalities; (v) technical assistance; and (vi) transaction costs.
Regarding the volume of assistance, LDC Governments will need to consider factors regarding the macroeconomic 
management of large increases in aid inflows in developing their approach to aid volumes. A statement on donor numbers 
and specialization is recommended to improve donor coordination by limiting the number of donors and channels of 
assistance. As previously noted, it could also specify an appropriate division of labour between donors. Inclusivity requires 
that all donors (whether new or traditional) should be subject to the same procedures and machinery of dialogue with 
Government. Similarly, a statement of minimum acceptable levels of concessionality should be included. This should be 
consistent with external debt sustainability policies where relevant. A statement on Government preferences regarding 
aid modalities (budget support, technical assistance, etc.) is clearly a very important aspect of any aid management 
policy. Technical assistance in LDCs needs to be nationally owned, demand-driven and oriented around Government 
priorities. The aid management policy will also need to specify mechanisms for reducing transaction costs, as outlined 
in the Paris Declaration.
129Changes in the Terms of Development Partnership
(e)  The organization of aid mobilization and management
It is clear that greater inter-ministerial coordination in terms of streamlining aid management within LDC Governments 
to avoid fragmentation and unclear divisions of responsibility will be necessary. This may require Government tasking 
a particular ministry or department with drafting an agreed protocol setting out the roles and responsibilities of the 
ministries involved. A further possibility might consist of creating small secretariats supported by consultative forums and 
structured around key sub-themes of the aid management policy. Thematic bodies and forums are especially relevant 
in contexts where problems and opportunities cut across subsectors, or ministries.
(f)  Implementation
This would be comprised of two key components: (i) dealing with matters of mutual concern to both Government 
and donors; and (ii) dealing with how Government intends to implement the content of the aid management policy. The 
former concerns matters of mutual accountability such as (a) improving the provision of information on aid flows and 
plans to strengthen partnerships and efficacy; (b) measures to strengthen monitoring and evaluation through the use of 
joint accounting and national reporting procedures, which also reduce the transaction costs of aid management; and (c) 
the policy statement, which should specify how monitoring and evaluation of both donor performance and Government 
in a given LDC will be organized and managed. This may take the form of periodic independent monitoring and 
evaluation reviews as in Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania. In terms of the execution of the policy, this 
should outline initial implementation stages or steps as part of an implementation action plan. Potential components of 
an action plan elaborated to give this effect might include the following: (a) the administration of a donor self-assessment 
questionnaire outlining the extent to which they conform to the content of the policy; (b) shared dissemination strategies; 
(c) an evaluation of the adequacy of the resources of the agency/unit responsible for the implementation of the policy; 
and (d) proposals for enhancing local ownership and effectiveness of technical assistance.
2.  Steps to an aid management policy – preparing the policy statement
It is possible to envisage a five-stage process for the preparation of an aid management policy statement:
(a) Stage 1: Prepare and distribute a consultation document by Government outlining the policy objectives, process 
to be followed and a statement of initial issues to be addressed through the aid management policy;
(b) Stage 2: Schedule and hold stakeholder (e.g. Government ministries, agencies, NGOs and donors) workshops to 
solicit reactions to the consultation document. These workshops could be convened jointly by Government with 
wider stakeholder groups, or solely within Government (involving only ministries and agencies of the State);
(c) Stage 3: The responsible executing unit or authority within Government should revise the consultation document 
in the light of feedback received and then shared with stakeholders;
(d) Stage 4: A second round of consultation meetings, which should also include a politically mandated resolution 
within Government of the division of labour amongst ministries and agencies. At this stage, the implications of 
this policy for resources, training and location of the agency/body responsible for its implementation should be 
considered; and
(e) Stage 5: The aid management policy is finalized and approved by Government through the preparation of an 
action plan for its implementation.
This process is vital for building greater trust and transparency. The Government must retain control over what is 
finally put into the policy, but there is a need to convince donors as far as possible of the desirability of its provisions. 
It should also be based on a realistic understanding of donor perspectives. The responsibilities of different stakeholders 
also need to be negotiated. 
Source:  Killick (2008).
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Notes
1 The main country studies on which this chapter draws are: Afghanistan (Lockhart, 2007); 
Burkina Faso (AFRODAD, 2007a); Ethiopia (AFRODAD, 2006; Furtado and Smith, 2007); 
Malawi (Cromwell et al., 2005); Mali (Bergamaschi, 2007); Mozambique (De Renzio 
and Hanlon, 2007; IPAM, 2008; Warren-Rodrigues, 2007); Rwanda (Hayman, 2007); 
Senegal (AFRODAD, 2007b); Sierra Leone (EURODAD, 2008a); Uganda (AFRODAD, 
2007c); United Republic of Tanzania (AFRODAD, 2006 and 2007d; Harrison and Mulley, 
2007); Zambia (AFRODAD, 2006; Fraser, 2007); as well as AFRODAD (2007e), which 
synthesizes the findings of case studies of aid effectiveness which include: Mozambique, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Liberia, Uganda and Senegal. EURODAD (2008b) synthesizes the 
findings of case studies of aid effectiveness which include Cambodia, Mali and Niger, 
as well as IPAM (2008) and EURODAD (2008a). The chapter also draws on De Renzio 
and Goldsbrough (2007), Goldsbrough and Cheelo (2007) and Goldsbrough et al. 
(2007), which are case studies of IMF practices in Mozambique, Zambia and Rwanda 
respectively; and Bull et al. (2006), which examines conditionality related on privatization 
and liberalization in Bangladesh, Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia. The sources are 
listed in the references at the end of this chapter.
2 In some ways, this was a return to the past. The Report of the Secretary-General of 
UNCTAD to UNCTAD II in 1968, entitled “A Global Strategy for Development”, not 
only introduced the target of 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) but also 
argued that finance should be provided to those developing countries which showed 
the willingness and discipline to promote their own development. A “development 
plan” which increased their domestic resource mobilization and decreased their aid 
dependence and external economic vulnerability was seen as “the expression of the 
primary responsibility of the peripheral countries to solve their own problems” (UNCTAD, 
1968: 66). Moreover, “the granting of international finance should closely be linked to 
the way in which a development plan proposes to achieve these aims” (ibid.: 60). But 
in the current partnership framework, the focus has shifted from economic development 
to poverty reduction and human development, a change which raises many important 
questions about how the one is related to the other. 
3 For an extensive review of the debates surrounding conditionality, including the deficiencies 
of traditional policy conditionality, see the background papers in World Bank (2005) 
and IMF (2007a). 
4 The specific titles are: Benin: Growth Strategy for Poverty Reduction; Burkina Faso: 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; Cambodia: National Strategic Development 
Plan; Ethiopia: A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty; 
Gambia: Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; Madagascar: Madagascar Action 
Plan; Malawi: Malawi Growth and Development Strategy; Mali: Growth and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy; Niger: Accelerated Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy; 
Rwanda: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy; United Republic of 
Tanzania: National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty; Zambia: Fifth National 
Development Plan.
5  In one case, it is noted that high levels of aid dependence make the Government reluctant 
to insist on its own priorities (Killick et al., 2005: 50). In the other case, “government 
technicians and planners know very well what kinds of development management 
discourse appeal to donors and they evoke these terms in order to increase their chances 
of gaining approval and access to credit” (Harrison and Mulley, 2007: 24). In both these 
cases, effective partnership depends on some level of strategic ambiguity in terms of 
agreed priorities. In the final case, it is noted, “[T]he Government needs to keep donors 
on board, which it does by committing itself to the international norms of development 
and reminding the international community of its responsibilities… Real policy freedom 
is therefore constrained by the need to appeal to external financiers” (Hayman, 2007: 
20).
6 The relationship between the PRSP and PRGF is also evolving since the introduction 
by the IMF of the Policy Support Instrument in October 2005.  This is designed as a 
complement to the PRGF for countries which are mature stabilizers, and which may 
not want or need Fund financial support but still seek IMF policy support and signaling. 
Uganda (2006), Cape Verde (2006), Tanzania (2006) and Mozambique (2007) have 
used this facility.
7 In this regard, it is worth recalling that in the consultation with low-income countries 
on policy conditionality, organized by the World Bank on 22 April 2005, whilst some 
country representatives wanted no World Bank or IMF role, others “stressed that their 
Governments welcomed bank and fund participation in helping prepare their PRSPs and 
welcomed the positive role being played by budget support groups of donors”. Moreover, 
in some cases, they stressed that “close Fund involvement was needed as donors wanted 
a positive signal from the Bank and the Fund” (World Bank, 2005b:15–16).
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sufficiently explore more expansionary but still feasible spending options, although 
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2007: 28–29).
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Explanatory Notes
Definition of country groupings
Least developed countries1
The United Nations has designated 50 countries as least developed: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia.
LDCs geographical classification
African LDCs (and Haiti): Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic 
of Tanzania, Zambia (32).
Asian LDCs: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nepal and Yemen (8).
Island LDCs: Cape Verde, Comoros, Kiribati, Maldives, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu 
and Vanuatu (10).
Major economic areas
The classification of countries and territories according to main economic areas used in this document has been adopted for 
purposes of statistical convenience only and follows that in UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 
2007.2  Countries and territories are classified according to main economic areas as follows:
Developed economies: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Israel, Japan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, San 
Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Transition economies: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
All developing countries:  All other countries, territories and areas in Africa, Asia, America, Europe and Oceania not specified 
above.
Other developing countries: All developing countries excluding LDCs.
Major petroleum exporters: Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Congo, Gabon, Antilles, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic 
Republic of), Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, 
United Arab Emirates, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen.
Newly industrialized economies: 1st tier: Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China), Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan Province of China.
Newly industrialized economies: 2nd tier: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.
Other country groupings
DAC member countries: The countries of the OECD Development Assistance Committee are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Non-DAC member countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Rep. of Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Rep. Turkey, Thailand and 
Arab Countries (Algeria, Iran Islamic Republic of, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates). 
Other notes
Calculation of annual average growth rates. In general, they are defined as the coefficient b in the exponential trend function yt =
aebt  where t stands for time. This method takes all observations in a period into account. Therefore, the resulting growth rates reflect 
trends that are not unduly influenced by exceptional values.
Population growth rates are calculated as exponential growth rates.
The term “dollars” ($) refers to United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.
Details and percentages in tables do not necessarily add to totals because of rounding. 
The following symbols have been used:
A hyphen (-) indicates that the item is not applicable. 
Two dots (..) indicate that the data are not available or are not separately reported. 
A zero (0) means that the amount is nil or negligible. 
Use of a dash (–) between dates representing years, e.g. 1980–1990, signifies the full period involved, including the initial and 
final years.
1 Cape Verde is included in spite of its graduation from the LDC group on 21 December 2007 (see box on p.xii).
2 United Nations Publication, Sales No. E/F.07.II.D.19.
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Abbreviations
AfDF African Development Fund
AsDF Asian Development Fund
DAC Development Assistance Committee
EC European Commission
EIA Energy Information Administration
ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAOSTAT FAO statistical database
GDP gross domestic product
GEF Global Environment Facility
GNI gross national income
IDA International Development Association
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IEA International Energy Agency
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPU Inter-parliamentary Union
ITU International Telecommunication Union
LDC least developed country
ODA official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PASS. Passengers
PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
SAF Structural Adjustment Facility
SITC Standard International Trade Classification 
UN DATA United Nations Data Access System
UN DESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UIS UNESCO Institute for Statistics
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNTA United Nations Technical Assistance
UPU Universal Postal Union
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
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1.  GDP per capita and population: Levels and growth
Country Real GDP per capita Annual average growth rates 
of real GDP per capita 
Population
(2006 dollars)a (%) Level 
(million)
Annual average growth rates 
(%)
1980 1990 2006 1980–1990 1990–2000 2000–2006 2006 1980–1990 1990–2000 2000–2006
Afghanistan 496 466 319 -0.2 -5.9 9.8 26.1 -1.4 5.1 3.9
Angola 2 371 2 115 2 855 -0.1 -0.6 7.9 16.6 3.0 2.8 2.9
Bangladesh 233 267 437 1.4 2.8 3.8 156.0 2.4 2.1 1.9
Benin 448 460 536 -0.1 1.2 0.6 8.8 3.4 3.4 3.3
Bhutan 316 644 1 422 7.6 5.5 5.0 0.6 2.8 0.0 2.6
Burkina Faso 286 298 416 -0.1 2.4 2.9 14.4 2.7 3.0 3.2
Burundi 152 164 114 0.7 -4.0 -1.0 8.2 3.3 1.5 3.5
Cambodia 175 207 453 2.6 3.5 7.4 14.2 3.9 2.8 1.8
Cape Verde 883 1 198 2 153 3.2 4.6 2.7 0.5 2.1 2.4 2.4
Central African Republic 499 428 333 -1.2 -1.3 -2.4 4.3 2.6 2.6 1.6
Chad 299 373 634 3.1 0.1 10.4 10.5 2.9 3.3 3.6
Comoros 603 576 486 -0.4 -1.6 -0.5 0.8 3.1 2.9 2.7
Dem. Republic of the Congo 370 299 136 -1.4 -7.6 1.8 60.6 3.0 2.9 3.1
Djibouti 1 493 998 925 -4.5 -1.2 1.2 0.8 5.3 2.6 1.9
Equatorial Guinea 1 738 1 324 19 166 -2.7 20.8 17.7 0.5 4.9 2.4 2.4
Eritrea .. .. 249 .. 2.1 -0.7 4.7 0.0 0.0 4.2
Ethiopia .. .. 164 .. 1.5 3.2 81.0 0.0 0.0 2.6
Gambia 268 293 307 0.1 -0.5 0.9 1.7 3.7 3.7 3.1
Guinea 253 260 311 0.5 1.2 1.2 9.2 2.8 3.1 1.9
Guinea-Bissau 211 269 196 1.8 -1.9 -2.6 1.6 2.4 3.0 3.1
Haiti 907 723 489 -2.0 -2.7 -1.9 9.4 2.3 1.9 1.6
Kiribati 676 552 801 -1.9 3.7 0.4 0.1 2.8 1.5 1.8
Lao People's Dem. Republic 233 316 599 2.2 3.9 4.8 5.8 2.8 2.5 1.6
Lesotho 435 547 725 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.7 0.9
Liberia 1 067 304 192 -6.3 -0.2 -7.0 3.6 1.4 4.1 2.3
Madagascar 408 329 287 -1.6 -1.0 -0.2 19.2 2.9 3.0 2.8
Malawi 127 110 164 -1.2 4.9 1.2 13.6 4.5 2.0 2.6
Maldives 599 1 306 3 020 8.4 5.3 5.5 0.3 3.2 2.4 1.6
Mali 322 366 498 1.4 2.0 2.6 12.0 2.4 2.7 3.0
Mauritania 852 753 899 -1.0 0.2 2.3 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.9
Mozambique 218 198 349 -1.0 2.7 5.6 21.0 1.0 3.1 2.4
Myanmar 93 87 281 -1.3 5.6 11.4 48.4 1.9 1.3 0.9
Nepal 173 218 290 2.2 2.4 0.6 27.6 2.3 2.5 2.1
Niger 367 268 247 -3.1 -0.7 0.5 13.7 3.0 3.6 3.6
Rwanda 265 226 242 -1.9 -0.9 2.4 9.5 3.8 1.1 2.3
Samoa 1 788 1 694 2 348 0.6 1.6 3.0 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.7
Sao Tome and Principe 557 419 480 -2.4 -0.1 2.2 0.2 2.0 1.9 1.7
Senegal 647 653 768 0.1 0.9 1.9 12.1 3.0 2.7 2.6
Sierra Leone 344 356 318 0.2 -8.0 7.4 5.7 2.5 0.8 4.2
Solomon Islands 1 086 1 044 860 -0.9 -0.7 0.4 0.5 3.2 2.9 2.6
Somalia 369 395 283 0.9 -3.5 -0.3 8.4 0.2 0.4 3.0
Sudan 598 472 934 -2.6 3.5 5.2 37.7 2.8 2.6 2.0
Timor-Leste .. 453 319 .. 0.6 -5.9 1.1 2.6 0.8 5.5
Togo 574 464 356 -1.8 -1.7 -0.5 6.4 3.7 3.2 2.9
Tuvalu 1 747 1 599 2 441 -0.4 2.7 4.0 0.0 1.6 0.8 0.5
Uganda 197 209 346 0.0 4.0 2.6 29.9 3.5 3.3 3.2
United Rep. of Tanzania 247 236 335 -0.3 0.8 4.1 39.5 3.1 2.9 2.6
Vanuatu 1 242 1 576 1 635 2.1 1.4 -1.4 0.2 2.4 2.4 2.6
Yemen .. 636 853 0.0 2.7 0.9 21.7 0.0 4.0 3.0
Zambia 1 163 944 938 -2.1 -2.0 3.0 11.7 3.2 2.6 1.9
LDCs 336 322 454 -0.4 1.3 4.0 785.4 2.6 2.6 2.4
  African LDCs and Haiti 403 367 468 -1.0 0.6 3.6 481.1 2.9 2.8 2.7
  Asian LDCs 242 252 424 0.7 2.6 4.8 300.4 2.2 2.4 2.0
  Island LDCs 641 833 1 068 0.5 2.3 0.9 3.9 2.6 2.0 3.1
Other developing countries 1 243 1 464 2 580 1.8 3.4 4.3 4 499.6 2.0 1.6 1.3
All developing countries 1 134 1 317 2 264 1.7 3.2 4.2 5 285.1 2.1 1.8 1.5
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from United Nations/DESA/Statistics and Population Divisions, January 2008. 
a Real GDP data has been rebased using an implicit GDP deflator.
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2.  Real GDP, total and per capita: Annual average growth rates
(Per cent)
Country Real GDP Real GDP per capita
1980–
1990
1990–
2000
2000–
2006
2003 2004 2005 2006 1980–
1990
1990–
2000
2000–
2006
2003 2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan -1.6 -1.1 14.1 14.3 9.4 14.5 11.1 -0.2 -5.9 9.8 9.9 5.1 10.0 6.8
Angola 2.9 2.2 11.1 3.3 11.2 20.6 14.3 -0.1 -0.6 7.9 0.3 7.9 17.2 11.1
Bangladesh 3.9 4.9 5.8 6.3 5.4 6.7 6.5 1.4 2.8 3.8 4.3 3.4 4.8 4.7
Benin 3.3 4.6 3.9 3.9 3.1 2.9 3.6 -0.1 1.2 0.6 0.5 -0.2 -0.4 0.4
Bhutan 10.6 5.5 7.7 7.6 6.8 6.5 8.5 7.6 5.5 5.0 4.6 4.1 4.2 6.5
Burkina Faso 2.5 5.4 6.3 7.9 6.6 5.9 5.9 -0.1 2.4 2.9 4.5 3.2 2.6 2.7
Burundi 4.0 -2.6 2.5 -1.2 4.4 0.9 6.1 0.7 -4.0 -1.0 -4.5 0.6 -2.9 2.0
Cambodia 6.6 6.4 9.3 7.0 14.9 13.4 7.2 2.6 3.5 7.4 5.2 12.9 11.5 5.4
Cape Verde 5.4 7.1 5.2 4.7 4.4 5.8 5.5 3.2 4.6 2.7 2.2 2.0 3.3 3.1
Central African Republic 1.4 1.3 -0.8 -7.6 1.3 2.2 3.2 -1.2 -1.3 -2.4 -9.0 -0.2 0.5 1.4
Chad 6.0 3.4 14.4 14.3 33.7 8.6 2.9 3.1 0.1 10.4 10.1 29.0 5.0 -0.3
Comoros 2.7 1.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.8 1.2 -0.4 -1.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 0.2 -1.3
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 1.6 -4.9 4.9 5.8 6.6 6.5 6.5 -1.4 -7.6 1.8 2.7 3.4 3.2 3.2
Djibouti 0.5 1.3 3.1 3.5 3.0 3.2 4.2 -4.5 -1.2 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.4 2.4
Equatorial Guinea 2.0 23.7 20.5 13.6 30.0 9.3 -1.0 -2.7 20.8 17.7 11.0 27.0 6.8 -3.3
Eritrea .. 4.3a 3.4 3.9 2.0 4.8 2.0 ..     2.1a -0.7 -0.5 -2.2 0.8 -1.6
Ethiopia     3.4b 4.4 5.9 -3.5 13.1 10.3 10.6     0.1b 1.5 3.2 -6.0 10.3 7.5 7.9
Gambia 3.8 3.2 4.0 6.9 5.1 5.0 5.6 0.1 -0.5 0.9 3.6 1.9 2.0 2.7
Guinea 3.2 4.4 3.1 1.2 2.7 3.3 5.0 0.5 1.2 1.2 -0.6 0.8 1.4 3.0
Guinea-Bissau 4.3 1.1 0.4 0.6 2.2 3.5 4.6 1.8 -1.9 -2.6 -2.5 -0.9 0.4 1.5
Haiti 0.2 -0.8 -0.3 0.4 -3.5 1.8 2.3 -2.0 -2.7 -1.9 -1.2 -5.0 0.2 0.7
Kiribati 0.8 5.3 2.2 0.9 -2.0 3.6 0.8 -1.9 3.7 0.4 -0.9 -3.8 1.8 -0.9
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 5.1 6.5 6.5 5.8 6.9 7.3 7.3 2.2 3.9 4.8 4.1 5.3 5.6 5.5
Lesotho 4.5 3.9 2.9 2.7 4.0 2.9 1.6 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 3.2 2.2 0.9
Liberia -5.0 3.9 -4.8 -31.3 2.6 5.3 7.0 -6.3 -0.2 -7.0 -32.2 0.8 2.4 2.9
Madagascar 1.2 2.0 2.6 9.8 5.3 4.6 4.7 -1.6 -1.0 -0.2 6.7 2.4 1.7 1.9
Malawi 3.2 7.0 3.9 6.1 6.7 1.9 8.5 -1.2 4.9 1.2 3.4 4.1 -0.7 5.8
Maldives 11.9 7.8 7.2 9.2 11.3 -4.0 21.7 8.4 5.3 5.5 7.6 9.6 -5.6 19.7
Mali 3.8 4.7 5.7 7.6 2.3 6.1 4.6 1.4 2.0 2.6 4.4 -0.8 3.0 1.5
Mauritania 1.6 3.0 5.2 5.6 5.2 5.4 14.1 -1.0 0.2 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.5 11.1
Mozambique -0.1 5.9 8.2 7.9 7.5 6.2 8.5 -1.0 2.7 5.6 5.3 5.0 3.8 6.3
Myanmar 0.6 7.0 12.3 13.8 13.6 13.2 7.0 -1.3 5.6 11.4 12.9 12.6 12.3 6.1
Nepal 4.6 4.9 2.7 3.3 3.8 2.7 1.9 2.2 2.4 0.6 1.2 1.7 0.7 -0.1
Niger -0.1 2.9 4.0 3.8 -0.6 7.1 3.5 -3.1 -0.7 0.5 0.2 -4.0 3.4 0.0
Rwanda 1.8 0.1 4.7 0.7 3.8 6.0 3.0 -1.9 -0.9 2.4 -1.0 2.2 3.9 0.5
Samoa 1.0 2.6 3.7 3.5 3.7 5.1 4.0 0.6 1.6 3.0 2.8 3.1 4.4 3.1
Sao Tome and Principe -0.4 1.8 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.0 5.5 -2.4 -0.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 1.3 3.8
Senegal 3.1 3.6 4.6 6.7 5.6 5.5 4.0 0.1 0.9 1.9 3.9 2.9 2.8 1.4
Sierra Leone 2.6 -7.2 11.9 10.7 9.6 7.5 9.7 0.2 -8.0 7.4 5.6 5.0 3.7 6.8
Solomon Islands 2.3 2.1 3.0 6.5 8.0 5.0 5.0 -0.9 -0.7 0.4 3.8 5.3 2.4 2.5
Somalia 1.1 -3.2 2.7 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.4 0.9 -3.5 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6
Sudan 0.1 6.2 7.4 6.1 7.2 7.9 12.1 -2.6 3.5 5.2 4.1 5.1 5.7 9.7
Timor-Leste 0.0 1.4 -0.7 -6.2 0.4 2.2 -1.6 0.0 0.6 -5.9 -11.9 -5.5 -2.9 -5.7
Togo 1.8 1.4 2.4 1.9 3.0 0.8 4.2 -1.8 -1.7 -0.5 -0.9 0.2 -1.9 1.4
Tuvalu 1.2 3.5 4.5 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 -0.4 2.7 4.0 3.5 3.5 1.6 0.6
Uganda 3.5 7.4 5.9 6.5 5.6 6.5 6.2 0.0 4.0 2.6 3.1 2.2 3.1 2.8
United Rep. of Tanzania 2.8 3.7 6.8 7.1 6.7 6.9 5.9 -0.3 0.8 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.3 3.3
Vanuatu 4.5 3.8 1.1 2.4 4.2 3.1 3.4 2.1 1.4 -1.4 -0.2 1.5 0.5 0.9
Yemen .. 6.8 4.0 3.7 3.8 4.6 3.9 .. 2.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.5 0.9
Zambia 1.0 0.5 4.9 4.3 6.2 5.1 6.0 -2.1 -2.0 3.0 2.4 4.3 3.2 4.1
LDCs 2.2 4.0 6.5 5.5 7.3 7.9 7.5 -0.4 1.3 4.0 3.0 4.7 5.3 5.0
  African LDCs and Haiti 1.9 3.4 6.4 4.5 7.6 7.9 8.2 -1.0 0.6 3.6 1.7 4.7 5.0 5.3
  Asian LDCs 2.7 5.1 6.8 7.2 6.9 7.9 6.4 0.7 2.6 4.8 5.1 4.8 5.8 4.3
  Island LDCs 4.6 4.3 4.0 4.2 5.4 2.4 7.5 0.5 2.3 0.9 0.8 2.0 -0.6 4.6
Other developing 
countries
3.9 5.0 5.7 5.6 7.1 6.5 6.9 1.8 3.4 4.3 4.3 5.8 5.2 5.6
All developing countries 3.9 5.0 5.7 5.6 7.1 6.5 7.0 1.7 3.2 4.2 4.1 5.6 5.1 5.5
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations based on UN/DESA Statistics and Population Divisions, January 2008. 
Note: Data refers to real GDP and real GDP per capita (1990 dollars).
a 1993–2000 for Eritrea and Ethiopia. b Data for Ethiopia prior to 1992 include Eritrea.
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3.  Agricultural production: Total and per capita
(Per cent)
Country Percentage share of agriculture in: Total agricultural productiona Per capita agricultural productiona
Total Labour force Share of GDP (Annual average growth rates) (Annual average growth rates) 
1990 2004 1990 2006 1990–
1996
2000–
2006
2004 2005 2006 1990–
1996
2000–
2006
2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan 70.3 65.6 35.7 42.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Angola 74.5 70.8 18.0 8.0 4.3 7.1 7.1 6.2 2.3 1.1 4.0 4.0 3.2 -0.6
Bangladesh 65.2 51.8 30.8 20.2 0.9 2.2 -2.1 8.8 5.5 -1.3 0.3 -3.9 6.8 3.6
Benin 63.6 50.0 35.4 37.3 7.1 1.2 5.1 -4.0 -9.8 3.3 -2.0 1.7 -7.0 -12.6
Bhutan 94.1 93.6 39.0 22.2 2.8 1.4b 2.6 0.0 .. 1.3 -1.5b -0.3 -2.8 ..
Burkina Faso 92.4 92.2 28.6 26.1 3.7 7.5 -6.1 15.3 5.2 0.7 4.1 -9.0 11.8 2.1
Burundi 91.6 89.7 52.4 38.4 -2.0 0.3 -0.3 -3.7 3.1 -3.7 -3.0 -3.8 -7.3 -0.6
Cambodia 73.9 68.5 50.1 29.6 4.7 6.6 -7.5 30.3 3.7 1.5 4.7 -9.0 28.1 2.0
Cape Verde 30.9 20.4 15.2 11.5 3.1 -1.2b -2.9 0.3 .. 0.8 -3.2b -4.9 -1.5 ..
Central African Republic 80.2 69.2 43.0 51.8 4.2 0.5 4.9 1.0 -3.2 1.4 -1.1 3.3 -0.6 -4.8
Chad 83.2 71.4 39.2 21.3 3.0 3.9 -0.1 9.2 2.3 -0.2 0.2 -3.6 5.6 -1.0
Comoros 77.6 71.8 40.4 49.1 2.3 -0.1 0.6 -5.2 -1.5 -0.5 -2.7 -2.0 -7.6 -4.0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 67.8 61.3 28.6 51.2 -2.0 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 -1.3 -5.3 -3.5 -3.3 -2.9 -4.2
Djibouti 82 76.8 3.1 3.7 2.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.2 -1.7 -1.6 -1.3 -1.7
Equatorial Guinea 74.8 68.4 61.9 4.4 -0.9 -1.5b -1.3 0.0 .. -2.6 -3.6b -0.8 -2.7 ..
Eritrea .. 76.3 .. 17.1 4.3 c 0.4b -1.0 17.4 ..  10.8c -3.2b -4.5 13.3 ..
Ethiopia .. 80.7 .. 47.5 8.5c 5.2 6.3 10.4 0.9  2.4c 2.5 3.6 7.7 -1.5
Gambia 82 77.7 22.2 32.4 -1.7 -0.1 25.1 -13.7 4.5 -5.3 -3.1 21.4 -16.2 1.6
Guinea 87.2 82.3 23.8 25.2 3.8 3.1 4.2 1.2 7.3 -0.1 1.2 2.3 -0.7 5.3
Guinea-Bissau 85.4 81.8 44.6 60.8 2.2 2.7 9.7 6.8 -2.4 -1.0 -0.4 6.3 3.6 -5.3
Haiti 67.8 60.2 35.8 30.8 -1.4 -0.1 -1.1 -0.5 -0.2 -3.3 -1.7 -2.7 -2.1 -1.7
Kiribati 30 25.6 18.6 9.7 4.3 2.6 6.8 3.3 0.0 2.9 0.7 4.9 1.5 -1.7
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 78.2 75.8 61.2 46.8 1.1 1.8b 4.6 -1.2 .. -0.5 0.0b 0.8 -3.9 ..
Lesotho 41.3 38.4 20.8 16.2 2.4 0.9b 8.6 0.0 .. 0.8 0.8b 9.2 0.2 ..
Liberia 72.4 65.5 53.4 65.2 -2.5 0.3 3.3 -0.6 2.8 -3.3 -1.9 1.5 -3.3 0.1
Madagascar 78.1 72.5 28.6 27.6 0.9 2.7 7.1 4.4 2.7 -2.1 -0.2 4.2 1.6 0.0
Malawi 86.6 81.3 45.0 38.3 4.0 -2.0 14.7 -12.5 5.2 2.7 -4.5 11.8 -14.7 2.7
Maldives 32.6 19.1 14.9 8.4 2.5 -1.8 -17.7 -9.3 -1.9 -0.2 -3.3 -18.9 -10.7 -3.4
Mali 85.8 78.7 47.8 38.3 3.5 5.0b -1.1 0.5 .. -0.1 0.3b -2.1 -2.4 ..
Mauritania 55.2 51.8 37.5 25.6 1.1 1.3b -0.6 -2.4 .. -1.4 -1.6b -3.4 -5.3 ..
Mozambique 83.4 80.3 37.1 21.5 3.0 7.7 5.0 27.3 -0.5 -0.4 5.1 2.5 24.5 -2.7
Myanmar 73.3 68.9 57.3 52.6 6.0 5.3 6.8 3.9 0.0 4.5 4.4 5.9 3.0 -0.9
Nepal 93.6 92.8 50.6 38.1 2.3 3.1 3.8 2.1 1.8 -0.2 1.0 1.7 0.1 -0.1
Niger 89.8 86.8 35.3 43.2 2.7 5.2 -19.9 18.6 7.7 -0.7 1.6 -22.6 14.5 4.2
Rwanda 91.7 90.1 43.6 41.8 -8.3 2.8 -0.5 6.4 1.1 -4.1 0.6 -2.0 4.3 -0.8
Samoa 42.1 30.8 20.5 13.0 1.1 1.3 2.9 1.7 0.0 0.2 0.6 2.3 0.9 -0.7
Sao Tome and Principe 71.4 61.8 27.6 17.7 6.6 1.5 1.1 0.3 0.0 4.6 -0.2 -0.6 -1.4 -1.6
Senegal 76.8 72.4 19.4 16.3 1.2 -0.3 2.3 16.1 -16.6 -1.5 -2.9 -0.3 13.1 -18.6
Sierra Leone 67.5 60.1 39.6 47.2 -1.0 11.8 7.8 12.7 17.4 -1.2 7.2 3.3 8.8 13.4
Solomon Islands 76.7 71.5 45.5 44.5 3.7 3.1 8.8 4.4 0.0 0.8 0.5 6.1 1.9 -2.4
Somalia 75.3 69.3 69.3 60.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sudan 69.5 57.4 33.8 45.8 7.7 2.6 -3.9 2.5 1.5 4.9 0.5 -5.8 0.4 -0.6
Timor-Leste 83.6 81.2 29.5 32.2 2.8 2.9b 4.8 0.0 .. 0.4 -1.0b 0.3 -4.2 ..
Togo 65.5 57.3 36.6 43.1 4.6 3.4 0.9 3.9 0.9 1.8 0.5 -1.8 1.1 -1.7
Tuvalu .. .. 25.6 16.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 84.5 78.1 52.8 32.2 2.0 0.8 0.2 -0.9 -1.3 -1.4 -2.4 -3.0 -4.0 -4.3
United Rep. of Tanzania 84.4 78.7 44.2 44.5 0.8 1.9 7.6 7.3 -3.4 -2.3 -0.7 4.9 4.6 -5.8
Vanuatu 42.9 34.0 20.0 14.4 -0.6 2.5 14.7 0.8 -0.1 -3.3 -0.1 11.7 -1.7 -2.6
Yemen 60.1 46.4 25.7 12.6 2.1 3.8 0.9 2.5 8.3 -2.4 0.8 -2.1 -0.5 5.2
Zambia 74.4 67.0 20.6 21.8 2.0 2.6 3.8 -1.6 1.2 -0.6 0.7 2.0 -3.4 -0.6
LDCs 74.9 68.4 35.7 28.0 4.0 3.1 1.6 5.8 1.5 -1.0 0.7 -0.7 3.4 -0.8
All developing countries 61.1 53.0 14.8 10.3 1.3 3.4 4.2 3.3 2.4 0.5 2.0 2.8 1.9 1.1
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on FAO, FAOSTAT online data, January 2008; UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2007.
a Index, base year 1999–2001.
b 2000–2005  for Bhutan, Cape verde, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Lao People's Dem. Rep., Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania and Timor-Leste. 
c 1993–1996 for Eritrea and Ethiopia.
142 The Least Developed Countries Report 2008
4.  Food production, total and per capita: Average annual growth rates
(Per cent)
Country Total Food Productiona Net per capita food Productiona
1990–1996 2000–2006 2004 2005 2006 1990–1996 2000–2006 2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Angola 4.5 7.2 7.1 6.3 2.3 1.3 4.2 4.0 3.3 -0.5
Bangladesh 1.0 2.3 -2.2 9.1 5.7 -1.2 0.4 -4.0 7.1 3.8
Benin 5.1 2.7 5.7 -1.5 -6.2 1.4 -0.6 2.3 -4.6 -9.0
Bhutan 2.8 1.4b 2.6 0.0 .. 1.3 -1.5b -0.3 -2.8 ..
Burkina Faso 4.1 5.3 -12.0 14.3 2.5 1.1 2.0 -14.8 10.8 -0.6
Burundi -1.8 0.2 -4.2 -0.2 0.1 -3.5 -3.2 -7.6 -3.9 -3.5
Cambodia 4.8 6.7 -6.8 29.5 3.8 1.5 4.8 -8.4 27.3 2.0
Cape Verde 3.1 -1.2b -2.9 0.3 .. 0.8 -3.2b -4.9 -1.5 ..
Central African Republic 4.2 1.3 5.2 1.2 -3.2 1.4 -0.3 3.5 -0.5 -4.7
Chad 2.9 3.7 -5.0 11.3 1.2 -0.3 0.0 -8.3 7.6 -2.1
Comoros 2.3 -0.1 0.6 -5.2 -1.5 -0.5 -2.7 -2.0 -7.6 -4.0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo -2.0 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 -1.3 -5.3 -3.5 -3.3 -2.9 -4.3
Djibouti 2.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.2 -1.7 -1.6 -1.3 -1.7
Equatorial Guinea -0.1 -1.0b 1.8 0.0 .. -2.6 -3.6b -0.8 -2.7 ..
Eritrea 4.3c 0.4b -1.0 17.6 .. 3.1c -3.2b -4.5 13.3 ..
Ethiopia 8.6c 5.5 7.7 10.5 -0.2 5.2c 2.8 5.0 7.7 -2.7
Gambia -1.7 -0.1 25.2 -13.8 4.5 -5.3 -3.2 21.5 -16.2 1.6
Guinea 3.9 3.5 4.4 1.1 7.8 0.1 1.6 2.5 -0.8 5.8
Guinea-Bissau 2.2 2.7 9.8 6.9 -2.5 -0.9 -0.4 6.5 3.7 -5.3
Haiti -1.2 0.1 -1.1 -0.4 -0.1 -3.1 -1.5 -2.7 -2.0 -1.7
Kiribati 4.3 2.6 6.8 3.3 0.0 2.9 0.7 4.9 1.5 -1.7
Lao People's Dem. Republic 2.0 2.3b 3.3 -1.8 .. -0.5 0.0b 0.8 -3.9 ..
Lesotho 2.3 0.9b 9.1 0.0 .. 0.8 0.8b 9.2 0.2 ..
Liberia -2.0 -0.1 2.1 0.1 3.5 -2.8 -2.3 0.4 -2.6 0.7
Madagascar 1.0 2.7 7.3 5.1 1.9 -1.9 -0.1 4.4 2.2 -0.8
Malawi 4.3 -1.9 15.9 -13.6 6.2 2.9 -4.4 13.0 -15.7 3.6
Maldives 2.5 -1.8 -17.7 -9.3 -1.9 -0.2 -3.3 -18.9 -10.7 -3.4
Mali 2.6 3.4b 1.0 0.6 .. -0.1 0.3b -2.1 -2.4 ..
Mauritania 1.1 1.3b -0.6 -2.4 .. -1.4 -1.6b -3.4 -5.3 ..
Mozambique 3.0 7.8 4.4 28.9 -0.5 -0.4 5.2 1.9 26.1 -2.6
Myanmar 6.0 5.5 6.9 4.0 0.0 4.5 4.6 6.1 3.1 -0.9
Nepal 2.4 3.1 3.7 2.2 1.8 -0.2 1.0 1.6 0.1 -0.2
Niger 2.7 5.3 -19.9 18.7 7.8 -0.8 1.7 -22.6 14.6 4.2
Rwanda -8.1 2.8 -0.8 6.5 1.0 -4.0 0.6 -2.4 4.4 -0.9
Samoa 1.1 1.3 3.0 1.7 0.0 0.2 0.6 2.3 0.9 -0.7
Sao Tome and Principe 6.6 1.5 1.1 0.3 0.0 4.6 -0.2 -0.6 -1.4 -1.6
Senegal 1.3 -0.6 2.4 17.2 -17.1 -1.4 -3.1 -0.2 14.3 -19.2
Sierra Leone -1.0 12.3 8.5 13.4 17.9 -1.3 7.7 3.9 9.4 13.9
Solomon Islands 3.7 3.1 8.9 4.4 0.0 0.8 0.5 6.2 1.9 -2.4
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sudan 8.1 2.4 -4.4 1.9 1.5 5.4 0.4 -6.2 -0.2 -0.5
Timor-Leste 2.4 3.2b 5.7 0.0 .. 0.4 -1.0b 0.3 -4.2 ..
Togo 4.6 3.9 1.2 6.5 5.9 1.8 1.0 -1.5 3.7 3.1
Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 1.5 0.7 -0.3 -1.2 -0.7 -1.9 -2.5 -3.5 -4.3 -3.7
United Republic of Tanzania 0.7 1.3 5.2 6.3 -2.4 -2.4 -1.3 2.5 3.7 -4.8
Vanuatu -0.6 2.5 14.7 0.8 -0.1 -3.3 -0.1 11.7 -1.7 -2.5
Yemen 1.9 3.8 0.5 2.3 7.8 -2.6 0.7 -2.4 -0.7 4.7
Zambia 2.5 1.8 3.4 -5.3 1.4 -0.1 -0.1 1.5 -7.1 -0.4
LDCs 4.0 3.1 1.3 5.9 1.5 -1.1 0.8 -1.0 3.5 -0.8
All developing countries 1.4 3.3 3.7 3.6 2.3 0.6 1.9 2.2 2.2 1.0
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on FAO, FAOSTAT online data, January 2008.
a Index, base year 1999–2001.
b 2000–2005  for Bhutan, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Lao People's Dem. Rep., Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania and Timor-Leste. 
c 1993–1996 for Eritrea and Ethiopia.
143Statistical Annex: Data on the Least Developed Countries
5.  The manufacturing sector: Shares in GDP and average annual growth rates
(Per cent)
Country Share in GDP Annual average growth rates
1980 1990 2006 1980–
1990
1990–
2000
2000–
2006
2003 2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan 21.7 20.6 14.7 1.1 -5.8 9.2 -2.9 21.7 19.5 4.5
Angola 9.4 4.9 3.8 -1.7 -2.8 13.5 10.5 7.3 19.1 17.1
Bangladesh 16.6 13.4 16.6 3.2 6.9 7.3 7.1 8.4 10.5 3.1
Benin 8.4 7.5 8.3 3.7 5.6 2.2 0.7 -2.1 5.3 -4.6
Bhutan 2.9 8.4 7.6 12.9 8.9 4.0 2.1 5.6 4.4 5.0
Burkina Faso 11.4 14.2 13.3 5.1 3.5 9.6 10.5 9.9 8.8 7.8
Burundi 9.0 16.8 13.2 5.7 -8.1 -4.1 -6.2 -6.2 -6.3 15.8
Cambodia 3.5 7.3 20.9 7.0 13.8 13.9 12.1 17.8 9.7 14.2
Cape Verde 4.9 7.9 4.6 8.2 7.9 1.5 0.0 10.1 5.8 5.5
Central African Republic 8.8 9.8 11.2 2.6 -0.1 2.1 2.2 2.0 -2.7 1.4
Chad 13.4 14.6 6.7 7.9 0.2 8.0 0.5 -11.5 17.3 17.7
Comoros 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.8 1.2 1.5 2.1 3.1 1.4 1.8
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 8.7 9.5 5.4 2.7 -5.2 4.5 9.4 9.4 4.3 4.6
Djibouti 9.7 3.6 2.8 2.1 -1.0 0.6 -1.0 -5.4 3.9 6.8
Equatorial Guinea 1.3 1.6 5.0 2.8 4.7 70.6 6.4 19.3 -8.0 17.9
Eritrea .. .. 10.4 .. 8.9a 0.1 3.6 -2.2 -21.6 26.9
Ethiopia .. .. 4.6 .. 5.8a 4.4 0.8 6.5 8.0 8.1
Gambia 6.6 5.6 5.3 4.2 1.4 7.0 6.4 5.9 7.4 6.6
Guinea 4.5 4.6 4.1 3.2 4.5 2.8 -4.0 3.0 5.8 4.1
Guinea-Bissau 11.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Haiti 19.1 15.5 7.8 -1.6 -6.3 0.3 0.4 -2.5 1.6 1.4
Kiribati 1.2 1.2 0.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Lao People's Dem. Republic 9.6 10.0 20.1 3.7 11.7 9.9 6.3 13.7 9.0 4.0
Lesotho 6.3 12.2 17.4 13.6 6.6 3.3 5.7 2.1 -8.0 10.3
Liberia 9.5 11.2 10.2 -2.2 -6.8 6.1 -11.7 97.5 7.7 -11.4
Madagascar 17.2 11.6 15.4 -1.7 2.5 1.9 14.6 6.5 3.1 4.6
Malawi 17.6 19.5 11.6 3.6 0.2 2.7 3.2 6.9 11.9 1.9
Maldives 7.6 7.5 6.6 11.8 8.0 3.8 4.5 2.7 -9.9 8.8
Mali 4.3 8.1 9.0 8.8 7.5 5.3 -5.6 19.0 0.3 3.5
Mauritania 5.6 9.0 5.7 4.3 5.0 -1.1 -0.6 10.4 -11.6 26.7
Mozambique 22.0 11.7 13.0 -5.3 8.2 12.9 15.4 10.2 10.7 4.7
Myanmar 9.5 7.8 9.3 -0.1 7.9 14.7 22.1 3.9 17.5 7.6
Nepal 4.3 6.0 7.5 9.3 8.9 0.0 2.0 1.7 2.6 2.2
Niger 3.8 7.3 6.5 -1.1 0.5 5.0 6.4 6.5 3.3 3.6
Rwanda 15.8 15.8 9.2 1.3 -2.4 4.5 1.5 6.2 4.4 3.3
Samoa 19.2 19.2 15.2 0.9 -1.1 2.7 8.7 -6.0 -0.9 12.1
Sao Tome and Principe 5.4 4.3 3.9 -0.5 1.7 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.2 5.5
Senegal 12.4 15.0 16.2 4.3 3.7 4.6 4.0 2.7 8.4 3.1
Sierra Leone 4.3 3.7 2.5 -4.0 -7.3 6.7 -5.1 -1.2 23.8 -7.9
Solomon Islands 4.1 3.7 5.9 3.1 5.9 1.3 7.9 7.3 5.4 4.8
Somalia 4.7 2.0 2.5 -0.2 0.0 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.6
Sudan 7.4 8.7 8.3 2.9 4.7 8.8 10.0 7.0 6.7 12.9
Timor-Leste .. 2.9 2.6 .. 0.9 -0.1 0.0 1.8 0.0 -25.0
Togo 8.0 6.6 6.1 -0.3 -1.4 7.6 23.9 6.6 3.6 -6.7
Tuvalu 1.3 3.1 3.4 13.2 -2.3 5.2 -0.3 5.4 2.5 0.2
Uganda 7.0 6.4 9.0 2.8 13.4 6.0 2.6 11.7 4.6 5.5
United Republic of Tanzania 9.9 8.3 6.9 -0.7 3.7 7.6 8.7 8.3 8.9 4.1
Vanuatu 4.1 5.9 3.5 11.8 -2.6 -1.5 0.7 9.7 0.2 3.6
Yemen .. 8.3 6.4 .. 8.6 4.9 3.9 6.8 8.8 0.3
Zambia 18.3 36.1 11.2 4.1 0.8 5.5 6.3 5.9 3.7 7.1
LDCs 11.8 10.5 9.8 2.3 4.2 7.4 7.3 7.6 8.5 5.9
  African LDCs and Haiti 10.7 9.7 7.5 1.9 2.4 6.8 6.5 6.8 6.1 7.8
  Asian LDCs 13.9 12.1 13.8 2.9 6.6 8.0 8.1 8.6 11.0 4.1
  Island LDCs 7.4 6.4 5.9 5.7 4.0 2.1 3.7 3.5 -1.2 5.7
Other developing countries 22.1 22.5 24.0 5.3 6.8 7.4 7.8 9.8 8.0 8.3
All developing countries 21.7 22.0 23.6 5.2 6.8 7.4 7.8 9.7 8.0 8.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
a 1993–2000 for Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
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6.  Gross capital formation: Shares in GDP and average annual growth rates
(Per cent)
Country Share in GDP Annual average growth rate
1980 1990 2006 1980–1990 1990–2000 2000–2005 2003 2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan 13.2 13.4 17.3 -1.6 -1.4 23.0 29.0 45.5 39.7 -9.8
Angola 20.4 11.7 13.1 -6.5 9.5 3.8 4.1 -20.0 -0.2 98.5
Bangladesh 23.2 16.4 25.6 2.7 9.8 8.6 9.2 9.2 7.8 9.4
Benin 22.2 14.2 21.0 -3.0 5.3 6.0 15.6 8.9 -16.1 32.0
Bhutan 31.2 36.3 53.5 11.8 6.9 7.4 -0.9 14.8 -12.0 15.5
Burkina Faso 26.6 18.8 24.5 5.2 6.6 4.1 4.1 8.6 -0.8 10.8
Burundi 13.9 15.8 23.2 4.1 -11.5 22.5 5.4 9.7 39.0 58.3
Cambodia 9.3 8.3 19.3 5.5 15.2 10.7 41.7 -22.9 29.0 -8.0
Cape Verde 41.9 43.6 38.7 4.3 6.3 12.5 1.1 23.7 8.9 12.1
Central African Republic 7.0 12.3 5.7 10.0 -1.3 -3.1 -37.9 2.9 48.0 -2.7
Chad 8.2 7.2 23.6 5.9 5.5 24.0 -6.8 -11.2 19.1 12.6
Comoros 33.2 20.2 13.8 -3.9 -2.5 -0.9 1.1 -11.9 -3.8 29.0
Dem. Republic of the Congo 24.9 25.0 16.7 -1.9 -5.5 -0.1 7.9 8.7 10.5 10.0
Djibouti 14.4 27.1 19.7 1.4 -4.8 4.2 -8.3 3.5 7.3 1.4
Equatorial Guinea 11.9 54.4 33.2 10.0 55.0 15.0 101.7 -1.2 40.7 -7.9
Eritrea .. .. 18.1 .. 8.7a -1.5 -0.2 -13.9 -6.8 -2.7
Ethiopia .. .. 19.8 .. 7.9a 7.4 -6.2 4.0 32.1 1.2
Gambia 14.5 17.9 24.1 9.1 2.4 9.2 -2.3 50.3 -0.5 -1.9
Guinea 13.4 17.0 21.5 5.2 2.5 -1.0 -23.6 13.9 27.6 15.8
Guinea-Bissau 28.2 14.7 15.7 6.2 -3.0 -2.7 5.4 9.0 14.5 -4.0
Haiti 17.9 14.3 28.6 -0.1 3.4 2.3 3.1 -3.2 1.4 17.9
Kiribati 44.0 93.1 43.6 5.6 -0.4 1.7 0.0 -4.3 4.5 0.0
Lao People's Dem. Republic 7.4 11.3 30.7 10.7 6.1 25.5 39.6 32.1 8.0 3.2
Lesotho 42.5 53.2 41.1 6.1 1.5 0.3 0.0 -8.6 1.3 19.0
Liberia 26.8 10.8 12.3 -15.6 2.7 13.9 28.0 41.8 37.0 -17.1
Madagascar 23.5 17.0 21.7 -2.0 1.0 14.9 61.5 22.0 0.0 18.0
Malawi 22.2 17.1 10.5 -3.5 0.9 -5.5 3.5 -4.2 -11.9 1.9
Maldives 31.5 31.5 55.6 11.9 8.0 21.4 45.2 23.2 36.1 13.1
Mali 18.5 22.2 22.5 6.0 0.5 11.1 55.7 -32.6 42.0 7.5
Mauritania 26.8 19.5 29.0 -5.9 7.6 18.3 29.6 77.4 1.4 -25.6
Mozambique 10.2 19.7 24.8 -2.9 12.1 19.8 3.2 34.6 25.8 31.8
Myanmar 21.5 13.4 15.2 -4.0 15.3 19.6 6.9 25.8 24.6 26.0
Nepal 18.3 18.4 30.3 5.9 7.0 6.8 10.5 5.9 12.5 6.8
Niger 31.5 12.8 22.8 -7.3 11.0 10.8 6.6 -14.1 52.2 -13.1
Rwanda 19.6 13.9 20.8 3.0 1.1 0.0 -35.0 18.0 16.3 6.3
Samoa 27.6 22.9 9.8 0.2 -4.7 -3.0 -2.9 -5.0 -2.6 -2.2
Sao Tome and Principe 16.8 29.5 67.6 -4.7 2.6 11.6 14.6 1.8 1.6 107.0
Senegal 9.3 11.4 25.6 5.1 4.6 8.5 46.6 -0.5 12.3 3.5
Sierra Leone 16.1 10.0 16.5 -0.3 -20.7 .. .. 63.9 38.4 -7.3
Solomon Islands 22.0 20.1 19.6 3.1 1.9 3.0 6.4 8.0 5.0 5.0
Somalia 9.1 23.6 20.3 3.5 -4.9 2.7 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.4
Sudan 23.1 7.3 23.8 -4.0 13.0 11.9 22.3 -7.0 13.4 13.9
Timor-Leste - 35.0 19.0 .. 0.3 -7.9 -17.8 -8.5 2.4 -2.3
Togo 36.3 25.1 20.8 -2.7 0.7 6.7 5.3 2.8 5.5 10.4
Tuvalu 33.1 93.1 55.7 7.1 1.4 4.7 3.7 4.9 1.5 1.0
Uganda 6.2 14.7 24.8 10.9 9.1 12.8 13.7 17.4 13.0 16.1
United Republic of Tanzania 19.1 35.0 22.5 5.6 -1.8 10.1 6.0 9.1 9.5 4.2
Vanuatu 28.9 43.2 20.2 7.1 -2.3 0.1 -4.0 6.8 3.7 2.2
Yemen - 15.2 21.5 .. 9.0 4.6 13.4 1.0 -14.8 26.4
Zambia 23.3 17.3 25.9 -4.3 5.1 9.6 18.9 -1.6 2.1 11.0
LDCs 20.5 15.6 22.2 -0.4 7.5 10.0 14.5 5.4 13.3 13.0
  African LDCs and Haiti 19.3 15.3 21.2 -0.8 6.1 9.6 17.8 1.1 15.8 13.9
  Asian LDCs 22.4 15.7 23.7 0.3 9.7 10.6 11.0 10.5 10.5 11.9
  Island LDCs 30.3 33.0 32.5 3.8 3.0 9.9 8.0 14.5 14.4 13.1
Other developing countries 26.9 26.1 27.5 2.7 5.5 8.2 9.2 12.3 9.9 9.3
All developing countries 27.3 25.7 27.3 2.6 5.5 8.2 9.3 12.1 10.0 9.4
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from United Nations/DESA Statistics Division.
a 1993–2000 for Eritrea and Ethiopia.
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7.  Indicators on area and population
Country
Area Population
Land areaa
(000km2)
% of arable 
land and 
land under 
permanent
crops
% of 
land area 
covered
by forest
Density
(pop/km2)
Total 
(million)
Urban
(%)
Activity ratec
(2006)
(%)
2006 2005b 2005b 2006 2006 2006 Male Female Total
Afghanistan 652.1 12.3 1.3 40 26.1 29.6 88 39 64
Angola 1 246.7 2.9 47.4 13 16.6 37.6 92 74 82
Bangladesh 130.2 64.6 6.7 1109 156.0 23.5 86 53 70
Benin 110.6 27.3 21.3 79 8.8 46.6 86 54 70
Bhutan 47.0 3.8 68.0 14 0.6 32.1 79 49 64
Burkina Faso 273.8 17.9 24.8 50 14.4 18.0 89 78 83
Burundi 25.7 52.0 5.9 305 8.2 10.5 93 92 93
Cambodia 176.5 21.8 59.2 81 14.2 20.6 80 74 77
Cape Verde 4.0 12.2 20.7 129 0.5 58.4 76 34 54
Central African Republic 623.0 3.2 36.5 7 4.3 42.5 89 70 79
Chad 1 259.2 3.4 9.5 8 10.5 25.1 77 66 71
Comoros 1.9 71.5 3.0 275 0.8 36.9 87 58 72
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 2 267.1 3.4 58.9 26 60.6 32.6 .. .. ..
Djibouti 23.2 0.0 0.2 35 0.8 83.7 83 53 68
Equatorial Guinea 28.1 7.8 58.2 18 0.5 52.9 91 51 70
Eritrea 101.0 6.3 15.4 45 4.7 20.7 90 58 74
Ethiopia 1 096.3 12.7 11.9 73 81.0 16.1 89 71 80
Gambia 11.3 35.5 47.1 155 1.7 24.5 86 59 72
Guinea 245.7 7.6 27.4 37 9.2 39.0 87 79 83
Guinea-Bissau 28.1 19.6 73.7 58 1.6 36.1 93 61 77
Haiti 27.6 39.9 3.8 314 9.4 36.1 83 56 69
Kiribati 0.7 45.7 2.7 138 0.1 .. .. .. ..
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 230.8 4.7 69.9 25 5.8 23.3 81 54 67
Lesotho 30.4 11.0 0.3 59 2.0 16.5 72 45 57
Liberia 96.3 6.3 32.7 35 3.6 45.5 83 55 69
Madagascar 581.5 6.1 22.1 33 19.2 27.2 86 79 83
Malawi 94.1 29.1 36.2 140 13.6 17.1 89 86 87
Maldives 0.3 43.3 3.0 1 123 0.3 33.9 72 50 61
Mali 1 220.2 4.0 10.3 11 12.0 40.0 83 73 78
Mauritania 1 025.2 0.5 0.3 3 3.0 67.9 84 54 69
Mozambique 784.1 5.9 24.5 26 21.0 37.6 83 84 84
Myanmar 657.6 16.7 49.0 78 48.4 32.9 86 68 77
Nepal 143.0 17.4 25.4 193 27.6 16.3 78 50 64
Niger 1 266.7 11.4 1.0 11 13.7 25.0 95 71 84
Rwanda 24.7 59.8 19.5 375 9.5 23.0 84 80 82
Samoa 2.8 31.8 60.4 66 0.2 22.7 77 39 59
Sao Tome and Principe 1.0 58.3 28.5 167 0.2 39.3 75 30 52
Senegal 192.5 13.5 45.0 62 12.1 51.2 82 56 68
Sierra Leone 71.6 9.5 38.5 79 5.7 40.5 94 56 75
Solomon Islands 28.0 2.8 77.6 17 0.5 17.6 82 54 69
Somalia 627.3 2.2 11.4 14 8.4 36.7 95 59 77
Sudan 2 376.0 8.3 28.4 16 37.7 40.9 72 24 48
Timor-Leste 14.9 12.8 53.7 69 1.1 7.1 83 55 70
Togo 54.4 48.4 7.1 116 6.4 36.4 90 50 70
Tuvalu 0.0 66.7 33.3 403 0.0 .. .. .. ..
Uganda 197.1 38.6 18.4 152 29.9 12.5 86 80 83
United Republic of Tanzania 883.6 11.7 39.8 45 39.5 38.1 .. .. ..
Vanuatu 12.2 8.6 36.1 18 0.2 23.5 88 80 84
Yemen 528.0 3.1 1.0 41 21.7 26.6 .. .. ..
Zambia 743.4 7.1 57.1 16 11.7 37.4 91 66 78
LDCs 20 267.3 8.2 27.4 38 785.4 27.9 85 61 73.3
  African LDCs and Haiti 17 636.2 7.3 27.4 27 481.1 29.8 86 66 75.9
  Asian LDCs 2 565.1 14.3 26.5 117 300.4 25.0 85 56 70.3
  Island LDCs 66.2 11.4 56.2 59 3.9 26.3 81 51 66.5
Other developing countries 56 622.6 13.7 27.5 79 4 499.6 45.9 82 51 66.6
All developing countries 76 888.9 12.2 27.5 69 5 285.1 43.2 82 52.4 67.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on FAO, FAOSTAT online data, January 2008; UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, 2007; United 
Nations/DESA Population Division; ILO, online data, December 2007. 
a Country area excluding inland water; 
b Latest year available;
c   Economically active population, aged 15 years and older as percentage of total population aged 15 years and older.
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8.  Indicators on demography
Country
Under 5 
mortality
rate
Infant
mortality rate Average life expectancy at birth
Crude
birth 
rate
Crude
death 
rate
Per 1 000 live births Years Per 1 000 population
1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2006 1990 2006
Female Male Total
Afghanistan 260 257 168 165 .. .. .. .. 46.0 46.0 52 49 23 21
Angola 260 260 154 154 41.6 42.9 38.1 40.0 39.8 41.4 53 48 24 21
Bangladesh 149 69 100 52 55.4 64.8 54.7 63.0 55.1 63.9 35 26 12 8
Benin 185 148 111 88 54.3 55.8 51.7 54.2 53.0 55.0 47 41 15 12
Bhutan 166 70 107 63 .. 65.2a .. 61.8a 55.9 63.5a 38 20 14 8
Burkina Faso 206 204 123 122 49.2 49.3 45.9 47.7 47.5 48.5 49 45 17 15
Burundi 190 181 114 109 46.4 45.7 42.5 43.7 44.4 44.7 47 46 19 16
Cambodia 116 82 85 65 56.4 60.6 52.4 53.6 54.3 57.0 43 27 12 10
Cape Verde 60 34 45 25 68.0 73.9 62.7 67.7 65.3 70.7 39 30 8 5
Central African Republic 173 175 114 115 50.7 40.1 45.1 38.8 47.8 39.4 42 37 16 19
Chad 201 209 120 124 47.9 45.1 44.1 43.0 46.0 44.0 48 46 16 16
Comoros 120 68 88 51 57.4 64.0 54.6 61.3 56.0 62.6 41 35 11 7
Dem. Republic of the Congo 205 205 129 129 47.3 45.1 43.8 43.0 45.5 44.0 49 50 18 19
Djibouti 175 130 116 86 52.3 54.6 49.2 52.3 50.8 53.4 42 30 14 12
Equatorial Guinea 170 206 103 124 47.5 42.6 43.8 42.0 45.6 42.3 42 39 19 16
Eritrea 147 74 88 48 50.6 56.8 46.0 53.1 48.2 54.9 41 40 16 10
Ethiopia 204 123 122 77 46.5 43.4 43.5 41.9 45.0 42.7 47 39 18 14
Gambia 153 113 103 84 51.5 58.2 48.5 55.5 50.0 56.8 43 37 15 11
Guinea 235 161 139 98 48.1 54.3 46.9 53.8 47.5 54.1 47 41 19 13
Guinea-Bissau 240 200 142 119 44.1 46.5 40.7 43.8 42.3 45.1 50 50 23 19
Haiti 152 80 105 60 51.1 53.3 46.8 52.0 48.9 52.6 37 29 13 10
Kiribati 88 64 65 47 59.1 66.0a 54.6 59.8a 56.8 62.8a 36 25 9 6
Lao People's Dem. Republic 163 75 120 59 .. 63.1a .. 60.6a .. 61.9a 43 28 13 8
Lesotho 101 132 81 102 59.5 35.9 55.4 34.5 57.4 35.2 37 30 11 18
Liberia 235 235 157 157 44.1 43.3 41.3 41.7 42.7 42.5 50 50 21 19
Madagascar 168 115 103 72 52.2 57.1 49.8 54.6 51.0 55.8 44 38 15 10
Malawi 221 120 131 76 47.3 40.2 44.1 40.8 45.7 40.5 50 42 18 16
Maldives 111 30 78 26 59.2 67.4 61.8 67.9 60.5 67.6 39 23 9 6
Mali 250 217 140 119 46.9 49.3 45.1 48.0 46.0 48.6 52 48 20 16
Mauritania 133 125 85 78 50.7 55.3 47.5 52.1 49.1 53.7 40 34 11 8
Mozambique 235 138 158 96 44.9 42.3 41.6 41.4 43.2 41.8 44 42 20 19
Myanmar 130 104 91 74 58.2 64.1 54.1 58.3 56.1 61.1 27 19 11 10
Nepal 142 59 99 46 54.3 63.2 54.8 62.2 54.6 62.7 38 29 13 8
Niger 320 253 191 148 40.2 45.0 40.0 44.9 40.1 44.9 56 50 22 15
Rwanda 176 160 106 98 33.4 45.7 29.0 42.6 31.2 44.1 49 43 31 18
Samoa 50 28 40 23 67.9 73.9 64.7 67.7 66.3 70.7 34 27 7 6
Sao Tome and Principe 100 96 65 63 62.5 64.6 60.7 62.4 61.6 63.5 38 34 10 8
Senegal 149 116 72 60 54.3 57.7 51.9 55.2 53.1 56.5 43 36 13 9
Sierra Leone 290 270 169 159 40.2 42.8 37.4 40.0 38.8 41.4 48 47 26 23
Solomon Islands 121 73 86 55 61.5 63.7 60.3 62.2 60.9 62.9 40 32 11 8
Somalia 203 145 121 90 43.3 49.0 40.0 46.5 41.6 47.7 46 44 22 18
Sudan 120 89 74 61 54.3 58.1 51.2 55.3 52.7 56.7 41 32 14 11
Timor-Leste 177 55 133 47 47.0 57.9 45.3 55.6 46.1 56.7 43 42 18 10
Togo 149 108 88 69 59.6 57.0 55.3 53.3 57.4 55.1 44 38 12 10
Tuvalu 54 38 42 31 .. .. .. .. .. .. 28 23 10 9
Uganda 160 134 93 78 47.7 50.6 43.9 49.3 45.7 50.0 49 47 16 14
United Republic of Tanzania 161 118 102 74 55.8 46.7 51.3 46.0 53.5 46.3 44 41 15 14
Vanuatu 62 36 48 30 65.0 71.4 62.0 67.7 63.5 69.5 37 30 7 5
Yemen 139 100 98 75 55.3 63.2 53.8 60.4 54.5 61.7 51 39 13 8
Zambia 180 182 101 102 47.5 37.9 44.1 38.9 45.8 38.4 44 41 16 20
LDCs 180 142 113 90 51.1 53.5 48.6 51.6 49.8 52.5 42 36 16 13
All Developing countries 103 79 70 54 63.4 64.7 59.4 61.2 61.3 62.9 29 23 9 8
Source: UNICEF, The State of the World's Children 2008, February 2008; World Bank, World Development Indicators, online, February 2008.
a 2002 for Bhutan, Kiribati and Lao's People's Democratic Republic.
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9.  Indicators on health
Country Low
birthweight
infanta
Skilled
attendant
at delivery 
Percentage of 1-year-old 
children immunized against:
Estimated
number of 
children living 
with HIV 
Estimated
number of 
people living 
with HIV
Estimated
adult HIV 
prevalence
rate
(%) (%) (%) (thousands) (%)
TB DPT3b Measles (0-14 years) (0+ years) (15+ years)
2006c 2006c 2006 2005 2005 end 2005
Afghanistan .. 14 90 77 68 .. <1.0 <0.1
Angola 12 45 65 44 48 35 320 3.7
Bangladesh 22 20 96 88 81 .. 11 <0.1
Benin 16 78 99 93 89 9.8 87 1.8
Bhutan 15 56 92 95 90 .. <0.5 <0.1
Burkina Faso 16 54 99 95 88 17 150 2
Burundi 11 34 84 74 75 20 150 3.3
Cambodia 11 44 87 80 78 .. 130 1.6
Cape Verde 13 89 70 72 65 .. .. ..
Central African Republic 13 53 70 40 35 24 250 10.7
Chad 22 14 40 20 23 16 180 3.5
Comoros 25 62 84 69 66 <0.1 <0.5 <0.1
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 12 61 87 77 73 120 1 000 3.2
Djibouti 10 61 88 72 67 1.2 15 3.1
Equatorial Guinea 13 65 73 33 51 <1.0 8.9 3.2
Eritrea 14 28 99 97 95 6.6 59 2.4
Ethiopia 20 6 72 72 63 .. .. ..
Gambia 20 57 99 95 95 1.2 20 2.4
Guinea 12 38 90 71 67 7 85 1.5
Guinea-Bissau 24 39 87 77 60 3.2 32 3.8
Haiti 25 26 75 53 58 17 190 3.8
Kiribati 5 85 99 86 61 .. .. ..
Lao People's Dem. Republic 14 19 61 57 48 .. 3.7 0.1
Lesotho 13 55 96 83 85 18 270 23.2
Liberia .. 51 89 88 94 .. .. ..
Madagascar 17 51 72 61 59 1.6 49 0.5
Malawi 13 54 99 99 85 91 940 14.1
Maldives 22 84 99 98 97 .. .. ..
Mali 23 41 85 85 86 16 130 1.7
Mauritania .. 57 86 68 62 1.1 12 0.7
Mozambique 15 48 87 72 77 140 1 800 16.1
Myanmar 15 57 85 82 78 .. 360 1.3
Nepal 21 19 93 89 85 .. 75 0.5
Niger 13 33 64 39 47 8.9 79 1.1
Rwanda 6 39 98 99 95 27 190 3.1
Samoa 4 100 84 56 54 .. .. ..
Sao Tome and Principe 8 81 98 99 85 .. .. ..
Senegal 19 52 99 89 80 5 61 0.9
Sierra Leone 24 43 82 64 67 5.2 48 1.6
Solomon Islands 13 85 84 91 84 .. .. ..
Somalia 11 33 50 35 35 4.5 44 0.9
Sudan 31 87 77 78 73 30 350 1.6
Timor-Leste 12 18 72 67 64 .. .. ..
Togo 12 62 96 87 83 9.7 110 3.2
Tuvalu 5 100 99 97 84 .. .. ..
Uganda 12 42 85 80 89 110 1 000 6.7
United Republic of Tanzania 10 43 99 90 93 110 1 400 6.5
Vanuatu 6 88 92 85 99 .. .. ..
Yemen 32 27 70 85 80 .. .. ..
Zambia 12 43 94 80 84 130 1 100 17
LDCs 17 38 85 77 74 1 100 11 700 2.7
All developing countries 16 59 86 78 78 2 300 35 100 1.1
Source: UNICEF, The State of World's Children 2008; UNAIDS, 2006 Global Report.
a Less than 2,500 grams. b  Diphteria, Pertussis and Tetanus.  c  2006 or latest year available.
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10.  Indicators on nutrition and sanitation
Country Total food supply 
(Kcal/capita/day)
% of population using 
improved drinking water sources
% of population using 
adequate sanitation facilities
1990 2005a 2004a 2004a
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
Afghanistan .. .. 39 63 31 34 49 29
Angola 1 861 2 672 53 75 40 31 56 16
Bangladesh 2 037 2 194 74 82 72 39 51 35
Benin 2 232 2 592 67 78 57 33 59 11
Bhutan .. .. 62 86 60 70 65 70
Burkina Faso 2 471 2 467 61 94 54 13 42 6
Burundi 2 006 1 691 79 92 77 36 47 35
Cambodia 1 881 2 501 41 64 35 17 53 8
Cape Verde .. .. 80 86 73 43 61 19
Central African Republic 1 954 2 040 75 93 61 27 47 12
Chad 1 707 1 828 42 41 43 9 24 4
Comoros 2 065 2 076 86 92 82 33 41 29
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 2 229 1 367 46 82 29 30 42 25
Djibouti 1 887 3 080 73 76 59 82 88 50
Equatorial Guinea .. .. 43 45 42 53 60 46
Eritrea .. .. 60 74 57 9 32 3
Ethiopia .. 1 846 22 81 11 13 44 7
Gambia 2 511 2 400 82 95 77 53 72 46
Guinea 2 233 2 612 50 78 35 18 31 11
Guinea-Bissau 2 194 1 902 59 79 49 35 57 23
Haiti 1 794 1 863 54 52 56 30 57 14
Kiribati 2 643 2 818 65 77 53 40 59 22
Lao People's Dem. Rep. .. .. 51 79 43 30 67 20
Lesotho .. .. 79 92 76 37 61 32
Liberia 2 340 2 078 61 72 52 27 49 7
Madagascar 2 201 2 046 50 77 35 34 48 26
Malawi 1 972 2 231 73 98 68 61 62 61
Maldives 2 680 3 327 83 98 76 59 100 42
Mali .. .. 50 78 36 46 59 39
Mauritania .. .. 53 59 44 34 49 8
Mozambique 1 818 2 288 43 72 26 32 53 19
Myanmar 2 559 3 619 78 80 77 77 88 72
Nepal 2 358 2 503 90 96 89 35 62 30
Niger 2 122 2 061 46 80 36 13 43 4
Rwanda 1 854 1 936 74 92 69 42 56 38
Samoa 2 751 3 592 88 90 87 100 100 100
Sao Tome and Principe 2 454 3 418 79 89 73 25 32 20
Senegal 2 352 2 513 76 92 60 57 79 34
Sierra Leone 2 116 1 874 57 75 46 39 53 30
Solomon Islands 2 185 2 056 70 94 65 31 98 18
Somalia .. .. 29 32 27 26 48 14
Sudan 2 051 2 351 70 78 64 34 50 24
Timor-Leste .. .. 58 77 56 36 66 33
Togo 2 287 2 123 52 80 36 35 71 15
Tuvalu .. .. 100 94 92 90 93 84
Uganda 2 362 2 333 60 87 56 43 54 41
United Republic of Tanzania 2 175 2 230 62 85 49 47 53 43
Vanuatu 2 478 2 025 60 86 52 50 78 42
Yemen 1 950 1 926 67 71 65 43 86 28
Zambia 2 020 1 642 58 90 40 55 59 52
LDCs 2 127 2 251 59 79 51 36 55 29
All developing countries 2 571 2 772 80 92 70 50 73 33
Source: FAO, FAOSTAT online data, January 2008; UNICEF, The State of World's Children 2008.
a Latest year available.
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11.  Indicators on education and literacy, 2005a
(Per cent)
Country Adult literacy rate Youth literacy rate School enrolment ratio
Primaryb Secondaryc Tertiaryd
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Afghanistan 43.1 12.6 28.0 50.8 18.4 34.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.9 0.5 1.3
Angola 82.9 54.2 67.4 83.7 63.2 72.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.0 0.7 2.9
Bangladesh 53.9 40.8 47.5 67.2 60.3 63.6 87.4 90.5 88.9 40.2 41.8 41.0 7.7 4.1 6.0
Benin 47.9 23.3 34.7 59.2 33.2 45.3 85.7 69.4 77.7 22.8 11.3 17.1 4.8 1.2 3.0
Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. .. 74.0 73.8 73.9 35.5 35.6 35.5 4.0 2.1 3.1
Burkina Faso 31.4 16.6 23.6 40.4 26.5 33.0 49.0 39.0 44.1 12.9 9.1 11.0 3.0 1.4 2.2
Burundi 67.3 52.2 59.3 76.8 70.4 73.3 61.1 55.5 58.3 .. .. .. 3.4 1.3 2.3
Cambodia 84.7 64.1 73.6 87.9 78.9 83.4 97.1 95.9 96.5 26.0 21.9 23.9 4.8 2.3 3.6
Cape Verde 87.8 75.5 81.2 95.8 96.7 96.3 90.8 89.4 90.1 55.0 60.0 57.5 6.8 7.1 6.9
Central African Republic 64.8 33.5 48.6 70.3 46.9 58.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.0 0.6 1.6
Chad 40.8 12.8 25.7 55.7 23.2 37.6 70.9 49.5 60.2 15.7 5.2 10.5 2.0 .. 1.2
Comoros 63.0 49.0 56.0 .. .. .. 59.5 50.5 55.1 .. .. .. 2.6 2.0 2.3
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 80.9 54.1 67.2 78.0 63.1 70.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Djibouti .. .. 70.3 .. .. .. 37.9 30.9 34.4 25.9 17.0 21.5 2.5 1.8 2.2
Equatorial Guinea 93.4 80.5 87.0 94.8 94.9 94.9 91.4 82.7 87.1 .. .. 25.3 3.8 1.7 2.7
Eritrea .. .. 60.5 .. .. .. 52.4 44.8 48.6 28.9 19.2 24.1 1.8 .. 1.0
Ethiopia 50.0 22.8 35.9 62.2 38.5 49.9 62.6 57.4 60.0 33.4 21.6 27.5 4.0 1.3 2.7
Gambia .. .. 42.5 .. .. .. 72.3 72.5 72.4 47.2 39.5 43.3 1.8 .. 1.1
Guinea 42.6 18.1 29.5 58.7 33.7 46.6 75.3 63.3 69.4 32.1 17.2 24.8 4.8 1.1 3.0
Guinea-Bissau .. .. 44.8 .. .. .. 52.9 37.4 45.1 11.2 6.2 8.7 0.6 .. ..
Haiti 54.0 50.0 52.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 97.4 64.6 70.8 67.6 .. .. ..
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 77.0 60.9 68.7 82.6 74.7 78.5 85.0 80.3 82.7 38.4 32.7 35.6 9.2 6.6 7.9
Lesotho 73.7 90.3 82.2 .. .. .. 73.1 77.4 75.2 18.8 29.2 24.0 3.0 3.8 3.4
Liberia 58.3 45.7 51.9 65.3 69.5 67.4 74.5 57.9 66.2 21.7 12.5 17.1 17.7 13.4 15.6
Madagascar 76.5 65.3 70.7 72.7 68.2 70.2 93.1 92.8 92.9 .. .. .. 2.8 2.5 2.6
Malawi 75.0 54.0 64.5 82.0 71.0 76.5 90.5 95.1 92.8 24.4 21.7 23.1 0.5 .. ..
Maldives 96.2 96.4 96.3 98.0 98.3 98.2 97.5 97.7 97.6 61.2 67.1 64.1 .. .. ..
Mali 32.7 15.9 24.0 32.0 17.0 24.5 66.5 51.7 59.1 .. .. .. 4.2 1.9 3.0
Mauritania 59.5 43.4 51.2 67.7 55.5 61.3 74.7 78.8 76.7 16.4 14.6 15.6 4.7 1.6 3.2
Mozambique 62.0 31.0 46.5 60.0 37.0 48.5 80.3 72.9 76.6 7.8 6.1 7.0 1.9 1.0 1.5
Myanmar 93.9 86.4 89.9 95.7 93.4 94.5 98.0 100.0 99.0 43.3 42.8 43.0 8.7 15.4 11.9
Nepal 62.7 34.9 48.6 81.0 60.0 70.0 84.3 73.8 79.2 .. .. .. 7.9 3.2 5.6
Niger 42.9 15.1 28.7 52.4 23.2 36.5 49.0 35.6 42.5 10.4 6.9 8.6 1.8 0.6 1.1
Rwanda 71.4 59.8 64.9 78.5 76.9 77.6 71.7 74.9 73.3 .. .. .. 3.2 2.0 2.6
Samoa 98.9 98.3 98.6 99.3 99.4 99.3 90.2 90.6 90.4 62.0 70.5 66.0 7.7 7.2 7.5
Sao Tome and Principe 92.2 77.9 84.9 96.0 94.9 95.4 97.1 95.3 96.2 30.9 34.3 32.6 .. .. ..
Senegal 51.1 29.2 39.3 58.5 41.0 49.1 71.0 68.3 69.6 19.9 15.0 17.5 .. .. 5.5
Sierra Leone 46.7 24.2 34.8 59.6 37.4 47.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.0 1.2 2.1
Solomon Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. 64.2 62.2 63.3 29.1 25.2 27.3 .. .. ..
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sudan 71.1 51.8 60.9 84.6 71.4 77.2 44.9 37.2 41.2 .. .. .. 6.4 5.9 6.2
Timor-Leste .. .. .. .. .. .. 69.5 66.6 68.1 .. .. 22.8 8.6 10.8 9.6
Togo 68.7 38.5 53.2 83.7 63.6 74.4 83.4 71.6 77.5 30.0 14.4 22.2 6.0 1.2 3.6
Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 76.8 57.7 66.8 82.7 71.2 76.6 .. .. .. 15.6 14.0 14.8 4.3 2.7 3.5
United Republic of Tanzania 77.5 62.2 69.4 80.9 76.2 78.4 93.4 91.7 92.5 .. .. .. 2.0 0.9 1.4
Vanuatu .. .. .. .. .. .. 92.9 92.1 92.5 40.7 35.3 38.1 5.9 3.5 4.8
Yemen 73.1 34.7 54.1 90.7 58.9 75.2 85.2 62.0 73.8 45.6 20.7 33.5 13.5 5.0 9.4
Zambia 76.0 60.0 68.0 73.0 66.0 69.5 91.2 92.9 92.0 31.2 24.9 28.1 3.2 1.5 2.3
LDCs 70.0 50.0 60.0 74.0 59.0 66.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
All developing countries 85.0 72.0 79.0 90.0 84.0 87.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), online data, February 2008; UNICEF, The State of the World's Children 2008; UNDP, Human Development Report 
2007–2008.
a  2005 or latest year available. b Net primary school enrolment. c Net secondary school enrolment. d Gross tertiary school enrolment.
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12.  Indicators on communication and media, 2006a
Country Post offices 
open to the 
public
Radio receivers Television 
sets
Telephone 
mainlines
Mobile
users
Personal 
computers
Internet
users
Per 100 000 
inhabitants
Per 1 000 inhabitants
Afghanistan 1.8 128 80 5 81 3 17
Angola 0.3 85 21 6 143 7 5
Bangladesh 6.3 64 106 8 132 24 3
Benin 2.0 358 107 9 121 4 80
Bhutan 13.9 321 32 40 47 16 31
Burkina Faso 0.5 106 13 7 75 2 6
Burundi 0.5 162 36 4 20 7 8
Cambodia 0.6 127 8 2 79 3 3
Cape Verde 6.9 184 105 138 210 116 61
Central African Republic 0.6 109 10 2 25 3 3
Chad 0.4 116 9 1 46 2 6
Comoros 2.9 154 31 21 20 7 26
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 0.2 379 5 0 74 0 3
Djibouti 1.4 107 77 16 64 27 14
Equatorial Guinea 4.2 429 12 20 193 18 16
Eritrea 1.4 466 68 8 14 6 22
Ethiopia 1.0 184 8 9 11 4 2
Gambia 0.6 155 15 34 260 16 38
Guinea 0.9 93 18 3 24 6 5
Guinea-Bissau 1.3 47 45 8 71 2 23
Haiti 0.6 55 63 17 59 2 75
Kiribati .. 96 44 51 7 11 22
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 7.6 150 57 13 108 17 4
Lesotho 7.7 75 44 27 139 1 29
Liberia 0.5 274 28 2 49 0 0
Madagascar 3.1 121 21 7 55 5 5
Malawi 2.4 310 7 8 33 2 5
Maldives 71.6 110 143 109 879 110 58
Mali 0.8 153 36 6 109 4 5
Mauritania 0.9 138 41 11 336 26 32
Mozambique 0.5 255 21 3 116 14 9
Myanmar 2.8 59 7 9 4 7 2
Nepal .. 39 11 22 38 5 9
Niger 0.3 66 12 2 23 1 3
Rwanda 0.2 151 8 2 34 2 7
Samoa 19.6 1 030 126 109 134 20 45
Sao Tome and Principe 6.0 312 127 47 115 38 181
Senegal 1.2 117 45 24 250 21 54
Sierra Leone 0.8 278 13 5 22 .. 2
Solomon Islands 4.2 126 12 15 13 46 16
Somalia .. 65 26 12 61 9 11
Sudan 0.5 461 387 17 127 115 95
Timor-Leste .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Togo 0.9 410 26 13 112 36 59
Tuvalu .. .. .. 85 124 80 162
Uganda 1.0 155 22 4 67 17 25
United Republic of Tanzania 1.1 398 41 4 148 9 10
Vanuatu 21.7 351 12 32 58 14 35
Yemen 1.3 64 337 46 95 19 12
Zambia 2.1 145 64 8 140 11 42
Source: UPU, online data, February 2008; ITU, online data, February 2008.
a Or latest year available.
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13.  Indicators on transport and transport network
Country Road networks                                 
2004a
Railways                                                             
2005a
Civil Aviation            
2005a
Total Paved Density Network Density Freight Passenger Freight Passenger
km % km/   
1000km2
km km/   
1000km2
million tons 
per km
million pass. 
per km
million tons 
per km
thousands
Afghanistan 34 782 23.7 53.3 .. .. .. .. 7.8 150
Angola 51 429 10.4 41.3 2 761 2.2 .. .. 68.1 240
Bangladesh 239 226 9.5 1 837.8 2 855 21.9 896 4340 183.5 1 635
Benin 19 000 9.5 171.8 578 5.2 86 66 .. ..
Bhutan 8 050 62.0 171.3 .. .. .. .. 0.3 49
Burkina Faso 15 272 31.2 55.8 622 2.3 .. .. .. 66
Burundi 12 322 10.4 479.8 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Cambodia 38 257 6.3 216.7 650 3.7 92 45 1.2 169
Cape Verde 1 350 69.0 335.0 .. .. .. .. 1.5 690
Central African Republic 23 810 2.7 38.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Chad 33 400 0.8 26.5 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Comoros 880 76.5 473.1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 153 497 1.8 67.7 3 641 1.6 444 140 7.4 95
Djibouti 2 890 12.6 124.7 781 33.7 97 82 .. ..
Equatorial Guinea 2 880 .. 102.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Eritrea 4 010 21.8 39.7 306 3.0 .. .. .. ..
Ethiopia 36 469 19.1 33.3 .. .. .. .. 132.6 1 667
Gambia 3 742 19.3 331.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Guinea  44 348 9.8 180.5 1 115 4.5 .. .. .. 59
Guinea-Bissau 3 455 27.9 122.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Haiti 4 160 24.3 150.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Kiribati 670 .. 917.8 .. .. .. .. .. 28
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 31 210 14.4 135.2 .. .. .. .. 2.5 293
Lesotho 5 940 18.3 195.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Liberia 10 600 6.2 110.0 490 5.1 .. .. .. ..
Madagascar 49 827 11.6 85.7 732 1.3 12 10 15.4 575
Malawi 15 451 45.0 164.2 710 7.5 87.9 25.03 1.4 132
Maldives .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.0 82
Mali 18 709 18.0 15.3 733 0.6 189 196 .. ..
Mauritania 7 660 11.3 7.5 717 0.7 .. .. 0.1 139
Mozambique 30 400 18.7 38.8 3 070 3.9 768 172 4.9 347
Myanmar 27 966 11.4 42.5 .. .. .. .. 2.7 1 504
Nepal 17 380 30.3 121.5 59 0.4 .. .. 6.9 480
Niger  14 565 25.0 11.5 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rwanda 14 008 19.0 567.8 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Samoa 2 337 14.2 825.8 .. .. .. .. 1.8 267
Sao Tome and Principe 320 68.1 333.3 .. .. .. .. 0.1 43
Senegal 13 576 29.3 70.5 906 4.7 371 138 .. 450
Sierra Leone 11 300 8.0 157.8 .. .. .. .. 8.1 17
Solomon Islands 1 391 2.4 49.7 .. .. .. .. 0.8 92
Somalia 22 100 11.8 35.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sudan 11 900 36.3 5.0 5478 2.3 766 40 43.1 511
Timor-Leste .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Togo 7 520 31.6 138.3 568 10.4 .. .. .. ..
Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 70 746 23.0 358.9 259 1.3 218 .. 28.6 49
United Rep. of Tanzania 78 891 8.6 89.3 2 600 2.9 1 196 628 2.4 263
Vanuatu 1 070 23.9 87.8 .. .. .. .. 1.8 112
Yemen 65 144 15.5 123.4 .. .. .. .. 66.8 1 083
Zambia 91 440 22.0 123.0 1 273 1.7 554 186 0.0 54
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007, online data, February 2008.
a  or latest year available.
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14.  Indicators on energy and the environment
Country Electrifi-
cation
rate            
(%)
Electricity
consumption
per capita 
 (Kilowatt-hour)
Net installed 
electricity capacity     
(Kilowatt/1000
inhabitants)
Coal, oil, gas 
and electricity             
(Consumption
per capita in kg of 
oil equivalent)
Carbon dioxide 
emissions per capita       
(Metric tons of carbon 
dioxide)
2005a 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2004b 1990 2000 2005
Afghanistan 7.0 89 28 42 39 20 20 63 17 12 0.5 0.1 0.0
Angola 15.0 80 104 165 44 36 33 68 124 238 0.7 0.9 1.3
Bangladesh 32.0 71 113 148 22 26 28 55 80 108 0.1 0.2 0.3
Benin 22.0 43 63 83 5 7 7 33 74 100 0.1 0.2 0.3
Bhutan .. 314 752 794 645 627 549 35 235 65 0.2 0.5 0.5
Burkina Faso 7.0 21 27 30 8 7 6 20 29 28 0.1 0.1 0.1
Burundi 2.0 22 20 22 6 5 4 14 15 12 0.0 0.1 0.1
Cambodia 20.1 17 36 61 5 10 14 18 14 13 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cape Verde .. 118 324 468 51 104 158 82 102 219 0.3 0.4 0.6
Central African Republic .. 32 28 26 14 11 10 25 25 22 0.1 0.1 0.1
Chad 2.0 15 11 10 5 3 3 8 5 4 0.1 0.0 0.0
Comoros 29.0 30 27 25 9 7 6 41 40 46 0.1 0.1 0.1
Dem. Republic of the Congo 5.8 149 94 96 75 49 44 45 24 19 0.1 0.1 0.0
Djibouti .. 319 247 317 152 151 147 226 175 158 3.1 2.5 2.4
Equatorial Guinea .. 53 53 56 32 28 27 108 125 957 0.4 4.8 10.1
Eritrea 20.2 .. 57 64 .. 45 37 .. 53 57 .. 0.2 0.2
Ethiopia 15.0 23 24 36 9 7 7 22 17 27 0.1 0.0 0.1
Gambia .. 73 95 93 18 21 19 69 66 62 0.2 0.2 0.2
Guinea 16.0 86 94 89 31 24 23 60 50 46 0.2 0.2 0.1
Guinea-Bissau .. 39 42 38 11 15 13 70 61 65 0.3 0.3 0.2
Haiti 34.0 67 64 60 22 28 24 47 55 62 0.1 0.2 0.2
Kiribati .. 97 119 109 28 36 33 97 131 92 0.3 0.3 0.3
Lao People's Dem. Republic .. 71 90 129 53 54 81 23 65 65 0.1 0.2 0.2
Lesotho 11.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.1 0.1 0.1
Liberia .. 264 101 97 155 61 55 65 48 53 0.3 0.1 0.2
Madagascar 15.0 109 114 124 18 14 12 26 40 38 0.1 0.1 0.1
Malawi 7.0 76 92 96 20 13 14 26 27 34 0.1 0.1 0.1
Maldives .. 111 381 542 23 132 166 139 608 809 0.5 1.8 2.6
Mali 11.0 32 41 40 11 11 10 17 20 19 0.1 0.1 0.1
Mauritania 22.0 72 102 141 54 57 58 411 315 269 0.5 1.3 0.9
Mozambique 6.3 60 72 529 174 130 115 24 28 80 0.1 0.1 0.1
Myanmar 11.0 62 112 125 27 25 25 39 71 74 0.1 0.2 0.3
Nepal 33.0 40 72 87 14 24 23 13 45 42 0.0 0.1 0.1
Niger 7.0 45 41 35 8 9 8 43 34 32 0.1 0.1 0.1
Rwanda 6.0 25 25 27 5 5 4 27 24 22 0.1 0.1 0.1
Samoa .. 310 513 604 118 146 158 272 276 304 0.8 0.8 0.9
Sao Tome and Principe .. 129 128 124 52 36 33 193 221 174 0.6 0.7 0.6
Senegal 33.0 112 162 220 29 27 48 120 106 120 0.3 0.4 0.5
Sierra Leone .. 55 21 15 31 12 9 26 33 44 0.3 0.2 0.2
Solomon Islands .. 96 149 142 38 34 30 169 132 111 0.6 0.4 0.4
Somalia .. 39 35 35 10 9 7 .. .. .. 0.1 0.1 0.1
Sudan 30.0 51 73 112 19 23 30 46 54 95 0.1 0.2 0.3
Timor-Leste .. .. .. 281 .. .. 42 .. .. 57 .. .. ..
Togo 17.0 88 103 108 9 9 8 54 87 113 0.1 0.3 0.4
Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 8.9 37 57 58 9 11 11 19 23 24 0.0 0.1 0.1
United Republic of Tanzania 11.0 64 75 82 20 13 14 28 27 39 0.1 0.1 0.1
Vanuatu .. 167 216 209 74 63 56 148 142 139 0.9 0.4 0.4
Yemen 36.2 67 188 225 43 48 52 .. 201 261 0.9 0.5 0.8
Zambia 19.0 775 569 758 280 216 197 146 99 117 0.3 0.2 0.2
LDCs .. 76 89 120 33 29 29 45 55 67 0.2 0.2 0.2
All developing countries 68.3 388 653 1304 88 160 295 498 575 718 1.5 1.9 2.4
Source: OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2006; UNCTAD Secretariat calculations based on United Nations, Energy Statistics Yearbook 1993,2003,2004; 
UN, Energy Statistics, March 2008, and EIA, International Energy Annual 2005, October 2007.
a Or latest year available. b Latest year available.
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15.  Status of women in LDCs
Country Education, training and literacy: 
female-male gaps a
Health, fertility and 
mortality
Economic activity, employment Political participation
(% of total)
Adult
literacy
rate
School enrolment ratio Fertility 
rate
Maternal
mortality)
Primary 
school net 
enrolment
ratio
Secondary 
school net 
enrolment
ratio
Tertiary 
gross
enrolment
ratio
Births 
per
woman
Maternal
deaths per 
100 000 
live births
Labour
force
Employees Own 
account
workers
Female
labour force: 
Agriculture/
Total labour 
force
Women 
in
governments
Women 
in
parliaments
2005b 2006 2005 2005 2004b 2004b 2005 2005 end-Dec. 
2007
Afghanistan 29.2 .. .. 27.9 7.2 1 800 37.8 .. .. 82.7 .. 27.7
Angola 65.4 .. .. 65.5 6.5 1 400 47.7 .. .. 81.9 5.7 15.0
Bangladesh 75.7 103.6 103.9 53.3 2.9 570 43.6 13.3 24.5 61.8 8.3 15.1
Benin 48.7 81.0 49.3 25.2 5.6 840 48.0 .. .. 48.6 19.0 10.8
Bhutan .. 99.8 100.3 52.8 2.3 440 40.6 .. .. 97.7 0 2.7
Burkina Faso 52.9 79.7 70.6 45.6 6.1 700 47.5 0.9 10.0 93.3 14.8 15.3
Burundi 77.6 90.8 .. 37.6 6.8 1 100 50.9 .. .. 97.4 10.7 30.5
Cambodia 75.6 98.7 84.2 46.8 3.3 540 53.7 13.6 32.9 72.1 7.1 19.5
Cape Verde 86.1 98.5 109.2 103.8 3.5 210 39.5 .. .. 20.3 18.8 18.1
Central African Republic 51.7 .. .. 18.7 4.7 980 46.7 .. .. 75.4 10.0 10.5
Chad 31.3 69.8 33.2 .. 6.3 1 500 46.6 .. .. 81.0 11.5 5.2
Comoros 77.8 84.8 .. 77.0 4.5 400 43.9 .. .. 85.2 .. 3.0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 66.8 .. .. .. 6.7 1 100 44.3 .. .. 74.9 12.5 8.4
Djibouti .. 81.3 65.7 72.7 4.1 650 46.2 78.7 15.3 82.0 5.3 13.8
Equatorial Guinea 86.2 90.5 .. 43.1 5.4 680 36.5 .. .. 87.7 4.5 18.0
Eritrea .. 85.5 66.5 .. 5.2 450 50.6 .. .. 80.3 17.6 22.0
Ethiopia 45.6 91.7 64.7 32.2 5.4 720 42.9 45.9 43.2 77.1 5.9 21.9
Gambia .. 100.2 83.7 .. 4.8 690 46.3 .. .. 88.2 20.0 9.4
Guinea 42.6 84.1 53.5 23.8 5.6 910 46.8 .. .. 86.5 15.4 19.3
Guinea-Bissau .. 70.8 55.4 .. 7.1 1 100 42.1 .. .. 94.9 37.5 14.0
Haiti 92.6 .. .. .. 3.7 670 43.7 .. .. 47.3 25.0 4.1
Kiribati .. .. 109.6 .. - - 41.3 .. .. 15.8 .. 4.3
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 79.1 94.5 85.1 71.1 3.3 660 48.0 5.4 57.0 78.6 0 25.2
Lesotho 122.5 105.8 155.7 127.0 3.5 960 42.2 43.7 52.7 52.8 27.8 23.5
Liberia 78.5 77.7 57.3 76.0 6.8 1 200 40.8 .. .. 73.0 .. 12.5
Madagascar 85.8 99.7 .. 88.9 4.9 510 45.9 12.0 33.7 80.0 5.9 7.9
Malawi 72.0 105.0 88.7 .. 5.7 1 100 49.2 4.8 93.0 94.4 14.3 13.0
Maldives 100.2 100.2 109.5 .. 2.6 120 45.0 28.8 35.1 15.9 11.8 12.0
Mali 48.6 77.8 .. 45.3 6.6 970 47.2 .. .. 78.5 18.5 10.2
Mauritania 72.9 105.5 89.1 34.4 4.5 820 45.0 .. .. 62.5 9.1 22.1
Mozambique 50.0 90.7 78.3 49.4 5.2 520 51.3 .. .. 94.5 13.0 34.8
Myanmar 92.0 102.0 98.8 177.4 2.1 380 44.4 .. .. 72.0 .. ..
Nepal 55.6 87.5 .. 40.3 3.4 830 43.1 .. .. 97.8 7.4 17.3
Niger 35.1 72.5 66.2 33.9 7.3 1 800 44.0 .. .. 97.2 23.1 12.4
Rwanda 83.7 104.5 .. 61.6 6 1 300 51.2 3.3 65.5 96.6 35.7 48.8
Samoa 99.4 100.5 113.7 93.3 4.1 - 34.8 .. .. 30.4 7.7 8.2
Sao Tome and Principe 84.5 98.1 110.7 .. 4 - 45.1 .. .. 71.9 14.3 1.8
Senegal 57.3 96.1 75.1 .. 4.9 980 45.5 .. .. 79.6 20.6 22.0
Sierra Leone 51.8 .. .. 40.1 6.5 2 100 38.5 .. .. 74.7 13.0 13.2
Solomon Islands .. 96.9 86.7 .. 4 220 47.5 .. .. 82.8 0 0.0
Somalia .. .. .. .. 6.2 1 400 44.7 .. .. 80.0 .. 8.2
Sudan 72.8 82.9 .. 92.0 4.4 450 31.5 .. .. 70.8 2.6 18.1
Timor-Leste .. 95.8 .. 126.3 6.7 380 46.4 .. .. 89.6 22.2 29.2
Togo 56.0 85.8 48.0 20.2 5 510 41.4 .. .. 59.5 20.0 11.1
Tuvalu .. .. .. .. - - 50.0 .. .. 0.0 .. 0.0
Uganda 75.1 .. 89.8 62.5 6.6 550 48.7 7.5 51.9 80.7 23.4 30.7
United Republic of Tanzania 80.2 98.2 .. 47.9 5.3 950 49.6 4.0 … 86.1 15.4 30.4
Vanuatu .. 99.1 86.7 59.4 3.9 - 46.2 .. .. 34.9 8.3 3.8
Yemen 47.4 72.7 45.5 37.1 5.6 430 29.6 13.8 23.6 70.2 2.9 0.3
Zambia 78.9 101.9 79.9 46.3 5.3 830 43.8 .. .. 72.3 25.0 15.2
LDCs .. .. .. .. 4.7 870 43.3 .. .. 76.3 .. 16.9
Source: UNESCO, Institute for Statistics (UIS), online data, February 2008; UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 2008; Maternal Mortality Estimates developed by 
WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA and the World Bank, Maternal Mortality in 2005; IPU database, February 2008.
a  Females as percentage of males;   b  Or latest year available.
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16. LDCs refugees population by country or territory of asylum or residence, end-2006
Countrya Refugees Populationb Asylum
seekersc
Returned
refugeesd
Internally
displacede
Returned
IDPsf
Stateless
personsg
Othersh Total
begin year end year
Afghanistan 32 35 5 387 917 129 310 10 443 0 0 527 710
Angola 13 984 13 090 1 588 47 017 0 0 0 0 61 695
Bangladesh 21 098 26 311 79 0 0 0 300 000 0 326 390
Benin 30 294 10 797 1 349 0 0 0 0 0 12 146
Bhutan - - - - - - - - -
Burkina Faso 511 511 756 0 0 0 0 0 1 267
Burundi 20 681 13 176 7 137 48 144 13 850 0 0 0 82 307
Cambodia 127 99 127 9 0 0 0 60 295
Cape Verde - - - - - - - - -
Central African Republic 24 569 12 357 1 907 51 147 000 0 0 0 161 315
Chad 275 412 286 743 8 20 112 686 0 0 0 399 457
Comoros 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 204 341 208 371 94 41 228 1 075 297 490 000 0 0 1 814 990
Djibouti 10 456 9 259 19 0 0 0 0 0 9 278
Equatorial Guinea - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eritrea 4 418 4 621 2 004 0 0 0 0 32 6 657
Ethiopia 100 817 96 980 323 23 0 0 0 0 97 326
Gambia 7 331 13 761 602 0 0 0 0 0 14 363
Guinea 63 525 31 468 3 887 1 0 0 0 0 35 356
Guinea-Bissau 7 616 7 804 317 0 0 0 0 0 8 121
Haiti - - 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Kiribati - - - - - - - - -
Lao People's Dem. Rep. - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lesotho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Liberia 10 168 16 185 53 107 954 0 237 822 0 8 362 022
Madagascar - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malawi 4 240 3 943 5 245 0 0 0 0 0 9 188
Maldives - - - - - - - - -
Mali 11 233 10 585 1 884 0 0 0 0 0 12 469
Mauritania 632 770 91 1 0 0 0 29 500 30 362
Mozambique 1 954 2 558 4 316 0 0 0 0 0 6 874
Myanmar - - 0 0 58 500 0 669 500 0 728 000
Nepal 126 436 128 175 1 481 0 100 000 0 3 400 000 10 387 3 640 043
Niger 301 317 20 0 0 0 0 0 337
Rwanda 45 206 49 192 3 945 5 971 0 0 0 0 59 108
Samoa - - - - - - - - -
Sao Tome and Principe - - - - - - - - -
Senegal 20 712 20 591 2 634 1 0 0 0 0 23 226
Sierra Leone 59 965 27 365 228 134 0 0 0 0 27 727
Solomon Islands - - - - - - - - -
Somalia 558 669 1 221 1 845 400 000 0 0 0 403 735
Sudan 147 256 196 200 4 460 42 258 1 325 235 11 955 0 42 114 1 622 222
Timor-Leste 3 3 3 0 155 231 11 727 0 0 166 964
Togo 9 287 6 328 442 7 917 0 3 000 0 0 17 687
Tuvalu - - - - - - - - -
Uganda 257 256 272 007 5 812 5 035 1 586 174 300 000 0 0 2 169 028
United Rep. of Tanzania 548 824 485 295 380 4 0 0 0 0 485 679
Vanuatu - - - - - - - - -
Yemen 81 937 95 794 859 2 0 0 0 0 96 655
Zambia 155 718 120 253 215 0 0 0 0 0 120 468
Source: UNHCR, Global Refugee Trends 2006.
Note: The data  are generally provided by Governments, based on their own definitions and methods of data collection.
a Country of asylum or residence.
b Persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN convention/1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the UNHCR 
Statute, persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection.
c Persons whose application for asylum or refugee status is pending at any stage in the procedure or who are otherwise registered as asylum-
seekers.
d Refugees who have returned to their place of origin during the year.
e Persons who are displaced within their country and to whom UNHCR extends protection and/or assistance.
f Internally Displaced Persons protected /assisted by UNHCR who have returned to their place of origin during the year.
g Persons who are not considered nationals by any State under the operation of its laws.
h Persons of concern to UNHCR not included in the previous columns.
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17.  Leading exports of the LDCs, 2004–2006
SITC 
Rev.3
Item
Value
($ millions)
As percentage of:
LDCs
total exports 
Developing
countries
World
Total all commodities 77 229 100.00 2.06 0.74
333 Petroleum oils, crude and crude oils obtained from bituminous minerals 30 375 39.33 5.87 4.22
334 Petroleum products, refined 5 954 7.71 2.55 1.39
845 Articles of apparel, of textile fabrics 4 546 5.89 7.31 4.83
841 Men's or boy's clothing of textile fabrics, not knitted 3 124 4.04 9.43 6.03
343 Natural gas, whether or not liquefied 1 989 2.58 4.02 1.31
971 Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores & concentrates) 1 769 2.29 7.32 3.86
682 Copper 1 757 2.28 4.95 2.35
842 Women's clothing, of textile fabrics, not knitted 1 692 2.19 3.99 2.56
667 Pearls, precious & semi-precious stones 1 554 2.01 4.55 1.74
844 Women's clothing, of textile, knitted or crocheted 1 390 1.80 6.82 5.01
843 Men's or boy's clothing, of textile, knitted or crocheted 1 329 1.72 10.69 8.51
263 Cotton 1 298 1.68 32.76 11.77
684 Aluminium 1 130 1.46 5.59 1.38
034 Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled or frozen 978 1.27 7.30 2.90
036 Crustaceans, mollusks and aquatic invertebrates 937 1.21 7.65 4.71
247 Wood in the rough or roughly squared 785 1.02 31.48 7.55
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes 747 0.97 7.72 4.88
054 Vegetables 638 0.83 5.70 1.93
121 Tobacco, unmanufactured 585 0.76 14.18 8.37
285 Aluminium ores and concentrates 506 0.66 13.70 4.68
Source: UNCTAD secretariat estimates and calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, COMTRADE database, March 2008.
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18.  Total merchandise exports: Levels and annual average growth rates
Country Total merchandise exports
($ million)
Annual average growth rates
(%)
1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 1995–
2000
2000–
2006
2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan 107.1 140.1 159.3 199.8 179.6 4.1 18.0 -8.5 25.4 -10.1
Angola 3 723.0 7 702.0 12 974.0 23 213.0 33 795.0 10.4 41.1 40.5 78.9 45.6
Bangladesh 3 407.2 5 493.2 8 267.5 9 427.0 11 962.6 8.7 18.4 29.1 14.0 26.9
Benin 332.8 188.4 298.3 288.2 283.1 -12.9 6.3 9.9 -3.4 -1.8
Bhutan 103.0 103.0 154.0 217.2 348.2 1.0 25.9 15.8 41.0 60.3
Burkina Faso 170.9 184.0 393.5 384.1 482.9 2.9 24.7 23.2 -2.4 25.7
Burundi 178.9 42.8 82.7 117.1 120.1 -19.8 32.8 25.5 41.6 2.6
Cambodia 301.8 1 389.5 2 797.5 3 144.4 3 990.5 41.7 20.9 32.1 12.4 26.9
Cape Verde 31.5 49.3 15.2 89.4 110.3 5.2 70.7 21.9 488.4 23.3
Central African Republic 119.5 79.3 101.0 116.4 144.3 -5.9 16.3 53.8 15.2 24.0
Chad 116.2 89.4 1 258.1 1 961.8 2 274.7 -4.4 135.0 1 293.3 55.9 16.0
Comoros 11.0 6.9 14.0 9.0 7.5 -9.7 -6.6 16.6 -35.5 -17.4
Democratic Rep. of the Congo 1 563.0 824.1 1 850.1 2 190.2 2 300.2 -13.7 22.0 34.6 18.4 5.0
Djibouti 14.0 13.0 13.0 13.5 18.9 -2.1 5.8 0.0 4.0 39.7
Equatorial Guinea 86.0 1 097.0 1 889.0 2 933.4 3 804.3 61.6 29.4 31.5 55.3 29.7
Eritrea 73.0 18.8 11.0 10.6 11.2 -28.0 -17.9 66.4 -4.2 5.6
Ethiopia 421.9 482.0 614.7 926.2 1 043.0 2.6 23.4 19.9 50.7 12.6
Gambia 18.7 16.2 18.1 5.1 11.5 0.7 15.7 256.3 -71.8 125.0
Guinea 701.9 522.4 787.0 965.4 976.2 -7.9 13.7 3.0 22.7 1.1
Guinea-Bissau 44.0 62.0 80.0 94.6 83.9 8.7 9.8 15.9 18.2 -11.3
Haiti 35.0 313.0 394.0 473.4 522.6 68.4 15.1 13.9 20.2 10.4
Kiribati 7.2 12.0 18.0 3.6 6.3 13.0 -17.5 38.5 -80.1 77.3
Lao People's Dem. Republic 311.0 330.0 361.1 549.6 876.5 0.6 21.0 -4.5 52.2 59.5
Lesotho - 336.2 657.0 609.1 671.9 - 19.7 36.9 -7.3 10.3
Liberia 864.7 691.5 1 011.7 1 436.6 1 490.2 -7.0 12.1 15.6 42.0 3.7
Madagascar 359.9 861.9 971.2 835.9 1 008.2 10.3 2.8 -0.8 -13.9 20.6
Malawi 433.3 379.3 458.7 495.5 668.4 -2.8 8.0 -8.7 8.0 34.9
Maldives 49.8 76.2 169.7 154.2 135.6 7.1 14.9 50.3 -9.2 -12.0
Mali 443.0 472.7 987.5 1 147.6 1 476.6 3.9 13.8 -2.0 16.2 28.7
Mauritania 509.3 342.8 435.2 556.4 1 258.7 -7.5 27.2 35.7 27.8 126.2
Mozambique 174.3 364.0 1 503.8 1 783.0 2 381.1 12.9 28.7 44.1 18.6 33.5
Myanmar 860.0 1 647.1 2 572.1 4 121.3 4 863.3 14.3 13.8 3.5 60.2 18.0
Nepal 359.2 708.8 756.0 829.7 759.7 13.7 4.2 15.8 9.7 -8.4
Niger 273.4 330.4 278.9 347.7 355.7 0.4 13.7 22.3 24.7 2.3
Rwanda 52.0 52.0 98.0 125.3 135.4 15.2 26.1 94.6 27.8 8.1
Samoa 9.0 14.0 85.4 84.9 84.9 13.0 5.9 -1.9 -0.6 0.0
Sao Tome and Principe 5.0 2.8 3.6 3.4 3.9 -14.5 0.5 -46.4 -3.9 13.4
Senegal 530.8 693.0 1 315.4 1 470.8 1 491.6 6.4 17.4 13.9 11.8 1.4
Sierra Leone 42.0 13.0 139.0 159.0 216.6 -30.9 51.3 51.1 14.4 36.3
Solomon Islands 168.0 65.0 74.0 80.1 91.5 -15.4 32.3 -3.9 8.2 14.3
Somalia 148.7 121.2 87.1 181.0 160.8 -4.8 8.7 -41.1 107.7 -11.1
Sudan 685.2 1 631.0 3 612.0 4 505.8 5 478.7 11.5 26.9 45.6 24.7 21.6
Timor-Leste 34.0 16.0 53.4 78.5 114.1 -9.1 38.5 84.1 47.1 45.3
Togo 382.8 191.7 408.3 359.9 359.7 -10.1 10.0 -17.4 -11.9 -0.1
Tuvalu 1.1 1.0 1.9 1.2 3.5 -2.6 15.1 -24.9 -37.3 194.4
Uganda 575.3 402.8 653.5 812.8 962.2 -7.1 17.6 22.9 24.4 18.4
United Republic of Tanzania 685.0 655.8 1 329.8 1 544.5 1 689.9 -2.2 17.9 17.5 16.1 9.4
Vanuatu 28.0 23.2 37.0 38.0 44.9 -3.9 21.1 37.1 2.6 18.3
Yemen 1 917.5 4 077.8 4 050.8 5 608.9 6 264.0 7.2 16.7 8.5 38.5 11.7
Zambia 1 055.0 892.4 1 575.6 1 809.8 3 770.4 -1.4 29.6 60.7 14.9 108.3
LDCs 22 525.5 34 221.8 55 878.0 76 513.6 99 294.7 51.9 33.3 28.4 36.9 29.8
  African LDCs and Haiti 14 813.8 20 066.0 36 287.5 51 873.6 69 447.8 35.5 38.3 34.0 43.0 33.9
  Asian LDCs 7 367.0 13 889.4 19 118.3 24 097.7 29 244.4 88.5 23.7 18.9 26.0 21.4
  Island LDCs 344.7 266.4 472.2 542.3 602.5 -22.7 13.0 24.4 14.8 11.1
Other developing countries 1 395 076.8 1 989 475.9 2 989 516.8 3 643 340.4 4 370 213.2 5.7 19.9 26.4 21.9 20.0
All developing countries 1 417 602.3 2 023 697.7 3 045 394.8 3 719 854.0 4 469 507.9 5.8 20.0 26.4 22.1 20.2
Source: UNCTAD secretariat estimates based on United Nations Statistics Division, COMTRADE database, March 2008.
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19.  Total merchandise imports: Levels and annual average growth rates
Country Total merchandise imports
($ million)
Annual average growth rates
(%)
1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 1995–
2000
2000–
2006
2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan 464.0 796.2 2 088.4 3 909.3 4 130.9 5.4 42.8 10.6 87.2 5.7
Angola 1 468.1 3 040.2 3 573.2 5 118.0 6 908.9 14.3 16.3 4.9 43.2 35.0
Bangladesh 5 438.4 7 611.3 11 372.7 13 107.9 15 279.4 6.9 13.3 12.1 15.3 16.6
Benin 719.0 547.1 893.8 898.7 1 011.3 -3.0 9.7 0.2 0.5 12.5
Bhutan 113.0 175.0 304.0 285.8 310.4 9.7 11.3 22.1 -6.0 8.6
Burkina Faso 483.8 724.5 1 264.0 1 392.1 1 419.1 9.0 24.4 33.8 10.1 1.9
Burundi 270.5 150.2 172.7 257.0 414.4 -7.7 24.7 19.4 48.8 61.2
Cambodia 218.0 1 438.8 2 062.7 2 478.0 2 996.2 51.2 14.6 16.2 20.1 20.9
Cape Verde 326.8 237.3 429.2 438.2 538.2 -6.7 16.3 21.0 2.1 22.8
Central African Republic 265.5 70.5 159.0 186.4 198.7 -21.4 27.8 59.6 17.2 6.6
Chad 179.7 136.3 358.3 420.9 456.4 -6.5 4.0 2.4 17.5 8.4
Comoros 62.4 71.9 76.1 87.8 102.5 4.6 14.8 24.5 15.4 16.8
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 871.1 697.1 1 986.1 2 269.6 2 799.5 -7.4 28.1 24.6 14.3 23.3
Djibouti 177.0 156.1 168.0 178.3 215.8 -2.9 5.4 1.8 6.1 21.1
Equatorial Guinea 50.1 451.1 844.0 1 136.2 1 098.7 41.2 22.1 34.8 34.6 -3.3
Eritrea 434.0 327.8 472.1 486.8 552.7 -5.7 3.3 9.1 3.1 13.5
Ethiopia 1 141.0 1 260.4 2 873.8 4 094.8 5 207.3 2.1 26.3 7.0 42.5 27.2
Gambia 214.5 189.4 236.7 259.6 259.3 -2.9 16.2 45.6 9.7 -0.1
Guinea 818.5 612.4 619.2 735.9 807.7 -5.7 5.3 2.8 18.8 9.8
Guinea-Bissau 56.8 49.1 82.0 104.5 91.4 -7.2 11.5 18.8 27.4 -12.5
Haiti 654.1 1 040.1 1 317.0 1 466.0 1 637.3 11.6 9.8 10.9 11.3 11.7
Kiribati 34.1 39.1 57.0 74.0 61.4 2.1 17.3 21.3 29.8 -17.0
Lao People's Dem. Republic 589.0 535.1 506.1 626.2 752.3 -4.3 8.5 -3.4 23.7 20.1
Lesotho - 613.3 1 431.1 1 469.5 1 535.3 - 21.7 40.2 2.7 4.5
Liberia 5 592.7 5 416.1 4 263.7 4 933.4 6 446.3 1.1 8.2 8.1 15.7 30.7
Madagascar 549.5 990.7 1 651.9 1 685.9 1 760.3 7.1 20.6 25.3 2.1 4.4
Malawi 500.4 532.1 928.7 1 165.2 1 209.2 2.1 17.2 18.2 25.5 3.8
Maldives 267.9 388.6 641.8 744.9 926.5 8.1 20.7 36.3 16.1 24.4
Mali 774.1 806.4 1 364.4 1 703.3 1 990.3 1.6 16.7 7.3 24.8 16.8
Mauritania 455.2 353.6 1 340.0 1 342.0 1 073.3 -2.9 35.0 246.8 0.2 -20.0
Mozambique 727.0 1 161.6 2 034.7 2 408.2 2 869.3 10.8 20.6 28.8 18.4 19.1
Myanmar 1 348.1 2 401.1 2 254.2 1 977.5 2 155.2 14.5 -5.2 7.8 -12.3 9.0
Nepal 1 292.0 1 557.9 1 870.1 1 859.0 2 098.9 - 7.7 3.8 -0.6 12.9
Niger 344.6 384.6 667.2 735.6 688.0 2.8 14.3 19.1 10.3 -6.5
Rwanda 241.1 211.1 284.0 402.5 496.4 -1.2 13.5 8.8 41.7 23.3
Samoa 95.0 106.1 209.8 238.9 275.0 2.8 17.4 39.5 13.9 15.1
Sao Tome and Principe 29.0 29.8 41.4 49.9 71.1 5.2 18.7 1.5 20.3 42.7
Senegal 1 224.5 1 552.8 2 839.1 3 497.7 3 671.0 0.7 17.3 18.4 23.2 5.0
Sierra Leone 134.1 149.0 286.1 344.3 388.9 -6.5 11.0 -5.6 20.3 13.0
Solomon Islands 154.1 98.0 100.0 151.7 165.3 -9.4 18.2 21.9 51.6 8.9
Somalia 154.5 324.4 284.4 571.5 602.2 17.0 14.9 -28.7 101.0 5.4
Sudan 1 184.9 1 657.4 4 034.8 7 366.8 8 844.5 4.9 37.4 39.2 82.6 20.1
Timor-Leste 112.0 126.0 113.5 101.6 104.6 -2.5 -11.6 -48.7 -10.5 2.9
Togo 556.3 323.6 557.8 592.6 637.4 -7.2 12.3 -1.9 6.2 7.6
Tuvalu 5.2 7.1 16.7 29.0 39.0 9.5 31.6 -3.5 73.5 34.4
Uganda 1 037.6 953.9 1 720.2 2 054.1 2 557.3 0.3 21.6 25.1 19.4 24.5
United Republic of Tanzania 1 653.0 1 586.4 2 551.9 3 274.7 4 439.5 2.2 21.7 17.9 28.3 35.6
Vanuatu 95.0 86.7 128.1 149.4 159.7 -1.3 14.7 21.9 16.7 6.8
Yemen 1 816.7 2 326.5 3 734.0 4 862.7 4 935.1 2.1 15.4 1.6 30.2 1.5
Zambia 708.2 888.0 2 152.1 2 558.0 3 074.3 3.8 25.9 36.7 18.9 20.2
LDCs 36 102.2 45 389.6 69 418.1 86 282.2 100 463.7 4.5 17.1 15.9 24.3 16.4
  African LDCs and Haiti 23 641.5 27 357.1 43 412.2 55 110.1 65 361.9 3.0 19.4 20.0 26.9 18.6
  Asian LDCs 11 279.3 16 842.0 24 192.1 29 106.5 32 658.4 7.7 13.2 9.2 20.3 12.2
  Island LDCs 1 181.5 1 190.5 1 813.8 2 065.5 2 443.4 -0.1 15.4 17.0 13.9 18.3
Other developing countries 1 443 381 1 810 939 2 745 002 3 259 438 3 794 455 2.8 18.3 26.8 18.7 16.4
All developing countries 1 479 483 1 856 328 2 814 421 3 345 720 3 894 919 2.8 18.3 26.5 18.9 16.4
Source: UNCTAD secretariat estimates based on United Nations Statistics Division, COMTRADE database, March 2008.
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20.  Main markets for exports of LDCs: Percentage share in 2006
Country Developed economies Econo-
mies in
transition
Developing countries Un-
allocatedTotal  EU 25 Japan USA
and
Canada
Other
developed
countries
Total China India Major 
petro-
leum
exporters
  Newly 
industrialized
economies:
Other
Developing
economies
1st tier 2nd tier
Afghanistan 35.8 20.2 0.2 14.9 0.6 6.6 57.6 0.1 22.0 4.5 1.6 0.1 29.4 0.0
Angola 50.7 8.5 1.9 39.9 0.4 0.0 49.3 34.2 0.0 0.5 6.8 0.4 7.4 0.0
Bangladesh 78.0 46.7 1.1 28.7 1.4 0.5 9.1 0.7 1.2 1.3 2.3 0.8 2.9 12.4
Benin 21.1 20.9 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 78.9 20.9 7.0 7.2 0.8 10.6 32.5 0.0
Burkina Faso 10.7 8.4 2.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 85.9 41.9 1.1 1.6 16.3 7.1 17.9 3.4
Burundi 51.2 16.1 0.5 0.9 33.7 1.1 26.8 .. 0.0 2.1 1.2 .. 23.6 20.8
Cambodia 76.3 18.2 1.0 56.6 0.6 0.2 23.4 0.4 0.0 0.1 19.4 0.7 2.8 0.1
Cape Verde 93.1 85.6 .. 2.6 2.6 0.0 6.6 .. 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 6.1 0.2
Central African Rep. 67.4 62.4 1.3 3.6 0.1 0.0 32.5 6.9 0.3 2.9 0.4 8.0 14.0 0.0
Chad 83.0 1.8 0.5 80.6 0.2 0.0 16.9 10.4 0.0 0.0 4.6 1.3 0.6 0.0
Comoros 77.0 71.7 0.2 4.9 0.2 0.5 21.1 .. 3.1 3.2 8.3 0.1 6.4 1.4
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 50.8 45.7 0.1 5.0 0.0 0.1 48.8 21.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.2 26.5 0.3
Djibouti 3.4 2.4 .. 0.9 0.1 .. 96.6 0.1 1.1 6.5 0.5 0.1 88.3 0.0
Equatorial Guinea 56.1 26.5 3.9 25.0 0.7 0.0 43.9 30.9 0.0 0.0 10.6 0.0 2.3 0.0
Ethiopia 49.9 30.6 7.8 7.7 3.8 0.6 34.9 11.0 1.0 10.9 0.5 0.6 10.9 14.6
Gambia 38.7 35.3 1.8 0.7 0.3 0.6 60.7 1.1 38.5 0.0 0.6 13.1 7.4 0.0
Guinea 41.8 31.7 0.0 10.0 0.1 27.4 14.4 0.8 1.9 0.0 9.2 0.1 2.3 16.4
Guinea-Bissau 3.0 2.6 0.0 0.3 .. 0.0 97.0 .. 76.1 18.1 0.9 0.1 1.9 0.0
Haiti 87.4 3.6 0.2 83.0 0.6 0.0 12.4 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.3 10.1 0.2
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 15.4 10.6 1.0 1.2 2.6 0.1 63.7 4.1 0.0 0.1 4.5 45.1 9.9 20.8
Liberia 71.2 56.0 0.8 12.4 1.6 0.6 28.2 0.1 1.6 0.2 4.1 4.8 17.3 0.0
Madagascar 86.9 57.1 2.6 26.6 0.5 0.1 10.1 2.1 1.5 0.3 2.7 0.4 3.1 2.9
Malawi 43.4 28.3 3.1 9.7 2.3 7.8 48.2 0.1 0.5 1.3 1.1 1.6 43.6 0.6
Maldives 42.5 30.2 10.3 1.5 0.4 0.0 57.5 0.3 0.7 6.2 2.6 33.6 14.2 0.0
Mali 20.4 11.9 0.1 2.6 5.8 0.1 74.3 35.2 2.0 0.6 7.1 12.1 17.4 5.2
Mauritania 53.9 44.3 5.4 3.5 0.7 3.7 41.1 26.3 0.1 3.1 0.2 0.0 11.4 1.3
Mozambique 68.9 66.1 0.3 0.3 2.2 0.4 24.9 1.4 1.3 0.2 0.2 1.1 20.8 5.8
Myanmar 13.2 7.4 5.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 79.6 5.2 12.7 0.7 4.5 51.8 4.7 7.1
Nepal 26.7 12.1 1.0 12.7 0.9 0.1 70.8 0.2 67.9 0.3 0.9 0.1 1.4 2.4
Niger 64.2 35.4 0.0 27.0 1.7 11.3 24.5 0.2 0.2 18.6 0.5 0.1 4.8 0.0
Rwanda 28.3 23.6 0.0 4.4 0.3 2.1 21.0 10.3 0.1 0.8 0.2 2.2 7.4 48.6
Samoa 50.3 0.8 0.7 3.4 45.4 .. 44.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 11.4 0.5 32.4 5.1
Sao Tome and Principe 87.2 84.0 0.4 2.5 0.3 0.1 12.6 .. 0.2 2.9 0.7 2.2 6.7 0.0
Senegal 28.5 23.5 1.0 0.5 3.4 0.0 54.9 0.7 5.8 3.7 0.9 0.2 43.6 16.6
Sierra Leone 89.3 67.5 0.4 19.9 1.5 0.5 6.9 0.4 1.7 0.4 0.8 0.3 3.2 3.2
Solomon Islands 17.7 5.6 8.9 1.2 2.0 .. 73.0 48.0 1.0 0.1 11.0 10.1 2.7 9.3
Somalia 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 98.9 0.9 4.0 88.2 0.2 1.0 4.6 0.0
Sudan 52.3 2.3 48.0 1.2 0.8 0.1 47.3 31.0 0.7 5.5 4.2 0.9 5.1 0.3
Togo 26.4 23.8 0.0 0.9 1.6 0.4 71.9 3.5 4.6 3.7 1.6 2.6 55.9 1.3
Uganda 53.6 48.0 0.9 3.5 1.2 1.4 35.9 2.3 0.6 8.7 1.9 1.8 20.5 9.1
United Rep. of Tanzania 40.7 23.9 5.3 4.5 4.8 1.9 49.3 8.8 8.8 5.4 2.7 3.8 19.8 8.1
Vanuatu 17.0 3.4 11.4 1.0 1.2 0.1 82.6 0.4 16.7 0.2 1.1 60.4 3.8 0.3
Yemen 14.2 2.4 3.5 6.7 1.5 0.0 85.2 31.4 17.4 9.8 7.6 17.4 1.6 0.5
Zambia 52.3 12.7 0.6 0.5 38.5 0.1 47.6 10.3 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 36.3 0.0
LDCs 51.6 20.1 4.8 24.1 2.5 0.7 44.2 19.2 3.2 2.2 5.5 4.9 9.1 3.5
  African LDCs and Haiti 52.5 18.0 5.9 25.5 3.0 0.9 44.8 24.2 0.9 1.9 5.3 0.8 11.7 1.7
  Asian LDCs 49.9 25.1 2.2 21.4 1.2 0.3 42.4 8.2 8.4 2.9 5.9 13.7 3.4 7.4
  Island LDCs 33.5 15.8 7.8 1.7 8.1 0.0 62.9 13.4 5.3 1.5 5.9 26.6 10.1 3.5
Other developing 
countries
50.4 17.5 8.2 22.2 2.4 1.8 45.9 9.5 1.4 4.5 14.7 5.7 10.1 1.9
All developing 
countries
50.4 17.5 8.2 22.3 2.4 1.7 45.9 9.7 1.4 4.4 14.5 5.7 10.1 2.0
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2007 and UNCTAD secretariat estimates, based on data from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, online 
data, March 2008.
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21.  Main sources of imports of LDCs: Percentage share in 2006
Country Developed economies Econo-
mies
in
transition
Developing countries Un-
allocatedTotal  EU 25 Japan USA
and
Canada
Other
developed
countries
Total China India Major 
petroleum
exporters
  Newly 
industrialized
economies:
Other
Developing
economies
1st tier 2nd tier
Afghanistan 29.9 15.0 1.9 12.1 0.8 13.9 56.3 2.9 5.1 1.2 2.2 2.1 42.8 0.0
Angola 57.5 37.6 1.8 15.8 2.3 0.9 41.4 8.8 1.6 0.2 11.4 1.3 18.1 0.2
Bangladesh 16.7 8.3 3.7 2.8 1.8 3.5 71.3 17.7 12.5 12.6 16.1 7.1 5.2 8.4
Benin 53.4 42.2 1.1 9.0 1.1 0.1 46.5 6.0 0.7 4.7 5.8 5.3 24.0 0.0
Burkina Faso 34.6 32.0 0.6 1.6 0.4 1.8 57.5 1.5 1.9 3.3 0.9 0.8 49.2 6.0
Burundi 29.4 18.4 7.8 2.9 0.3 4.7 43.4 4.4 3.4 12.7 0.2 .. 22.7 22.5
Cambodia 10.0 4.1 4.3 0.9 0.7 0.1 89.6 17.5 0.9 0.2 41.0 20.0 10.0 0.2
Cape Verde 75.7 73.2 .. 2.4 0.2 0.2 19.9 1.7 0.1 4.6 0.2 0.3 13.1 4.2
Central African Republic 50.5 40.2 0.3 9.3 0.6 0.1 22.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.4 20.2 26.8
Chad 59.0 40.6 0.2 14.8 3.4 2.6 38.4 3.0 1.0 10.6 0.4 0.3 23.1 0.0
Comoros 39.7 37.6 1.4 0.5 0.2 2.0 56.7 4.8 4.4 11.5 2.8 3.0 30.1 1.7
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 44.9 37.5 1.2 4.7 1.4 0.2 54.6 3.6 0.4 1.4 1.1 0.6 47.5 0.2
Djibouti 21.3 14.4 3.2 3.6 0.2 1.2 73.8 11.0 17.9 25.7 3.4 7.1 8.6 3.7
Equatorial Guinea 73.8 33.7 1.1 37.9 1.1 0.8 25.3 2.8 0.5 0.3 6.3 3.9 11.5 0.0
Ethiopia 28.3 20.3 3.1 4.0 1.0 1.9 52.2 11.4 8.1 20.3 1.5 1.5 9.3 17.6
Gambia 25.1 20.7 0.7 3.4 0.3 0.6 74.3 25.2 3.2 3.0 2.2 4.4 36.3 0.0
Guinea 33.4 26.5 2.3 3.5 1.1 1.2 29.4 8.6 3.2 1.6 1.6 1.9 12.5 36.0
Guinea-Bissau 49.8 45.5 0.1 3.2 1.0 0.0 38.4 3.1 0.5 .. 0.7 0.9 33.2 11.8
Haiti 62.3 11.5 1.8 48.1 0.9 0.2 37.4 3.4 1.0 1.1 1.1 3.3 27.5 0.1
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 5.8 2.4 1.4 0.5 1.5 0.2 92.1 11.3 0.4 .. 5.2 69.4 5.8 1.9
Liberia 25.4 11.2 12.8 1.1 0.3 3.5 71.0 8.2 0.4 0.0 58.3 0.3 3.8 0.0
Madagascar 27.1 23.0 1.1 2.6 0.5 0.1 59.1 12.0 3.0 14.8 8.7 3.2 17.3 13.6
Malawi 26.5 17.9 1.3 7.0 0.2 0.1 72.7 4.3 8.1 .. 2.1 1.8 56.4 0.8
Maldives 19.3 10.1 2.6 2.7 3.9 0.0 80.5 1.8 11.1 18.4 24.3 17.4 7.4 0.2
Mali 29.3 26.0 0.2 2.4 0.7 1.2 37.3 3.5 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 30.9 32.1
Mauritania 51.6 42.4 1.2 7.1 1.0 1.6 35.8 8.2 3.7 3.9 0.4 4.0 15.7 10.9
Mozambique 29.1 25.1 0.6 2.7 0.7 .. 54.3 2.6 3.2 2.1 1.2 2.8 42.4 16.6
Myanmar 7.1 2.9 3.0 0.2 1.0 0.8 91.9 35.1 4.0 0.2 20.6 30.0 2.0 0.2
Nepal 7.9 3.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 0.9 80.1 3.8 61.8 2.5 3.8 6.2 2.0 11.2
Niger 47.2 28.1 0.5 14.6 4.1 0.3 52.5 7.8 2.8 11.0 0.9 1.5 28.5 0.0
Rwanda 30.2 23.5 1.2 2.2 3.3 0.3 43.3 2.2 2.2 3.6 0.3 0.6 34.4 26.2
Samoa 47.7 2.6 8.6 6.4 30.2 .. 51.1 4.4 0.5 0.2 17.4 9.6 19.1 1.2
Sao Tome and Principe 86.5 79.5 0.2 5.2 1.7 1.0 12.5 1.7 0.4 3.6 0.3 2.9 3.5 0.0
Senegal 57.4 49.9 2.8 3.6 1.1 2.2 37.8 4.5 2.6 7.4 1.0 5.4 16.9 2.6
Sierra Leone 39.8 30.0 0.3 8.6 0.9 0.9 53.8 7.7 4.3 0.4 2.6 5.5 33.2 5.5
Solomon Islands 45.0 4.1 7.8 2.5 30.6 .. 43.3 2.2 0.1 0.0 24.7 7.0 9.3 11.6
Somalia 5.5 2.4 0.0 3.0 0.1 0.5 81.2 3.8 8.2 17.4 0.2 3.1 48.7 12.7
Sudan 32.2 24.1 2.6 2.0 3.6 3.1 63.5 17.7 4.5 19.7 3.6 2.5 15.5 1.2
Togo 67.6 57.0 0.9 8.0 1.6 2.4 30.1 6.4 1.1 1.9 3.8 1.1 15.7 0.0
Uganda 29.2 20.0 4.2 3.1 1.9 1.1 68.7 7.1 5.6 10.4 1.0 1.2 43.4 1.0
United Rep. of Tanzania 28.6 19.3 2.8 4.8 1.7 1.3 65.6 9.4 6.8 13.8 2.4 5.5 27.9 4.5
Vanuatu 56.8 3.7 19.7 3.9 29.4 0.0 40.9 7.4 0.9 .. 13.5 3.0 16.0 2.3
Yemen 25.3 14.9 3.2 4.4 2.7 2.9 70.9 12.8 2.4 31.8 2.6 6.7 14.6 0.9
Zambia 21.9 12.2 1.5 2.4 5.8 0.0 78.1 2.7 2.8 10.6 1.4 0.3 60.4 0.0
LDCs 32.5 21.2 3.2 6.1 2.0 2.3 62.5 11.1 6.1 9.2 11.1 6.0 18.9 2.7
  African LDCs and Haiti 40.7 28.0 3.1 7.8 1.8 1.6 56.1 8.7 3.5 7.9 9.6 2.4 24.0 1.6
  Asian LDCs 17.1 8.8 3.2 3.4 1.7 3.6 74.5 15.9 10.8 11.6 13.5 12.3 10.4 4.8
  Island LDCs 45.9 26.7 4.8 3.1 11.2 0.2 51.3 2.9 4.3 8.3 14.7 8.6 12.4 2.7
Other developing 
countries
42.4 15.7 10.1 13.4 3.3 2.4 51.1 11.2 1.6 9.3 14.1 7.4 7.5 4.0
All developing countries 42.2 15.9 9.9 13.2 3.2 2.4 51.4 11.2 1.7 9.3 14.0 7.3 7.8 4.0
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2007 and estimates, based on data from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, online data, March 2008.
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22.  Composition of total financial flows to LDCs
(Net disbursements)
Million current dollars Million 2006 dollarse
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006
Concessional loans and grantsa 16 623 17 143 12 621 25 222 25 882 28 181 22 674 19 317 17 123 26 624 26 589 28 181
DAC countries 16 047 17 097 12 427 25 028 25 601 27 659 21 894 19 266 16 871 26 406 26 295 27 659
of which:
Bilateral 9 888 9 344 7 947 15 971 16 151 17 230 13 462 10 634 10 838 16 910 16 613 17 230
Multilateral 6 159 7 753 4 480 9 057 9 450 10 429 8 432 8 632 6 033 9 496 9 682 10 429
Non-DAC countries 577 46 194 194 281 522 781 50 252 217 294 522
ODA grants total 12 223 13 020 10 593 22 156 23 225 52 708 16 769 14 799 14 572 23 282 23 825 52 708
ODA loans total, net 4 401 4 123 2 028 3 066 2 657 -24 527 5 905 4 518 2 551 3 342 2 764 -24 527
Technical cooperation 3 247 3 711 2 682 4 125 5 023 5 439 4 476 4 242 3 552 4 351 5 151 5 439
Otherb 13 376 13 432 9 939 21 097 20 859 22 743 18 198 15 075 13 571 22 273 21 438 22 743
Non-concessional flows 740 -430 1 072 1 861 115 1 720 1 018 -503 1 582 1 915 119 1 720
Total other official flows, net 723 -133 341 -456 -68 -871 995 -169 589 -529 -69 -871
DAC countries 726 -133 334 -451 -68 -878 726 -133 334 -451 -68 -878
of which:
Bilateral 692 -38 339 -607 -289 -953 954 -64 574 -687 -296 -953
Multilateral 35 -95 -4 156 221 75 46 -105 6 164 226 75
Non-DAC countries -3 .. 6 -5 1 7 -4 .. 8 -5 1 7
Total private flows, net 17 -297 731 2 317 183 2 591 23 -334 993 2 444 188 2 591
of which:
Export credits, netc -528 -374 63 -242 292 744 -720 -422 86 -255 300 744
Direct investment 250 332 22 1 790 580 661 341 374 30 1 889 596 661
Otherd 295 -255 646 768 -689 1 186 403 -287 877 811 -708 1 186
Total financial  flows 17 363 16 713 13 694 27 077 25 997 29 901 23 693 18 813 18 705 28 539 26 707 29 901
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/DAC, International Development Statistics, online data, May 2008.
a Total ODA.
b Total ODA excluding technical assistance grants.
c Bank and non-bank export credits. Non-bank export credit from 1995. 
d Portfolio investment, corresponds to bonds and equities.
e Data for total net private flows in constant 2006 dollars has been calculated by applying an ad hoc deflator for DAC countries (2006=100). 
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23.  Distribution of financial flows to LDCs and to all developing countries, by type of flow
(Per cent)
Country  To least developed countries To developing countries
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006
Concessional loans and grantsa 95.7 102.6 92.2 93.1 99.6 94.2 73.0 33.9 40.9 45.1 36.5 34.6
DAC countries 92.4 102.3 90.8 92.4 98.5 92.5 64.7 33.4 40.1 44.5 35.9 33.9
Of which:
 Bilateral 56.9 55.9 58.0 59.0 62.1 57.6 47.1 22.3 28.1 30.3 28.1 25.1
 Multilateral 35.5 46.4 32.7 33.5 36.3 34.9 17.6 11.1 11.9 14.2 7.8 8.8
Non DAC countries 3.3 0.3 1.4 0.7 1.1 1.7 8.3 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6
ODA grants total 70.4 77.9 77.4 81.8 89.3 176.3 53.3 24.4 30.8 42.5 34.1 49.2
ODA loans total, net 25.3 24.7 14.8 11.3 10.2 -82.0 19.7 9.5 10.1 2.7 2.4 -14.7
Technical cooperation 18.7 22.2 19.6 15.2 19.3 18.2 15.5 9.6 11.3 11.0 5.7 7.5
Otherb 77.0 80.4 72.6 77.9 80.2 76.1 57.5 24.2 29.6 34.1 30.8 27.1
Non-concessional flows 4.3 -2.6 7.8 6.9 0.4 5.8 27.0 66.1 59.1 54.9 63.5 65.4
Total other official flows, net 4.2 -2.6 7.8 6.9 0.4 5.8 25.7 66.1 59.1 54.9 63.5 65.4
DAC countries 4.2 -0.8 2.5 -1.7 -0.3 -2.9 25.9 7.2 3.7 -7.4 -0.2 -4.9
Of which:
Bilateral 4.0 -0.2 2.5 -2.2 -1.1 -3.2 10.8 5.2 -5.8 -4.2 -1.2 -4.8
Multilateral 0.2 -0.6 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.3 15.1 2.0 10.3 -3.5 0.7 -0.4
Non-DAC Countries 0.0 .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 .. -0.8 0.2 0.3 0.3
Total private flows, net 0.1 -1.8 5.3 8.6 0.7 8.7 1.3 58.9 55.4 62.3 63.7 70.3
Of which:
export credits, netc -3.0 -2.2 0.5 -0.9 1.1 2.5 -0.7 4.0 6.4 5.8 5.8 4.1
Direct investment 1.4 2.0 0.2 6.6 2.2 2.2 28.7 34.8 47.0 59.0 37.1 45.9
Otherd 1.7 -1.5 4.7 2.8 -2.7 4.0 -26.7 20.1 1.9 -2.5 20.7 20.4
Total financial  flows 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
For source and notes, see table 22.
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24.  Share of LDCs in financial flows to all developing countries, by type of flow
(Per cent)
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006
Concessional loans and grantsa 35.4 38.1 37.9 46.8 31.5 37.0
DAC countries 38.6 38.5 38.1 47.1 31.6 37.0
Of which:
 Bilateral 32.7 31.5 34.7 44.1 25.5 31.1
 Multilateral 54.4 52.5 46.2 53.6 53.5 53.5
Non DAC countries 10.8 7.4 28.3 25.4 23.3 38.3
ODA grants total 35.7 40.1 42.2 43.7 30.2 48.6
ODA loans total, net 34.8 32.8 24.7 96.7 49.9 75.9
Technical cooperation 32.5 28.9 29.3 31.3 39.0 33.0
Otherb 36.2 41.7 41.2 51.9 30.1 38.1
Non-concessional flows 4.3 .. 2.2 2.8 0.1 1.2
Total other official flows, net 4.4 .. 11.2 5.1 18.9 8.1
DAC countries 4.4 .. 9.0 4.9 7.0 7.7
Of which:
 Bilateral 9.9 .. .. 12.2 11.0 9.1
 Multilateral 0.4 .. .. .. 13.4 ..
 Non-DAC Countries 1.8 .. .. .. 0.1 1.0
Total private flows, net 2.0 .. 1.6 3.1 0.1 1.7
Of which:
Export credits, netc 114.7 .. 1.2 .. 2.2 8.3
Direct investment 1.4 0.7 0.1 2.5 0.7 0.7
Otherd .. .. 42.0 .. .. 2.6
Total Financial  flows 27.0 12.6 16.8 22.7 11.5 13.6
Note: No percentage is shown when either the net flow to all LDCs or the net flow to all developing countries in a particular year is negative.
For other notes and sources, see table 22.
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25.  Net ODAa from individual DAC member countries to LDCs
Donor countryb % of GNI $ million % change
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2006/
2000
Luxembourg 0.08 0.14 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.38 10 25 46 87 106 123 167.2
Norway 0.52 0.35 0.26 0.33 0.35 0.34 532 502 427 837 1 029 1 129 164.1
Denmark 0.37 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.32 462 511 537 735 814 878 63.5
Sweden 0.35 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.31 0.30 775 500 532 762 1 101 1 152 116.5
Ireland 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.28 21 66 114 322 365 524 358.2
Netherlands 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.21 834 933 794 1 541 1 658 1 395 75.7
Belgium 0.19 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.18 367 274 221 645 609 729 230.5
United Kingdom 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.16 834 827 1 426 2 994 2 709 3 827 168.4
Finland 0.24 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.14 317 106 112 167 245 296 164.4
Portugal 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.53 0.12 0.13 100 165 171 878 210 240 40.7
France 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.12 2 286 1 784 1 144 3 169 2 392 2 624 129.4
Switzerland 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 325 347 270 399 405 453 67.8
Canada 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 740 444 308 702 1 048 1 244 303.6
Germany 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 1 769 1 612 1 212 2 312 1 884 2 642 117.9
DAC countries, total 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 15 198 13 614 12 448 23 549 24 597 29 448 136.6
Austria 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 106 140 113 168 245 252 123.8
New Zealand 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 18 26 29 65 70 74 152.7
Japan 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 1 753 2 665 2 159 1 684 2 326 3 340 54.7
Spain 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 194 221 144 424 817 767 434.0
Australia 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 171 210 293 350 419 451 53.9
United States 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 2 199 1 873 1 989 4 504 4 661 6 416 222.6
Italy 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.04 1 382 382 389 788 1 407 789 102.6
Greece - - 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 - - 19 15 79 103 451.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/DAC, International Development Statistics, online data, May 2008; United Nations/DESA 
statistics for GNI.
a Net disbursements including imputed flows through multilateral channels.
b Ranked in descending order of the ODA/GNI ratio in 2006.
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26.  Bilateral ODA from DAC, non-DAC member countries and multilateral agencies to LDCs
($ million)
Net disbursements Commitments
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006
Bilateral donors: DAC
Australia 104.5 139.4 205.8 296.5 330.4 280.6 97.0 156.0 217.3 249.7 321.5 280.6
Austria 60.9 72.7 65.0 54.8 114.3 72.8 132.4 72.3 60.4 46.2 127.3 80.9
Belgium 273.5 156.9 154.8 458.9 351.0 481.0 273.5 162.0 159.9 488.6 521.4 561.0
Canada 391.6 252.8 195.0 548.6 722.2 744.4 354.0 233.1 265.3 655.7 780.4 789.1
Denmark 295.1 330.2 373.4 493.5 553.2 592.0 269.2 238.4 598.4 663.2 807.9 533.5
Finland 194.6 66.3 65.6 124.5 138.0 161.6 129.8 45.2 44.6 186.5 206.9 246.9
France 1 857.1 1 425.8 846.1 2 269.3 1 209.9 1 242.1 1 480.3 1 146.5 891.1 2 503.6 1 474.7 1 858.6
Germany 1 160.6 1 100.0 665.0 963.2 1 032.1 1 225.9 1 323.2 1 259.0 496.5 1 009.5 1 130.9 1 462.8
Greece .. .. 1.8 15.3 23.8 17.6 .. .. 1.8 15.3 23.8 17.6
Ireland 13.9 55.7 98.3 270.7 288.2 362.3 13.9 .. 98.3 270.7 288.2 362.3
Italy 968.8 275.2 240.1 287.6 291.7 261.1 846.0 529.9 269.0 302.2 463.5 218.8
Japan 1 067.2 1 676.0 1 319.2 914.9 1 311.2 1 139.4 1 144.7 1 824.2 1 266.5 1 848.8 2 559.7 1 676.0
Luxembourg 7.9 21.7 40.5 70.8 82.5 92.5 .. .. 39.9 70.8 82.5 92.5
Netherlands 592.8 673.7 559.9 1 054.9 1 076.4 951.4 681.7 689.3 609.9 802.1 1 188.3 1 474.9
New Zealand 13.3 20.7 24.7 56.3 57.5 58.4 9.7 .. 24.7 57.6 84.8 95.2
Norway 356.7 371.6 310.8 617.4 712.7 790.9 187.0 393.2 249.3 634.2 866.3 773.2
Portugal 99.6 154.6 147.8 824.5 156.8 165.5 .. 103.9 293.0 829.1 162.7 171.5
Spain 96.7 122.1 66.8 169.2 404.1 146.6 .. 7.3 91.6 195.6 461.6 244.6
Sweden 530.2 356.5 339.0 586.9 638.8 728.7 332.4 190.2 297.7 527.7 683.5 809.1
Switzerland 232.1 243.4 166.1 257.7 244.6 248.7 214.9 151.4 203.5 278.8 207.2 221.2
United Kingdom 473.0 561.0 1 015.4 2 202.0 1 751.3 2 151.6 480.0 573.4 1 026.7 2 204.1 1 749.8 2 193.7
United States 1 098.0 1 268.0 1 046.4 3 433.5 4 661.1 5 315.3 1 152.2 1 482.2 1 223.7 4 421.2 5 751.1 6 185.6
Total 9 888.0 9 344.1 7 947.2 15 970.7 16 151.4 17 230.2 9 121.7 9 257.2 8 428.9 18 261.0 19 944.1 20 349.5
Bilateral donors: non-DAC
Czech Republic .. .. 0.4 9.5 5.2 9.9 .. .. 0.4 .. .. ..
Hungary .. .. .. 2.3 20.4 0.5
Iceland .. .. 2.2 4.7 8.5 13.1
Korea 0.2 14.4 21.3 86.1 114.9 92.1 0.3 8.7 38.3 84.3 144.8 171.7
Poland 0.3 .. 0.8 9.6 0.9 93.9 .. .. .. .. 14.0 7.0
Slovak Republic .. .. .. 1.3 21.9 17.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Thailand .. .. .. .. .. 61.5
Turkey .. 1.9 0.4 11.3 33.6 80.6 .. .. .. .. .. 80.6
Arab countries 571.2 16.3 149.1 42.1 50.0 122.8 541.0 240.1 199.6 175.5 .. 125.9
Other bilateral donors 3.9 13.1 19.9 26.6 25.8 30.6 .. .. 19.9 26.5 25.6 1.0
Total 575.6 45.7 193.9 193.6 281.0 522.2 541.3 248.8 258.1 286.3 184.4 386.1
Multilateral donors
AfDF 561.3 452.6 206.6 675.6 709.0 1 282.2 864.4 0.0 398.5 967.0 1 027.8 1 229.8
AsDF 448.2 410.3 388.4 161.8 268.1 461.3 536.4 400.5 589.5 638.8 577.5 708.2
EC 1 168.4 1 565.1 1 013.8 2 642.6 2 909.2 3 124.6 790.8 1 829.5 2 055.1 2 585.8 4 461.3 3 332.2
GEF .. .. 8.1 16.0 25.3 35.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Global Fund .. .. .. 305.0 604.2 659.5 .. .. .. 463.7 638.4 852.3
Nordic Dev. Fund .. 24.3 25.1 43.0 42.5 41.4 .. 31.1 30.2 59.5 56.8 23.9
IDA 2 138.0 1 891.8 1 846.4 3 925.7 3 810.9 3 210.0 2 986.0 2 236.6 2 270.4 4 614.7 .. ..
IDB Spec. Fund 11.7 67.4 26.4 18.7 59.2 49.9 56.0 181.1 1.8 2.3 204.6 102.5
SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF) 297.9 1 383.9 -33.0 -3.7 -361.4 107.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
IFAD 120.6 55.3 78.6 109.4 116.6 113.7 72.1 131.3 152.1 185.6 180.2 185.6
UNDP 366.6 232.0 187.1 220.0 228.9 251.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
UNFPA 46.3 67.8 52.7 114.1 114.4 132.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
UNHCR 197.6 410.1 172.1 164.1 139.4 134.3 .. .. .. .. .. ..
UNICEF 232.7 348.0 171.3 202.8 256.0 294.8 .. .. .. .. .. ..
UNTA 59.0 149.2 113.4 114.9 142.6 85.5 .. .. .. .. .. ..
WFP 501.3 705.9 216.8 179.9 225.5 217.8 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Arab agencies 9.4 -10.2 6.6 167.4 159.2 227.5 216.6 .. 250.0 204.5 327.2 320.4
Total 6 158.8 7 753.3 4 480.3 9 057.3 9 449.6 10 428.9 5 522.2 4 810.1 5 747.6 9 721.9 7 473.7 6 754.9
Grand total 16 622.4 17 143.1 12 621.4 25 221.5 25 882.0 28 181.3 15 185.2 14 316.2 14 434.6 28 269.2 27 602.2 27 490.6
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/DAC, International Development Statistics, online, May 2008.
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27.  Net ODA to LDCs from DAC member countries and multilateral agencies mainly financed by them: 
Distribution by donor and shares allocated to LDCs in total ODA to all developing countries
(Per cent)
Country Distribution by donor Share of LDCs in ODA flows to all developing countries
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006
Bilateral donors: DAC
Australia 0.6 0.8 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.0 15.4 18.2 31.0 32.1 31.3 20.1
Austria 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 153.1 33.4 37.5 24.0 10.7 8.4
Belgium 1.6 0.9 1.2 1.8 1.4 1.7 72.2 46.3 50.6 71.4 35.9 48.4
Canada 2.4 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.8 2.6 39.5 38.0 42.6 49.5 39.0 49.4
Denmark 1.8 1.9 3.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 61.3 55.6 55.5 57.4 56.6 53.4
Finland 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 53.1 42.5 51.6 58.6 33.7 55.5
France 11.2 8.3 6.7 9.0 4.7 4.4 38.7 27.8 39.5 54.7 19.5 18.6
Germany 7.0 6.4 5.3 3.8 4.0 4.4 30.3 30.7 37.5 35.9 17.2 23.9
Greece .. .. 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 .. .. 14.4 31.2 38.7 30.1
Ireland 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.3 87.3 78.9 83.0 81.3 76.1 77.2
Italy 5.8 1.6 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.9 54.4 44.8 103.6 64.8 14.4 15.4
Japan 6.4 9.8 10.5 3.6 5.1 4.0 17.2 18.9 17.0 21.3 14.9 19.2
Luxembourg 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 60.4 56.0 51.2 55.0 57.1 58.8
Netherlands 3.6 3.9 4.4 4.2 4.2 3.4 37.4 44.4 53.7 66.6 45.6 51.0
New Zealand 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 22.6 28.6 41.1 46.3 37.0 42.5
Norway 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.8 62.2 59.0 59.2 66.7 59.0 66.5
Portugal 0.6 0.9 1.2 3.3 0.6 0.6 100.0 96.9 98.0 97.8 93.4 95.0
Spain 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.6 0.5 19.5 19.5 14.5 15.8 27.3 9.4
Sweden 3.2 2.1 2.7 2.3 2.5 2.6 57.8 45.9 47.3 57.5 56.8 48.6
Switzerland 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9 60.1 52.8 52.6 52.8 33.1 45.7
United Kingdom 2.8 3.3 8.0 8.7 6.8 7.6 44.1 46.3 53.5 55.1 26.4 30.8
United States 6.6 7.4 8.3 13.6 18.0 18.9 20.2 40.5 32.6 34.1 23.7 35.1
Total 59.5 54.5 63.0 63.3 62.4 61.1 32.7 31.5 34.7 44.1 25.5 31.1
Bilateral donors: non-DAC
Czech Republic .. .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. .. 13.4 24.5 17.1 25.7
Hungary .. .. .. 0.0 0.1 0.0 .. .. .. 32.6 93.1 0.7
Iceland .. .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. .. 67.5 62.8 69.4 71.8
Korea 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 2.1 26.7 21.2 29.2 26.9 31.5
Poland 0.0 .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 100.0 .. 11.7 69.6 9.8 96.5
Slovak Republic .. .. .. 0.0 0.1 0.1 .. .. .. 29.2 87.2 92.4
Thailand .. .. .. .. .. 0.2 .. .. .. .. .. 95.3
Turkey .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 .. 7.4 11.8 14.3 12.4 28.1
Arab Countries 3.4 0.1 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 10.8 3.5 28.1 16.2 14.2 30.1
Other bilateral donors 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 19.8 18.3 50.3 46.1 42.1 43.4
Total 3.5 0.3 1.5 0.8 1.1 1.9 10.8 7.4 28.3 25.4 23.3 38.3
Multilateral donors
AfDF 3.4 2.6 1.6 2.7 2.7 4.5 94.4 80.7 71.5 82.8 86.4 89.4
AsDF 2.7 2.4 3.1 0.6 1.0 1.6 41.3 37.6 43.8 26.2 33.4 49.0
EC 7.0 9.1 8.0 10.5 11.2 11.1 53.0 48.4 40.3 48.4 48.6 46.5
GEF .. .. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 .. .. 12.6 15.6 18.5 27.6
Global Fund .. .. .. 1.2 2.3 2.3 .. .. .. 54.1 63.4 56.6
Nordic Dev. Fund .. 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 .. 49.5 66.5 61.3 67.4 60.9
IDA 12.9 11.0 14.6 15.6 14.7 11.4 54.7 41.5 48.2 60.0 61.6 57.7
IDB Spec. Fund 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 10.4 27.8 19.1 7.9 29.8 27.0
SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF) 1.8 8.1 -0.3 0.0 -1.4 0.4 92.7 89.4 15.4 2.5 57.4 ..
IFAD 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 49.2 62.0 60.1 76.1 63.9 55.2
UN 8.4 11.2 7.2 3.9 4.3 4.0 51.0 55.8 47.7 46.0 42.5 43.5
Other 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.8 9.3 43.5 6.5 48.8 46.9 45.9
Total 37.0 45.2 35.5 35.9 36.5 37.0 54.4 52.5 46.2 53.6 53.5 53.5
Grand total 100 100 100 100 100 100 35.4 38.1 37.9 46.8 31.5 37.0
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/DAC, International Development Statistics, online, May 2008.
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28.  Total Financial Flows and ODA from all sources to individual LDCs
($ million, net disbursements)
Country Total financial flows of which: ODA
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan 120 213 157 2 207 2 795 3 045 122 213 136 2 171 2 752 3 000
Angola 88 491 118 1 085 1 689 153 266 416 302 1 145 437 171
Bangladesh 2 164 862 1 230 1 531 1 710 1 325 2 093 1 282 1 168 1 412 1 336 1 223
Benin 242 281 227 382 377 370 267 280 238 386 346 375
Bhutan 49 78 44 78 95 93 46 71 53 78 90 94
Burkina Faso 342 486 342 659 710 971 327 490 335 624 681 871
Burundi 253 279 78 353 373 403 263 287 93 362 365 415
Cambodia 41 568 404 321 558 720 41 551 396 483 541 529
Cape Verde 104 162 119 209 260 195 105 116 94 143 162 138
Central African Republic 256 168 50 111 97 138 249 168 75 110 96 134
Chad 312 284 -226 335 385 298 311 235 130 329 382 284
Comoros 44 40 -2 25 43 31 45 42 19 25 25 30
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 1 409 240 192 1 786 1 708 1 202 896 195 177 1 824 1 827 2 056
Djibouti 191 103 91 74 98 185 194 105 71 64 76 117
Equatorial Guinea 62 34 22 848 471 1 132 60 33 21 30 38 27
Eritrea 0 148 183 256 354 136 0 148 176 264 355 129
Ethiopia 982 860 680 1 669 1 919 1 944 1 009 876 686 1 806 1 910 1 947
Gambia 106 43 45 60 68 72 97 45 49 55 61 74
Guinea 283 433 329 223 163 175 292 416 153 272 199 164
Guinea-Bissau 133 116 84 76 77 77 126 118 80 77 79 82
Haiti 153 711 176 260 508 731 167 722 208 260 502 581
Kiribati 20 15 18 17 29 -46 20 15 18 17 28 -45
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 149 309 287 260 355 1 444 149 307 282 270 296 364
Lesotho 145 209 11 89 51 61 139 113 37 96 69 72
Liberia 519 -54 632 1 256 -2 317 312 114 123 67 213 233 269
Madagascar 429 251 318 1 229 721 888 397 299 322 1 248 914 754
Malawi 515 437 431 507 576 677 500 434 446 501 578 669
Maldives 38 44 11 76 128 143 21 58 19 27 77 39
Mali 471 586 385 534 745 833 479 540 359 568 699 825
Mauritania 218 214 211 217 203 173 236 230 211 181 196 188
Mozambique 1 046 1 092 1 146 1 388 1 269 1 623 998 1 062 876 1 235 1 277 1 611
Myanmar 115 177 56 86 130 120 161 150 106 124 145 147
Nepal 426 412 407 416 415 501 423 429 387 428 425 514
Niger 373 198 183 457 385 -532 388 271 208 541 511 401
Rwanda 283 641 318 490 559 548 288 695 321 486 571 585
Samoa 54 47 29 21 74 50 48 43 27 31 44 47
Sao Tome and Principe 53 58 36 32 31 25 54 84 35 33 32 22
Senegal 753 642 474 981 684 841 812 659 423 1 037 672 825
Sierra Leone 63 211 185 355 343 455 59 205 181 354 344 364
Solomon Islands 58 46 55 125 170 216 46 48 68 121 198 205
Somalia 486 188 100 195 237 400 491 188 101 200 237 392
Sudan 730 295 315 1 014 1 856 2 128 813 237 220 992 1 832 2 058
Timor-Leste -5 9 649 537 186 147 0 0 231 161 185 210
Togo 256 187 60 108 92 155 258 191 70 64 83 79
Tuvalu 5 8 0 8 8 19 5 8 4 8 9 15
Uganda 660 852 792 1 181 1 241 1 569 663 833 817 1 194 1 177 1 551
United Rep. of Tanzania 1 118 872 1 184 1 766 1 659 1 960 1 163 869 1 019 1 751 1 481 1 825
Vanuatu 148 35 71 21 51 79 50 46 46 38 39 49
Yemen 326 119 287 194 324 876 400 167 263 253 336 284
Zambia 578 2 011 701 973 1 332 845 475 2 031 795 1 125 935 1 425
LDCs 17 363 16 713 13 694 27 077 25 997 29 901 16 623 17 143 12 621 25 222 25 882 28 181
All developing countries 64 246 133 017 81 386 119 286 225 548 220 545 46 898 45 048 33 286 53 852 82 290 76 202
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/DAC, International Development Statistics, online data, May 2008.
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29.  Bilateral and multilateral net ODA disbursements to individual LDCs
Country Per 
capita
Net
disburse- 
ments
of which: 
technical
cooperation
Bilateral
ODA
a
of
which:
Grants
Multi- 
lateral 
ODA
of
which:
Grants
Per 
capita
Net
disburse-
ments
of which: 
technical
cooperation
Bilateral
ODA
a
of
which:
Grants
Multi- 
lateral 
ODA
of
which:
Grants
Dollars $ million As % of total net ODA Dollars $ million As % of total net ODA
1995–1996 2005–2006
Afghanistan 10.3 191.0 23.5 49.9 49.9 50.1 50.1 112.4 2 875.9 33.3 82.2 82.0 17.8 15.6
Sudan 7.6 227.4 29.6 55.6 57.3 44.4 36.6 52.1 1 945.3 8.9 80.0 78.0 20.0 19.4
Dem.Rep. of the Congo 3.9 180.4 31.2 62.9 71.0 37.1 39.1 32.5 1 941.5 9.8 65.3 56.5 34.7 25.4
Ethiopia * 13.8 846.2 21.0 57.6 52.5 42.4 19.9 24.1 1 928.4 12.0 58.7 56.7 41.3 123.2
United Rep. of Tanzania * 28.7 869.7 29.0 68.7 68.6 31.3 11.1 42.4 1 653.1 11.9 56.4 56.6 43.6 134.6
Mozambique * 60.2 974.1 21.5 64.4 71.1 35.6 12.5 69.6 1 443.8 14.1 59.0 59.7 41.0 70.3
Uganda * 34.9 753.3 18.2 54.0 48.2 46.0 18.9 46.4 1 364.0 17.9 59.9 60.0 40.1 147.2
Bangladesh 9.8 1 254.8 21.9 54.3 58.1 45.7 15.2 8.3 1 279.5 14.2 42.1 58.9 57.9 17.3
Zambia * 140.7 1 319.4 11.4 30.1 29.4 69.9 6.1 101.8 1 179.9 14.9 82.3 111.8 17.7 126.7
Madagascar * 23.1 327.1 36.3 65.0 76.2 35.0 16.1 44.1 834.1 12.5 46.1 58.2 53.9 154.8
Burkina Faso * 43.6 454.4 26.1 58.9 59.6 41.1 19.1 54.8 775.9 14.7 47.9 47.7 52.1 95.2
Mali * 58.1 514.7 24.3 54.5 52.1 45.5 12.6 64.6 762.0 17.5 51.9 54.2 48.1 132.3
Senegal * 67.2 616.6 27.9 66.1 71.9 33.9 13.3 62.8 748.5 39.4 64.5 76.7 35.5 146.1
Malawi * 45.4 462.8 18.7 52.7 48.8 47.3 19.9 46.5 623.0 16.7 59.1 60.8 40.9 206.4
Rwanda * 100.8 580.0 15.4 51.1 51.8 48.9 41.1 61.8 578.0 20.4 52.6 58.2 47.4 126.2
Haiti 68.9 544.8 18.3 60.7 60.2 39.3 19.3 57.8 541.5 30.0 65.0 64.9 35.0 22.9
Cambodia 41.9 483.8 29.2 61.4 61.6 38.6 19.9 38.0 534.8 34.4 69.6 65.6 30.4 13.1
Nepal 18.6 408.5 33.9 61.4 61.6 38.6 10.5 17.2 469.6 27.1 71.0 78.8 29.0 15.2
Niger * 27.6 261.4 36.4 68.6 75.9 31.4 22.7 33.8 456.1 18.6 53.7 56.6 46.3 162.9
Burundi 31.7 198.7 18.4 43.3 48.9 56.7 45.3 48.7 390.1 11.8 51.8 51.6 48.2 39.1
Benin * 45.0 283.9 22.4 62.5 57.4 37.5 12.8 41.8 360.5 28.5 60.4 63.7 39.6 151.3
Sierra Leone * 46.6 193.9 13.6 33.9 31.1 66.1 21.6 62.5 354.0 10.5 46.6 39.7 53.4 43.5
Chad 36.5 265.4 21.8 47.6 47.6 52.4 20.4 32.3 332.9 13.6 48.9 49.9 51.1 33.8
Laos 67.2 319.0 23.0 49.8 55.9 50.2 9.2 57.8 330.0 24.0 62.1 53.1 37.9 14.1
Somalia 22.0 137.9 27.2 57.6 59.9 42.4 43.3 37.8 314.5 4.4 65.6 65.9 34.4 34.4
Yemen 13.0 204.9 28.8 59.7 65.5 40.3 12.5 14.5 310.3 19.8 47.2 48.7 52.8 18.8
Angola 35.1 437.9 19.5 61.3 57.4 38.7 30.9 18.6 303.8 25.9 50.7 86.3 49.3 42.1
Liberia 66.8 147.9 8.4 49.6 26.7 50.4 50.4 71.4 250.6 22.2 66.4 67.1 33.6 33.6
Eritrea 47.2 152.9 33.5 75.4 73.7 24.6 23.7 52.5 242.0 9.1 58.8 55.3 41.2 22.4
Solomon Islands 123.0 45.2 52.4 79.1 83.4 20.9 12.4 421.1 201.4 73.2 87.2 87.4 12.8 11.8
Timor-Leste .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 180.9 197.2 38.7 84.9 84.9 15.1 15.1
Mauritania * 111.1 250.7 18.9 39.4 42.2 60.6 38.4 63.9 191.8 21.7 56.8 59.0 43.2 232.2
Guinea 48.0 356.9 19.3 53.4 52.0 46.6 21.2 19.9 181.2 38.1 67.9 76.0 32.1 35.3
Cape Verde 286.0 116.1 32.7 67.8 66.0 32.2 18.8 293.0 150.2 29.3 69.0 62.7 31.0 10.1
Myanmar 2.2 94.5 39.6 92.2 152.8 7.8 33.2 3.0 145.6 27.2 65.6 63.5 34.4 35.1
Central African Rep. 48.1 168.2 26.5 74.8 81.7 25.2 12.9 27.1 114.8 33.4 55.7 60.7 44.3 69.7
Djibouti 159.2 100.8 42.8 78.6 76.4 21.4 11.6 119.3 96.8 38.6 74.4 75.1 25.6 20.3
Bhutan 126.6 64.3 41.6 76.1 76.2 23.9 16.6 142.9 91.9 25.0 58.8 59.9 41.2 22.2
Togo 37.7 173.4 17.0 61.6 60.0 38.4 12.6 12.8 80.7 40.9 70.9 77.7 29.1 34.0
Guinea-Bissau 123.2 148.9 28.7 70.2 50.6 29.8 14.4 49.8 80.7 19.8 48.9 49.0 51.1 52.5
Lesotho 62.1 107.9 30.6 53.0 50.8 47.0 27.8 35.3 70.2 22.2 54.6 58.5 45.4 30.5
Gambia 34.5 40.7 47.1 48.0 62.0 52.0 22.9 41.3 67.7 16.1 34.0 31.9 66.0 27.0
Maldives 179.3 44.9 20.7 61.1 48.0 38.9 9.9 194.0 57.8 15.1 62.0 51.5 38.0 26.1
Samoa 223.3 37.8 48.9 81.8 82.5 18.2 11.2 246.6 45.5 46.9 75.1 75.2 24.9 14.0
Vanuatu 220.2 38.3 51.6 86.4 86.4 13.6 11.1 202.4 44.1 72.4 84.9 86.2 15.2 18.1
Equatorial Guinea 83.0 32.1 43.7 70.1 72.2 29.9 23.5 66.7 32.7 52.2 73.1 80.6 26.9 35.7
Comoros 65.2 40.2 38.7 54.7 54.6 45.3 25.5 34.2 27.6 48.4 69.1 76.5 31.9 30.7
Sao Tome & Principe * 509.1 65.7 28.2 68.8 48.4 31.2 12.0 173.7 26.7 41.3 68.6 69.0 31.4 39.1
Tuvalu 923.4 9.1 32.5 85.2 85.2 14.8 12.8 1162.1 12.2 25.2 76.8 76.8 23.4 14.8
Kiribati 180.7 14.1 51.1 81.5 81.5 18.5 18.2 -92.2 -8.6 -123.6 170.4 170.4 -70.4 -57.1
LDCs 25.6 15 562.5 23.3 56.6 57.2 43.4 19.0 34.8 27 031.6 19.3 63.2 65.8 36.8 74.7
All devg. countries 9.5 42 676.3 29.0 67.1 58.7 32.9 14.1 15.1 79 246.4 19.9 76.6 78.7 23.4 38.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/DAC, International Development Statistics, online, May 2008; United Nations DESA Population Division, 
January 2006.
Note:   The countries have been ranked in descending order of total net ODA disbursements received in 2005–2006.
a Includes ODA from DAC and non-DAC donors.
* LDCs that have reached the HIPC completion point (October 2007).
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30.  Foreign direct investment: Inflows to and outflows from LDCs
($ million)
Country FDI inflows FDI outflows
1985 1990 2000 2004 2005 2006 1985 1990 2000 2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan .. .. 0.2 0.6 3.6 2.1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Angola 278.0 -334.5 878.5 1,449.2 -1,303.3 -1,140.0 .. 0.9 -21.4 35.2 219.4 92.7
Bangladesh -6.7 3.2 578.7 460.4 692.0 625.0 .. 0.5 2.0 5.7 1.9 8.3
Benin -0.1 62.4 59.7 63.8 53.0 63.0 .. 0.3 3.6 -1.3 -0.4 -0.8
Bhutan .. 1.6 0.0 3.5 9.0 6.1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Burkina Faso -1.4 0.5 23.1 14.3 34.2 25.9 0.0 -0.6 0.2 -8.9 -0.2 -2.4
Burundi 1.6 1.3 11.7 0.0 0.6 290.0 -1.1 0.0 0.0 .. .. ..
Cambodia .. .. 148.5 131.4 381.2 483.2 .. .. 6.6 10.2 6.3 8.4
Cape Verde .. 0.3 33.5 20.4 75.5 121.7 .. 0.3 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
Central African Republic 3.0 0.7 0.8 24.8 28.6 24.3 0.6 3.8 0.0 .. .. ..
Chad 53.7 9.4 114.8 495.4 612.9 700.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 .. .. ..
Comoros .. 0.4 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.8 .. 1.1 .. .. .. ..
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 69.2 -14.5 23.4 9.9 -78.6 180.0 .. .. -1.8 -0.1 .. ..
Djibouti 0.2 0.1 3.3 38.5 22.2 108.3 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Equatorial Guinea 2.4 11.1 111.4 1,650.6 1,873.1 1,655.8 .. 0.1 -3.6 .. .. ..
Eritrea .. .. 27.9 -7.9 -3.0 3.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ethiopia 0.2 12.0 134.6 545.1 221.1 364.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ethiopia (former) 0.2 12.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Gambia -0.5 14.1 43.5 49.1 44.7 69.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Guinea 1.1 17.9 9.9 97.9 102.0 108.0 0.0 0.1 .. -1.0 -5.0 ..
Guinea-Bissau 1.4 2.0 0.7 1.7 8.7 42.0 .. .. .. -7.5 0.7 -3.8
Haiti 4.9 8.0 13.3 5.9 26.0 160.0 .. -8.0 .. .. .. ..
Kiribati 0.2 0.3 17.6 18.8 0.8 12.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Lao People's Dem. Rep. -1.6 6.0 34.0 16.9 27.7 187.4 -0.2 0.2 4.1 .. .. ..
Lesotho 4.8 16.1 31.5 53.3 57.3 57.0 .. .. .. 0.1 .. ..
Liberia -16.2 225.2 20.8 236.9 -479.5 -81.7 245.0 -3.1 779.9 304.5 436.8 346.4
Madagascar -0.2 22.4 83.0 95.2 86.0 230.2 .. 1.3 .. .. .. ..
Malawi 0.5 23.3 39.6 22.0 26.5 29.7 .. .. -0.6 1.6 1.0 0.9
Maldives 1.2 5.6 13.0 14.7 9.5 13.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 2.9 5.7 82.4 101.0 223.8 185.0 .. 0.2 4.0 0.8 -0.9 0.8
Mauritania 7.0 6.7 40.1 391.6 863.6 -3.4 .. .. .. 4.0 2.0 ..
Mozambique 0.3 9.2 139.2 244.7 107.9 153.7 .. .. 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4
Myanmar .. 225.1 208.0 251.0 235.8 142.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Nepal 0.7 5.9 -0.5 -0.4 2.4 -6.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Niger -9.4 40.8 8.4 19.7 30.3 20.5 1.9 0.0 -0.6 7.1 -4.4 1.6
Rwanda 14.6 7.7 8.1 7.7 10.5 15.0 0.0 0.0 .. .. .. ..
Samoa 0.4 6.6 -1.5 2.2 -3.6 -1.7 .. .. .. 0.4 2.0 1.5
Sao Tome and Principe .. .. 3.8 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Senegal -18.9 56.9 62.9 77.0 44.6 58.0 3.1 -9.5 0.6 13.1 -7.7 4.8
Sierra Leone -31.0 32.4 38.9 61.2 58.6 42.8 .. 0.1 .. .. -7.5 2.7
Solomon Islands 0.7 10.4 1.4 5.7 18.6 18.8 .. .. .. 0.0 1.6 0.4
Somalia -0.7 5.6 0.3 -4.8 24.0 96.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sudan -3.0 -31.1 392.2 1 511.1 2 304.6 3 541.4 .. .. .. .. .. 8.8
Timor-Leste .. .. .. 2.9 0.1 2.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Togo 16.3 22.7 41.5 59.4 77.0 56.7 .. 4.6 0.4 -12.6 -14.9 -20.3
Tuvalu .. .. -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda -4.0 -5.9 180.8 222.2 257.1 306.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
United Rep. of Tanzania 14.5 0.0 216.0 330.6 447.6 376.9 .. .. .. .. .. -0.1
Vanuatu 4.6 13.1 20.3 17.8 13.4 61.3 .. .. .. 0.8 0.8 0.8
Yemen 3.2 -130.9 6.4 143.6 -302.1 -384.7 0.5 .. -8.8 21.5 26.0 36.3
Zambia 51.5 202.8 121.7 364.0 380.0 350.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
LDCs 445.6 578.7 4 026.4 9 319.9 7 326.2 9 374.5 250.2 -7.5 766.2 373.6 657.8 487.4
  African LDCs and Haiti 442.8 431.7 3 001.4 8 250.8 6 237.9 8 212.2 249.9 -8.2 762.3 335.0 619.1 431.8
  Asian LDCs -4.4 111.0 975.3 1 009.9 1 049.7 1 058.0 0.3 0.7 3.9 37.4 34.2 53.0
  Island LDCs 7.2 36.1 49.8 59.2 38.6 104.4 .. .. .. 1.2 4.4 2.7
Other developing 
countries
13 751.3 35 313.4 252 061.4 273 709.9 306 989.5 369 696.0 3 661.4 11 920.8 132 574.8 116 962.9 115 202.6 173 901.8
All developing countries 14 196.9 35 892.1 256 087.8 283 029.8 314 315.7 379 070.5 3 911.6 11 913.3 133 341.0 117 336.5 115 860.4 174 389.3
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database.
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31.  External debt and debt service by source of lending
($ million) 
External debt (at year end)a % of 
total
Debt service % of
total
1985 1990 2000 2004 2005 2006 1985 2006 1985 1990 2000 2004 2005 2006 1985 2006
I. Long term 59 030 106 222 120 012 139 465 132 896 108 048 80.2 81.2 2 202 3 056 4 504 5 288 6 098 7 872 100.0 100.0
Public and publicly 
guaranteed
58 544 105 369 117 594 137 342 130 930 107 535 79.5 80.8 2 145 2 975 4 437 5 061 5 810 7 682 97.4 97.6
Official creditors 50 757 90 628 107 746 126 830 119 303 97 602 69.0 73.3 1 510 2 226 2 868 3 587 3 659 4 842 68.6 61.5
A Concessional 38 313 69 379 90 936 112 900 107 176 85 948 52.0 64.6 682 1 243 2 235 2 538 2 655 3 018 31.0 38.3
Of which:
Bilateral 25 429 39 481 37 143 35 471 31 638 32 942 34.5 24.8 456 756 1 154 1 039 1 181 1 162 20.7 14.8
Multilateral 12 884 29 897 53 792 77 429 75 538 53 006 17.5 39.8 226 488 1 081 1 499 1 474 1 856 10.3 23.6
B. Non-concessional 12 444 21 249 16 810 13 930 12 127 11 653 16.9 8.8 827 983 633 1 049 1 004 1 824  
Private creditors 7 787 14 741 9 848 10 512 11 627 9 933 10.6 7.5 635 749 1 568 1 474 2 151 2 840 28.8 36.1
      Bonds 7 10 7 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.1 0.0
      Commercial banks 2 491 3 159 5 023 6 389 7 647 6 640 3.4 5.0 227 174 1 273 1 107 1 889 2 024 10.3 25.7
      Other private 5 289 11 572 4 818 4 122 3 978 3 292 7.2 2.5 407 574 295 367 261 816 18.5 10.4
Private non-guaranteed 486 852 2 418 2 123 1 967 2 274 0.7 1.7 57 81 67 227 288 199 2.6 2.5
II. Short term 9 400 13 078 16 782 16 910 18 078 19 948 12.8 15.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
III. Use of IMF credit 5 181 5 397 5 838 6 397 5 474 3 315 7.0 2.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Total external debt 73 611 124 697 142 632 162 771 156 448 133 082 100.0 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from World Bank, Global Development Finance, online, May 2008. 
a Refers to debt stocks.
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32.  Total external debt and debt service payments of individual LDCs
($ million)
Country External debt (at year end)a Debt serviceb
1985 1990 2000 2004 2005 2006 1985 1990 2000 2004 2005 2006
Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. 1 771 .. .. .. .. .. 9
Angola .. 8 592 9 412 9 347 11 782 9 563 .. 283 1 680 1 866 2 541 4 213
Bangladesh 6 658 12 439 15 717 20 129 18 928 20 521 195 495 684 646 769 624
Benin 854 1 292 1 591 1 916 1 855 824 41 33 60 54 60 81
Bhutan 9 84 204 593 649 713 0 5 7 12 7 9
Burkina Faso 513 832 1 422 2 045 2 042 1 142 25 28 38 48 41 50
Burundi 455 907 1 108 1 390 1 322 1 411 21 40 14 59 39 39
Cambodia 7 1 845 2 628 3 439 3 515 3 527 0 29 19 16 20 28
Cape Verde 95 134 326 520 543 601 5 6 16 23 32 30
Central African Republic 344 699 858 1 081 1 016 1 020 12 17 12 11 1 63
Chad 216 529 1 138 1 701 1 633 1 772 12 6 24 32 47 52
Comoros 134 188 237 307 291 282 2 1 2 3 4 3
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 6 183 10 259 11 692 11 434 10 600 11 201 300 137 0 136 209 311
Djibouti 144 205 262 417 412 464 4 11 11 17 14 21
Equatorial Guinea 132 241 248 296 272 278 2 1 2 5 4 4
Eritrea .. .. 311 718 736 800 .. .. 3 19 20 12
Ethiopia 5 206 8 630 5 483 6 644 6 261 2 326 111 201 123 89 80 160
Gambia 245 369 483 672 668 725 1 30 19 25 25 28
Guinea 1 465 2 476 3 388 3 538 3 247 3 281 61 149 131 149 131 141
Guinea-Bissau 318 692 804 765 693 711 5 6 19 39 29 30
Haiti 757 890 953 1 044 1 034 1 189 21 15 29 72 45 48
Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 619 1 768 2 502 2 524 2 690 2 985 5 8 32 113 165 166
Lesotho 175 396 672 769 664 670 18 23 56 53 80 46
Liberia 1 243 1 849 2 032 2 715 2 576 2 674 19 2 0 0 0 0
Madagascar 2 520 3 689 4 691 3 790 3 466 1 453 94 155 102 75 66 67
Malawi 1 021 1 558 2 705 3 428 3 183 850 76 103 51 49 60 70
Maldives 83 78 206 353 368 459 9 7 19 32 33 33
Mali 1 456 2 468 2 980 3 320 3 025 1 436 34 43 68 79 70 79
Mauritania 1 454 2 113 2 378 2 333 2 316 1 630 76 118 66 45 54 69
Mozambique 2 871 4 650 7 257 4 869 4 637 3 265 57 64 84 62 66 53
Myanmar 3 098 4 695 5 928 7 239 6 645 6 828 185 57 75 105 92 70
Nepal 590 1 627 2 869 3 358 3 197 3 409 13 52 95 115 116 136
Niger 1 195 1 726 1 677 1 973 1 980 805 95 71 22 35 32 67
Rwanda 363 708 1 272 1 661 1 518 419 13 14 21 23 19 30
Samoa 76 92 197 571 656 858 5 4 6 6 6 8
Sao Tome and Principe 63 150 310 366 340 355 3 2 3 6 6 9
Senegal 2 559 3 744 3 607 3 940 3 883 1 984 103 225 185 297 168 198
Sierra Leone 711 1 197 1 226 1 728 1 682 1 428 15 16 19 24 20 27
Solomon Islands 66 120 155 177 166 173 3 10 9 17 14 4
Somalia 1 639 2 370 2 562 2 849 2 750 2 836 5 7 0 0 0 0
Sudan 8 955 14 762 16 411 19 353 18 455 19 158 89 23 185 281 356 265
Timor-Leste .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Togo 935 1 281 1 430 1 836 1 708 1 806 90 60 15 4 5 7
Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 1 239 2 606 3 497 4 753 4 427 1 264 56 84 47 70 133 110
United Rep. of Tanzania 9 105 6 454 6 931 7 805 7 796 4 240 140 136 150 86 75 101
Vanuatu 16 38 74 121 82 86 1 2 2 2 2 3
Yemen 3 339 6 352 5 075 5 488 5 363 5 563 94 108 126 175 148 159
Zambia 4 487 6 905 5 722 7 455 5 378 2 325 87 171 177 211 194 147
LDCs 73 611 124 697 142 632 162 771 156 448 133 082 2 202 3 056 4 504 5 288 6 098 7 881
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations  based on World Bank  Global Development Finance  online data  May 2008.
a External debt cover both long-term and short term debt as well as the use of IMF credit.
b Debt service cover long term debt only.
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33.  Debt and debt service ratio
(Per cent)
Country  External Debta / GDP Debt serviceb / exportsc
1985 1990 2000 2003 2004 2005 1985 1990 2000 2003 2004 2005
Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. 21.1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Angola .. 83.7 103.1 47.3 38.5 21.2 .. 7.1 20.5 10.7 7.7 7.6
Bangladesh 30.8 41.3 33.4 35.5 31.5 33.2 16.3 26.9 10.4 6.7 6.5 6.5
Benin 81.6 70.0 70.6 47.3 43.3 17.3 16.6 12.3 17.5 8.9 9.4 ..
Bhutan 5.0 27.5 45.5 83.2 78.3 75.7 0.1 6.2 5.0 3.3 4.1 2.2
Burkina Faso 33.0 26.8 54.5 40.0 36.4 18.5 16.1 8.3 15.9 7.7 8.8 6.2
Burundi 39.6 80.1 156.3 209.2 166.1 156.2 16.7 44.6 25.3 44.1 65.0 39.6
Cambodia .. 165.5 71.9 64.8 56.1 48.6 .. 42.3 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.4
Cape Verde .. 39.5 61.4 56.2 54.4 52.5 .. 13.1 10.8 14.0 13.4 14.2
Central African Republic 39.7 47.0 89.4 82.7 74.1 68.3 6.5 7.5 6.2 0.1 6.7 0.3
Chad 21.0 30.4 82.2 38.5 27.7 27.1 10.1 2.8 10.2 1.5 1.0 1.2
Comoros 117.2 75.1 117.2 84.7 75.1 69.9 9.7 2.7 5.9 5.6 6.2 8.1
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 85.9 109.7 271.6 174.0 149.2 131.1 15.2 5.0 0.0 7.1 6.1 8.3
Djibouti 42.2 45.4 47.6 62.6 58.2 60.3 .. 4.5 5.5 5.5 6.0 4.4
Equatorial Guinea 166.2 182.4 19.8 6.0 3.6 3.2 7.2 2.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
Eritrea .. .. 49.1 113.1 75.8 73.7 .. .. 3.1 13.2 22.2 23.2
Ethiopia 55.3 71.4 69.4 70.0 55.0 17.5 20.1 29.9 12.5 5.5 4.8 3.8
Gambia 108.6 116.5 114.8 167.6 144.9 142.0 0.9 16.0 9.2 10.8 12.1 ..
Guinea 9.4 92.9 108.9 89.1 97.5 98.9 1.4 18.0 17.9 13.8 16.1 12.2
Guinea-Bissau 221.3 283.7 373.3 283.4 230.0 233.6 34.7 23.7 27.7 11.9 34.7 22.8
Haiti 37.7 31.1 24.8 27.2 24.0 23.9 6.6 2.9 6.3 6.7 12.0 6.4
Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. ..
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 26.1 204.3 144.2 100.6 93.2 86.9 4.9 8.5 6.2 14.6 14.4 13.4
Lesotho 60.5 64.3 78.8 58.3 46.6 44.8 43.9 22.0 21.9 8.4 7.5 10.6
Liberia 132.9 481.0 362.2 590.2 486.9 423.8 4.0 .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Madagascar 88.2 119.7 121.0 86.9 68.8 26.4 26.8 30.2 8.6 4.5 5.5 4.1
Malawi 90.2 82.9 155.2 130.6 111.5 26.9 27.9 23.0 11.3 5.0 8.1 11.1
Maldives 65.3 36.2 33.0 46.9 49.1 49.5 .. .. 3.3 2.9 .. ..
Mali 110.8 101.9 123.0 68.1 57.0 24.5 15.6 10.3 10.4 4.5 5.8 3.7
Mauritania 212.8 207.3 219.9 150.7 126.1 61.2 18.5 25.3 13.1 9.3 6.8 3.7
Mozambique 64.4 188.8 170.8 85.5 70.5 47.8 44.4 31.6 11.3 4.0 2.9 2.3
Myanmar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Nepal 22.5 44.8 52.2 46.2 39.1 38.1 4.4 13.6 7.4 9.1 9.7 9.6
Niger 82.9 69.6 93.2 67.1 57.7 22.0 31.9 18.9 7.0 5.6 6.9 ..
Rwanda 21.2 27.4 70.2 91.0 70.7 16.8 7.1 9.5 13.9 10.1 10.2 6.7
Samoa 89.4 82.1 85.2 159.6 162.5 202.5 .. .. 7.1 .. .. ..
Sao Tome and Principe .. .. .. 341.9 302.3 289.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Senegal 86.4 65.5 76.9 49.6 44.9 21.6 12.5 15.5 14.1 9.7 12.7 7.2
Sierra Leone 82.9 184.2 193.4 161.3 138.6 98.5 12.0 11.3 16.1 9.7 9.1 6.2
Solomon Islands 41.0 57.1 51.9 66.7 55.5 51.5 3.1 10.2 7.6 7.4 .. ..
Somalia 187.0 258.5 .. .. .. .. 9.1 7.5 .. .. .. ..
Sudan 71.9 163.7 132.7 89.3 66.1 51.2 12.5 4.7 9.8 6.4 5.6 5.9
Timor-Leste .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Togo 122.7 78.6 107.6 89.1 81.0 81.9 24.4 11.0 3.6 0.2 0.5 ..
Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 35.2 60.5 59.0 69.7 50.6 13.4 11.6 26.9 7.1 6.1 6.1 9.4
United Rep. of Tanzania .. 151.5 76.3 68.8 61.9 33.2 .. 25.4 9.8 3.0 2.9 2.4
Vanuatu 13.0 25.4 30.5 36.6 22.3 22.2 0.9 2.3 .. 1.3 1.7 ..
Yemen .. 131.6 53.8 39.6 32.0 29.2 .. 15.7 3.2 .. .. ..
Zambia 199.2 210.0 176.7 137.0 74.0 21.7 10.5 14.5 20.2 32.8 8.5 4.7
LDCs 64.9 91.3 86.3 66.7 54.3 39.6 12.1 14.4 11.1 7.4 6.4 6.1
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007 and Global Development Finance 2007,
online data, May 2008.
a External debt cover  both long-term and short -term debt as well as use of IMF credit.
b Debt service cover long term debt only. 
c Exports of good and services (including non-factor services).
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The least developed countries (LDCs) are a group of countries that have been classified by the United 
Nations as least developed in terms of their low GDP per capita, their weak human assets and their high 
degree of economic vulnerability. This Report assesses recent trends in growth and poverty in these 
countries, as well as changes in the terms of development partnership. 
The strong growth performance of the LDCs as a group has been one of the most encouraging features of 
the global economy so far in this decade. Their economic expansion since 2000 has been stronger than 
in the 1990s, and a spurt of growth in 2005 and 2006 gave LDCs their strongest growth performance 
for thirty years. Against this background, the Report asks: 
?   How sustainable is economic growth and how many LDCs are participating in the growth surge?
? To what extent is economic growth leading to improvements in human well-being? In particular, 
how much is rapid growth translating into accelerated poverty reduction and improved progress 
towards the Millennium Development Goals? 
? To what extent do LDCs have effective leadership and ownership in the design and implementation 
of their national development strategies?
The Report finds that rapid economic growth in the LDCs has been associated with a slow rate of poverty 
reduction and slow progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The LDCs as a group are not 
on track to achieve the goal of reducing the incidence of poverty by half between 1990 and 2015. There 
is no evidence of any significant acceleration in social progress since 2000, despite the adoption of the 
Millennium Declaration and more socially-oriented policy reforms. The LDCs are also very vulnerable 
to a slowdown in growth, as they are still characterized by low levels of domestic resource mobilization 
and investment, high levels of commodity dependence, very weak development of their manufacturing 
industries, weak export upgrading, worsening trade balances, and rising food and oil import bills. 
The achievement of more sustainable and inclusive economic growth in the LDCs requires effective 
national development strategies as well as effective aid. Enhanced country ownership of national 
strategies and policies is essential for a strong development partnership. The Report finds that significant 
steps are being taken to enhance country ownership, but various processes continue to weaken country 
ownership in LDCs. This is having adverse consequences on development effectiveness. The Report 
identifies some practical measures, including the adoption of aid management policies by the LDCs, 
which could help rectify this situation, ensuring better outcomes and more balance in the terms of 
development partnership. 
FRONT COVER
The front cover shows a farmer transplanting rice near Dhaka, Bangladesh. More than two 
thirds of the population of LDCs lives in rural areas and therefore agriculture is essential for 
their livelihood. However, most farmers in these countries work with rudimentary instruments 
on small patches of land. Their productivity is very low and therefore they earn very little and 
most of them live in poverty. The global food crisis of 2007–2008 has hit LDCs harder than 
other countries because most LDCs are net food importers and a majority of households are 
net buyers of food, even in rural areas. Higher food prices thus hinder progress towards the 
reduction of poverty and hunger for the majority of the population.
The photograph was taken by John Isaac in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and is available from United 
Nations Photo (# 56961, at www.unmultimedia.org/photo). 
